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Evstigneeva

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2020-08-10
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2023-12-29
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un-security-council

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  1. We believe that a settlement in the Sudan would also help to create conditions conducive to advancing cooperation on the Abyei issue, especially since both countries recently demonstrated earnest intentions to develop their dialogue on Abyei, including by establishing mutually beneficial cooperation on the joint exploitation of the disputed Area’s potential oil resources. The summit of the leaders of the Sudan and South Sudan and the meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, both held in January in Juba, served to reaffirm their commitment to working together on border issues. We commend the determination of both countries to develop a strategy for working with local communities living along the common border to restore the normal functioning of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, including in Gok Machar.

    2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source

  2. We welcome the participation in today’s meeting of Mr. Al-Harith Idriss Al-Harith Mohamed and Mr. Akuei Bona Malwal, the Permanent Representatives of the Sudan and South Sudan. We very much appreciate the joint efforts deployed by the leadership of South Sudan and other regional players aimed at ensuring a swift cessation of the hostilities in the Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. We note in particular the work of the South Sudan authorities in hosting Sudanese refugees on their territory and their willingness to assist in resolving the humanitarian crisis in the region.

    2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source

  3. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): At the outset, we would like to wish everyone in the Chamber a happy 9 May, which is Victory Day. On this momentous occasion, we pay our profound respects and extend our deepest recognition to all whose unparalleled feats on the battlefield and selfless labour on the home front enabled the defeat of Nazism. Were it not for this day, the founding of the United Nations would not have happened. We believe that the legacy of the great victory will continue to contribute to strengthening and building productive relations among nations and peoples on a basis of respect for the principles of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples. We thank Assistant Secretary-General Martha Pobee and Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa Hanna Tetteh for their briefings.

    2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source

  4. There are no more names on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 8.55 p.m.

    2023-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9310 (2023) · source

  5. In conclusion, we wish to reaffirm the unwavering readiness of the Russian Federation to continue to provide assistance to a friendly Sudan, successfully overcome the current difficulties and return to a path of peace and sustainable development. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I give the floor to the representative of the Sudan.

    2023-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9310 (2023) · source

  6. We fully support those colleagues who today spoke about the unacceptable nature of any external interference in the sovereign affairs of the Sudan that could add fuel to the fire. Such interference could turn the country into a platform for geopolitical plays, in particular those provocations that are being carried out by Western media at the moment. We are certain that citizens of the Sudan can and must resolve their domestic problems themselves. They are fully able to do this and decide who is a friend and who is not. We call on the warring parties to demonstrate political will and undertake immediate steps for a cessation of hostilities. We believe that any disagreement can be resolved around the negotiation table.

    2023-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9310 (2023) · source

  7. We note the mediation work carried out with the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, as well as neighbouring countries. We note the agreement reached over the weekend on a ceasefire that will allow for the general fighting in the Sudanese capital to be less intense. However, it has not been able to stop the fighting completely. Regional players should be provided with the necessary space and time. It is critically important not to repeat the experience of Libya, where African political efforts were haughtily cast aside, and Western countries’ use of force wreaked havoc on the country and destabilized half of the continent. It is important that all mediators act in a united manner in order to calm the situation independent of their possible national interests.

    2023-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9310 (2023) · source

  8. As a result, the imposition of so-called democracy through pressure and blackmail caused the fragile stability in the country to be sacrificed. This has been disappointing to see in the context of activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS), which very recently reported to the Security Council on its achievements (see S/PV.9289). On many occasions, we drew attention to the fact that UNITAMS should not focus its efforts only on one objective, namely, seeking an ultimate agreement, while also ignoring a whole host of issues in its mandate. As a result, the crisis in the Sudan caught everyone off guard. In the region, efforts to reconcile parties are continuing.

