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Evstigneeva

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2020-08-10
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2023-12-29
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un-security-council

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  1. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We note the timely nature of the convening of today’s joint briefing by the three important subsidiary bodies. First of all, we would like to express our gratitude to the Norwegian chairpersonship of the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and to thank Ambassador Trine Heimeback personally for her skilful leadership over the past two years and her willingness to responsibly and constructively address the various issues. We note the work of the 1267 Committee and consider it one of the Council’s most effective mechanisms in counter-terrorism.

    2022-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9201 (2022) · source

  2. In our view, there is only one alternative today — the need to ensure that all parties demonstrate restraint and reaffirm, in practice their readiness to renew dialogue, in line with previous agreements and commitments. The Russian-Chinese draft political and humanitarian resolution remains on the table, as do other initiatives of our countries that could truly encourage the parties to step up their negotiation efforts.

    2022-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9197 (2022) · source

  3. The quest for a political and diplomatic solution is an integral part of the Security Council’s resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Yet here in the Council we are once again limiting ourselves to talking about preventive diplomacy. We have not seen any real steps that go beyond promises on the part of Washington and other Western States to establish substantive dialogue with Pyongyang. We listened carefully to the statement made today by the representative of the United States, but we cannot expect miracles if it all comes down to the United States and its allies expanding military measures and threatening sanctions, policies that only threaten to create further tensions on the peninsula, which could lead to unpredictable and dangerous consequences for the entire North-East Asian region.

    2022-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9197 (2022) · source

  4. It is precisely because of the position of the United States that the Council was unable to marshal the strength to respond appropriately and facilitate a process of détente. We believe that the mechanisms of the United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, should be leveraged to support inter-Korean dialogue and multilateral negotiations rather than becoming an impediment to them. Only then will it be possible to discuss effective solutions to the problems that have accumulated in the region, including the nuclear issue, on the basis of mutually acceptable agreements. A further escalation of sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will go beyond measures to counter its prohibited missile and nuclear programmes and threaten North Korean citizens with unacceptable socioeconomic and humanitarian upheaval.

    2022-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9197 (2022) · source

  5. We cannot ignore Washington’s increasingly aggressive promotion of its unilateral security doctrine in the Asia-Pacific region, which serves only to create artificial divisions in that part of the world. New military blocs are being formed, such as the alliance between the United States, Great Britain and Australia, which raises serious doubts about those States’ good intentions and does not help to establish dialogue. We deeply regret the fact that our Western colleagues have consistently ignored Pyongyang’s repeated calls for the United States to cease its hostile activities, which would create opportunities for dialogue. Pyongyang’s concessions in 2018 and 2019 and the positive signals that it sent were not taken into account.

    2022-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9197 (2022) · source

  6. Irresponsible discussions continue at the leadership level of those countries on deploying United States deterrents, including nuclear deterrents, on the Korean peninsula and in the region. In that regard, it is obvious that Pyongyang’s missile launches are a consequence of the United States’ short- sighted, confrontational military activity in the region of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which is damaging both to its partners in the region and to the situation in North-East Asia as a whole. Moreover, the situation on the Korean peninsula cannot be considered in isolation from the complex processes that are taking place in that part of the world.

    2022-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9197 (2022) · source

  7. It is Washington’s desire to compel Pyongyang into unilateral disarmament with the help of sanctions and forceful pressure. As part of their new concept of extended deterrence, the United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan have significantly increased their military training activities in the region. On the eve of the North Korean launch, the naval forces of the United States and South Korea conducted a training exercise for missile defence systems with the participation of destroyers. At the same time, they carried out exercises with the use of strategic bombers and a simulated strike on North Korean ballistic-missile installations. At the previous meeting of the Council on the matter (see S/PV.9183), we spoke in detail about other large-scale exercises that Washington and its allies conduct in the region.

    2022-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9197 (2022) · source

  8. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, Under- Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, for her briefing. Russia is opposed to any military activity that threatens the security of the Korean peninsula and the countries of North-East Asia. However, we are once again becoming trapped in a vicious circle that is very familiar to us in the context of this issue. The United States and its allies in the region carry out large-scale exercises, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea reacts accordingly, and then we meet here to discuss it all. The problem with that logic is that with each new round, the positions of the parties and their actions become increasingly provocative and dangerous for international peace and security. In our opinion, the reason for the events is clear.

