YouSaid · the spoken record

Evstigneeva

lines on the record: 1,001
first: 2020-08-10
most recent: 2023-12-29
sittings or episodes: 153
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“However, rather than relentlessly seeking to establish influence, perhaps it is time for Washington to consider extending the hand of mutually respectful dialogue to Pyongyang. Every undertaking requires gradual steps, but so far any such steps are going in the exact opposite direction. We urge the parties to refrain from dangerous actions that could lead to a large-scale conflict. Everything we are seeing suggests that we are witnessing an endless vicious circle in which the military-political triangle led by the United States is provoking a further escalation of tensions rather than facilitating the settlement of relations between neighbours.”
2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source
“Russia complies responsibly with its international obligations, which does not prevent us from developing traditional relations of friendship and cooperation with our neighbours, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, founded on long-standing historical roots. Behind the attempts to smear Russia in the context of the situation on the Korean peninsula is a desire to divert the Council’s attention from the real causes of instability in the region, which are linked to the United States’ ambitions to strangle Pyongyang at any cost. Looking at the situation in a broader context, it is becoming clear that Washington has virtually no leverage left over Pyongyang — something that is increasingly being discussed in the expert community.”
2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source
“Incidentally, we once again heard no due assessment of those provocative steps by the Secretariat today. Russia has consistently advocated for a peaceful settlement of the entire range of problems on the Korean peninsula exclusively through political and diplomatic means, without external pressure or blackmail. The Russian-Chinese political and humanitarian draft resolution remains on the table. Its adoption could constitute a genuinely constructive contribution by the Council to resolving the current difficult situation on the Korean peninsula. We heard several delegations accuse Russia today of so-called illegal military-technical cooperation between it and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Such suggestions are baseless.”
2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source
“Moreover, it is also noteworthy that the Government of the Republic of Korea, by way of a retaliatory measure, took the decision to partially suspend the effect of the inter-Korean military agreement of 2018, which plays an important role in maintaining stability and preventing armed incidents in the area of the military demarcation line. Those steps could only provoke a retaliatory response. We are also concerned about the conflicting signals from Tokyo and Seoul, the United States’ allies in North-East Asia, about their so- called strengthened cooperation with Washington in the nuclear arena, which can certainly be interpreted as allowing for the possibility of American nuclear weapons to be deployed on their territory as well as the possibility of developing their own nuclear weapons.”
2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source
“It is very interesting to hear from the United States delegation how those actions are in line with the requirements of resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 27, regarding the need to work to reduce tensions in the Korean peninsula and beyond. Today the Council was convened in relation to the rocket launch from the territory of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of a reconnaissance satellite, which triggered a very sharp reaction in the West. Russia does not support the steps of any of the parties that run counter to the aims of establishing long-term peace in the region. At the same time, when assessing this news, we suggest taking note of the fact that, back on 7 November, we learned about Seoul’s plans to launch, at the end of the month, their first reconnaissance satellite from America’s Vandenberg base.”
2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source
“Thus far this year, the allies have already conducted six joint exercises with the direct involvement of the American armed forces. Let us just look at the most recent examples. On 15 November, for the second time in the space of a month, two United States B-52 strategic bombers arrived on the territory of the peninsula. On 16 November, in the Sea of Japan, the most recent major exercises of the United States and Republic of Korea navies came to an end. They involved heavy offensive weapons, including destroyers, fighters and helicopters. On 21 November, the port of Busan was visited by a United States carrier strike group led by the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, one month after it was visited by another American aircraft carrier, the USS Ronald Reagan.”
2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source
“However, let us broaden the scope of today’s subject slightly and look at the current state of affairs in the region as a whole. In March, we drew the Council’s attention to the bellicose manoeuvres of the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea that were conducted in direct proximity to the borders of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Even back then, the allies’ Freedom Shield and Ssangyong military exercises, under the leadership of Washington, were of a stunning scale. It seemed to many that the region had reached a dangerous threshold, beyond which the possibilities for a political settlement would be reduced to nought. Unfortunately, since then, the proper conclusions have not been drawn, and the show of United States military force thousands of kilometres from its borders continues to break records.”
2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We listened closely to the briefing by Assistant Secretary-General Khiari, and we also welcome the participation in the meeting of the permanent representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea. Russia is concerned about the rapid development of a new cycle of escalation on the Korean peninsula. Over the past few months, we have been hearing from Washington and its allies in the region regular alarmist signals about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea building up its ballistics programme, which is a threat to its national security. At every opportunity, the United States delegation convenes the Security Council to portray itself almost as the victim of a situation that was allegedly created by Pyongyang alone.”