    2023-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9310 (2023) · source

  9. Security sector reform in the country was one of the most complex issues, requiring increased attention and a painstaking negotiation process. However, what have observed that many external players artificially forced through a process for the transfer of authority to civilian forces and imposed a great many decisions that were not accepted by vast swathes of the population. A host of countries trumpeted the Sudan political framework agreement of 5 December 2022, but it did not turn out to be an inclusive platform for the various Sudanese forces. Several political heavyweights were left out of this format, which made it unlikely to foster a comprehensive resolution. The provision of sorely needed international assistance to the country was directly tied to the transfer of authority to a civilian Government.

    2023-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9310 (2023) · source

  10. We welcome the efforts of all Sudanese forces that are working to ensure the safe evacuation of people who wish to leave the country and the responsible approach shown by the Sudan’s neighbours, which are providing support to this process. We must state that the current crisis in the Sudan is to a large extent due to external interference in its sovereign affairs as well as attempts to engage in political engineering and impose democratic formulae on the country. The political situation in the Sudan was difficult from the very beginning. Sudanese political forces were fragmented, and their cooperation was under colossal pressure due to historic, ethnic, economic and other factors. This is also true of the relationship between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces.

    2023-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9310 (2023) · source

  11. The Russian Federation is deeply concerned by the clashes in the Sudan since 15 April between regular Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. We have been following developments very closely. The humanitarian situation is deteriorating, and in many regions of the country there are shortages of food and medicines. Attacks on diplomatic mission staff and representatives of international organizations accredited in Khartoum are particularly alarming. We agree that the relevant task today is to carry out evacuations from combat zones. We underscore that it is not only United Nations staff and Western nationals who are in dire straits in Khartoum but also other foreigners and Sudanese people themselves, whose problems deserve equal attention.

    2023-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9310 (2023) · source

  12. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation. We are grateful to the Secretary-General for his brief introductory statement at our meeting today, and we listened very carefully to the briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Volker Perthes, and by the representative of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Ms. Joyce Msuya. We are also grateful to the head of the African Union Mission to the United Nations, Ms. Fatima Mohammed, for her participation in today’s meeting, as well as that of the Permanent Representative of the Sudan, Mr. Al-Harith Idriss Al-Harith Mohamed, and other representatives of countries of the region.

    2023-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9310 (2023) · source

  13. I thank Ms. Mohammed for her briefing. Unfortunately, the video link with Mr. Ismael Wais of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development was interrupted. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

    2023-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9310 (2023) · source

  14. Ismael Wais, Intergovernmental Authority on Development Special Envoy. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I warmly welcome the Secretary-General, Mr. António Guterres, and give him the floor.

    2023-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9310 (2023) · source

  15. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Sudan and the Sudan to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Volker Perthes, Special Representative of the Secretary- General and Head of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan; Ms. Joyce Msuya, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; Ms. Fatima Kyari Mohammed, Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations and Mr.