    2022-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9197 (2022) · source

  9. In our view, the resolution adopted today takes another erroneous step in that direction, as it further enshrines on paper the notion that Al-Shabaab is to be dealt with by the Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992), which is in charge of the Somali sanctions regime. That does not take into account the full range of views of States in the region on the matter.

    2022-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9196 (2022) · source

  10. We would like to think that those countries, having endured various crises, will continue to advance wisely and patiently on a path of dialogue and rapprochement. That is the only correct choice and one that Russia respects. We continue to be troubled by the ambivalent approach to Al-Shabaab, which blurs the focus of global counter-terrorism efforts. No one doubts or disputes the truly dangerous nature of that entity and its affiliation with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Al-Qaida, yet for some reason it continues to be kept at a distance from the Committees established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), respectively.

    2022-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9196 (2022) · source

  11. We view the latest broad exemptions from the arms embargo not as a privilege, but rather as a specific tool to help eliminate threats that are common to all. We believe in the importance of ensuring equal and fair conditions for all and maintaining maximum transparency, including regarding supplies designed to ensure the safety and security of foreign military presences in Somalia. We hope that the peoples of the African continent will firmly reject any regression to a colonialist mindset. It is that unfortunate phenomenon, rather than any genuine concern for peace, that explains the unwillingness of a number of Security Council members to exclude questions relating to bilateral relations between Djibouti and Eritrea from the Somali agenda.

    2022-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9196 (2022) · source

  12. While there is no doubt that players outside the region can make a valuable contribution, in the long term, no matter how difficult it may be, the Somalis must learn to counter that threat themselves — albeit not without support and assistance — which will be impossible without resolving their protracted internal conflicts and restoring the country’s unity. Somalia’s neighbours should provide robust foundational support for those processes under the auspices of the African Union and other regional associations. At the same time, against a backdrop of the ongoing internal disunity in Somalia, it is unacceptable that external forces continue to use their paramilitary presence in the country for selfish purposes, benefiting from the country’s unique geographic position and further militarizing the Horn of Africa.

    2022-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9196 (2022) · source

  13. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation abstained in the voting on resolution 2662 (2022), drafted by the United Kingdom, on the extension of the sanctions regime against Somalia, based on our disagreement with a number of its provisions. However, we want to underscore that we welcome the latest step taken in the resolution to ease the arms embargo. We deem it essential to demonstrate to countries under sanctions regimes that the Security Council is receptive to their relevant requests substantiated by the urgent need to strengthen their State authority and national security sectors. Countering terrorism remains a critically important task for Somalia and the entire region, but achieving it is inconceivable until the destructive capacities of Al-Shabaab have been dismantled.

