YouSaid · the spoken record

Evstigneeva

lines on the record: 1,001
first: 2020-08-10
most recent: 2023-12-29
sittings or episodes: 153
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“We are concerned about the reports of continued outbreaks of violence in some peripheral areas of South Sudan, with localized clashes and intercommunal armed conflicts that have provoked fresh flows of refugees and displaced civilians. The clashes among the various opposition groups are also worrisome. We strongly condemn all violations of the peace agreement and acts of violence against civilians, including humanitarian workers. We take note of the response measures undertaken by the Government. We commend the mediation efforts of the African Union and States members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and look forward to the continuation of the important work of the Community of Sant’Egidio to bring new groups back to a path of dialogue. We urge all non-signatories to the peace agreement to join the peace process.”
2023-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9353 (2023) · source
“We agree on the need to accelerate those processes and to abide by the previously agreed timelines. However, all of that demands broader support for Juba. We continue to view as a priority the targeted efforts of the South Sudanese authorities to form a unified armed force of South Sudan as a guarantor for the further advancement of the peace process and the successful holding of the general elections. We note that phase I of establishing a unified army has been completed and agreement reached on the mid-level command structure and a budget for the deployment of military graduates. However, the launch of phase II remains stalled.”
2023-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9353 (2023) · source
“Against that background, we welcome the political and diplomatic efforts that President Salva Kiir Mayardit has made since the start of the confrontation in the Sudan. Juba, along with the other capitals in the region, is well aware of the complicated political dynamics in the country, and that is an essential factor in the quest for a path to resolving the issue. Despite the situation’s complexity, the Government has been able to make progress in its State-building process and in implementing its commitments under the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and the associated road map. We note the productive work of Parliament, the launch of the preparations for the elections to be held in December 2024 and the work done on the Constitution.”
2023-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9353 (2023) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Nicholas Haysom, and the interim Chairperson of the reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, Mr. Charles Tai Gituai, for their briefings. We are also grateful to Mr. Marco Impagliazzo, President of the Community of Sant’Egidio, for his report, and we welcome the participation in today’s meeting of Mr. Akuei Bona Malwal, Permanent Representative of South Sudan to the United Nations. South Sudan is currently going through a difficult time. The conflict in its neighbour the Sudan is having a palpable impact on the situation, leading to various serious problems. The number of refugees and South Sudanese returnees is nearing 90,000 and is putting an additional heavy burden on the country.”
2023-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9353 (2023) · source
“However, we are convinced that the key role in crisis prevention and conflict resolution must be played by the States of the region themselves, with the necessary support from the international community, fully respecting their sovereignty, independence and the decisions they take — in deed, not just in word.”
2023-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9338 (2023) · source
“We are concerned about the serious humanitarian situation in the subregion, where experts have recorded a large number of refugees, internally displaced persons and people in need of humanitarian assistance of some kind. We are aware of the gravity of the situation in the Sudan and of the conflict-related risks and difficulties for neighbouring States. There is a new flow of refugees. According to the most recent United Nations data, Chad alone has already hosted more than 100,000 people. International support to the States in the subregion must be increased, in line with growing needs. The challenges faced by the countries of the subregion are complex.”
2023-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9338 (2023) · source
“With the support of our partners, including the Russian Federation, the Central African authorities have managed to overcome the most difficult phase in the fight against those who sought to achieve an unconstitutional change of Government by armed force. We appreciate the cooperation with the Central African Republic, and we will continue to help Bangui to combat the insurgency and extend the State’s presence throughout the country with the aim of reaching a final settlement. We call for the Security Council to take more decisive steps in July aimed at completely lifting the arms embargo on the Central African Republic, which we feel is essential to strengthening the country’s defence capabilities. The African Union and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region are unequivocally in favour of lifting the restrictions.”
2023-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9338 (2023) · source
“We are concerned about the continuing attacks on commercial vessels in the Gulf of Guinea. It is important to mobilize the international community’s resources in order to build the capacity of coastal States to combat piracy, especially in light of their current lack of naval capacity. We are monitoring developments in Cameroon, where the problems faced by the Anglophone provinces are rooted in the colonial period. It will be crucial to ensure that they refrain from violence and find solutions through negotiations. We are also watching the situation in Chad in relation to its transitional institution-building process and the implementation of the recommendations resulting from its national dialogue. We are closely following developments in the Central African Republic.”
