YouSaid · the spoken record

Evstigneeva

lines on the record: 1,001
first: 2020-08-10
most recent: 2023-12-29
sittings or episodes: 153
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General El Ghassim Wane for his briefing on the work of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and recent developments in the country. We welcome Ms. Sadya Touré and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Mali, Mr. Abdoulaye Diop, to today’s meeting. We believe that the only way for Malians to surmount the current challenges is through the establishment of internal political stability and security in the country. The more territory that is under the control of the State, the more effective counter-terrorism efforts will be and the better protected the people of the country will be.”
2022-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9061 (2022) · source
“And with regard to the activity there of private military companies, we want to stress that the choice of any partner engaged in that or any other area is the prerogative of the national authorities, including with regard to issues of law enforcement and investigations of violations of international law.”
2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source
“A few months ago, however, our Western colleagues found a reason to blame someone else. Apparently, it is Russia’s fault. In reality we are actually helping African countries, including the Central African Republic, to build the combat capacity of their official armed forces. With the permission of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic we have provided it with a number of shipments of military supplies. Russian instructors have also been conducting successful training at the invitation of the official authorities. To say that the campaign to discredit us is bewildering would be an understatement. Russia has strictly complied with all the restrictions that the Council has imposed regarding the Central African Republic.”
2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source
“We have been able to discuss the true state of affairs with regard to food supplies and other vital issues with African representatives, including at President Putin’s meeting with the Chairperson of the African Union, President Macky Sall of Senegal. In the general historical context, the real question that arises is why countries that are so rich in human and natural resources find themselves in this kind of economic and security situation. The countries of the West have curated them for decades, trying to impose their own ideas of governance, primarily in the sphere of financing and other resources. They have deployed their own military missions to African lands and have allegedly been fighting terrorism there. Yet the situation is only getting worse.”
2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source
“We have repeatedly clarified in various international forums why the global food security situation began to worsen long before the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine. I ask the Council to refrain from trying to blame Russia for socioeconomic problems related to global development issues and challenges such as the coronavirus pandemic. Members would also do well to remember that the current difficulties with food supplies are primarily a result of the introduction of illegal unilateral restrictive measures on our country and Belarus. The United States recent disturbing fictions claiming that grain that Russia has been shipping to Africa is stolen are deeply hypocritical, and we are glad to see that the countries of Africa do not believe them.”
2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source
“In October 2021, a squadron of ships from Russia’s Northern Fleet participated in a tour of duty in the Gulf of Guinea for naval manoeuvres aimed at combating piracy. To conclude my main statement, I would like to note that we categorically reject the assessments in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/436) of the situation in Ukraine and its influence on global food security, views that we consider highly politicized. In that regard, we also want to comment on the far-fetched accusations we have heard yet again today alleging that Russia has created a global food crisis that is damaging the economies of countries in Africa. I reiterate that we categorically reject the way that the issue has been framed.”
2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source
“It is crucial to employ the resources of the international community in order to build the capacity of coastal States to combat piracy. There is a need for cooperation on maritime surveillance, establishing systems for identifying and escorting vessels, as well as early warning on potentially hazardous objects on navigation routes. We welcome the establishment of the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Collaboration Forum in July last year, which provided a new format for cooperation and coordination on joint anti-piracy operations. We take an active part in the work of that mechanism and stand ready to provide assistance to our Western African partners. In 2021, Russia made an earmarked contribution to the United Nations Global Maritime Crime Programme to provide technical assistance to Gabon and Equatorial Guinea.”
2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source
“We support the decision taken by the command of the Multinational Joint Task Force of the Lake Chad basin States to launch, in April this year, Operation Lake Sanity, a large-scale operation to eliminate terrorists from islands within the borders of the three States — Chad, the Niger and Nigeria. We believe that it is important to strengthen interaction among countries of the region both bilaterally and in various international forums, including the United Nations. We welcome the work of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa in promoting peacekeeping processes and strengthening security in the region, including through the tools of preventive diplomacy. We are concerned by the increasing number of attacks on commercial vessels in the Gulf of Guinea.”
