YouSaid · the spoken record

Nakamitsu

lines on the record

465

first

2015-08-20

most recent

2023-12-15

sittings or episodes

46

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un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

1. “To effectively address threats to international peace and security, it is imperative that small arms and light weapons be consistently and comprehensively considered. That involves not only strict control over their supply but also addressing the underlying factors that contribute to their demand.”

   2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

2. “In his report, the Secretary-General offers a number of recommendations on this matter that can be considered by the Security Council. In particular, the Council is encouraged to continue to seek reports from Member States on the steps that they have taken to implement arms embargoes and on their efforts to cooperate and share information with the panels of experts. I would like to conclude my briefing by stressing the need to fully integrate small arms and light weapons considerations throughout the Security Council’s work. Whether addressing geographic contexts or thematic issues, the widespread availability and illicit proliferation of those weapons and their associated ammunition serve as key drivers and enablers of conflict, terrorism, violence and crisis.”

   2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

3. “The illicit flows of arms and ammunition in violation of arms embargoes remain a matter of grave concern. I welcome the action taken by the Council through the adoption of resolution 2616 (2021) on combating the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and diversion of arms and related materiel in violation of arms embargoes which has been crucial in addressing that serious threat to international peace and security. However, illicit arms trafficking and diversion, in violation of Security Council-mandated arms embargoes, continue to be documented. That demonstrates the ongoing need to improve national and regional implementation and enforcement of arms embargoes. At the same time, panels of experts across many arms embargo regimes continue to face challenges in identifying the origin and supply chain of seized weapons and ammunition.”

   2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

4. “I encourage the Security Council to also incorporate weapons and ammunition considerations in its work on the protection of civilians and conflict prevention. When mandating United Nations peace operations, the Security Council could assess the potential contribution of conventional arms control and integrate related mandates into protection-of-civilian efforts. Integrating arms-related risks in conflict analysis and protection risk assessments makes it possible to identify and address arms-related threats, including as part of conflict prevention, management and resolution efforts. The collection and analysis of arms-related information as part of civilian casualty recording and human rights monitoring is also an important practical step to address concerns related to conventional weapons and ammunition.”

   2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

5. “To adequately address challenges related to small arms and light weapons in peace operation contexts, the Security Council is encouraged to ensure that missions are consistently and appropriately mandated to assist States in the effective, safe and secure management of weapons and ammunition. It is likewise crucial that peace operations do not inadvertently contribute to risks of diversion and unplanned explosions at munitions sites. I welcome the continued work to strengthen weapons and ammunition management by troop- and police-contributing countries. Concerted and coordinated efforts are needed by those countries and field missions to effectively implement relevant policies and international guidelines and to ensure the safety, accountability and security of their weapons and ammunition.”

   2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

6. “The Security Council has considered the negative impacts of small arms and light weapons in relevant country and regional contexts that are experiencing armed conflict and high-levels of armed violence. I commend the Council’s increasing consideration of the issue of small arms, including the integration of weapons-related provisions into its resolutions on Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen. Weapons and ammunition management also continues to be integrated into the work and mandates of peace operations.”

   2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

7. “We need to further strengthen those linkages, including by greater harmonization between national strategies and actions plans for implementing the women and peace and security agenda and those regulating small arms and light weapons, as well as greater coordination and exchanges between national and regional women and peace and security focal points and small arms control focal points. More needs to be done to foster women’s full and meaningful participation in arms control at the international, regional and national levels. I note the Secretary-General’s recommendation to identify good practices through a report on gender equality in national, regional and international institutions and organizations working on conventional arms control and disarmament.”

   2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

8. “That forms the basis for the development of evidence-based prevention and protection strategies and for gender- responsive policymaking and programming on small arms and light weapons. Accordingly, the Security Council is encouraged to mandate United Nations entities to systematically collect such data, including when recording casualties and monitoring incidents of conflict-related sexual violence. Small arms and light weapons control efforts play a crucial role in advancing the women and peace and security agenda.”

