YouSaid · the spoken record

Nakamitsu

lines on the record

465

first

2015-08-20

most recent

2023-12-15

sittings or episodes

46

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un-security-council

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1. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: Since the previous briefing to the Security Council on this topic in June (see S/PV.9364), the provision of military assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine has continued in the context of a full- scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. Information from Governments about their transfers of weapons systems and ammunition is available through open sources. The transfers have reportedly included heavy conventional weapons, such as battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft, helicopters, large-scale artillery systems, missile systems and uncrewed combat aerial vehicles, as well as remotely operated munitions and small arms and light weapons and their ammunition. In the past few months, reported transfers of arms and ammunition to the Ukrainian defence forces have expanded.”

   2023-08-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9399 (2023) · source

2. “In that, we are guided by international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and relevant General Assembly resolutions, as the Secretary-General has repeatedly emphasized.”

   2023-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9364 (2023) · source

3. “Under international humanitarian law, parties to an armed conflict are prohibited from targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure and have the responsibility to take all feasible precautions in the conduct of military operations to avoid, or at least minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. The United Nations strongly condemns attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure and calls for their immediate cessation. The past 16 months have seen immense loss, suffering and devastation in Ukraine. As the conflict has intensified, diplomatic efforts and initiatives by Member States seeking de-escalation and calling for a peaceful settlement have also increased. The United Nations stands ready to support all meaningful efforts to bring just and sustainable peace to Ukraine.”

   2023-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9364 (2023) · source

4. “In addition to the thousands of civilians killed or injured, the continued and intensified attacks against critical infrastructure and essential services, including energy infrastructure, health and educational facilities, roads and bridges, are alarming. Mines and explosive remnants of war have resulted in widespread land contamination, rendering land unusable for agriculture, while impeding the movement of people. The destruction of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant dam is possibly the most significant incident of damage to civilian infrastructure since the start of the war.”

   2023-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9364 (2023) · source

5. “The actual figures are likely to be considerably higher. The vast majority of civilian casualties are a result of the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects. The missile attack in central Kramatorsk on 27 June, which killed 12 people, is a case in point. The Secretary- General has unequivocally urged all sides to avoid the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, as such use is highly likely to result in indiscriminate harm. I take this opportunity to refer to the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, adopted in November 2022.”

   2023-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9364 (2023) · source

6. “I reiterate my call to States to join relevant treaties and agreements and to fully implement their legal obligations and political commitments under conventional arms control instruments to which they are party, to minimize the risk of the diversion of arms and ammunition. The establishment of the unified weapons register by the Ukrainian Ministry for Internal Affairs and Police, designed to digitize registration, accounting and control activities associated with civilian firearms circulation, is a timely initiative to minimize diversion risks. The impact of the intensifying war in Ukraine on civilians continues to be an area of serious concern. From 24 February 2022 to 18 June 2023, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights recorded 24,862 civilian casualties in Ukraine, with 9,083 killed and 15,779 injured.”

   2023-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9364 (2023) · source

7. “Moreover, the Arms Trade Treaty, the Firearms Protocol and the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, with its International Tracing Instrument, are some of the arms control instruments that have been established by States to prevent the diversion of conventional arms and regulate the international arms trade. I take this opportunity to welcome the recent conclusion of work by the Open-Ended Working Group on Conventional Ammunition and commend the elaboration of a new global framework for through-life conventional ammunition management. The framework is a much-needed instrument to more effectively counter the diversion of conventional ammunition of all types, which continue to fuel instability, insecurity and conflict across the world.”

   2023-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9364 (2023) · source

8. “Such measures include pre-transfer diversion risk assessments, end-user certificates and non-retransfer clauses, effective legal and enforcement measures and post-shipment verifications. To prevent the diversion of weapons, supply chain transparency and cooperation and information exchange among importing, transit and exporting States is required, as well as concrete measures such as marking and tracing, effective accounting and record-keeping practices, the physical safeguarding of arms and ammunition, customs and border control measures and diversion monitoring and analysis. As I mentioned many times before, transparency in armaments is a crucial confidence-building measure that can serve to reduce tensions and ambiguities among Member States. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is a key instrument in that regard.”