2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source
“The insufficient capacity of the armed forces of States of the region, problems with military coordination and a lack of reliable intelligence do not allow them to effectively resist well- organized militant groups that use the tactic of guerrilla war and often have the support of the locals, who have to live side by side with the militants. The ideology of radical Islam is gaining popularity, especially among young people. The Islamic State in West Africa Province and Boko Haram pose a major threat in the Lake Chad basin. The militants are enhancing their capabilities and continue to attack military personnel in Nigeria, Chad, the Niger and Cameroon and terrorize the local population.”
2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Assistant Secretary-General Martha Pobee and Mr. Gilberto Da Piedade Veríssimo, President of the Commission of the Economic Community of Central African States, for their briefings. We listened carefully to Ms. Jeanne-Danielle Nlate. We would also like to take this opportunity to thank Mr. François Fall, former Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, for his work. The situation in Central Africa is characterized by a high level of terrorist threat, ongoing conflicts and political and social tensions.”
2022-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9058 (2022) · source
“The Congolese population has suffered from violence and armed conflict for far too long. People need to have hope for peace and for a normal life. We do hope that with the assistance from the United Nations, States of the region and the international community, Kinshasa will be able to curb the recent acute threats and reorient the Democratic Republic of the Congo towards the tasks of nation-building and socioeconomic development. That is particularly important in view of the presidential elections planned for late 2023. These elections are to become a key stage in stabilizing the country.”
2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source
“We must not allow the repetition of the bloody events of previous years or an escalation into large-scale hostilities, which would again affect the region and whose consequences all of us, above all the citizens of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, would have to deal with for decades to come. In practical terms, we believe that it is important to make full use of the tools of the Regional Oversight Mechanism of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region. In addition, we need to concentrate our efforts on developing and implementing disarmament, demobilization and social reintegration programmes for former combatants, which would significantly increase the number of those willing to leave the ranks of armed groups once and for all.”
2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source
“We believe that frank and constructive interaction among the States of the region should play a key role in advancing long-term settlement and reconciliation. It is important to refrain from confrontational rhetoric, overcome persistent mutual distrust and disagreement and support and facilitate the development of the processes that have been initiated, and are continuing, within the Nairobi framework. Every effort must be made to transform the commitment to dialogue of the countries neighbouring the Democratic Republic of the Congo into practical cooperation in order to achieve stability. That is, of course, in the interests of all the countries of the region and of the international community.”
2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source
“We would like to call special attention to the fact that the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Blue Helmets of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are valiantly carrying out their duties. They risk their lives every day for peace in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The immediate priority today is to end hostilities and begin dialogue, as it is impossible to achieve normalization in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by military measures alone. We call on illegal armed groups to cease their attacks, reject the use of violence and negotiate with the Congolese Government. A ceasefire must be followed by measures and steps that would lead to a genuine change in the situation.”
2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Assistant Secretary-General Martha Ama Akyaa Pobee and Special Envoy of the Secretary-General Huang Xia for their briefings. We welcome the participation at this meeting of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Christophe Lutundula Apala Pen’apala, and the representatives of Rwanda and Uganda. Like other Security Council members, we are extremely concerned about the grave outbreak of hostilities in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We hope that the Congolese armed forces, together with United Nations peacekeepers and international partners, will be able to swiftly re-establish control over the security situation and prevent any further escalation of violence.”
2022-05-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9051 (2022) · source
“We would like to remind the Council that presidential note 507, on the Council’s working methods (S/2017/507, annex), stipulates that penholders must provide their colleagues with the opportunity to participate fully in the drafting of resolutions and conduct consultations in a spirit of openness and flexibility. Unfortunately, in the work on the resolutions on South Sudan, we are increasingly encountering situations where Washington’s own interests are being placed above those of Juba and the region, and where the opinions of other Council members are not being taken into account.”
2022-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9045 (2022) · source
“Juba’s position on the lifting of the sanctions is well known and has been expressed at the highest level. It is also important to note that its position is supported by the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Nevertheless, while preparing the document, the penholder for the South Sudan file, the United States, once again ignored not only Juba’s calls but also the agreed position of the countries of the African continent and the views of other members of the Security Council, including Russia, regarding the importance of demonstrating respect for South Sudan’s opinion and willingness to ease the sanctions in order to help the country achieve even greater results in its State-building process. We should not omit to mention that we have an increasing number of questions regarding penholders’ working methods.”