    2022-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9196 (2022) · source

  14. Russia will continue to participate constructively in the collective efforts to ensure stability in the Sahelo-Saharan region and will continue supporting the Sahel on a bilateral basis in order to increase the military preparedness of its armed forces, military personnel in training and law enforcement agents. We will also provide humanitarian assistance, including for education and health care.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  15. In addition, Washington endlessly lectures others about how to run their countries, who they should cooperate with and how they should extract and use their resources, including whom they should sell them to. It acts as if it knows better than the countries of the region how they should govern themselves and how they should deal with their own wealth and resources. Russia will never — and has never — done such a thing on the continent. Our assistance has always had a legitimate basis, in which the interests of the host countries and their populations are an unconditional priority for us.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  16. Unlike its Western counterparts, Russia provides military and technical assistance to Bamako without any political conditions. Our relations are based on the long-standing principle of equitable bilateral cooperation and an understanding of our common goal of combating the global evil of terrorism. Today we have heard, and will probably hear more, attempts to slander my country’s assistance to Mali and other countries in Africa. Stories about Russian mercenaries are being spread by those who have sent their own mercenaries to the continent for many decades now to overthrow unwanted regimes and control its natural wealth. The consistency with which our American counterparts speak about the Wagner Group in their statements shows exactly what Washington is concerned about.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  17. The return of a number of States in the region to constitutional order, which we are convinced is necessary, must be effected without attempts to impose foreign prescriptions and must be based on careful and realistic assessments of the situation. That is what guides our country’s bilateral assistance for those in need. Mali is a good example of that. Like the transitional authorities of that country, we are convinced that the liberation of Mali’s territories from terrorists and fighters is a priority for ensuring the successful completion of the transitional period and the holding of general elections. In that regard, with the support of Russian trainers, the Malian armed forces have achieved impressive successes in the fight against terrorism in 2022, by all accounts far exceeding what had been done in previous years.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  18. We support the message resulting from the high-level meeting in New York on 26 September as part of the initiative launched during the summer by the African Union, the United Nations, ECOWAS and the G-5 Sahel on security, governance and development in the Sahel on the importance of taking additional collective measures to improve the situation in the region. It is important to note that international assistance provided to the States of the Sahel should be based on the principle of non-interference in States’ internal affairs, respect for their national sovereignty and the principle of African solutions to African problems.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  19. The tradition of African mutual assistance, based on a deep understanding of national needs, can help contribute to the adoption of urgent measures to strengthen security structures and State institutions, resolve socioeconomic issues and protect human rights. It will be crucial to prevent the further radicalization of the population, especially young people. In that context, we note the extraordinary session held in the capital of Algeria on 13 October of the Joint Operational Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and the Niger, where a general desire to continue coordination to ensure peace and security in the region was expressed.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  20. A new destabilizing factor has been the sharp uptick in attempts to turn the Sahel into another theatre for geopolitical confrontation, which runs counter to the national interests of the States and peoples of the region. In that regard, it was internal disagreements within the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel), to a great extent externally provoked, that forced Mali to leave the organization on 15 May, meaning that future activities of the G-5 Sahel will require significant adjustments. Russia is convinced of the importance of coordinating the efforts of the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and other regional organizations aimed at combating terrorism in the Sahel.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  21. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I would like to thank Assistant Secretary- General Pobee and the other briefers for their statements. Unfortunately, the situation in the Sahel is not improving — we completely agree with the Assistant Secretary-General in that regard. The terrorist activity in the region is not subsiding, while acute inter-ethnic and intercommunal conflicts persist, which is having an extremely negative impact on the security situation. Dozens of troops and hundreds of civilians are dying at the hands of militants. The grave challenges facing the countries of the region are a legacy of many years of unresolved problems on the security, counter-terrorism, socioeconomic and humanitarian fronts.

    2022-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9194 (2022) · source

  22. Thanks to the efforts of Russian trainers, the capacity of its security forces has increased considerably, and the governing authorities have significantly stabilized the situation in their country. That means greater security for civilians, better protection of human rights and a better life for ordinary people. That is a fact, and no smear campaign aimed at my country will change it, because actions speak louder than words.

    2022-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9190 (2022) · source

  23. We believe that building a mutually respectful dialogue with the host country based on trust and partnership should be a priority, while taking into account Bangui’s concerns, including in the area of security. Without that it is impossible for any peacekeeping mission to fully implement its mandate. Russia has always supported the work of the Blue Helmets in the Mission, who occupy an important place in the overall security architecture of the Central African Republic. We continue to believe that MINUSCA is a fundamental element in ensuring that our approach to combating armed groups functions effectively. We will continue to give active assistance via bilateral channels to our friend the Central African Republic.

    2022-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9190 (2022) · source

  24. Had the French penholders really wanted to, they could have drafted a truly well- balanced document that responded to the vital interests of the people of the Central African Republic. But they preferred not to do that, which is why it was not possible for us to support the document. Nevertheless, we hope that the renewal of the MINUSCA mandate will help to advance President Touadera’s efforts to strengthen and expand the Government’s presence in various regions of the country, which among other things is essential to addressing its humanitarian problems. We also count on the professionalism and wisdom of Ms. Valentine Rugwabiza, as she continues her intelligent leadership of MINUSCA and the work of addressing emerging problems, in close cooperation with the Government of the Central African Republic.

    2022-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9190 (2022) · source

  25. We wonder why the French penholder did not include our proposed wording on the need to investigate the supply chains used to deliver explosive devices and their components deployed to the Central African Republic, which led to the deaths of three peacekeepers from Bangladesh. Emergency medical assistance was provided to one of the wounded on 3 October by a medical worker from a team of Russian instructors in the area. The Council should focus on why those explosive devices and components found their way into the country instead of engaging in pointless witch hunts and blame-laying. Besides what I have just discussed, there were many other aspects that did not make it into the final document.

