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Evstigneeva

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2020-08-10
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2023-12-29
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un-security-council

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  1. We warn of the extremely dangerous consequences of such a misguided approach, and we call for an end to further experimentation on the independent Bosnian State and its peoples so that they may be enabled to develop independently, in full compliance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The destructive role of the Office of the High Representative is becoming increasingly apparent. That mechanism has lost any semblance of impartiality and propriety and has become a tool for imposing decisions of dubious value and feasibility.

    2022-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9029 (2022) · source

  2. The practices of illegal unilateral sanctions against Bosnian political representatives, as well as pressure, threats and blackmail, are becoming widespread. That is the path towards further degradation of intra-Bosnian dialogue and the destabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which by no means helps to normalize the situation in the country and ensure its socioeconomic development. Responsibility for the continuing deterioration of the political climate in the country and the mass exodus of the population lies on the shoulders of those who are trying to reshape the Dayton-era Bosnia and Herzegovina from the outside in order to suit their own interests.

    2022-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9029 (2022) · source

  3. Šefik Džaferović, Chair of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was not agreed upon with the other members of the Presidency, in accordance with the established procedure. Clearly, the necessary conclusions from the consequences of the reckless interference of the previous High Representative, Mr. Inzko, in the affairs of sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina and its peoples in the summer of last year have not been drawn. We are now witnessing a conscious rejection of the approach previously approved by the international community of the transfer of full responsibility to the legitimately elected authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in favour of the manual control of the Bosnian processes by Brussels, Washington and a number of European capitals. Foreign approaches and rules are being actively imposed.

    2022-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9029 (2022) · source

  4. We are concerned about the increasing trend towards centralization of the multi-ethnic Bosnian State around Bosniaks, the majority ethnic community, to the detriment of the constitutional rights of the other two peoples and the entities of the country with broad authority. That is also evident in the discussion of electoral law reform and in adopting foreign policy decisions that do not reflect the interests and will of the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We see that as a flagrant violation of the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is being directly encouraged by a number of Western countries, including those responsible for ensuring its implementation. In that connection, we regret that today’s statement by Mr.

    2022-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9029 (2022) · source

  5. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We note with regret that, in the six months since the previous Security Council debate on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see PV.8896), the state of affairs in that country has not improved. We are witnessing the deepest internal political crisis of the entire post-conflict period and an unprecedented decline in the level of inter-ethnic trust and dialogue. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina to find common ground, while the Dayton ideals of compromise and consensus have become almost unattainable.

    2022-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9029 (2022) · source

  6. For our part, we stand ready to promote stabilization in the Great Lakes region by encouraging dialogue and constructive cooperation among the countries of the region. We are committed to meaningful cooperation with the relevant institutions of the United Nations system and its representatives

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  7. We welcome the peacekeeping role played by leaders of States of the Great Lakes region, as well as by subregional organizations, such as the Southern African Development Community and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. We hope that the meeting of Heads of State and Government of the Regional Oversight Mechanism of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework that took place in February will foster subregional cooperation and expedite the peace process. We also note the recent summit in Nairobi, where States of the region were able to reach some important agreements. We fully support efforts of the United Nations to promote the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region, as well as United Nations work on the action plan for its implementation.

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  8. Every effort must also be made to improve the socioeconomic situation in the region, effectively implement disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes for former combatants and promote national reconciliation processes. The illegal exploitation of natural resources, which are used by militants to finance their activities and strengthen their combat capabilities, also remains an urgent issue. In general, we have a positive assessment of the momentum for dialogue among States of the Great Lakes region and their readiness to develop practical cooperation to stabilize the situation in the region.

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  9. A thorough and transparent investigation into the circumstances surrounding the crash must be conducted, including through the Secretariat, and to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. We note with concern the information about the links between some illegal armed groups operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and terrorist organizations. We reiterate our commitment to combating international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. However, we continue to believe that long-term normalization in the Democratic Republic of the Congo cannot be achieved through military measures alone. Efforts need to be made to ensure the full implementation of the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region.