2022-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9045 (2022) · source
“In our view, many of the current Security Council sanctions regimes no longer correspond to the situations on the ground and thereby hinder the plans of national Governments in their State-building efforts and formation of effective security forces. The situation concerning the South Sudanese sanctions regime is no exception. Let me emphasize that we do not seek to downplay the situation in that young country, which has yet to overcome many challenges. However, it cannot be denied that the security situation in South Sudan has changed significantly. Juba has made some progress in meeting the benchmarks provided for in resolution 2577 (2021), despite some objective delays of which we are all aware. At this stage, the State needs to strengthen its emerging armed forces in particular.”
2022-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9045 (2022) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation abstained in the voting on resolution 2633 (2022), prepared by the United States, on the extension of the sanctions regime on South Sudan. Security Council sanctions constitute a powerful response to threats to peace, but we firmly believe that they must be applied with the utmost care and be totally justified and nuanced. Their use as a punitive measure is unacceptable. The restrictions applied by the Security Council should reflect the situation on the ground and serve the political process. Accordingly, they should also be subject to regular review and modification until they are fully lifted.”
2022-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9045 (2022) · source
“In the very near future, the Security Council will have to work on a draft resolution to extend the mandate of UNITAMS. We categorically oppose the use of that document to exert political pressure on the Sudanese authorities and impose on them questionable schemes and democratizing patterns developed in countries located on other continents. The Sudan is a country with a very rich political, multi-ethnic, cultural and religious past and present, whose citizens can and, most importantly, must find solutions to their own problems. United Nations assistance must be based on respect for the views of the host country, in a spirit of cooperation and a genuine intent to help the people of the Sudan.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“At the same time, we note that the Government of the Sudan is taking measures to react to the situation in line with its capacities and resources. In recent months, deputy governors have been appointed in the states of West and South Kordofan. Some progress has also been made in the formation of a joint security force in the region and the work of the Permanent Ceasefire Committee. We are convinced that under current circumstances it is important to maintain a balanced stance regarding the events in the country; that is especially true for the United Nations. We note with regret that the reports provided by the Secretariat remain politicized. The particular features of Sudanese political culture and the irreversible political changes that have taken place in the country should be borne in mind.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“Particular attention should be paid to helping mobilize international financial and donor assistance so as to support the transitional institutions, the economy and the social sphere, implement the Juba Peace Agreement and tackle the issue of internally displaced persons and refugees. Those tasks cannot be left for later. They are exactly the goals that were set when the Mission was created. We also note that it is unacceptable to use assistance in economic development and implementing the provisions of the peace agreement for blackmail. That is unfair and inhumane vis-à-vis the Sudanese people, regardless of what part of the country they are in. The recent intercommunal clashes in Darfur are worrisome.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“We expect that the trilateral coordination mechanism, established in March, consisting of the United Nations, the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, will contribute to resolving that problem by helping with the intra-Sudanese dialogue. We remain convinced that the people of the Sudan can on their own resolve their issues through national dialogue. We hope that that process will be inclusive in nature and that all political forces of the country that have the genuine support of the people of the Sudan will participate. We call on the special political mission and Mr. Perthes personally to strictly abide by their mandate and focus equally on all its components.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“The situation has been aggravated by the suspension of a significant portion of donor assistance, which has resulted in humanitarian and socioeconomic challenges. We fully support the efforts being made by the Government of the Sudan against that background to stabilize the situation and establish a constructive national dialogue. It is vital that the authorities reaffirm their commitment to the Juba Peace Agreement and declare their intent to hold general elections in July 2023. We note that that work is already bearing fruit, given the reduction in the number of demonstrations in the capital. At the same time, we are seriously concerned at the fact that the radicals retain influence in the country and reject the idea of any kind of dialogue with the Government, even through mediation.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Volker Perthes, for the information he provided on the developing situation in the Sudan. We welcome the participation in today’s meeting of the new Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations, Mr. Al-Harith Idriss Al-Harith Mohamed. We read carefully the most recent quarterly report on the country (S/2022/400) and on the work being done there by the Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS). The situation in the Sudan remains challenging. The country is in the throes of a political crisis. The Sudanese street remains feverish.”