    2022-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9190 (2022) · source

  26. We cannot accept a text that equates all the parties to the conflict and the armed groups with one another. It is well known that the latter are responsible for the overwhelming majority of cross-border crimes and violations of international humanitarian law and human rights. Neither was it possible to avoid making public the bilateral modalities between Bangui and MINUSCA on the authorization of Mission night flights, which was justified by purported concern for peacekeepers. Once again, we recall that the key to ensuring the safety of peacekeepers is contingent on constructive cooperation with the authorities of the host country.

    2022-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9190 (2022) · source

  27. Despite the lengthy negotiation process leading to the adoption of resolution 2659 (2022), it in fact addresses only one of the many issues of principle raised by the Central African Republic — the termination of the authorization of the French assistance to MINUSCA — which is not in any way a concession, as it merely reflects what France already announced publicly. In addition, Bangui’s proposals regarding the mandate were not reflected in the document, which disregarded the justified request to designate assistance in maintaining State presence as MINUSCA’s priority task. That amendment was supposed to faithfully reflect the changed situation on the ground and support further efforts by the country’s authorities to stabilize the situation there, which, as we have seen, have already produced results.

    2022-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9190 (2022) · source

  28. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian delegation abstained in the voting on resolution 2659 (2022) to extend the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) for one year. On 5 November, the country’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ms. Sylvie Baipo Temon, who is here with us today, circulated a letter addressed to the members of the Security Council in which she outlined the vision of the Central African Republic with regard to the work of MINUSCA, the main goal of which is to support the official authorities of the Central African Republic in dealing with the challenges facing them, above all the challenge of stabilizing the country and creating the necessary conditions for establishing a lasting peace.

    2022-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9190 (2022) · source

  29. As a police-contributing country, the Russian Federation has continued to systematically increase its participation in United Nations police peacekeeping and to deploy personnel with the relevant skills, including women, to missions. Women personnel from our Ministry of Internal Affairs have achieved positive results in Cyprus, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Abyei. As we underscored at the most recent United Nations Chiefs of Police Summit, Russia stand ready to continue contributing to the development of police peacekeeping.

    2022-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9189 (2022) · source

  30. Our country conducts training for Russian and foreign law-enforcement personnel through United Nations- certified programmes at the peacekeeping training centre of the All-Russian Research Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation in Domodedovo. Over the past 20 years and more, the centre has produced more than 2,500 highly skilled professional police officers. The course curriculum is targeted at law-enforcement officers from developing States, particularly in Africa, with a focus on women police. Special attention is also given to language training, taking into account the specificities of host States.

    2022-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9189 (2022) · source

  31. In that regard, we believe there is a need for an ongoing dialogue between the Security Council and troop-contributing countries, as well as with host States, on all aspects of the activities of peacekeeping operations, including at the planning and mandate design stages. We believe firmly in the importance of stepping up cooperation with regional organizations, including at the level of the United Nations police. In that regard, we support the work being done by the United Nations Secretariat, as well as the initiatives of many regional organizations, particularly the African Union, to improve training for police peacekeepers. Russia is also making its contribution to that common cause.

    2022-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9189 (2022) · source

  32. There is no doubt that for the police to effectively carry out their tasks, especially given the increasingly difficult operating conditions, proper logistical support and staffing are required. Missions should improve planning and management and avoid unnecessary expenditures and the duplication of efforts. As part of those processes, it is important that the Secretariat carefully consider the views and recommendations of police-contributing countries. Attempts to promote various outside initiatives and concepts that have not received the support of all Member States in the General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations are counterproductive.

    2022-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9189 (2022) · source

  33. Another important aspect is effective engagement with the people, attention to their concerns and, at times, clarification of the mandate in order to win their trust while preventing high or false expectations. Depending on the national, cultural and religious characteristics of the communities living in the mission deployment area, women peacekeepers can play a particular role in establishing communication with them. At the same time, we are convinced that the focus should not be on the pursuit of quantitative gender indicators, but rather on the experience, professionalism and competence of officers and on adherence to the principle of broad geographical representation, including at the senior level.