   2023-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9364 (2023) · source

9. “There are also reports of States transferring, or planning to transfer, weapons such as uncrewed combat aerial vehicles and ammunition to the Russian armed forces for use in Ukraine. Moreover, media outlets have reported on the transfer of major conventional arms, including artillery rocket systems, to other armed groups involved in the war in Ukraine. The supply of weapons into any armed conflict situation raises significant concerns about the potential escalation of violence and the risks of diversion. Measures to address the risk of diversion to unauthorized end users and for unauthorized uses are essential for preventing further instability and insecurity in Ukraine, the region and beyond.”

   2023-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9364 (2023) · source

10. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: Since the previous briefing to the Security Council on this topic (see S/PV.9325), in May, the provision of military assistance to the Armed Forces of Ukraine has continued, in the context of full- scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. Information on transfers of weapons systems and ammunition flows from Governments are available through open sources. Those transfers have included heavy conventional weapons, including battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft, helicopters, large-calibre artillery systems, missile systems and uncrewed combat aerial vehicles, as well as remotely operated munitions and small arms and light weapons and their ammunition. There are reports that the supply of arms and ammunition has accelerated and expanded ahead of the reported counteroffensive by Ukrainian forces.”

    2023-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9364 (2023) · source

11. “The use of chemical weapons anywhere, by anyone, under any circumstances, is a grave violation of international law. There can be no justification for their use. Those responsible for such attacks must be identified and held accountable for the sake of the victims and as a deterrent to future chemical warfare. It is my sincere hope that Council members will unite on the issue and show leadership, not only in the Council, but also at the upcoming Review Conference, in upholding the hard-won gains of the Chemical Weapons Convention and demonstrating that impunity for the use of chemical weapons will not be tolerated. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can.”

    2023-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9317 (2023) · source

12. “The Investigation and Identification Team also continues its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic and will issue further reports in due course. In conclusion, I would like to call the attention of the Council to the fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which will take place next week. The Conference is an important opportunity for States parties to renew and strengthen their commitments to the CWC and the norm against the use of chemical weapons. As I have previously urged the Council, we must make every effort to ensure the continued resilience of the taboo against those horrific weapons.”

    2023-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9317 (2023) · source

13. “It is my understanding that the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) continues to provide support to the OPCW mission in Syria, in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement concluded between the OPCW, UNOPS and the Syrian Arab Republic. The current extension of that agreement remains in force until and including 30 June. I have been advised that the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) continues to study all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. In that context, I understand that the FFM is currently preparing upcoming deployments and will report to the Executive Council on the results of its work in due course.”

    2023-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9317 (2023) · source

14. “Regarding the unauthorized movement of the two cylinders related to the chemical weapons incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018, in which those cylinders were allegedly destroyed in an attack on a chemical weapons production facility, the OPCW Technical Secretariat is still awaiting information related to the unauthorized movement of those cylinders. I again call upon the Syrian Arab Republic to respond with urgency to all of the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s requests. With regard to the invitation extended by the OPCW Director-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic for an in-person meeting, I note that the OPCW Technical Secretariat stands ready to engage further on an agreed agenda for the meeting through the agreed channel.”

    2023-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9317 (2023) · source

15. “Considering the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, at this time the OPCW Technical Secretariat assesses that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. With regard to the inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the SSRC, I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to plan the next round of inspections, to be held in 2023. I regret to inform the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the detection of a Schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC in November 2018.”

    2023-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9317 (2023) · source

16. “The outcome of the first deployment was reported to the States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in March, and the outcomes of the second deployment will be reported to the OPCW Executive Council in due course. The OPCW Technical Secretariat remains fully committed to implementing its mandate aimed at verifying the fulfilment of the Syrian Arab Republic’s declaration obligations under the Convention, decisions by OPCW policymaking organs and resolution 2118 (2013). However, as has been previously emphasized, full cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is essential to closing all outstanding issues.”

    2023-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9317 (2023) · source

17. “That includes the complete declaration of activities at the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) and the declaration of quantities of nerve agents produced at one chemical weapons production facility that was declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used to produce chemical weapons. Owing to this situation, and in a further attempt to implement its mandate, the OPCW Technical Secretariat proposed to deploy a reduced team comprised of several members of the DAT to the Syrian Arab Republic to conduct limited in-country activities. The first such deployment took place from 17 to 22 January, and the second took place from 12 to 19 April.”