    2023-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9310 (2023) · source

  16. We note the important role played in alleviating the humanitarian consequences of the crisis by the entities of the United Nations system, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Programme, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and others. In conclusion, I would like to commend the continued work of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on its preparations for the holding of general elections in December. We hope that Kinshasa, with the support of MONUSCO and regional assistance, will be able to ensure conditions for elections that meet international standards and the aspirations of all Congolese citizens.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  17. We look forward to greater coordination between the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Mission, as well as with other regional and national institutions involved in resolving the conflict, in order to work more effectively to protect the population of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. With regard to the implementation of the joint transition plan for the phased drawdown of the Mission and its withdrawal from the country by 2024, we believe that we must take into account above all the development of the situation on the ground, and react to that in a gradual and responsible manner.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  18. We offer our condolences to the Republic of South Africa, which lost a peacekeeper in early February. We strongly condemn all attacks and provocations against Blue Helmets and United Nations civilian personnel. We hope that all issues related to providing the Mission with resources — especially logistical resources — will be addressed swiftly and effectively. As a matter of principle, we regard the presence of MONUSCO peacekeepers in the conflict zone as an important stabilizing factor. We believe that the Mission needs to focus on the main tasks under its mandate.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  19. Under the current challenging circumstances at both the international and regional levels, such increased efforts are critical for ensuring the country’s adoption of its own independent foreign and domestic policy; resolving its own complex national issues, which are to a large extent the result of the country’s tragic history; and ensuring its control over its own natural resources for the benefit of the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In that regard, we welcome the lifting last year of the notification requirement for arms imports by the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We reaffirm our principled support for the efforts of MONUSCO and its leadership and peacekeepers. We thank them for their work under difficult conditions and their commitment to the protection of civilians.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  20. We support the work of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, Huang Xia, towards establishing inter-State dialogue in order to reduce tensions in that part of Africa. Political solutions will enable achieving a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and create the conditions necessary for sustainable stabilization. At the same time, we are convinced that Kinshasa must also redouble its efforts with regard to building its own effective armed forces and the reform of the country’s security sector and other State institutions.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  21. We also note the importance of linking and effectively coordinating the Nairobi and Luanda processes in order to create conditions for inter-Congolese dialogue and the restoration of relations between Kinshasa and Kigali. We hope that the understandings reached at the recent summits of the East African Community will contribute to normalizing the situation in the region and returning to the agreed framework, including the implementation of the Luanda road map. We believe that we must continue to work towards the full implementation of the foundational 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes Region.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  22. We are convinced that the current top priority is to achieve a cessation of hostilities and launch an inclusive dialogue among all parties to the conflict. In that regard, we look forward to further effective steps being taken by neighbouring States in the framework of the Luanda and Nairobi processes, which seek to find joint solutions and a sustainable solution to the crisis. We welcome the commitment of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to conducting negotiations with armed groups on the political track of the Nairobi process, another round of which is planned to be held in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We commend the efforts of the countries of the East African Community and the countries that have contributed troops to the EAC regional force.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  23. Its offensives have exacerbated the humanitarian crisis and have increased the number of internally displaced persons and refugees, human rights violations and the daily suffering of civilians. We note with concern that as the Government forces, MONUSCO and the East African Community (EAC) regional force have had to concentrate on containing the advance of the M-23, other groups, in particular the Allied Democratic Forces, the Coopérative pour le développement du Congo, the Mayi-Mayi, the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda and the Résistance pour un État de droit au Burundi, are taking advantage of the situation to strengthen their position in the east. The risk of escalating tensions between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda is of the utmost concern.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  24. We are grateful to the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for their warm welcome and their openness to holding frank and substantive discussions. We believe that it was especially important to be able to visit the eastern part of the country, in particular the city of Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu, in the vicinity of which the situation remains tense. The Council’s visit was particularly timely at this difficult juncture. We are carefully following developments in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We are deeply concerned about the most recent round of the crisis involving the renewed activity of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M-23).

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  25. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General Bintou Keita for her briefing. We also welcome the presence at this meeting of the Permanent Representatives of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi. We are grateful to our colleagues, the Permanent Representatives of Gabon and France, for their briefing (see S/PV.9297) on the visit by the Security Council mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo conducted from 9 to 12 March. We thank the Secretariat and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) for organizing that important trip, which was extremely informative with regard to the processes under way in the country.

    2023-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9298 (2023) · source

  26. We hope that, under the auspices of the Committee, the Panel will continue to fulfil the duties conferred upon it in an impartial manner, including, most important, assisting the Committee in implementing its mandate.

    2023-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9292 (2023) · source

  27. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Russia voted in favour of resolution 2680 (2023), which extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. But at the same time, we find it regrettable that the United States penholder did not incorporate a number of important proposals put forward by our delegation, among others, concerning the need to minimize the unintended adverse impact of sanctions on the population of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as well as to enhance coordination within the Panel and improve its overall functioning. We believe that those issues need to be carefully considered and addressed in the future.