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  10. Unfortunately, despite the joint military operations undertaken by Congolese and Ugandan army units and the efforts of the peacekeepers of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we are seeing increased activity in the eastern part of the country by illegal armed groups. Yet another tragic illustration of that scenario were the events of 29 March, when a helicopter deployed by the United Nations Mission was downed by the fighters, with Russian military observer Lieutenant Colonel Alexei Mizura on board. We offer our heartfelt condolences to the families and loved ones of all the peacekeepers killed.

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  11. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. Huang Xia, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, and Mr. João Samuel Caholo, Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, for their briefings. We listened very attentively to the briefing provided by Mr. Dinesh Mahtani. We welcome the presence among us the representatives of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other countries of the region. It is clear that the dire situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo is still having a major impact on the situation in the Great Lakes region.

    2022-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9023 (2022) · source

  12. As we see in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/316), the replacement of the Ethiopian troops in UNISFA with new peacekeepers from other countries is proceeding smoothly and moving towards its conclusion. It is also important to ensure that the new configuration is deployed in proper succession with the work of the Ethiopian peacekeepers, who demonstrated a high level of professionalism and bravery, and that logistical problems are avoided. We think that the ongoing presence in the region of peacekeepers is still very important. In that connection, we support the Secretary-General’s proposal to review UNISFA’s mandate, including providing support for the JBVMM for six months.

    2022-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9020 (2022) · source

  13. We note that are still some issues concerning the activities of the Blue Helmets and progress on meeting the benchmarks in the work of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM). We continue to believe that pressure and accusations will not solve those problems. We call on the leaders of UNISFA to work further towards resolving those issues with Khartoum and Juba. The positions of the Sudan and South Sudan and the concerns they have voiced must be closely taken into account. We hope that this situation will be taken into account in the work on the resolution of the Security Council on the UNISFA mandate rollover.

    2022-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9020 (2022) · source

  14. We hope the dialogue between Khartoum and Juba will facilitate agreements on the final status of Abyei. We consider the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) an important factor in ensuring stability. To that end, we believe that UNISFA must strictly adhere to its mandate. The main aim of the United Nations presence in the region is to maintain security and to assist the Sudan and South Sudan in their efforts to find a mutually acceptable resolution to the border dispute. We welcome the mission’s work to maintain dialogue between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities with an emphasis on elaborating confidence-building measures between them. The causes of the new episodes of violence in Abyei should be analysed more closely. We hope that the next joint peace conference of traditional leaders will soon be held.

    2022-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9020 (2022) · source

  15. In that regard, we welcome the fact that representatives of the Sudan and South Sudan stepped up their contacts during the reporting period, including at the highest levels. We also commend the fact that the parties demonstrated readiness to establish mutually beneficial cooperation, in particular on the joint exploitation of the potential oil resources of the disputed Abyei Area. We view the visit by the Chairperson of the Sovereign Council of the Sudan, General Al-Burhan, to Juba on 18 and 19 March and his talks with the President of the Republic of South Sudan, Mr. Salva Kiir Mayardit, as an important step in that direction. We also welcome the joint meeting in October between the Joint Political and Security Mechanism and the Joint Border Commission.

    2022-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9020 (2022) · source

  16. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Under-Secretary-General Jean-Pierre Lacroix and Special Envoy of the Secretary- General for the Horn of Africa Hanna Tetteh for their informative briefings. I congratulate Ms. Tetteh on her new appointment. Let me also take this opportunity to thank Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga for his work in the post. We are pleased to note that, despite some recurrent cases of intercommunal violence, which were swiftly resolved by representatives of the Sudan and South Sudan and the Blue Helmets, including the new Nigerian command, the situation in Abyei has remained generally stable in recent months. It requires the joint efforts of the parties to successfully promote an inter-Sudanese settlement.