2023-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9338 (2023) · source
“We note the increased capacity of illegal armed groups to enhance their organizational structure, enabling them to plan and conduct military operations, prepare terrorist attacks, carry out kidnappings, conduct surveillance and information-gathering, select and train recruits and manufacture improvised explosive devices. Effective counter-terrorism requires systematic and collective efforts. We attached great importance to the large-scale operation conducted last year by the Multinational Joint Task Force of the countries of the Lake Chad basin to eliminate terrorists from islands along the borders of Chad, the Niger and Nigeria. We believe it is vital to further strengthen cooperation among the States of the region both bilaterally and through various international platforms, including the United Nations.”
2023-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9338 (2023) · source
“The level of terrorist threats in Central Africa is high, as are social and political tensions. The armed forces of the States of the subregion have to contend with illegal armed groups on a daily basis. The situation is exacerbated by highly porous borders and inadequate resources for effective border control, enabling illegal armed groups to conduct cross-border raids. In the Lake Chad basin, Islamic State West Africa Province and Boko Haram are particularly active and have extended their reach into parts of Nigeria, Chad, the Niger and Cameroon. They are terrorizing local populations, forcing them to coexist and sometimes collaborate with them. The ideology of radical Islam is becoming increasingly popular as it is being widely disseminated by terrorists, especially among young people.”
2023-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9338 (2023) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. Abdou Abarry, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Da Piedade Veríssimo, President of the Commission of the Economic Community of Central African States, and Ms. Marie Tamoifo for their detailed briefings. Russia has always supported the work of the United Nations Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) in strengthening peace and security in the region, and considers UNOCA a key instrument of international preventive diplomacy. We note that the good offices of the Special Representative are in high demand in the subregion and that mediation efforts are under way in close contact with the parties in problematic areas, as well as in coordination with regional mechanisms and organizations.”
2023-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9338 (2023) · source
“When working on Council documents, we are defending that and consider even the slightest deviation from that to be unacceptable.”
2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9337 (2023) · source
“We call on the United Nations to pay special attention to providing humanitarian assistance to the Sudan and neighbouring States in strict compliance with the relevant guiding principles enshrined in General Assembly resolution 46/182. In that regard, when discussing press statement SC/15305, which we also adopted today, we were concerned by the attempts to question those foundational principles. External interference in the sovereign affairs of the Sudan is unacceptable, and we regret the fact that a clear signal on that, which was agreed by the African Union, was not reflected in the Security Council’s reaction to the situation in the country. Moreover, we would like to reiterate our commitment to the national unity of the Sudan.”
2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9337 (2023) · source
“We support national and regional efforts to settle the situation and ensure a ceasefire. We believe that a technical rollover of the mandate of UNITAMS in this situation is the only correct thing to do. We believe that, in its future activities, the Mission, which operates at the invitation of the Sudan, will take into account the opinion of the host country and listen to its concerns, without which the effective fulfilment of the mandate will be impossible. We expect that, once the acute phase of the conflict is over, the Security Council will be able to return to discussing the parameters of the United Nations presence that the country needs.”
2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9337 (2023) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation voted in favour of resolution 2685 (2023) on a six-month technical rollover of the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) prepared by the United Kingdom. The situation in the Sudan remains worrisome. On 15 April, the conflict started between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces began, and it has not subsided. The humanitarian situation is very difficult. Further escalation could worsen the security risks within the Sudan and destabilize neighbouring countries, which are themselves very vulnerable. We urge the Sudanese parties to demonstrate political will and wisdom and to take immediate steps to end the armed confrontation.”
2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9337 (2023) · source
“We call on Washington to undertake specific steps to lower tensions and resume dialogue instead of trying to shift responsibility to other countries. We remain convinced that the Security Council can also play a positive role if its discussions are constructive and comprehensive and the proposed products seek genuinely positive results. In that regard, we note the Russian-Chinese draft of a political and humanitarian resolution, which remains on the table.”
2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9336 (2023) · source
“In that regard, we again draw the Council’s attention to the Russian-Chinese action plan for a comprehensive settlement of the situation on the Korean peninsula. That plan includes concrete steps by the States involved in various areas. Obviously, it would require a mutually respectful dialogue that takes into account the legitimate concerns and rights of all States involved, including, obviously, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We note the readiness for dialogue pointed out by the United States representative, but we are not certain that Washington is genuinely ready to have a constructive discussion with Pyongyang. That can be seen in the history of American diplomacy in the Korean dossier over the past decades, as well as through the practical steps undertaken by the United States.”