    2023-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9292 (2023) · source

  28. We support Khartoum’s request for a review of the outdated Security Council sanctions, which is also echoed in the consolidated position of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the League of Arab States and the regional Group of African States here in New York. We continue to believe that the current situation in Darfur demands that the restrictions imposed 18 years ago should be lifted immediately. We hope that the issue will be resolved as quickly as possible, in line with resolution 2676 (2023), adopted this month. In conclusion, we would like to reiterate the Russian Federation’s firm willingness to continue to help our friends in the Sudan overcome their current difficulties and return to a path of sustainable development.

    2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source

  29. In general, we feel compelled to conclude that so far the results of UNITAMS’s activities in implementing its mandate have not fully lived up to our expectations. The Mission’s main efforts are concentrated only in one area, and its annual reports suffer from unbalanced assessments. Meanwhile, the Sudanese vision of the situation is being largely ignored. We commend the efforts by the Sudanese leadership to stabilize the situation in Darfur and implement the Juba Peace Agreement. Given the periodic outbreaks of intertribal violence, we hope the central and local authorities will continue to take every possible measure to respond to them expeditiously.

    2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source

  30. We are convinced that the Sudanese citizens are more than capable and should resolve their domestic issues themselves. The prolonged period of internal political turbulence and the renewed outbursts of violence have had a negative impact on the socioeconomic situation. A significant part of the Sudan’s population lives below the poverty line, and there are food shortages in the country. In that connection, the issue of the international community’s ability to honour its commitments to providing financial assistance is particularly relevant. We call on the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) to finally engage seriously in unblocking international assistance without any preconditions. We think the efforts to tie the issue to the country’s transfer of power to a civilian Government are hypocritical.

    2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source

  31. We believe that pushing the current political process forward artificially is unlikely to help to promote a comprehensive settlement. In order to achieve a sustainable solution, inter-Sudanese dialogue should be based on the principle of inclusiveness, which implies the involvement of all influential political forces and ethno-religious groups, including regional leaders with authority. We call on the tripartite mechanism of the United Nations, the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development to continue efforts in support of the drafting of a constitutional document that could unite the entire country. We believe that any kind of external interference in the affairs of the friendly country of the Sudan is counterproductive and unacceptable.

    2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source

  32. We welcome the Sudanese leadership’s willingness to cooperate constructively with the various components of civil society, which made it possible to sign the political framework agreement on 5 December 2022 with the participation of the faction of the former ruling coalition — the Forces for Freedom and Change — Central Council. We note the ongoing discussions in the country on outstanding issues, including with the support of the States of the region. We hope that such efforts will have a stabilizing effect on the situation in the country. At the same time, we note that the political framework agreement did not include a number of significant players in the country’s political arena, who continue to reject it.

    2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source

  33. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to Special Representative Perthes for the update on developments with respect to the situation in the Sudan. We have taken note of the 90-day report of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), concerning the Sudan, submitted by the Permanent Representative of Ghana (see S/PV.9288). We also welcome the participation in today’s meeting of the Permanent Representative of the Sudan. We are closely following developments with respect to the situation in the Sudan. The Sudanese political landscape remains fragile, with many different possible scenarios of further development.

    2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9289 (2023) · source

  34. The Security Council cannot simply be a one-sided game, where we only hear from one side of the street. The Russian-Chinese draft resolution and the proposals that we submit to the Security Council are specifically geared towards arriving at a political settlement. It is a diplomatic path consisting of constructive steps, which Washington is constantly trying to block.

    2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9287 (2023) · source

  35. At the same time, with their rhetoric, the United States and its allies are completely turning everything upside down with respect to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, when they say that their policy is not hostile. Previously, we had heard that NATO itself was merely a defensive alliance, and that Iraq allegedly possessed weapons of mass destruction, under which pretext, the country was transformed into a land on fire. For, in reality, it will turn out the same way for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: notwithstanding what is currently being said in the Security Council Chamber, similar plans are being laid with respect to the Democratic People’s Republic. In fact, the Democratic People’s Republic has been advancing calls for a political and diplomatic resolution, but they have been completely disregarded.