    2022-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9189 (2022) · source

  34. We can hardly consider international support to be effective if the long-term presence of missions results only in the United Nations replacing the efforts of local police. Another critical mission of police peacekeepers is to protect civilians from immediate security threats by patrolling, monitoring and dealing with those who violate public order. Those efforts and the role of the Blue Berets, as the link not only between the population and peacekeeping presence, but also between the population and the Government of the host country, helps to build citizens’ trust in Government institutions and thus lays the groundwork for achieving national reconciliation and sustainable peace. Of key importance in that process is establishing constructive communication with the host country and taking the priorities it defines into account.

    2022-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9189 (2022) · source

  35. Peacekeeping missions are often deployed in countries in which national law enforcement bodies are considerably weakened and at times non-existent. In such situations, Blue Berets have to take over their functions. However, it is important to remember that the United Nations does not have unlimited capabilities, and that our global Organization cannot permanently replace the efforts of local police. In that regard, it is important for professionally trained and well-equipped United Nations police officers to be able to share their expertise, organize their work and train local personnel as effectively as possible, which will enable national security authorities to fully take over the maintenance of law and order and independently ensure the protection of civilians. It is the principle of national ownership that is the key to success.

    2022-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9189 (2022) · source

  36. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Under-Secretary-General Mr. Jean- Pierre Lacroix and the Police Commissioners of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, Ms. Christine Fossen, and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Mody Berethe, for their assessments. We also listened carefully to Ms. Emma Birikorang. Police components undoubtedly play an important role in contemporary peacekeeping missions. As an integral part of United Nations peacekeeping operations, the Blue Berets help to implement mission mandates that are determined by the specific situation in the country of deployment. One of the objectives of police components is to assist in reforming law enforcement institutions and build the national capacity of host States.

    2022-11-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9189 (2022) · source

  37. The build-up of military measures by the United States and its allies threatens to further heighten tensions on the Peninsula, which could lead to unpredictable and dangerous consequences for the entire North-East Asia region. What, then, are our options? In our opinion, our objective today is to ensure that all parties demonstrate restraint and reaffirm, in practice, their readiness to renew dialogue in line with the agreements previously reached and commitments undertaken. The Russian- Chinese political and humanitarian draft resolution remains on the table, as do other initiatives of our countries, which could really encourage the parties to step up negotiation efforts.

    2022-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9183 (2022) · source

  38. The further escalation of sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea already goes beyond measures to counter the prohibited missile and nuclear programmes, threatening North Korean citizens with unacceptable socioeconomic and humanitarian upheaval. This is not the first time that the Council has discussed the need for preventive diplomacy, the importance of finding a politico-diplomatic solution and real steps by Washington that go beyond just promises to establish a substantive dialogue with Pyongyang. Our Western colleagues do not seem prepared to do any of those things. In that regard, we must not expect a miracle.

    2022-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9183 (2022) · source

  39. Pyongyang’s concessions made in 2018 and 2019 and the positive signals it sent were not taken into account. It is precisely because of the United States position that the Council was unable find the strength to respond appropriately and to promote the process of détente. We are convinced that United Nations and, specifically, Security Council mechanisms should be harnessed to support inter-Korean dialogue and multilateral negotiations, rather than becoming an impediment to them. Only then will it be possible to discuss effective solutions to the problems accumulated in the region, including the nuclear question, on the basis of mutually acceptable agreements.

    2022-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9183 (2022) · source

  40. We cannot help but note the increasingly pushy promotion by Washington of its unilateral security doctrine in the Asia-Pacific region, which serves only to create new risks for the countries of the region and seeks to divide them according to the principle of “whoever is not with us is against us.” Part of those activities involve the establishment of new military blocs, such as the alliance among the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, which raises serious doubts about the good intentions of those States. Pyongyang shares those doubts, as such actions do not contribute to the establishment of dialogue. We deeply regret that our Western colleagues have consistently ignored Pyongyang’s repeated calls for the United States to cease its hostile activities in order to open up opportunities for dialogue.

    2022-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9183 (2022) · source

  41. There are irresponsible discussions under way at the leadership level of those countries about the deployment of American means of deterrence, including of a nuclear nature, on the Korean peninsula and in the region. In that regard, it is clear that Pyongyang’s missile launches are a consequence of the United States short-sighted confrontational military activity around the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, harming both its partners in the region and the situation in North-East Asia as a whole. Moreover, the situation on the Korean peninsula cannot be considered in isolation from the complex processes that are currently taking place in that part of the world.