2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9336 (2023) · source
“Russia has consistently spoken out against any military activity that threatens the security of the Korean peninsula and that of the countries of Northeast Asia. Similarly, we also oppose the dead-end and inhumane policy of increasing sanctions pressure. Separately, we note that unilateral restrictions not only trample on the sovereignty and legitimate interests of Member States and run counter to the norms and rules of international trade, but they also undermine the integrity of restrictions agreed by the Security Council. I once again recall that the Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea seek to find ways to resolve the situation on the Korean peninsula through political and diplomatic means. As we can see, there is no acceptable alternative.”
2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9336 (2023) · source
“They are called “combined annihilation firepower drills”. And, as was also the case in spring and earlier United States-South Korea military exercises, they were unprecedented in scale. It is evident that such actions do not contribute to the de-escalation of tensions in the subregion, and the situation, as we have stated time and time again, continues to follow a vicious circle. Such actions are destabilizing — not only for the situation in North-East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. Its continued militarization and undisguised attempts to create new demarcation lines there have a negative impact on global stability. Another example of that is the recent United States-South Korean agreements on the use of nuclear weapons, which will only further escalate tensions and provoke an arms race.”
2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9336 (2023) · source
“We have repeatedly pointed out the root cause of the current spiralling tensions — the desire of the United States and its allies to increase pressure on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea within the framework of the concept of the so-called “extended deterrence”. The extremely negative consequences of continued military exercises in the subregion should already be obvious to everyone, but Washington has no intention of slowing down there. On 25 May, the United States and South Korea conducted live-fire drills not far from the border with North Korea, in which, according to media reports, 2,500 troops and about 610 weapons systems, including fighter jets, attack helicopters, drones, tanks and artillery, took part. Moreover, those exercises are only the first of a series planned to be completed before mid-June.”
2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9336 (2023) · source
“The Russian Federation has consistently advocated a comprehensive consideration of the situation on the Korean peninsula in the Security Council and ensuring that all factors impacting the situation be considered in a balanced manner. Attempts to paint a one-sided picture of events, as we saw today on the part of some of the delegations, are, in our view, very counterproductive and at variance with the goals with which the Security Council members are entrusted, namely, to be impartial and objective when reacting to threats to international peace and security. They only take us further away from resolving all of the issues on the Korean peninsula. Recently, the situation in the subregion has deteriorated significantly.”
2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9336 (2023) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We listened to the statement by Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, and we are surprised that neither today nor in the statement made by the Secretary-General related to the launch did we hear a single word about the fact that the growing military activity by the United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan in North-East Asia is having a destructive influence on the region. That is obvious, yet, at the same time, that important circumstance is fully ignored by the Secretariat. The Secretariat should adopt an impartial and objective stance. Other unrelated topics, such as, for example, the accusations concerning the cyberactivity of Pyongyang were mentioned in the briefing.”
2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9336 (2023) · source
“In the coming year, we will of course continue to closely monitor IRINI’s work, particularly in terms of its compliance with the law of the sea and relevant Security Council resolutions. Moreover, it therefore logical that it is hardly advisable to leave the practical aspects of maintaining regional security to one player alone. The not-entirely-successful experience of IRINI merely reaffirms the fundamental importance of establishing effective and genuinely multilateral formats in order to arrive at sustainable solutions to the pressing issues of Libya and the Mediterranean region as a whole. The meeting rose at 10.10 a.m. 2/223-15692”
2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9335 (2023) · source
“The few incidents that have been triumphantly announced by the leadership of the operation raise many questions, primarily because of the hasty conclusions drawn about the military nature of the cargo inspected. This year the situation has not improved: the former Jamahiriya is still awash in weapons. Mention should also be made of the selective nature of the IRINI inspections, as a result of which potential violators of the arms embargo have little to fear from this naval presence. Despite the statistics provided, the actions of European seafarers remain largely opaque. It seems that our EU colleagues are motivated by a desire to formally register their presence in the region and to privatize efforts to promote compliance with the Libyan arms embargo in the public arena.”
2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9335 (2023) · source
“We were convinced of the importance of the operation of the inspection mechanism to the situation in Libya and hoped that such measures could contribute to reducing illicit arms trafficking on the territory of that North African country. However, the opportunities offered by the special inspection regime have become effectively locked up by one regional organization: the European Union (EU). We are forced to note that the activities of its IRINI naval operation have not brought about practical results in terms of stabilizing the situation on the ground. It is difficult to say that there have been any unequivocally successful interceptions of contraband for the duration of the IRINI period.”