2022-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9041 (2022) · source
“We call on the United Nations, international and regional partners to continue assisting Somalia while complying with the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the country and without meddling in its domestic affairs. We believe that there is a way of improving the effectiveness of international assistance, which would be through a strategic review of the activities of the special political mission headed by Mr. Swan, and we are ready to provide any necessary support for this work.”
2022-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9040 (2022) · source
“We hope that ATMIS, which in March received unanimous support from the Security Council (see S/PV.9009), will meet the objectives on its agenda, so that ultimately Mogadishu be able to take on complete responsibility for security in the country. In saying this, we are convinced that the effectiveness of the Mission’s work will in many ways depend on the stability of the financing for African peacekeepers. As before, we believe that the transfer of responsibility to the Somali army should take place gradually, as a function of the real situation on the ground. In the current conditions, where there is still a terrorist threat, it would be too early to talk about ending the Transition Mission.”
2022-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9040 (2022) · source
“We hope that the Somali authorities will soon be able to form a new Federal Government and focus on the task of State-building and dealing with urgent problems, including the fight against terrorism and overcoming the consequences of an unusual drought. We call on our Somali partners to devote greater attention to security issues. We are seriously concerned by the notable activity of Al-Shabaab against the backdrop of elections not only in the regions but also in the capital. There was an incursion into the safe zone of the international airport in Mogadishu in March, and there was also an attack on the Burundi contingent in ATMIS in El Baraf at the beginning of May. This is evidence of the fact that Al-Shabaab’s strength is growing.”
2022-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9040 (2022) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, James Swan, and the Special Representative of the African Union, Francisco Madeira, for their detailed briefings. We welcome the participation in today’s meeting of the Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations, Abukar Dahir Osman. We have also studied carefully the most recent report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/392). We congratulate our Somali colleagues on the successful parliamentary and presidential elections and the official entry into office today of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. We welcome the contribution of the African Union Mission in Somalia, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and Mr. Swan personally in achieving that result.”
2022-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9040 (2022) · source
“I have significant doubts as to that, since we see how the situation is playing out — for example, with regard to refugees — and how attention is waning on the part of the international community — the Western community — when it comes to conflicts in Africa and other regions, because Europe and the West and its problems are the top priority. We hope that all these arguments will be taken into account and that countries, including in Africa, will not be misled regarding the selfless help being provided to them, as we heard in the statements of some of our colleagues. All that is not for free — and is not at all selfless. The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.”
2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source
“Western States are doing everything possible to block shipments of food from Russia, including shipments of grain and fertilizer, to disrupt logistical and financial chains and prevent us from supplying food to countries where hunger could arise. I believe that saying that we are creating obstacles for food shipments is complete and unprecedented hypocrisy. First of all, millions of tons of grain are being shipped out of Ukraine by land and through ports in Romania. But where is that grain going? Will it ultimately reach Africa and other regions that are experiencing shortages?”
2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the floor. Regarding the statement of the representative of the United States of America, I believe that I have already provided a comprehensive response in my main statement. I now wish to comment on the statement of the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, who said that the increase in food prices in Africa and the possible negative impact on food security are an issue. Prices are increasing, and there are many reasons for that, which came about long before the Ukrainian crisis. But, of course, at this stage the situation is made particularly acute by the sanctions that were collectively introduced by the West, primarily under pressure from the United States.”
2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source
“Another telling statistic is the list of official military interventions by the West in Africa — several dozen, even according to the most conservative estimates. And there are dozens more that have never been acknowledged. Regrettably, neocolonialism is now being leveraged to pit countries of the region against one another in order to weaken them. That should not be happening in the twenty-first century. Africa is capable of determining its own future. We call on Mali’s neighbours to once again reconsider their own sovereign role in addressing the issues of their continent versus those with a hidden agenda with regard to Africa.”
2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source
“I would also like to underscore that our bilateral military and technical assistance to Mali and other African States is aimed at supporting national authorities in their very complex task of combating terrorism and strengthening national security, which is essential if their citizens are to feel safe and secure and able to engage in their countries’ development efforts. Here in the Security Council, Western countries are once again making claims about certain mercenaries. I would like to point out, however, that mercenaries from the West, including from countries represented on the Council, have participated in numerous coups on the African continent since the collapse of colonialism, as well as in propping up apartheid and looting natural resources, including with the aim of supporting the interests of their big businesses.”