    2023-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9317 (2023) · source

18. “Unfortunately, all efforts by the OPCW Technical Secretariat to organize the next round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority continue to be unsuccessful. As Council members were previously informed, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has provided the Syrian Arab Republic with the list of pending declarations and other documents requested by the DAT since 2019 that could assist in resolving the current 20 outstanding issues. In May 2022, the OPCW Technical Secretariat proposed to address the declaration-related issues through exchange of correspondence. I have been advised that, although the Syrian Arab Republic agreed to that proposal, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has still not yet received from the Syrian Arab Republic any declarations or other documents requested.”

    2023-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9317 (2023) · source

19. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: I thank Council members for the opportunity to brief them on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since the Council’s previous consideration of this matter (see S/PV.9275), and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with its counterparts at the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on activities related to resolution 2118 (2013). The OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) has continued its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration and subsequent declarations of the Syrian Arab Republic.”

    2023-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9317 (2023) · source

20. “Only then can we make a real contribution to international and regional peace, security and stability, reduce human suffering and promote transparency and cooperation.”

    2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source

21. “I strongly encourage all Member States to participate in that transparency mechanism by reporting on exports and imports of equipment that falls within the Register’s seven categories of major conventional arms, as well as small arms and light weapons and procurement through national production. I also call on all States that have not yet done so to join the Arms Trade Treaty. Finally, I call on States to consider the differential impact of the illicit trade in arms and ammunition on women, men, girls and boys. Taking that into account, we must guarantee the full, equal, meaningful and effective participation of women in decision-making and implementation processes related to conventional arms control.”

    2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source

22. “Preventing diversion also requires cooperation and information exchange between importing, transit and exporting States, appropriate accounting practices and safeguarding of arms and ammunition, as well as customs and border control measures. Tracing weapons and ammunition is another important measure to effectively address diversion. That requires the marking of conventional weapons and their ammunition and recordkeeping and protocols for international cooperation need to be in place. Transparency in armaments is yet another confidence-building measure that can serve to reduce tensions, ambiguities and misperceptions among Member States. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which was established in 1992, remains a key tool in that regard.”

    2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source

23. “Regulating the international arms trade and preventing the illicit trade in conventional weapons and ammunition requires robust frameworks for the effective control over the export, brokering, import, transit, storage and retransfer of weapons and ammunition. Emanating from any arms transfer is the inherent risk of diversion of the equipment to unauthorized end users. Measures to counter the potential diversion of weapons and ammunition contribute to international peace and security, particularly to conflict resolution and prevention efforts. In accordance with international norms, any transfers of arms and ammunition should include pre-transfer risk assessments and post-shipment controls, such as on-site inspection and end-user verifications.”

    2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source

24. “At the international level, that includes, for instance, the Arms Trade Treaty — whose tenth anniversary we just marked on 2 April — as well as the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, the International Tracing Instrument and the Firearms Protocol. Those instruments vary in scope and membership, but they are all guided by the overarching principle of preventing and combating the illicit trade in arms. My Office shares that objective and has been supporting States in the full and effective implementation of those instruments. As such, Member States are urged to comply with their international obligations under the agreements to which they are parties.”

    2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source

25. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: The illicit and unregulated trade in, and the diversion of, weapons and their ammunition has been a major concern for the international community. Illicit and unregulated arms transfers can instigate, fuel and prolong armed conflict, armed violence, terrorism and crime. They can destabilize entire regions, contribute to and enable human rights abuses and lead to violations of arms embargoes. To respond to the risks associated with illicit and unregulated arms transfers, States have established a number of international, regional and bilateral arms control treaties, agreements and frameworks to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in, and diversion of, conventional arms, to regulate the international arms trade and to promote transparency in weapons transfers.”

    2023-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9301 (2023) · source

26. “They should return to dialogue to de-escalate tensions urgently and find ways to develop and implement transparency- and confidence-building measures. For the sake of all our security, I echo the Secretary-General’s call for the Russian Federation and the United States to return to the full implementation of the New START Treaty and commence negotiations on its successor. The accelerated implementation of commitments under the NPT can also contribute to undergirding international stability. I therefore appeal to all States parties to the NPT to fully adhere to their obligations under the Treaty and to immediately engage in serious efforts to reduce nuclear risk and de-escalate tensions.”