    2022-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9020 (2022) · source

  17. Violations of human rights are condemned only when it is beneficial or convenient to the United States, and international legal mechanisms are applicable only with respect to those who it labelled ahead of time as criminals. For example, the United States did not wait for an investigation into the heinous provocation that transpired in Bucha, Ukraine. Perhaps it identified the perpetrators even before that provocation was staged. I ask the United States to not engage in these double standards and approaches that are apparent — not just to me but to others as well, including the Serbs. Insofar as what lies behind the actions of the United States, there is only one clear goal — the willingness and desire of NATO to dictate and impose its will, through force, upon other members of the international community.

    2022-04-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9019 (2022) · source

  18. The United States representative mentioned that I have nothing to teach him in the current circumstances, and yet he has been teaching the residents of Belgrade, Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Raqqa and Baghuz, as well as the Afghan provinces of Kandahar and Nangarhar and other parts of Afghanistan very well. Not all of the United States strikes were precise, to put it mildly. But that is different. That is collateral damage, as Madeleine Albright put it, and apparently such collateral damage was justified in the view of the United States. Indeed, the truth lies in the fact that the essence of United States policy and action is rooted in a single premise — the West is always right. International law can be distorted in any direction if it advances the interests of Washington and its military industrial complex.

    2022-04-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9019 (2022) · source

  19. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I cannot but respond to the statement delivered by our colleague from the United States, who, in commenting on my statement on the Kosovo issue, drew a parallel to the situation in Ukraine. I call on him to go ahead and familiarize himself with the statement of the United States Representative at a Security Council meeting on Kosovo on 24 March 1999 (see S/PV.3988). His own double standards will then become quite obvious to him. For 78 days, NATO bombed Belgrade. The United States killed nearly 1 million Iraqis. What did it do to Libya? Those countries are thousands of kilometres from the United States and pose no threat to it, and yet it actively fabricated various theories of limited sovereignty or humanitarian interventions.

    2022-04-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9019 (2022) · source

  20. Even the harsh criticism of Kosovo for its failure to comply with basic democratic and human rights standards, which Western countries have resorted to of late, has failed to yield results. Clearly, these kinds of observations are insufficient. In fact, no tangible steps are being undertaken. That brings dialogue to a dead end and leads Brussels on a path to discreditation of mediation efforts, which is especially unfortunate given that the protracted crisis in the province is escalating. There are clear threats from this area to all of Europe — economic, migration and even terrorist threats. It is important to understand that this is a reckless approach.

    2022-04-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9019 (2022) · source

  21. As for Kosovars themselves, they would be well- advised to fundamentally reconsider their priorities and not to allocate resources for the purchase of weapons, including through a special fund established to raise funds for strengthening the defence of the province, but for addressing the difficult socioeconomic situation. Those are the realities of the modern so-called State of Kosovo. Despite the methods adopted by the United States and a number of European countries when it was created in 1999, which I mentioned at the beginning of my statement, currently neither Brussels nor even Washington are in a position to exert significant influence over Pristina.

    2022-04-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9019 (2022) · source

  22. We are seriously concerned by the ongoing attempts since late February by Mr. Kurti and his network to undermine the situation in the region by escalating anti-Serb rhetoric and calling on the West to protect Kosovo from the threats it allegedly faces. Pristina has begun to demand expedited integration into NATO and other Western alliances and to seek the deployment of a new permanent United States military base in the province. Such plans, including the intention to create a full-fledged army in Kosovo, are fundamentally in violation of resolution 1244 (1999) and are fraught with the risk of further escalating tensions. We have repeatedly heard about the British deliveries to Pristina of anti-tank missile launchers and guided missiles, and the deployment of instructors to train the security forces.