   2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

9. “The Council has paid increasing attention to the gendered aspects of small arms and light weapons control, including the full and effective participation of women in arms control policy and practice, as well as the differentiated impacts of illicit arms on women, men, girls and boys. Of particular concern to international peace and security is the role played by the proliferation and illicit circulation of small arms in facilitating and perpetrating gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence. I would like to underscore the need for the collection and analysis of gender- and age-disaggregated data on the impact of small arms and light weapons.”

   2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

10. “Small arms control measures have proven themselves to be effective tools to disrupt the supply of illicit small arms and light weapons to terrorist and criminal groups. Such measures include robust transfer controls, border security strategies, safe and secure stockpile management, comprehensive marking, tracing and record-keeping and the collection and analysis of data on diversion, as well as investigations and prosecutions of firearms trafficking offences. Thematic discussions on the women and peace and security agenda are also important opportunities to consider the connection and points of intersection with small arms-related issues within the framework of the Security Council’s agenda.”

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

11. “That includes addressing small arms and light weapons as they relate to the protection of civilians, human rights, women and peace and security, children and armed conflict and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, as well as linkages to transnational organized crime and terrorism. On the latter, in his reports to the Council, the Secretary-General has repeatedly underscored the challenges posed by arms acquisition by non-State actors, including transnational organized criminal groups and, of course, terrorist groups. He has encouraged further consideration by the Council of the nexus between terrorism, organized crime and small arms and light weapons as interrelated and multifaceted security threats that require complementary approaches and responses.”

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

12. “The United Nations has established the Saving Lives Entity, a global funding facility within the Peacebuilding Fund, which continues to support United Nations country teams in beneficiary countries through such transformative and comprehensive programmes on small arms and light weapons control and armed violence reduction. Due to the cross-cutting and multidimensional impact of small arms and light weapons, the Secretary- General has consistently encouraged the Security Council to consider small arms and light weapons and their ammunition in the context of country-specific and thematic agenda items and discussions.”

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

13. “Linkages between arms control and peace and development have been long recognized, including through Goal 16 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Adequate small arms control is a critical means of reducing armed violence, preventing conflict and building peaceful and inclusive societies, without which sustainable development cannot happen. At the same time, sustainable development can help reduce the demand for small arms by addressing the inequalities and enabling factors that perpetuate their illicit trafficking. This integration of small arms and light weapons considerations into development efforts also requires comprehensive and multidisciplinary approaches for the control of small arms, while also addressing the political, socioeconomic and cultural drivers of supply and demand for these weapons.”

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

14. “The second is the setting of voluntary national and regional targets and measuring progress through data collection and monitoring. Good practices and lessons learned from successful regional initiatives demonstrate the importance of robust monitoring and evaluation frameworks to measure progress in implementation and to inform further programming and policymaking. At the national level, voluntary target-setting promotes the development of nationally owned and led approaches, based on a State’s needs, capacities and priorities. The third is the pursuit of whole-of-Government approaches that integrate small arms and light weapons control into development, prevention and peacebuilding initiatives.”

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

15. “The first is the development and strengthening of national and regional instruments and action plans to address challenges related to diversion, proliferation and misuse. Global commitments must be translated into tailored action at the national and regional levels. I welcome the progress made in developing and implementing regional and subregional policy frameworks and strategies on small arms and light weapons, among them the ones in the Western Balkans and in the Caribbean, as well as the one currently being developed in Central America. Those mechanisms reflect the unique realities, priorities, challenges and ownership of each region, while continuing to reinforce and enhance coordination in the area of small arms and light weapons control.”

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

16. “Let me take this opportunity to highlight the successful adoption of the new Global Framework for Through- life Conventional Ammunition Management (General Assembly resolution 78/47), a remarkable achievement by Member States to reduce the risks of illicit trafficking and diversion of conventional ammunition, as well as to prevent and mitigate unplanned explosions at munitions sites. While existing regulatory frameworks have enabled great strides, implementation continues to be uneven and challenges persist. In his New Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General put forward three recommendations to advance comprehensive approaches for small arms and light weapons control, which the Security Council could consider in addressing the threat posed by their diversion, illicit trafficking and misuse.”