2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9335 (2023) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I would like to begin my statement by congratulating the delegation of the United Arab Emirates on beginning their presidency of the Security Council. We would like to thank the delegation of Switzerland for their able leadership of the Council last month. Just as it did last year, the Russian Federation abstained in the voting on the Security Council resolution prepared by France and Malta on the extension of a special inspection regime in the high seas off the coast of Libya to implement the arms embargo (resolution 2684 (2023)). We would like to recall once again that Russia, along with other members of the Security Council, was at the origin of that regime.”
2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9335 (2023) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The statement made by the representative of France is yet more proof of what I said in my earlier statement. It is well known that the international community to which our Western colleagues refer includes only themselves, and that they are never to blame for anything. Indeed, all they do is bring “peace” and “democracy” to the world. Such endeavours have never resulted in stability, however, That is the way that “peace” and “democracy” have been brought to Libya, Somalia and many other parts of the world. As regards France’s efforts on “peace” and “economic development” in Africa, volumes have been written about that already.”
2023-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9326 (2023) · source
“With regard to the future work of UNITAMS, we believe that given the current situation on the ground, now is not the time to complicate the parameters of United Nations assistance. The current mandate could be technically extended, and the main role delegated to national and regional efforts. It could then be revisited after the acute phase is over. Providing humanitarian assistance to the Sudanese population and to the neighbouring countries that have generously opened their borders will be crucial.”
2023-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9326 (2023) · source
“For its part, Russia, for which the Sudan has always been a friendly country, is maintaining contact with the Sudanese parties. If needed and requested, we stand ready to assist them, but we will not interfere in the country’s internal affairs. The Russian embassy in Khartoum is continuing its work despite serious security threats. At this point, it will be critical to ensure that all the mediators work in a concerted manner, regardless of their potential national interests. We hope that the measures being taken will create the necessary conditions for stabilizing the situation in the country and relaunching an inclusive political process. Attempts to influence the situation by force, including through illegitimate unilateral coercive measures, are counterproductive.”
2023-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9326 (2023) · source
“We believe that any disagreement can be resolved at the negotiating table, and the Sudanese have the wisdom and political experience they need to do that. We welcome regional efforts to help the Sudan. We need to give them space and time, consult with countries of the region and support the steps they take. We must ensure that there is no repetition of the experiences in Libya, where forceful intervention led the country to catastrophe and has destabilized half the continent. We believe that the signing of the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of the Sudan and the agreement on a seven-day humanitarian truce by representatives of the army leadership and the Rapid Support Forces is a step in the right direction.”
2023-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9326 (2023) · source
“We continue to believe that the Sudanese people should be fully granted the right not only to make decisions about their own and their country’s future but also to take full responsibility for them. Many of the structural problems of Sudanese society have their roots in the legacy of colonialism and are related to the process of consolidating a unified State. That discussion is beyond the scope of the current crisis and represents a long- term effort, but if we fail to address it, sustainable stability in the country will be difficult to achieve. We call on the Sudanese parties to demonstrate the necessary political will and take immediate steps to definitively end the armed confrontation.”
2023-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9326 (2023) · source
“Instead of enabling a genuinely Sudanese-owned and Sudanese-led political process to take place, hasty measures have been imposed on the country that are neither based on the national political culture nor broadly accepted by the population. Unfortunately, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) also forced the process of the transfer of power to civilians. We have repeatedly pointed out that the efforts to attract international financial assistance for the much-needed social and economic stabilization of the country have been inadequate. On the contrary, in fact, the country has been deprived of that assistance as a form of punishment, making its provision contingent on achieving artificial deadlines and obtaining consent for the adoption of questionable democratizing formulas.”
2023-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9326 (2023) · source
“Any further escalation of the situation risks exacerbating the security situation in the Sudan itself as well as destabilizing neighbouring countries that are themselves in extremely vulnerable situations. Many are struggling with their own conflicts, receiving international assistance and hosting peacekeeping and special political missions. In order to effectively respond to the current crisis in the Sudan, we must understand its causes and analyse the steps that led to this outbreak of tensions. We believe that to a great extent the conflict is a result of the mismanagement of the political settlement in the Sudan. Much of the responsibility for that lies with the Western countries that have long considered themselves entitled to interfere in the country’s internal affairs.”