    2022-04-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9019 (2022) · source

  23. Each new pretext is more absurd than the previous. They range from unsuccessful searches for contraband to attempts to seize coronavirus disease vaccines. Pristina’s actions towards UNMIK are unacceptable. Kosovo Albanians involved in the beating and detention of UNMIK officer Mikhail Krasnoshchekov on 28 May 2019 have still not been brought to justice. Another Mission representative, Mr. Antonov, was declared persona non grata by regional authorities on 31 December 2021, in flagrant violation of established international legal norms. Clearly, the United Nations must do more to ensure the inviolability of its representatives in Kosovo. The work of the Mission in the province is more important than ever. It must be able to fully carry out its mandate and have the necessary resources to do so.

    2022-04-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9019 (2022) · source

  24. We demand that in the future such legal violence be countered — in deed and not in word — by the international presence, in line with its broad authority, first and foremost by the missions of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Other dangerous unilateral actions by Kosovars include their efforts to destabilize the Serb-populated north of the province. In September and October 2021, the situation almost spiralled out of control when Pristina’s special forces occupied a checkpoint Administrative Boundary Line and a number of other areas. It should be recalled that the Kosovo police used firearms. Dozens of civilians were injured. Such reckless conduct continues to this day, including in the isolated — and therefore more vulnerable — Serb enclaves in the south.

    2022-04-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9019 (2022) · source

  25. The number of non-Albanians returning to Kosovo are negligible. I ask my colleagues in the Security Council to reflect on whether they want to be complicit in creating an ethnically cleansed Kosovo for Albanians only. For Russia, such a prospect is categorically unacceptable. Also absolutely unacceptable is the way in which the so-called provincial Government has treated the electoral rights of Kosovo Serbs. Contrary to previous practice, they were forbidden from voting — first in the Serbian referendum on 16 January and, subsequently, during the general presidential and parliamentary elections of 3 April. Ultimately, tens of thousands of people were excluded from the democratic process. We strongly condemn attempts to obscure the long-term negative effect of what happened.

    2022-04-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9019 (2022) · source

  26. There has also been a sharp increase in attacks this year, with 35 incidents taking place between January and March alone. Let us recall that, since 1999, there have been virtually no Serbs in southern Kosovo. However, systematic efforts to definitively drive them out of the province continue, and there is an obvious attempt to erase their cultural and religious identity. Orthodox churches and monasteries, including those on the UNESCO World Heritage List, are under constant threat. One of them, the Vsoki Dečani monastery, has not been able to regain its lands since 2016, despite the decision of the so-called Constitutional Court of Kosovo in its favour. In addition to Serbs, other non-Albanians are being subjected to discrimination. In fact, all national minorities are being forced out of the province.

    2022-04-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9019 (2022) · source

  27. Under myriad pretexts Kosovo Albanians have been sabotaging the creation of an association of Serb municipalities for nine years, thereby derailing the process of inter-ethnic reconciliation in the province. After all, the association was intended to provide basic guarantees for the survival of Kosovo Serbs in the areas of security, judicial and political affairs and socioeconomic and cultural affairs. We regret that neither the Secretary-General’s report (S/2022/313) nor statements of most our colleagues pay any considerable attention to that issue. Without the association, Kosovo Serbs remain in a very disadvantaged position. Here is a vivid example – attacks on Kosovo Serbs and their property doubled in 2021 as compared to 2020.

    2022-04-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9019 (2022) · source

  28. An important step towards ending the bloodshed and starting work towards reconciliation between Belgrade and Pristina should have been the Security Council’s adoption of resolution 1244 (1999). However, the Western permanent members of the Security Council were the first to lose sight of the resolution, as they rushed to recognize Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. There was no referendum or resolution of the Security Council or the General Assembly to that effect. As a result, a Kosovo quasi-State, a Western pet project, was created. After another two years, the negotiations were placed under Brussels’ auspices. However, unfortunately, the Brussels Agreement, reached by the parties in 2013, did not lead to tangible political results.