2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source
“In fact, the separation of those functions from the political component has not at all affected the effectiveness of assistance to ordinary Sudanese, who find themselves in catastrophic conditions. The UNITAMS mandate will expire on 3 December. We have taken note of the plans for conducting a strategic review aimed at preparing recommendations for further United Nations assistance to the Sudan. However, we still consider that the position of the Government of the Sudan on this issue will be the determining factor. The future of UNITAMS will be decided based on the views of the host country. In conclusion, we would like to confirm our unfailing support for the territorial integrity, independence, unity and sovereignty of the Sudan.”
2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source
“What is most important now, however, is to step up such efforts both within the Sudan itself and neighbouring countries that are under increasing pressure, including as a result of the large number of refugees. We have said before that much of the responsibility for the current situation lies with the leadership of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS). Many of the tasks under the mandate have remained on paper over the years, for various reasons, including the lack of promised financial assistance from donors. According to our calculations, United Nations humanitarian and economic entities are now adequately carrying out their functions with the resources available to them.”
2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source
“Close coordination between the mediators and the Sudanese authorities is needed more than ever to achieve tangible results towards reaching a settlement based on realistic goals. Restoring stability in the country must be at the top of the agenda. That is the highest priority. Lessons must also be learned from previous failed efforts. At the same time, the country is in dire need of assistance. We commend the work of the Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs and other humanitarian organizations that are working selflessly on the ground in very difficult conditions, with limited resources. As we have always done in the past, we encourage humanitarian workers to act strictly in accordance with the United Nations guiding principles for humanitarian assistance.”
2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source
“In that regard, any reconciliation efforts must take those factors into account and must involve all national stakeholders. Mediation initiatives must not be allowed to deepen disputes or increase mistrust, as we have unfortunately seen in a number of cases. In our view, that is a sign that the actions of external players are motivated by their own interests, not the interests of the Sudanese people. We are categorically opposed to attempts at political or social engineering, including outside the Sudan. The Sudanese do not, and should not, need to rely on mediators with the colonial mindset of their knowing best. The cost of playing such games could be further chaos.”
2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source
“We continue to call on the parties to the conflict — the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces — to demonstrate political will and take the necessary steps to bring about a ceasefire. We believe that differences can be resolved around the negotiating table. Unfortunately, to date, none of the many mediation initiatives has produced significant results, especially in terms of ending the armed confrontation. It is also not encouraging that the region as a whole is in a vulnerable situation and that, while the situation in the Sudan not only has an impact on the region, the converse is also true. We welcome the aspirations of the Sudan and neighbouring countries to restore trust in the region. The Sudanese conflict is rooted in history and complex national particularities.”
2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Assistant Secretary-General Martha Pobee for her briefing. We welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of the Sudan, Mr. Al-Harith Idriss Al-Harith Mohamed, at this meeting. We continue to follow with concern the development of the armed conflict in the Sudan. The situation has seriously deteriorated in recent months. Intense battles are being fought over strategic facilities in the area of the capital. We note the difficult situation in Nyala and Zalingei and the escalation of hostilities in El Fasher and North Kordofan. Military operations have spread into new territories, leading to many casualties, including among civilians. The country is facing a humanitarian disaster. The number of displaced persons is becoming unprecedented.”
2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source
“We intend to continue our constructive cooperation with the Mission and our joint efforts to definitely stabilize the Central African Republic for the benefit of international peace and security.”
2023-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9476 (2023) · source
“It no longer aligns with the consistent, years- long position of France in favour of maintaining an arms embargo against the Central African Republic. We also know that the lion’s share of misinformation and disinformation that was proactively disseminated by global media outlets, including French media, focused not on the activities of the Mission, but instead on the host Government and bilateral partners. Let us underscore that the resolutions of the Security Council cannot be used for interference in the internal affairs of States. Many objectives, including the demand to conduct night flights, need to be resolved by the Mission in close cooperations with the host country. In conclusion, we would like to emphasize that Russia consistently supports MINUSCA’s activities and its Head, Ms. Valentine Rugwabiza.”