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

17. “Considerable efforts have been undertaken at the global, regional, subregional and national levels in support of small arms and light weapons control. They include work in the framework of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and its International Tracing Instrument, the Firearms Protocol to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Arms Trade Treaty. The United Nations continues to advocate for the universalization of, and compliance with, relevant legally binding arms control instruments and for the full and effective implementation of political instruments.”

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

18. “Let me highlight a few points from his most recent report, which provides an overview of significant trends and developments over the past two years. In it, the Secretary-General laments the deteriorating security environment, the escalation in armed conflicts and the related surge in civilian casualties. In addition, we have seen a continued rise in global military expenditure and the costs of small arms and light weapons for peace, security and sustainable development. Notably, in his policy brief on a New Agenda for Peace, the Secretary- General not only identified arms regulation and control measures as critical for preventing conflict and violence and sustaining peace, but also called for actions to reduce the human cost of weapons, including through greater control of small arms and light weapons and ammunition.”

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

19. “Small arms and light weapons are the weapons of choice in initiating, sustaining and exacerbating conflict, armed violence, terrorism and other forms of organized crime. Their misuse facilitates human rights violations and gender- based violence. According to the latest figures, 260,000 people were killed by small arms in 2021 alone, amounting to 45 per cent of all violent deaths — more than 700 people daily, or one person dying from small arms every two minutes. In view of the gravity of the issue, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to report on small arms on a biennial basis beginning in 2008. Since that request, there have been eight reports of the Secretary-General on this topic.”

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

20. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: Allow me to express my gratitude to Ecuador for convening this very important meeting and for giving me the opportunity to brief on the Secretary-General’s biennial report (S/2023/823) on small arms and light weapons, which was released last month. I applaud the Security Council’s commitment to addressing the issue of small arms and light weapons on a regular basis. The biennial consideration of small arms began more than 15 years ago with a 2007 presidential statement (S/PRST/2007/24). Since then, the Council has continued to recognize that the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons constitute a threat to international peace and security.”

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

21. “Mines and explosive remnants of war have resulted in widespread land contamination, which renders land unusable for agriculture while impeding people’s movement. I reiterate my call to all the relevant parties to abide by their obligations under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and not to transfer or use any mines prohibited by its Amended Protocol II. The past 18 months have seen death, loss, unbearable suffering and devastation in Ukraine. The world cannot afford for this senseless war to continue. I appeal to all Member States to make every effort for peace. As the Secretary-General has repeatedly emphasized, the United Nations is committed to supporting all meaningful efforts to bring a just and sustainable peace to Ukraine guided by the Charter, international law and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.”

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

22. “The continued and intensified attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure and services in Ukraine, including energy infrastructure, health and educational facilities, ports, roads, bridges and grain facilities, remain very alarming. Under international humanitarian law, parties to an armed conflict are prohibited from targeting civilians and civilian objects, including civilian infrastructure, and have the responsibility to take all feasible precautions in the conduct of military operations in order to avoid, or at least minimize, the incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. The United Nations strongly condemns attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure and urges for their immediate cessation.”

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

23. “The continued use of large numbers of armed uncrewed aerial vehicles against civilians and civilian infrastructure is concerning. Armed uncrewed aerial vehicles must not be used in a manner inconsistent with international humanitarian law. The Secretary-General has unequivocally urged all sides to avoid the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, as their use is highly likely to result in indiscriminate harm, including in Ukraine. I would like to take this opportunity to call on all Member States to implement in a broad and meaningful manner the Political Declaration adopted in November 2022 on strengthening the protection of civilians from the humanitarian consequences arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.”

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

24. “Beyond addressing arms transfers, all parties to armed conflicts have a duty to protect civilians in armed conflict and to ensure compliance with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law. From 24 February 2022 to 27 August of this year, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights recorded 26,717 civilian casualties in Ukraine, with 9,511 killed and 17,206 injured. The actual figures are likely to be considerably higher. The vast majority of civilian casualties have been the result of the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects, including by shelling from artillery, tanks, multiple-launch rocket systems, cruise and ballistic missiles and by air strikes.”