    2022-04-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9019 (2022) · source

  29. So far that has been in vain. For our part, we view as unacceptable attempts by Pristina to challenge the legitimacy of the judicial process and to convince the international community of the manifest infallibility of the KLA’s representatives. I also recall that, on 24 March 1999 (see S/PV.3988), the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Mr. Lavrov, cautioned about the long-term adverse consequences of such an act by NATO, not only for the prospects for resolving the Kosovo situation and ensuring security in the Balkans but also for the stability of the entire contemporary system of international relations. It is clear that that was when the West tried on the role of the world’s policeman and opened a Pandora’s box.

    2022-04-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9019 (2022) · source

  30. In total, 15 tons of that radioactive substance were released, thereby contaminating a large area. The dire consequences of that crime for human health and the environment can still be seen today. We also cannot overlook NATO’s choice of an ally on the ground — the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) — whose many crimes remain unpunished to this day. On 7 January 2011, a report by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe was published on the crimes committed by members of the Kosovo Liberation Army between 1998 and 2000, including crimes against humanity, war crimes, systematic abductions and killings, as well as widespread organ trafficking. It is now 2022, and we are still closely following the work of the Specialist Court on the investigation of KLA crimes. We continue to hope for an objective trial and fair verdicts.

    2022-04-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9019 (2022) · source

  31. We support Belgrade and Pristina in reaching a viable, mutually acceptable solution, on the basis of that Security Council resolution, which should be in line with international law and be endorsed by the Security Council. Before turning to an assessment of the current situation in the province, I should like to remind colleagues that this March marked the twenty- third anniversary of the NATO coalition bombing of Belgrade. As a result of that operation, which lasted 78 days, thousands of civilians were killed and more than 1,500 residential areas, 60 bridges, 30 per cent of all schools, hospitals and approximately 100 monuments were destroyed. The coalition used tens of thousands of bombs and cruise missiles, many of them equipped with depleted uranium.

    2022-04-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9019 (2022) · source

  32. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): First of all, I would like to congratulate Special Representative of the Secretary-General Caroline Ziadeh on her first briefing on the situation in the province, and I thank her for the views that she provided. We welcome the participation of the Minister for Foreign Minister of Serbia, Mr. Nikola Selaković. We listened to the views of Ms. Donika Gërvalla- Schwarz. At the outset, we would like to emphasize that the position of the Russian Federation on Kosovo remains unchanged. Resolution 1244 (1999) remains the international legal basis for the settlement of this issue.

    2022-04-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9019 (2022) · source

  33. In the original version of my statement, I was going to say that we hope that the traditional partners of Mali will take the opportunity to reject the logic of sermonizing, acting with superiority and using the language of sanction and work within the framework of respectful dialogue with Bamako to find a way of overcoming differences. But, having heard the discussions today, I am compelled to admit that this is probably not something that will happen, and the Western countries will once again fail to heed the appeal for equitable, mutually beneficial and respectful cooperation.

    2022-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9012 (2022) · source

  34. In that regard, I would like to note once again that the consequences of unprecedented anti-Russian sanctions, which have resulted in the disruption of all logistical and financial links and chains across the world, show most countries of the world, including those in Africa, how important it is to defend one’s own political independence and financial capacities so as to overcome the legacy of colonialism and give up any neo-colonial mechanisms that remain. In conclusion, I would like to say that Russia will continue to extend support to Malians, including through collective efforts aimed at helping to stabilize the situation in their country. At the same time, we ask Bamako to have a balanced approach to crisis settlement.

    2022-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9012 (2022) · source

  35. We once again heard accusations against Russia today, stating that we are supposedly provoking famine in the Sahel. Let me recall that, some time ago, climate was the culprit responsible for everything. Now it is Russia. At the same time, Mali has had numerous sanctions levied on it. The borders are closed, the trade routes are blocked, and the people of the entire region are suffering. They do not have even the most basic income. But if we take a look at the slogans that ordinary people are voicing when they come out to protest, they mention Russia, but not at all in the way that Western countries would like to see.