2023-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9326 (2023) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. Bankole Adeoye, African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Mr. Workneh Gebeyehu, Executive Secretary of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and Mr. Volker Perthes, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, for their briefings. We also welcome the Permanent Representative of the Sudan, Mr. Al-Harith Idriss Al-Harith Mohamed, to today’s meeting. Russia is deeply concerned about the dangerous dynamics of the situation in Sudan. The 15 April outbreak of hostilities between units of the regular army and the Rapid Support Forces has resulted in many casualties. The humanitarian situation is complex. The numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees are growing.”
2023-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9326 (2023) · source
“We note that sustainable normalization in Iraq continues to be hampered by some countries’ attempts to capitalize on intra-Iraqi disagreements. It is unacceptable to transform the country into an arena for settling political scores and for regional confrontation. We highly appreciate Baghdad’s efforts to build good neighbourly relations and call on the international community to support Iraq’s steps to stabilize the overall regional situation. In conclusion, we would like to reaffirm our commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and stability of Iraq and our unflagging support for the various activities of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, which will turn 20 in August. We support the extension of its mandate, which expires on 31 May.”
2023-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9324 (2023) · source
“According to the Secretary-General’s most recent report (S/2023/340), various provinces of the Republic continue to be targeted by attacks by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant fighters, who are thus destabilizing the already precarious regional security. We are concerned about the military activity in the northern parts of the country, including in the Kurdish Autonomous Region. In that context, we would like to emphasize once again that the remaining challenges and threats can be effectively countered only through the broadest possible coordination of counter-terrorism efforts. At the same time, we continue to maintain that all parties involved in the fight against terrorism in Iraq must respect the sovereignty of the Iraqi State and coordinate their actions with the official authorities.”
2023-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9324 (2023) · source
“We expect that all Iraqi political forces will continue to act responsibly and will strive to resolve existing differences only through constructive dialogue and in the interests of all ethnic and religious communities and social groups. In that context, we support the continuation of substantive negotiations between the federal authorities of Baghdad and the Kurdish Autonomous Region of Iraq on all outstanding disputed issues, primarily in the oil and gas industry. We are convinced that resolving such issues will help to effectively realize the economic potential of the country, for the benefit of the Kurds and the Iraqi people, as a whole.”
2023-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9324 (2023) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I, too, thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert for her detailed briefing on the situation in the Republic of Iraq. We also listened very closely to Ms. Khanim Latif, and we welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of Iraq in today’s meeting. We are closely following the positive trends in the internal political situation in the friendly country of Iraq against the backdrop of the continuing difficult socioeconomic situation. In that regard, we welcome and support the efforts of the Cabinet of Ministers, led by Mr. Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani, to improve the sociopolitical situation in the country, ensuring stability, security and law and order and conducting socioeconomic reforms.”
2023-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9324 (2023) · source
“I ask my colleagues to carefully read the official comments of the Government of Mali on the report on the events in Moura. I urge them to respect the Malian authorities and wait for the results of their national investigation. Meanwhile, we will continue to provide assistance to Bamako, and we will never interfere in the internal affairs of Mali.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“In that regard, we consider the report by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) regarding the events in Moura in March 2022 to be yet another politically motivated attempt to discredit Mali’s efforts to combat extremism. It creates the impression that instead of engaging directly with the Government of Mali, objectively and impartially, to establish the circumstances of what happened in Moura, the OHCHR obediently followed the lead of a number of countries that were demanding instant results. That undoubtedly affected the conduct of the fact-finding investigation, which relied on the testimony of unnamed witnesses and the proverbial tradition of “beyond a reasonable doubt”. Not to mention the fact that none of the experts who prepared the report visited Moura in person.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“All of that engagement is perfectly legitimate and is welcomed by the countries of the region. However, we are not surprised by the repeated attempts to denigrate our efforts to provide assistance to Mali and other countries in the region. That now seems to have become a main theme of the statements delivered in the Council by the representatives of the United States, as well as a favourite topic of America’s so-called free media. We deplore the impact of that on African States, including Mali — which is now facing serious challenges on all fronts, especially in the area of security. Unfortunately, Western States are now using every possible lever at their disposal, including, very regrettably, the levers of the United Nations.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“What is important is moving from words to action as quickly as possible, and the decision at the ECOWAS summit in Abuja on 4 December 2022 to fast-track the mobilization of $1 billion for the implementation of the ECOWAS 2020–2024 action plan on counter-terrorism was aimed at precisely that. Strengthening coordination among the region’s peace and stability structures is a top priority. Russia will continue to participate constructively, including as a permanent member of the Council, in the collective efforts to ensure security in the Sahara-Sahel region. We will also continue to provide bilateral support to the States in the region, including by building the capacity of their armed forces, training their military and law-enforcement personnel and providing humanitarian assistance, as in the past.