2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source
“Russia will continue its constructive participation, including as a permanent member of the Security Council, in the collective efforts to achieve peace and stability in the Sahara-Sahel region, while providing support to African countries on a bilateral basis in order to increase the operational effectiveness of their armed forces by training military and law-enforcement personnel and providing humanitarian assistance, including in education and health care. The higher- education institutions of Russia’s Ministry of Defence are currently providing instruction to military personnel from Mali, the Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad, and our Ministry of Internal Affairs is training Malian police.”
2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source
“In that regard, we call on the members of the G-5 Sahel to adopt a constructive approach and take the necessary measures to put themselves on an independent path to unity without dictates from outside. We hope that by following the principle of African solutions to African problems, the States of the Sahel, including Mali, will be able to agree on the future activities of their Joint Force, and that the ongoing difficulties will not diminish their efforts to combat terrorism.”
2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source
“It seems clear that it was assumed that Mali’s army would not be able to achieve its military objectives, but as we know, that did not happen. Thanks to its own efforts and those of more effective partners, there have been visible successes whereby a number of settlements have been unblocked and the country’s northern and eastern regions are being steadily liberated. Rather than creating obstacles, in the current situation what should be done is to provide the Malian authorities with effective assistance while encouraging them to pursue a balanced course in resolving the crisis in the country, including where restoring constitutional order is concerned.”
2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source
“On far-fetched pretexts, Mali was denied presidency of the Group, and a Joint Force summit planned for February, where Bamako was supposed to take lead of the Force, was never held. In that regard, the decision of the Malian authorities to withdraw from the G-5 Sahel, provoked by the confrontational behaviour of its neighbours, appears entirely logical. Besides that, we should not forget that harsh Western economic sanctions, and restrictions from the Economic Community of West African States, have been imposed on Mali, and the withdrawal from Malian territory of France’s Operation Barkhane and the Task Force Takuba is continuing. All of that is going on at a time when it is extremely difficult for Mali to deal with major challenges, and first and foremost the threat of terrorism.”
2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source
“The members of the Council are well aware that since the initiative behind the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel was first put forward by the countries of the region themselves — which is an important fact — Russia has consistently supported its formation and deployment. The fact is that the fight against terrorism knows no borders or nationalities and is a shared priority for all. We also advocated expanding United Nations assistance to the Joint Force, which would help to strengthen regional solidarity. We have to point out with regret that due to Western pressure, primarily from France, the G-5 Sahel has found itself dealing with challenges that are far removed from the much more urgent issue of combating terrorism.”
2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Assistant Secretary-General Martha Pobee for her briefing on the evolving situation in the region. We are also grateful to the representatives of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel) and civil society. Unfortunately, the situation in the Sahel is not improving, and in that regard we are in full agreement with the briefers. The terrorist activity in the region continues, along with acute inter-ethnic and intercommunal conflicts, and with a very negative impact on the security situation. Dozens of soldiers and hundreds of civilians are dying at the hands of militants. A new and very worrisome destabilizing element is the growth of tensions among the countries of the regions themselves, tensions that are largely a result of external interference.”
2022-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9035 (2022) · source
“The Russian-Chinese political-humanitarian draft resolution remains before the Council and could encourage parties to step up their negotiation efforts. At the same time, we would like to note that the lack of progress on the political track — progress that could have been secured by the adoption of the draft resolution I mentioned — threatens to further increase tensions on the Korean peninsula, as has unfortunately been the case in recent months.”
2022-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9030 (2022) · source
“Further resentment has also been caused by the so-called autonomous secondary sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and other States that have been imposed by Washington and its allies, in circumvention of and in addition to Security Council sanctions. By running counter to the norms and rules of international trade, unilateral sanctions undermine not only the sovereignty and legitimate interests of Member States but also the integrity of the sanctions agreed by the Security Council. It is unacceptable to attempt to enshrine such sanctions through the Security Council’s authority or that of its Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006). In that regard, we call on all to exercise restraint and reaffirm a practical readiness for renewed dialogue in line with previous agreements and obligations.”