    2022-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9012 (2022) · source

  36. We are working to increase their combat readiness and train the military and law enforcement. There are currently approximately 200 Malian military personnel and nine police officers being trained in Russia. We are convinced that the stabilization of Mali is not being helped by the regional sanctions imposed on it, or by the restrictions imposed by a number of Western countries. Those sanctions can serve only to compound the already very difficult situation, not to mention that they worsen the living conditions of ordinary Malians, as well as that of the people in other countries of the region. Under such conditions, Bamako and its neighbours will find it increasingly difficult to address the country’s challenges, chief among them terrorism.

    2022-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9012 (2022) · source

  37. We also pay tribute to the Malian armed forces and express our condolences to the families of those who perished — both military and civilian — and, of course, the United Nations peacekeepers. We call upon one and all to respect the memory of all victims of terrorism. At the same time, we note that the general staff of the Malian armed forces are committed to human rights and international humanitarian law and that Bamako is making efforts to investigate allegations of human rights violations. We view the information campaign about the so-called “Russian mercenaries” as part of a sordid geopolitical game. We would like to point out that cooperation between Russia and Mali has a long history and tradition. Russia has been extending assistance to Malian armed forces on the basis of bilateral agreements.

    2022-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9012 (2022) · source

  38. And now, without having accomplished anything, they are dropping Mali on a trumped-up pretext, even though everyone agrees that it is a key country for stability and security in the Sahel region. As Mali is left alone to face serious cross-border challenges, the transitional authorities are trying to protect their people on their own and through interaction with partners and organizations from other countries. The Malian authorities have a sovereign right to decide who they want to work with. We welcome the intensification of counter- terrorism operations by the Malian armed forces and the successes in that regard, as a result of which a number of settlements in the centre of the country have been freed.

    2022-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9012 (2022) · source

  39. It is also unclear what impact the withdrawal of Operation Barkhane and the Takuba Task Force will have on combat readiness for the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, who are to be on the front lines of fighting terrorism in the Sahara and the Sahel. At the same time, I would like to recall that what is happening in Mali and the Sahel in general is a legacy of the intervention of Western countries in Libya in 2011. Since then, the region has become a target for banditry and terrorism. The fact that in 2013 our Western partners decided to lend assistance is certainly commendable, but upon taking a closer look of the outcome of that assistance, it is apparent that the situation did not improve from that time until 2021.

    2022-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9012 (2022) · source

  40. We share the concern expressed by the Malian authorities with regard to the worsening situation in the northern areas of the country. The withdrawal of the French military presence creates a security vacuum there. We hear from Bamako that, as was the case last autumn, the decision to fully withdraw Operation Barkhane forces was taken without consultations with the Malian side. That is a violation of the bilateral agreements, and we think that it is extremely irresponsible. We also share the assessments made in the Secretary-General’s report (S/2022/278) with regard to the negative consequences for the implementation of the MINUSMA mandate and, more specifically, the security of peacekeepers, of actions taken by France and its European Union partners.

    2022-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9012 (2022) · source

  41. During the reporting period, we heard the Malian authorities repeat that Bamako is committed to gradually achieving this goal. The fact that the Malian authorities are conducting a broad national process to prepare for elections and the fact that they have created an extended working group for that purposes, as well as a dialogue group to relaunch negotiations with the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), show their constructive approach and make it clear that they do not have a hidden agenda. We hope that, in the near future, the negotiations between Bamako and ECOWAS will bear fruit. We call upon both sides to continue dialogue and on the mediators to continue their efforts.

    2022-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9012 (2022) · source

  42. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to Special Representative El- Ghassim Wane for his briefing on the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the situation in the country. We listened very carefully to Ms. Bouaré Samaké, and we welcome the participation of the Permanent Representative of Mali in this meeting. We are convinced that overcoming the existing challenges in Mali will be possible only if there is internal political stability in the country. We can see that the transition authorities are serious about their intention to gradually resolve the accumulated issues. Restoring constitutional order is, of course, one of the priority issues.