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“The States of the Sahel should exercise full control — through actions, not words — over their decision-making in the fight against terrorism, because the security situation is hugely significant for every country in the region. When there is a terrorist threat, There are clear military responses that can be made to terrorist threats, and they should be swift. If bilateral agreements between the armed forces of the countries of the region are the most effective way to do that, we can only support them. In such situations, all political considerations, let alone geopolitical considerations, should take a back seat. We commend the commitment of the leading regional associations, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to getting involved in the task of combating the terrorist threat in the Sahara-Sahel.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“Against that backdrop, a complete overhaul of our approach to cooperation in the area of counter-terrorism is required, which we have not seen to date. We are convinced that the lead role in supporting peace and security in the Sahara-Sahel region should be played by the States of the region, with the tangible support of the international community. However, it is worth underscoring that the international assistance provided to the Sahel States should be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States, respect for national sovereignty and the principle of African solutions for African problems.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“France has lost its post-colonial position, and as a result all it can do is pin the blame on someone else. Paris’ intransigent unilateral actions, aimed at effecting regime change in Bamako, continue to cause significant damage to Africa’s collective efforts to achieve stability in the Sahara-Sahel region. The most recent report of the Secretary-General (S/2023/328), which we have all carefully read, includes information on the European Commission’s decision to end the funding provided to the Joint Force by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali for logistical and operational support. We understand the reasons for Mali’s withdrawal from the G-5 Sahel and its Joint Force. As a result, the political and military capacities of the Force have been significantly reduced.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“The activities of Boko Haram cells and those of the Islamic State in West Africa, in particular, are exacerbating the worrisome situation in Nigeria and the Niger. The situation in Burkina Faso and Chad remains extremely unstable. In that context, it is worth recalling that the current high level of threats to security and stability in the Sahara-Sahel region is a direct consequence of Western countries’ military intervention in Libya in 2011 and the subsequent collapse of Libyan statehood. France’s attempts to destabilize the Sahel have not borne fruit. Furthermore, the terrorist threat has increased as a result. On that note, we are not surprised to have heard the representative of France express concern about its inability to rectify the situation in the country.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“The tri-border area of Mali, Burkina Faso and the Niger remains the epicentre of tensions. Militants of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and the Jama‘at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin are highly active in that triangle. The most serious issues are prevalent in Ménaka, Mali, where extremists are fighting for control of the main transportation arteries. It is important for the States of the region to continue to cooperate on security matters. On 24 March, the Niger announced that it would engage in anti-terrorist raids jointly with Mali and is activating its special forces units against the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara in the Hamarat region. Signatories to the Algiers peace agreement are also joining the fight. We can see that the situation is also serious elsewhere in the region.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Assistant Secretary-General Martha Pobee and the Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel), Mr. Eric Tiaré, for their briefings. We also listened very carefully to Ms. Aïssatou Diouf. Terrorism is one of the most pressing pan-African issues. The most complex and serious terrorist threat is in the Sahara-Sahel region. The situation is further compounded by the subversive activities of several extremist groups, against a backdrop of persistent internal political and socioeconomic crises in the States in the region. Terrorist International, which is entrenched in the Sahara-Sahel region, is stepping up its activities and extending its geographical reach, which poses a direct threat to the coastal States of the Gulf of Guinea.”
2023-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9322 (2023) · source
“The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) remains a key factor for ensuring stability in the region. We welcome the role the Blue Helmets are playing in resolving current security problems and the assistance that is being provided through the United Nations peacebuilding programme. The transformation of UNISFA into a multinational mission is almost complete. We expect the mission to continue to carry out its mandate with a clear focus on maintaining security and providing support to both States in their efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution to the border dispute.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source
“We continue to believe that, in order to successfully advance an inter-Sudanese settlement that would determine Abyei’s final status, joint efforts by both parties are needed. We consider unacceptable any unilateral attempts to alter the status of the disputed Area in violation of the existing international legal framework and the agreements signed by the two States. In that connection, it is important that both countries uphold their obligations to support Abyei’s demilitarized status. The state of intercommunal dialogue in the Area is a cause for concern, especially in the light of the ongoing conflict between the Twic Dinka and Ngok Dinka. At the same time, we note the significant steps taken by the South Sudanese authorities aimed at achieving reconciliation between the two communities.”
2023-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9318 (2023) · source