2022-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9030 (2022) · source
“The establishment of new military alliances in the region, such as the trilateral security pact among Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, casts serious doubts about the good intentions of those countries, including from the perspective of Pyongyang, and does not help to foster dialogue. The institutions and mechanisms of the United Nations and the Security Council should be used to support the settlement processes and intra-Korean dialogue and should not be an obstacle to them. Only then will we be able to address the effective resolution of the problems that have accumulated in the region, including the nuclear issue, on the basis of dialogue and mutually acceptable agreements. Sanctions and pressure will not achieve that.”
2022-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9030 (2022) · source
“We also believe that the further strengthening of sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea exceeds the scope of measures that are needed to cut off channels for funding nuclear missile programmes and expose the people of North Korea to unacceptable socioeconomic and humanitarian turmoil. We would like to remind our American colleagues that negotiations are a two-way street. There is no point in expecting Pyongyang to disarm without conditions under the threat of tightening the vice of sanctions, while in return it receives only unsubstantiated promises as guarantees.”
2022-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9030 (2022) · source
“In each of the resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea adopted since 2006, the Council has expressed its readiness to review the restrictions based on the level of Pyongyang’s compliance with the provisions of the relevant documents. Regrettably, to date the Council has only tightened the sanctions, while ignoring the positive signals from North Korea. In that regard, the current developments are merely the consequence of the short-sightedness of some colleagues here, who are not ready to move beyond the limits of a sanctions-based paradigm, which for many years has been unable to guarantee security in the region. We have seen no other viable initiatives from them.”
2022-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9030 (2022) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Russia opposes any military activity that threatens the security of the Korean peninsula and the States of North-East Asia. We are convinced that seeking mutually acceptable political and diplomatic solutions is the only way to peacefully resolve the issues concerning the Korean peninsula and establish stable security mechanisms in North-East Asia. That should be our main goal, which once achieved will enable the normalization of the situation in the region. We note with regret that for the past four years, the Security Council has been unable to respond to the dismantling by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its nuclear test site, as well as Pyongyang’s compliance with the moratorium on nuclear testing and the launching of intercontinental ballistic missiles.”
2022-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9030 (2022) · source
“As an alternative source of information on the situation in the country, we suggest familiarizing ourselves with the report of Republika Srpska, which has been circulated as document S/2022/376. Russia, as one of Dayton’s guarantor States, fully supports the fundamental principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the equality of the three constituent peoples and the two entities with broad authority. The 1995 Peace Agreement remains fully relevant. The balance of interests of the three peoples therein remains in effect. Moreover, there is no alternative to it. Attempts to destroy it could have serious consequences for the Balkans and for Europe as a whole.”
2022-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9029 (2022) · source
“It has gone from being a source of stability to an element of intimidation and political confrontation, which is completely unacceptable and dangerous. The upcoming general election in Bosnia and Herzegovina is of great importance. The voting should take place in accordance with Bosnian law and in full compliance with the principles of representation in Dayton, and the results should express the sovereign will of the peoples. We demand that outside parties stop interfering in the election agenda. We call on the Security Council to provide a constructive assessment of the current events in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the lens of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which was endorsed by a Security Council resolution, and not on the basis of arbitrary speculation on the part of the Office of the High Representative.”
2022-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9029 (2022) · source
“We believe that a frank and concrete discussion is needed on practical ways to close the Office of the High Representative as soon as possible, as it has exhausted its positive functions. We note with particular concern that the European Union forces carrying out European Union Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea) in accordance with a Security Council mandate are increasingly creating an atmosphere of danger and fear. Without any justification or explanation, the military contingent of the operation was doubled in March. Armed men in camouflage are patrolling the streets of Bosnian cities, and heavy military equipment is being moved around, sowing panic among the population. Such behaviour raises serious questions about the added value of the continued presence of EUFOR- Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
2022-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9029 (2022) · source
“Attempts to invoke the so-called Bonn powers to annul unwanted domestic laws are unlawful and legally null and void, both because there is no agreement on their use by the international community and because those emergency tools were granted personally to the High Representative, whose post, following the resignation of Valentin Inzko, remains vacant. As we emphasized at the beginning of the meeting, we believe that German citizen Christian Schmidt is a private individual and has no mandate to represent the international community. We consider inappropriate the attacks on the Russian Ambassador in Sarajevo, contained in the so-called report (see S/2022/374), in the context of the situation in Ukraine, which has nothing to do with the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
2022-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9029 (2022) · source