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

25. “I welcome the conclusion of the work of the Open- ended Working Group on Conventional Ammunition and applaud the successful adoption of its final report (see A/78/111), which contains the text of the new Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management. The Framework is a much-needed instrument to more effectively counter the diversion of conventional ammunition of all types that continue to fuel instability, insecurity and conflict across the world. I reiterate my call on all States to join the relevant treaties and agreements and to fully implement their legal obligations under the conventional arms- control instruments to which they are party, as well as their political commitments, to minimize the risk of the diversion of arms and ammunition.”

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

26. “In its 30 years of operation, 178 Member States have submitted a report to UNROCA at least once, and I call on all States to continue to participate in the mechanism. UNROCA captures around 90 per cent of global arms flows and can help track influxes of weapons into conflict zones. Moreover, the Arms Trade Treaty, the Firearms Protocol, the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, and its International Tracing Instrument, are some of the arms-control instruments established by States to prevent the diversion of conventional arms and regulate the international arms trade.”

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

27. “Requirements for preventing the diversion of weapons include supply-chain transparency and cooperation and information exchange among importing, transit and exporting States, as well as concrete measures such as marking, tracing, effective accounting and comprehensive record-keeping practices, the physical safeguarding of arms and ammunition, customs and border-control measures and diversion monitoring and analysis. As I have said many times, transparency in arms transfers is a crucial confidence-building measure that can serve to reduce tensions and avoid ambiguities among Member States. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) remains a key instrument in that regard.”

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

28. “Measures to address the risk of diversion of weapons and ammunition to unauthorized end users and for unauthorized uses are essential for preventing further instability and insecurity in Ukraine, the region and beyond. Such measures include the enforcement of marking practices, comprehensive pre-transfer diversion risk assessments, end-user certificates, including non-transfer clauses, effective legal and enforcement measures and post- shipment verifications.”

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

29. “In line with his long-standing position, these weapons must be consigned to history. Most recently, in his policy brief on the New Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General has encouraged Member States to commit to reducing the human cost of weapons, including by achieving universal participation in treaties banning inhumane and indiscriminate weapons, such as the Convention on Cluster Munitions. We also take note of reports related to the transfer of depleted uranium tank ammunition to the Ukrainian forces. The supply of weapons and ammunition into any armed conflict situation raises significant concerns about the potential escalation of violence and presents significant risks of diversion and proliferation, even after the conflict has ended.”

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

30. “Over the last months, reported transfers of arms and ammunition to the Ukrainian defence forces have expanded. There have also been reports of States transferring or planning to transfer weapons, such as uncrewed aerial vehicles and ammunition, to the Russian armed forces, including for possible use in Ukraine. Needless to say, any transfer of weapons must take place within the applicable international legal and policy frameworks, including relevant Security Council resolutions. Any potential or suspected violations of relevant Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions or restrictive measures, if verified, are very concerning. Reports related to the transfer and use of cluster munitions throughout the war are also very concerning. The Secretary-General has repeatedly called for an immediate end to the use of cluster munitions.”

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

31. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: Since my most recent briefing to the Security Council on this topic only weeks ago (see S/PV.9399), the provision of defensive military assistance to the armed forces of Ukraine has continued in the context of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine launched by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022 in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Much of the information on transfers of weapons systems and ammunition flows from Governments is available through open sources. These transfers have reportedly included heavy conventional weapons such as battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft, helicopters, large-calibre artillery systems, missile systems and uncrewed combat aerial vehicles, as well as remotely operated munitions, small arms and light weapons and their ammunition.”

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

32. “As the Secretary-General has stated before, any use of chemical weapons is unacceptable and a clear violation of international law. We have a responsibility, particularly to the victims, to identify those responsible and ensure accountability for the use of those heinous weapons. The United Nations will continue to support all efforts to uphold the norm against chemical weapons and to relegate those dreadful weapons to history. I urge the members of the Council to unite on the issue and show leadership in demonstrating that impunity in the use of chemical weapons will not be tolerated. The Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can.”