    2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9287 (2023) · source

  36. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): It was also interesting for me to listen to the views set out by the representative of the United States of America about Washington and its allies allegedly not nurturing any hostile plans directed against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Exercises are allegedly being carried out routinely, but it is also alleged that they are in no way in response to the launches carried out by the Democratic People’s Republic. It is unclear why, then, and in response to what, those exercises are being carried out. This military activity is unprecedented in nature. Let us recall that those same exercises — the Ssangyong exercises — had not been carried out for five years, so they cannot be labelled routine.

    2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9287 (2023) · source

  37. The Russian- Chinese draft political and humanitarian resolution of the Security Council is still on the table. The adoption of that draft resolution could truly contribute to Council efforts to resolve the current difficult situation on the Korean peninsula.

    2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9287 (2023) · source

  38. Attempts to provide any degree of legitimacy to such restrictions through the authority of the Security Council or the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) are unacceptable. We recall that Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — and we heard today calls on the need to comply with them — provide for a search for a political and diplomatic solution. Those specific provisions remain unfulfilled. We note once again that Russia is committed to the full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions. In that regard, we draw attention to the Russian-Chinese plan of action for a comprehensive settlement of the situation on the Korean peninsula. The plan spells out concrete measures to be taken in various areas by the States involved.

    2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9287 (2023) · source

  39. Such aspirations give rise to clear concerns — not only for Pyongyang, but also for other countries of the region. Obviously, attempts to increase sanctions pressure on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea do not help matters either. For many years, we have been highlighting the need to end this policy, which is a dead end in form, and inhuman in substance. However, the negative aggregate effects of international and unilateral restrictive measures continue to accumulate, exacerbating the plight of the North Korean population. We would note, in particular, that unilateral restrictions not only violate the sovereignty and legitimate interests of Member States, but also contradict the norms and rules of international trade and undermine the integrity of the restrictions agreed upon by the Security Council.

    2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9287 (2023) · source

  40. It is futile to expect Pyongyang to respond positively to stepped-up pressure, the threat of sanctions spirals or empty promises. The situation on the Korean peninsula cannot be considered in isolation from other processes in the Asia-Pacific region either. In parallel with proactive efforts to step up the military capabilities of the United States-allied countries of North-East Asia, we note Washington’s persistent advancement of its unilateral security doctrine in the Asia-Pacific region, the establishment of new blocs, such as the unification of the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, also known as AUKUS, whereby nuclear-powered submarines are transferred to a non-nuclear State. That has a devastating impact and has resulted in the emergence of artificial dividing lines in that part of the world.

    2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9287 (2023) · source

  41. We note once again that there is no alternative to a multilateral political and diplomatic process aimed at creating a system of peace in North-East Asia that would take into account the legitimate concerns of all — and I stress “all” — the States of the region and at providing them with reliable security assurances. Otherwise, the situation concerning the Korean peninsula will remain locked in a vicious circle. Let us recall that, in the past, Washington and its allies essentially disregarded the steps taken by Pyongyang in 2018 and 2019. The implementation of those measures could have led to a fundamental improvement in the situation in the subregion. The subsequent repeated calls by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for the United States to cease hostile activities and to refrain from escalating pressure also went unheeded.

    2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9287 (2023) · source

  42. Yet, we continue to hear more and more bellicose rhetoric, while the intensity of the military manoeuvres conducted by the United States and its allies continues undiminished. Indeed, the United States-South Korean Freedom Shield exercise began on 13 March, along with a whole series of field manoeuvres, and next week we expect to see the first United States-South Korean Ssangyong exercise in five years, involving naval and air forces. It is especially troubling that those exercises are being officially presented as evidence of “the will of the South Korean- American alliance to achieve peace through strength”. After hearing such statements, it is clear what path those countries have embraced and what calls from the Security Council now for the resumption of talks are worth. The measures actually taken highlight the opposite.