2023-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9476 (2023) · source
“We note with regret that our attempts to fine-tune the text to ensure that it would be a compromise that could be supported by the Russian Federation came up against the unwillingness to the French penholders to abandon their politicized approaches. That was most starkly made clear in the categorical rejection of any mention of what is factual in form and clear for us all in terms of content, namely, the role of the Central African Republic’s bilateral partners as part of the country’s stabilization. At the same time, our French colleagues insisted on keeping France in the text of the resolution as one of the country’s partners in facilitating the strengthening of national security structures. I will be so bold as to propose that that wording is obsolete and no longer reflects the actual situation.”
2023-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9476 (2023) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation abstained in the voting on resolution 2709 (2023), drafted by France, on the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). Despite a number of positive changes — first and foremost the long-overdue transfer of the Mission’s tasks to facilitate the presence of the State as a matter of priority — the text continues to include obsolete elements that no longer reflect the situation in the Central African Republic. In the course of the resolution’s drafting, we described, frankly and in detail, our concerns, both to the French penholders and to other colleagues.”
2023-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9476 (2023) · source
“In that connection, we support the proposal for a technical extension of the peacekeeping mandate, including support for the JBVMM, for another year.”
2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source
“Against that background, the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) remains the most important factor in ensuring stability. We welcome the role played by the Blue Helmets in resolving ongoing security problems, maintaining law and order and strengthening relations between local communities. We are concerned about issues involving the work of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), in particular its headquarters in Kadugli, the operability of supply routes and the rotation of UNISFA personnel. We call on the UNISFA leadership to work more closely with the authorities of both States to resolve the situation. We believe that the continued presence of the Blue Helmets in the Area remains very important.”
2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source
“We commend the steps taken by South Sudan to welcome Sudanese refugees and South Sudanese returnees. We also acknowledge Juba’s efforts to promote intercommunal reconciliation in Abyei and the significant reduction in recent months in the number of clashes between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka and the Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka communities. However, we are concerned about the outbreaks of violence among the Nuer community. We continue to believe in the need for the parties to work together in matters concerning Abyei. Any unilateral attempts to change the status of the disputed Area in violation of the existing international legal framework and the agreements between the two States are unacceptable. In that regard, we attach importance to both countries’ fulfilment of their obligation to maintain Abyei’s demilitarized status.”
2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source
“South Sudan is facing serious challenges in terms of fulfilling its commitments under the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, completing the transition period and holding its first- ever general elections, scheduled for December 2024. Both countries are facing acute shortfalls in terms of financial resources as well as dealing with political blackmail and external interference, including through the imposition of illegitimate unilateral measures. At the same time, there have been no major negative developments in the situation in Abyei in recent months. Despite occasional incidents of intercommunal violence, the situation in the Area has generally remained stable. We welcome the responsible approach that both States have taken with regard to Abyei.”
2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Under-Secretary-General Lacroix and Ms. Tetteh, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa, for their informative briefings. We welcome the participation of the representatives of the Sudan and South Sudan in this meeting. As the report of the Secretary-General (S/2023/777) notes, there has been no political progress in the Abyei peace process in the past few months. However, in the current circumstances, there are empirical reasons that should not lead us to expect more. The Sudan is in the middle of an intense armed conflict that has engulfed the capital region and parts of Darfur, with severe humanitarian consequences for the entire region.”
2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source
“We call on UNSOM to continue to provide the necessary assistance to the Federal Government of Somalia, within the bounds of its mandate. Work should be intensified to implement what the Security Council approved last year — the recommendations for the independent strategic review of the Mission’s activities, including those related to launching the process of steadily handing over its functions to the United Nations country team. In providing assistance to the country, we call for strict adherence to the fundamental United Nations principles enshrined in General Assembly resolution 46/182, as the only consensus basis for international humanitarian assistance. Interference in the internal affairs of this State, including its legislative work in its sovereign Parliament, is unacceptable.”
2023-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9463 (2023) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation supported the Security Council resolution to renew the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) (resolution 2705 (2023)), prepared by our British colleagues. Somalia is now at an extremely important stage in its modern history. Contrary to all of the challenges, including the continued arms embargo, the Federal Government is successfully combating extremism. There are also results in State-building and the development of a national dialogue. We welcome Mogadishu’s leading role in resolving internal inter-clan conflicts in Laascaanood. Against this background, the role of the United Nations special political mission is growing significantly.”
2023-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9463 (2023) · source
“Russia will continue to provide the Central African Republic with all the necessary support, both as a permanent member of the Security Council and on a bilateral basis. We sympathize with the citizens of the Central African Republic in their desire to return to a normal, peaceful life in their country, and we have no doubt that their aspirations will be fulfilled.”