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9411 (2023) · source

33. “I understand that the Fact-Finding Mission is currently preparing upcoming deployments and will report to the Executive Council on the results of its work in due course. The Investigation and Identification Team also continues its investigations into incidents in which the Fact-Finding Mission has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic and will issue further reports in due course. Two weeks ago, on 21 August, the world marked the tenth anniversary of the large-scale chemical weapons attack that took place in the Ghouta district of Damascus. In remembering that horrible incident, the United Nations pays its respects to the victims of the attack, which resulted in numerous casualties, particularly among civilians and including many children.”

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9411 (2023) · source

34. “Following the inspection, the OPCW Technical Secretariat engaged the Syrian National Authority on the matter and requested information that would allow it to assess that all activities conducted therein are for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. The OPCW Technical Secretariat has also requested information regarding the unauthorized movement of the two cylinders related to the chemical weapon incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018, which were allegedly destroyed in an attack on a chemical weapons production facility. I have been advised that the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission continues to study all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.”

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9411 (2023) · source

35. “With regard to the inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the SSRC, I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to plan the next round of inspections, to be held in 2023. I regret to inform the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the detection of a Schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC in November 2018. In addition, I have been informed that during the ninth round of inspections at the Barzah facility of the SSRC in September 2022, the inspection team observed a number of boxes containing a chemical of a dual-use nature, stored in large quantities at the facility’s chemical storage warehouse.”

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9411 (2023) · source

36. “The OPCW Technical Secretariat remains fully committed to implementing its mandate, aimed at verifying the fulfilment of the Syrian Arab Republic’s declaration obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, decisions by OPCW policymaking organs and, of course, resolution 2118 (2013). However, as has been previously emphasized, full cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is essential to closing all outstanding issues. Considering the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, at this time the OPCW Technical Secretariat assesses that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.”

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9411 (2023) · source

37. “As the Council was previously informed, a delegation from the Technical Secretariat met with representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic in Beirut on 22 and 23 June. At that meeting, the OPCW Technical Secretariat emphasized its priority of the resumption of rounds of consultations, which would include all experts designated by the Technical Secretariat. In that regard, I understand that the matter was to be referred to the head of the Syrian National Authority and that the OPCW Technical Secretariat is awaiting that decision in order to proceed with planning for the next round of consultations.”

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9411 (2023) · source

38. “That includes the complete declaration of activities at the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) and the declaration of quantities of nerve agents produced at one chemical weapons production facility that was declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used to produce chemical weapons. Due to this situation, and in a further attempt to implement its mandate, the OPCW Technical Secretariat deployed a reduced team comprised of several members of the DAT to the Syrian Arab Republic to conduct limited in-country activities. The first such deployment took place from 17 to 22 January, and the second took place from 12 to 19 April. The outcomes of the deployments were reported to States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in March and July, respectively.”

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9411 (2023) · source

39. “As previously reported, the last round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority took place in February 2021. Since then, all efforts to organize the next — the twenty-fifth — round of consultations have been unsuccessful. I have been advised that, although the Syrian Arab Republic agreed to the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s May 2022 proposal to address the declaration-related issues through an exchange of correspondence, the Technical Secretariat has yet to receive from the Syrian Arab Republic any declarations or other documents requested.”

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9411 (2023) · source

40. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: I thank Security Council members for the opportunity to brief them once again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since the Council’s previous consideration of this matter (see S/PV.9372), and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with its counterparts at the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) the on activities related to resolution 2118 (2013). Since then, the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) has continued its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration and subsequent declarations submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic.”

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9411 (2023) · source

41. “Russia’s military offensive in Ukraine, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, is hitting the most vulnerable the hardest. It is imperative to put an end to this brutal war. I appeal to all Member States to make every effort for peace. The United Nations stands ready to support all genuine efforts to bring a just and sustainable peace to Ukraine, in line with the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the relevant General Assembly resolutions.”