    2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9287 (2023) · source

  43. Only that kind of approach, which pays due attention to both the long-standing issues and the most recent actions of all the parties involved, will facilitate a truly constructive discussion. In that connection, we must once again highlight the particular responsibility of Washington and its allies, who have set out to impose sanctions and forceful pressure on Pyongyang based on the concept of so-called extended deterrence. That has already led to a sharp increase in military activity in North-East Asia, which clearly serves only to deter a political and diplomatic settlement of the problems of the Korean peninsula and to contradict the declared objectives of the members of the Council.

    2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9287 (2023) · source

  44. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Assistant Secretary-General Jenča for his briefing. Our position is well known: Russia opposes any military activity that threatens the security of the Korean peninsula and the countries of North-East Asia. We continue to expect that the current trend towards escalation will be replaced by a search for a negotiated de-escalation. In that regard, we call for restraint and practical steps to resume dialogue. With regard to the regular discussion of the situation on the Korean peninsula in the Security Council, we would like to emphasize once again the need to take into account all the factors relevant to that situation.

    2023-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9287 (2023) · source

  45. When providing assistance with reforms, it is important for the various stakeholders to coordinate their efforts to ensure that the reforms and the training of personnel are based on the same approaches and principles throughout the country. And of course the international community must understand that complex processes — especially in post-conflict environments — such as reform of the security sector and the rule of law require painstaking effort, patience and a sufficiently long period of time to ensure their full restoration and functioning.

    2023-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9285 (2023) · source

  46. We note the special role within the United Nations system played by the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, which provides assistance to United Nations missions on the ground and to States at their request. We also note the role of the Peacebuilding Commission in post-conflict recovery and in security sector reform in particular. Developing a comprehensive approach to consultative and financial support for post- conflict countries significantly improves the reliability, accountability and professionalism of national security structures. We should not underestimate the potential of the Peacebuilding Fund as a flexible instrument for financing projects in the area of security sector reform.

    2023-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9285 (2023) · source

  47. Timely financial support makes it possible to better address existing and emerging challenges, but obviously the allocation of funds must be long-term and sustainable. The United Nations, above all through its peacekeeping and special political missions, plays an important role in providing appropriate international assistance to States. For example, many early peacebuilding issues are now included in the multidimensional mandates of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeepers play a key role in supporting security sector reform, as well as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and in restoring law-enforcement bodies and the rule of law in general.

    2023-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9285 (2023) · source

  48. All of these issues can lead to a reluctance to accept innovations and in the worst-case scenario to the undermining of agreements previously reached, further fragmentation of the security sector and relapses into conflict. There is no question that security sector reform should be carried out in the context of broader reconstruction processes and include comprehensive efforts on the political and socioeconomic tracks. Only a holistic approach can give rise to a hopeful and lasting peace and security and ensure a sustainable outcome. Security sector reform is a resource-intensive process in itself, and it is often closely linked to the equally complex process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

    2023-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9285 (2023) · source

  49. We agree with the Mozambican presidency’s concept note (S/2023/168) that proposals on security sector reform should not be based on provisions hastily inserted into agreements that do not take into account broader political arrangements on power-sharing and the historical and country-specific context for the formation of armed forces and security bodies, or that are derived from externally imposed prescriptions. We often see rigid timelines imposed by donors or formulaic approaches undermining the fragile process of building State institutions for maintaining security. Sanctions, including those authorized by the Security Council, should never get in the way of reform processes.

    2023-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9285 (2023) · source

  50. National ownership is critical to the legitimacy, sustainability and effectiveness of such reform programmes. However, even minimal progress in transforming the security sector can bolster citizens’ trust in the authorities, as well as create conditions conducive to a return to normalcy, a peaceful social and economic life and a safe education. Unfortunately, in many cases post-conflict countries are not in a condition to maintain their security and restore viable and effective State institutions without external support. In such situations, the international community’s assistance is especially important and should be based on fundamental principles that include the consent of the host country and respect for its national sovereignty and political independence.

    2023-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9285 (2023) · source