    2022-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9183 (2022) · source

  42. On 31 October, the United States and the Republic of Korea began an exercise of an unprecedented scale that involved approximately 240 modern military aircraft. That was essentially a rehearsal for conducting massive strikes on the territory of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and neither was it a one-off. Large-scale military training activities by the United States began there in August. At the end of September, exercises by the United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan were conducted in the Sea of Japan using a nuclear missile carrier and providing training to target critical infrastructure on the territory of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

    2022-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9183 (2022) · source

  43. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We carefully listened to the briefing delivered by Assistant Secretary-General Khaled Khiari. However, we note with regret that, as in the past, the United Nations representative did not give a full picture of the situation. The risks in the region today are too high for us focus solely on one-sided information. Russia opposes any military activity that threatens the security of the Korean peninsula and the countries of North-East Asia. We note with regret that the situation on the Korean peninsula has recently deteriorated significantly, the reason for which is clear: Washington’s desire to force Pyongyang into unilateral disarmament by implementing sanctions and exerting force.

    2022-11-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9183 (2022) · source

  44. But in that regard as well we should be guided by countries’ national priorities, the root causes of conflicts and each country’s individual specifics.

    2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181 (2022) · source

  45. United Nations peacekeeping operations can provide targeted peacebuilding efforts in the framework of their mandates — for example, in promoting security sector reform; enabling disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; and increasing the training of national personnel in the areas that the host country deems important. However, they cannot fully cover those needs. The main role in that regard should be played by the relevant specialized United Nations bodies and international financial institutions. We also agree that the Peacebuilding Commission, whose recommendations were submitted for this meeting, should play the role of the connecting link where security issues cross over into the area of socioeconomic development.

    2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181 (2022) · source

  46. In the concept note for this meeting (see S/2022/799), Ghana is right to point out that a number of long- standing challenges hinder conflict prevention and resolution, including the lack of social and economic development and education, the growing percentage of young people in the structure of society and the effects of climate change, among other challenges. United Nations assistance in those areas is absolutely justified and is needed now more than ever before. At the same time, we are convinced that it is important to clearly understand which United Nations institutions can be most effective in solving these problems.

    2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181 (2022) · source

  47. The key to the success of regional efforts is a common assessment by the countries of the region of the existing threats and ways to overcome them, as well as their willingness to bear the risks of responding to those threats, to create a coherent and effective command- and-control system based on trust and cooperation. As far as funding modalities are concerned, regardless of what the situation requires, it is important that initiating countries have the space to make their own political decisions to counter threats, without those decisions being dictated by external influences. We believe that African States are justified in raising the issue of the provision of financial assistance by the United Nations, and we stand ready to discuss the matter.

    2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181 (2022) · source

  48. As we have said on numerous occasions, there have been examples of situations in Africa in which a common sense of purpose and trust-based cooperation have led to the achievement of meaningful results. Nevertheless, that was possible only when all the countries of the region affected by a given problem agreed on how, when and with what means they could push back the terrorists. In terms of the situation in West Africa, in particular in the Sahel, where the issue of terrorism is now particularly acute, we must not forget that all countries must be united in their desire to overcome it even if they have political differences.

    2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181 (2022) · source

  49. Even different units within the same mission may view their tasks differently. Unfortunately, in many country-specific situations, we see a mentoring approach to solving purely domestic political problems, and that only makes the situation worse. Concerning the exacerbation of the terrorist threat in many regions of the world, including in Africa, the discussion of how to counter that scourge has recently intensified. We do not believe we should be under any illusions that United Nations peacekeeping operations can take on that burden. It is a problem that requires a military solution, inter alia, which can be provided only through national efforts, if necessary with bilateral or regional assistance.

    2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181 (2022) · source

  50. That can lead to the expansion of a peacekeeping operation’s mandate to include various secondary and non-core tasks related to human rights, social affairs, gender-related issues and climate change. Peacekeeping operations then risk being built into the domestic political context and become part of the conflict-management process rather than a tool for its resolution. As a result — and we have witnessed it more and more often recently — public dissatisfaction with the way peacekeepers carry out their mandate is on the rise. However, the cause of those problems is the discrepancy between the means and the established goal, and therefore the unreasonably high expectations of the population. Also, the multifaceted nature of modern peacekeeping operations only makes it more difficult to focus on the main priorities.

    2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181 (2022) · source