    2023-08-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9399 (2023) · source

42. “I encourage all the relevant parties to abide by their obligations under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and not to transfer or use any mines prohibited by its Amended Protocol II. Under international humanitarian law, parties to an armed conflict are prohibited from targeting civilians and civilian objects, including civilian infrastructure, and have the responsibility to take all feasible precautions in the conduct of military operations to avoid or at least minimize incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. The United Nations strongly condemns attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure and calls for their immediate cessation.”

    2023-08-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9399 (2023) · source

43. “I take this opportunity to refer to the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, which was adopted in November 2022. It falls on Member States to implement the Declaration in a broad and meaningful manner. The continued and intensified attacks against critical infrastructure and services, including energy infrastructure, health and educational facilities, ports, roads and bridges, are alarming. Mines and explosive remnants of war have caused widespread land contamination, rendering land unusable for agriculture, while impeding the movement of people.”

    2023-08-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9399 (2023) · source

44. “From 24 February 2022 to 13 August 2023, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights recorded 26,384 civilian casualties in Ukraine, with 9,444 people killed and 16,940 injured. The actual figures are likely to be considerably higher. The vast majority of civilian casualties are a result of the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects, including by shelling from artillery, tanks, multiple-launch rocket systems and cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as by air strikes. The Secretary-General has unequivocally urged all sides to avoid the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, as such use is highly likely to result in indiscriminate harm.”

    2023-08-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9399 (2023) · source

45. “I call on States to consider joining the relevant treaties and agreements and to fully implement their legal obligations under conventional arms-control instruments to which they are party, as well as their political commitments, in order to minimize the risk of the diversion of arms and ammunition. Beyond addressing arms safety and security risks across all stages of their life cycle, including arms transfers, all parties to the armed conflict have a duty to protect civilians in armed conflict and to ensure compliance with the applicable international law, including international humanitarian law. The impact of the intensifying violence on civilians remains an area of great concern.”

    2023-08-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9399 (2023) · source

46. “I would like to take this opportunity to commend the work of the Open-ended Working Group to Elaborate a Set of Political Commitments as a New Global Framework That Will Address Existing Gaps in Through-Life Ammunition Management and applaud the successful adoption of its final report (see A/78/111) containing the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management, which is a much-needed instrument for addressing both the safety and security risks associated with conventional ammunition to prevent diversion and unplanned explosions.”

    2023-08-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9399 (2023) · source

47. “In order to prevent the diversion of conventional arms and regulate the international arms trade, States have also established a number of arms-control treaties and instruments, including the Arms Trade Treaty, the Firearms Protocol and the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and its International Tracing Instrument.”

    2023-08-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9399 (2023) · source

48. “The requirements for preventing the diversion of weapons include supply-chain transparency and cooperation and information-sharing among importing, transit and exporting States, as well as concrete measures such as marking and tracing, effective accounting and comprehensive record-keeping practices, the physical safeguarding of arms and ammunition, customs and border control measures and diversion monitoring and analysis. Transparency in arms transfers is yet another confidence-building measure that can serve to reduce tensions, ambiguities and misperceptions between Member States. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms remains a key tool in that regard.”

    2023-08-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9399 (2023) · source

49. “Measures aimed at addressing the risk of the diversion of weapons and ammunition to unauthorized end users or for unauthorized uses are essential to preventing further instability and insecurity in Ukraine, the region and beyond. Such measures include the enhancement of marking practices, comprehensive pre-transfer diversion risk assessments, end-user certificates, including non-transfer clauses, effective legal and enforcement measures and post- shipment verifications.”

    2023-08-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9399 (2023) · source

50. “There have also been reports of States transferring, or planning to transfer weapons, such as uncrewed combat aerial vehicles and ammunition, to the Russian armed forces for use in Ukraine. In that regard, I would like to emphasize that the reports on the transfer and use of cluster munitions are very concerning. The Spokesperson of the Secretary- General has called for those types of munitions to be consigned to history and not to be used. An influx of weapons and ammunition into any armed conflict can contribute to its escalation and presents significant risks of their diversion and proliferation even after the conflict has ended.”

    2023-08-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9399 (2023) · source