2023-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9454 (2023) · source
“In general, we support the work of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. MINUSCA is an important contributor to security and plays a key role in the efforts to counter armed groups and protect civilians. We thank the personnel deployed by troop- contributing countries for their commitment to carrying out their duty, which often involves risking their lives. We are convinced that the full implementation of the peacekeepers’ mandate will be possible only if a mutual understanding is maintained with the authorities of the host country. We commend the work of Special Representative Rugwabiza, who has established close contacts with Bangui.”
2023-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9454 (2023) · source
“Further progress on the issue of ensuring the country’s full participation in the Kimberley Process is also important for strengthening Bangui’s capacity in terms of an effective humanitarian response and, in general, improving the socioeconomic situation in the Central African Republic. We call for the settlement of all related issues of a technical nature. We are convinced that a long-term settlement and progressive progress towards stabilization will not be possible without effective support for the Central African Republic in increasing the combat effectiveness of the national armed forces and law enforcement units. The current sanctions restrictions on the Central African Republic, despite having been eased, hamper Bangui’s ability to restore order in the country. We are determined to seek their complete lifting.”
2023-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9454 (2023) · source
“Aid should not be politicized, as civilians are the ones who suffer the most, especially now that the humanitarian needs of the Central African Republic have been further exacerbated by developments in the neighbouring Sudan and growing instability in parts of Chad. According to estimates by the Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs, the number of refugees from those countries, among them many from the Central African Republic wanting to return home, has surpassed 56,000. The situation seriously increases the burden on the country’s State budget. In that regard, in addition to stopping the politicization and instrumentalization of external assistance, it is also necessary to fully fund the United Nations humanitarian appeal for the Central African Republic.”
2023-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9454 (2023) · source
“It is important to build on the results and continue further efforts. We call for the continuation of adequate international financial support for Bangui. The unique operation, supported by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), to repatriate 127 former Lord’s Resistance Army fighters to Uganda should be commended. We also welcome the efforts of the authorities of the Central African Republic to establish a State presence, strengthen administrative structures, continue security sector reform, develop the judiciary and prepare for local elections. It is important to continue humanitarian and development assistance to Bangui so as not to jeopardize the achievements of recent years.”
2023-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9454 (2023) · source
“We are convinced that the agreements reached are key to ensuring stability and security in the Central African Republic. We note the practical steps taken by Bangui to continue the political process. Thanks to the consistent work in that area, to date, 9 of the 14 signatory groups to the Political Agreement have voluntarily disbanded. We also welcome the significant results in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and social reintegration programme for combatants. Within the framework of the programme, approximately 4,500 former combatants who fought against the national army have laid down their weapons and have embarked on the path to the peaceful return to civilian life. That progress, together with the voluntary disbandment of most of the signatory groups to the Political Agreement, is highly commendable.”
2023-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9454 (2023) · source
“We call for support for the people of the Central African Republic in their efforts to ensure border security in order to prevent the cross-border movements of illegal armed groups and their weapons supply. Earmarked funding and expert assistance are important in that regard. We call on the militants who have not laid down their arms to give up violent means and engage in good- faith dialogue with Bangui, since there is no alternative to a political and diplomatic settlement in the Central African Republic. We welcome the commitment of the leadership of the Central African Republic to the further implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic and the Luanda road map.”
2023-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9454 (2023) · source
“The public campaign to spread disinformation and misinformation continues unabated. We interpret such actions by Western countries as an acknowledgement of the effectiveness of our assistance, given the fact that it is provided on an equal and respectful basis, with full respect for the sovereignty of African States. However, the most important proof of this lies in the trust that African countries place in us, despite the pressure being exerted on them, as well as the goodwill we have created within the general population of those countries. Security threats in the Central African Republic have not been definitively eradicated, and work continues. At the moment, however, that mainly concerns areas bordering neighbouring States. We welcome Bangui’s efforts to strengthen coordination and targeted cooperation with countries of the region.”
2023-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9454 (2023) · source
“We note with satisfaction that, with every year, the situation in the Central African Republic has continued to change for the better. With the support of the international community, represented by the United Nations and bilateral partners, including Russia, the authorities of the country have managed to overcome the most difficult phase of the fight against illegal armed groups. Government troops now control more than 85 per cent of the national territory, which is a significant achievement. The Russian instructors sent to the Central African Republic in response to the request by the Government of the country have made a significant contribution to that end. We are aware of the efforts of Western countries, including the United States, who send representatives to African countries. Their only demand is to stop cooperating with Russia.”