    2022-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9012 (2022) · source

  43. We believe it is important that another meeting of the High-Level Meeting of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo was held in February.

    2022-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9007 (2022) · source

  44. We welcome the efforts of the authorities in preparing for the organization of elections. We commend the commitment of the neighbouring countries of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to develop practical cooperation aimed at stabilizing the situation in the Great Lakes region, as well as progress in bilateral dialogue between regional stakeholders vis-à-vis, first and foremost, security issues, strengthening of national borders and combating illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons. We welcome the efforts of the leaders of the States in the region, the Southern African Development Community and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.

    2022-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9007 (2022) · source

  45. It is crucial to implement non-military measures to strengthen local institutions of State governance, alleviate the humanitarian situation and provide conditions for sustained socioeconomic development. The priority in making headway for a long-term resolution and reconciliation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is, with the assistance of the Blue Helmets, the implementation of the programme for the disarmament, demobilization and social reintegration of former combatants. A key pillar for politics in the Democratic Republic of the Congo over the near term is presidential elections. It is necessary for elections to be carried out in line with the timetable set out under the Constitution, to ensure that they be inclusive and in line with international elections standards.

    2022-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9007 (2022) · source

  46. We believe during the implementation of the joint transition plan adopted on 15 September 2021 by the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the leadership of MONUSCO with regard to the Mission’s drawdown and withdrawal from the country in 2024, it is important to account for the situation and developments on the ground and to operate in a phased and responsible way. There is an acute persistent problem of fighters illicitly exploiting natural resources to fund operations and build up military capabilities. We hope that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, working alongside United Nations peacekeepers and international partners, will manage to restore control over the security situation and normalize the situation.

    2022-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9007 (2022) · source

  47. In the first few months of this year, attacks targeting civilians were repeatedly carried out. We are particularly troubled by attacks on camps for internally displaced persons and the use by armed groups of improvised explosive devices. We believe that, in order to successfully vanquish the fighters, it is necessary to further step up coordination between the peacekeepers and the Congolese security forces, as well as to facilitate capacity-building for the latter. We welcome the establishment, in October 2021, of a centre to coordinate the operations of MONUSCO and the Congolese army. We also welcome the establishment of tripartite cooperation, with the participation of Ugandan military personnel. We support the reinforcement of MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade.

    2022-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9007 (2022) · source

  48. We welcome efforts to counter the militias. However, it behoves us to note that the Congolese armed forces, alongside their regional partners and MONUSCO peacekeepers, have not yet managed to fundamentally curb the capacity of the numerous militias proliferating in the area. We note the stepped- up activities of a number of armed groups, first and foremost, the Allied Democratic Forces. It is with alarm that we have learned of late that the activity of the Coopérative pour le développement du Congo has increased. On 1 February, following an attack by that entity in Ituri, more than 50 people died, including women and children. The Russian Federation supported the adoption of a Security Council press statement on 4 February (SC/14787) to condemn this heinous act.

    2022-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9007 (2022) · source

  49. Ms. Evstigneeva (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We wish to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ms. Bintou Keita, for her briefing. It is with great alarm that we have learned about the missing helicopter belonging to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). We support the activities of peacekeepers in the country. It is with further alarm that we note that problems in the area of security have escalated in the eastern and north-eastern parts of the country, specifically in Ituri and North Kivu provinces. There, since May 2021, a state of siege has been in effect, and since November 2021, a joint military operation has been carried out with armed units of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda.

    2022-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9007 (2022) · source

  50. We would also like to note that in resolution 2620 (2022) of 15 February, the intention was expressed to establish by 31 August clear and realistic benchmarks for reviewing the measures imposed on the Sudan because of the situation in Darfur. We call for that time frame to be complied with fully rather than extending it, since to do so would show only that some countries seek to maintain international sanctions as an instrument for exerting pressure on Khartoum.

    2022-03-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9006 (2022) · source