2023-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9454 (2023) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ms. Valentine Rugwabiza, for her briefing. We welcome the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Francophonie and Central Africans Abroad of the Central African Republic, Ms. Sylvie Valérie Baipo Temon, to this meeting. At the outset, we would like to congratulate Bangui on the successful holding of the constitutional referendum in July, which is undeniably an important step in the development of the Central African Republic and eloquently attests to the people’s support for the path chosen by the country’s leadership to ensure security, safeguard the country’s sovereignty and promote its domestic development, based on equal and mutually beneficial cooperation with the international community.”
2023-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9454 (2023) · source
“We would urge Member States to take all necessary measures to right this deplorable situation. We are prepared to consider any proposals to expand the sanctions list along the lines of the 2653 Committee. Nonetheless, we believe it is important to be as careful as possible when introducing new names to the list. That work should be aimed at stabilizing the situation in the country and not at conducting a so- called clean-up of the political landscape in Haiti in the interest of those leaders pushed forward by the West. Russia advocates for a considered and targeted use of the sanctions regime against Haiti without a blind copy-and-pasting of the unilateral coercive measures introduced by a number of countries.”
2023-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9449 (2023) · source
“We call for a transparent investigation into that tragedy, which has triggered the destabilization of the entire country. Turning to the question of sanctions, we welcome the approval by the Security Council on 19 October of an expanded arms embargo to all non-State actors in Haiti (resolution 2700 (2023)). We trust that that measure, along with the work of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022), concerning Haiti, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) will help to shed light on the sources and roots of the smuggling, as there has been no significant progress in countering the illegal transfer of light weapons to Haiti, including from the region’s largest weapons producer, the United States.”
2023-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9449 (2023) · source
“It is the pernicious practice of imposing on Haitians political models that are divorced of local realities, with complete disregard for national interests and local cultural particularities, that has led to the current multidimensional crisis. We advocate for the provision of responsible international assistance to the country, with an emphasis on a political settlement that is based on the objective needs requested by the Haitians themselves and on finding political solutions that are mutually acceptable to the opposing parties. More than two years later, the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse remains unsolved, and it is difficult to imagine that it will be, because its investigation is being conducted by the very country whose citizens are suspects in the assassination.”
2023-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9449 (2023) · source
“The Mission must have input from Haitian society. The history of foreign intervention in Haiti has been overwhelmingly negative in its effects. Haiti has suffered the most of any country in Latin America as a result of colonial oppression, and even after it won independence it has had to pay a tribute to its former metropole France for its freedom. We are convinced that foreign intervention is one of the main factors underpinning instability in Haiti. Various tools — from theories based on political science to unilateral sanctions — have been used to model the country’s political space to the liking of individual capitals. Meanwhile, the country has been further plunged into a crisis of statehood and legitimacy. Haiti has not had a democratically elected Government for more than six months.”
2023-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9449 (2023) · source
“Attacks on humanitarian convoys and the looting of their cargoes are unacceptable. Haiti’s problems have drawn the international community’s particular attention, which has been attested to by the adoption of two recent resolutions, on the extension of the sanctions regime (resolution 2700 (2023)) and on the establishment of the Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti (resolution 2699 (2023)). We are closely following progress in the preparations for the non-United Nations operation. We note the importance of duly elaborating its concept of operations and providing it to the Council, including its rules of engagement and exit strategy. At the same time, we draw attention to the voices expressing opposition to foreign intervention, both within the country and among the Haitian diaspora. They cannot be ignored.”
2023-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9449 (2023) · source
“The casualties and victims of the surge in violence, which has become a daily occurrence in Port-au-Prince, are often civilians. In addition to the Haitian capital, the situation in the Artibonite department, where gangs have expanded their area of control, is of concern. We are alarmed about the reports of schoolchildren increasingly falling victim to street clashes among gangs. Since the situation began to escalate last year, one in four schools in Haiti has been closed. UNICEF estimates that more than 1 million children no longer have access to education. The situation involving medical care, as well as access to basic goods and services, is even worse. We note the efforts of the United Nations humanitarian branch and other humanitarian organizations to help civilians.”
2023-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9449 (2023) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We welcome your participation, Mr. Minister, at today’s meeting. We would like to thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General María Isabel Salvador for her briefing on the situation in the country and her work in the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH). We listened closely to Ms. Catherine Russell, Ms. Ghada Fathi Waly and Ms. Mirlande Manigat. We welcome to this meeting the representatives of Haiti and other countries of the region. The situation in Haiti remains extremely grave. The crime rate is skyrocketing. Since the beginning of this year, more than 2,400 people have been killed — more people than were killed in all of last year.”
2023-10-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9449 (2023) · source
“In the light of the ongoing Security Council discussions on the extension of the UNSOM mandate, we express the hope that the leadership of the special political mission will be able to provide the necessary assistance to the Somali authorities within the Mission’s existing mandate. We believe that it is important to step up work to implement the recommendations approved by the Security Council on an independent strategic review of UNSOM activities, including with regard to the launch of a process for the gradual transfer of the Mission’s functions to the United Nations country team.”
2023-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9446 (2023) · source
“Against that backdrop, ATMIS remains a very important factor in containing extremist and other illegal activities in Somalia. Any reduction in the Mission’s contingent should be based on the real situation on the ground. We agree with the request of the Federal Government of Somalia, supported by the African Union, to postpone the completion of the stage 2 of the ATMIS withdrawal process by three months. We hope that the Security Council will soon be able to approve that request. We also share Mogadishu’s concerns regarding the arms embargo, which creates objective obstacles to combating Al-Shabaab effectively. We will be ready to join substantive talks on that issue in November.”
2023-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9446 (2023) · source
“Despite the offensive operations of the Somali National Army, Al-Shabaab maintains a firm hold in the country. The group is still carrying out high-profile acts resulting in a large number of casualties, including terrorist attacks, the occupation of towns and villages and attacks on the protected zone of the Mogadishu airport. We categorically condemn all terrorist attacks and pay tribute to the African peacekeepers and the Somali National Army, including those who have lost their lives in the line of duty. The situation in Laascaanood remains unresolved. We support the mediation efforts of the Federal Government, clan elders and States of the region to resolve that conflict. We urge UNSOM to continue to render the necessary assistance to Mogadishu as part of the Mission’s mandate.”
2023-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9446 (2023) · source
“At the NCC meeting held in August, important decisions were taken to strengthen the coordination of military operations against Al-Shabaab and accelerate the implementation of the national reconciliation plan. We note the personal contributions of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to the efforts to consolidate public opinion in the country. Nevertheless, we are concerned that Puntland and Somaliland are not participating in that process. Also of concern is the increased opposition in South-West state, Puntland and Jubaland. We urge all participants in the Somali political process to continue working together to establish a sustainable federative model in the country, while preserving the territorial integrity and unity of Somalia. The security situation is of particular concern.”
2023-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9446 (2023) · source
“Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to Special Representative of the Secretary-General Catriona Laing and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and Head of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), Mr. Mohamed El-Amine Souef, for their briefings. We welcome to today’s meeting Mr. Abukar Dahir Osman, Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations. Russia supports the efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia to stabilize the domestic political situation. Over the past year, there has been a significant uptick in the work of the National Consultative Council (NCC). The Parliament has begun discussing proposals to review the national Constitution and the electoral model.”
2023-10-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9446 (2023) · source
“We call for a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and the comprehensive fulfilment of the Luanda road map in order to create the conditions to promote an inter-Congolese negotiations process and re-establish good neighbourly relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. It is also important to intensify efforts to implement the fundamental Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region. We welcome the African Union’s focus on revitalizing this document. For our part, we will continue to support the stabilization of the Great Lakes region by promoting dialogue and constructive cooperation among all players. We will also continue to support the activities of Special Envoy Huang Xia aimed at reducing tensions in the region.”
2023-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9440 (2023) · source
“We are convinced that security and stability in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is in the interest of all States in the Great Lakes region. In our view, the regional efforts undertaken through the Nairobi and Luanda negotiation processes, as well as those undertaken by the East African Community presidency are of crucial importance. We also note the intentions of member States of the Southern African Development Community to assist in the peace process in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is clear that military methods will not achieve a lasting normalization in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region. Without direct and open dialogue between the main players in the region, and without taking into account everyone’s security interests, the spiral of violence will only worsen.”
2023-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9440 (2023) · source
“We call on illegal armed groups to end this violence, hand over their weapons and participate in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, without preconditions. We also support the efforts of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and its leadership to ensure peace and protect civilians. The presence of blue helmets in the conflict zone remains an important stabilizing factor. We agree with the Special Envoy’s conclusions on the subject of MONUSCO whereby, with further consideration by Kinshasa and the United Nations on the reconfiguration and gradual withdrawal of the Mission from the country, it is important to take into account the evolution of the situation on the ground and the views of the host country.”
2023-10-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9440 (2023) · source