    2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source

27. “States parties have taken different positions and interpretations on the issue of nuclear sharing, and those positions are well-known to all and recorded in the summaries of the various Review Conferences. The risk of a nuclear weapon being used is currently higher than at any time since the depths of the Cold War. The war in Ukraine represents the most acute example of that risk. The absence of dialogue and the erosion of the disarmament and arms control architecture, combined with dangerous rhetoric and veiled threats, are key drivers of that potentially existential risk. I would therefore like to repeat: States must avoid taking any actions that could lead to escalation, mistake or miscalculation.”

    2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source

28. “The elimination of nuclear weapons remains the highest disarmament priority of the United Nations and a goal to which all United Nations States Members remain committed. The issue of the hosting by a non-nuclear-weapon State of a nuclear-weapon State’s nuclear weapons is one that has existed for decades, across various regions and under different arrangements. Those arrangements predate the NPT, with the exception of the recent announcement. The issue of so-called “nuclear sharing” was debated intensely during the negotiation of the NPT. It has been the subject of subsequent discussions, including at Review Conferences of the Parties to the NPT.”

    2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source

29. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: On 25 March, the Russian Federation announced that it had reached an agreement with Belarus to station its non-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarusian territory. When it comes to issues related to nuclear weapons, I wish to be clear at the outset: all States must avoid taking any actions that could lead to escalation, mistake or miscalculation. All States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike — must strictly adhere to the commitments and obligations they assumed under the Treaty. The fulfilment of those commitments and obligations is an essential element of preventing the spread and use of nuclear weapons and in bringing about their elimination. It is at the core of the maintenance of international peace and security.”

    2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source

30. “It is my sincere hope that the members of the Council will unite on this issue and show leadership in demonstrating that impunity in the use of the chemical weapons will not be tolerated. The Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can.”

    2023-03-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9275 (2023) · source

31. “Council members will recall that at the invitation of the President of the Security Council, the Director-General and the Coordinator of the IIT also briefed the Security Council on the report during last month’s meeting, on 7 February. The IIT will issue further reports in due course. In closing, I would like to reiterate that any use of chemical weapons is a grave violation of international law, and it is imperative that those responsible for such attacks are identified and held accountable. That is not only what we owe the victims of such attacks, but it is also critical for international peace and security to ensure continued respect for the strict norm against chemical weapons.”

    2023-03-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9275 (2023) · source

32. “In that context, I understand that the FFM was deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic from 6 to 12 November 2022 and is currently preparing upcoming deployments. The Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) also continues its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic. On 2 February 2023, the Director-General of the OPCW and the Coordinator of the IIT briefed States parties in The Hague on the third report of the IIT, in which the IIT concluded that the Syrian Arab Air Force was responsible for the use of chemical weapons in an incident in Douma on 7 April 2018, killing at least 43 named individuals and affecting dozens of others.”

    2023-03-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9275 (2023) · source

33. “With regard to the invitation extended by the OPCW Director-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic for an in-person meeting, I note that the OPCW Technical Secretariat stands ready to engage further on an agreed agenda for the meeting through the agreed channel. It is my understanding that the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) continues to provide support to the OPCW mission in Syria, in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement concluded between the OPCW, UNOPS and the Syrian Arab Republic. The current extension of that agreement remains in force until and including 30 June 2023. I have been advised that the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) continues to study all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.”

    2023-03-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9275 (2023) · source

34. “Regarding the unauthorized movement of the two cylinders related to the chemical weapons incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018, in which said cylinders were destroyed in an attack on a chemical weapons production facility, and although the Syrian Arab Republic shared with the OPCW Technical Secretariat on 8 February 2023 pictures from the site at which the cylinders were reportedly destroyed, the OPCW Technical Secretariat is still awaiting information related to the unauthorized movement of those cylinders. I again call upon the Syrian Arab Republic to respond with urgency to all of the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s requests.”

    2023-03-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9275 (2023) · source

35. “With regard to the inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the SSRC, I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to plan the next round of inspections, to be held in 2023. I regret to inform the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the detection of a Schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC in November 2018.”

    2023-03-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9275 (2023) · source

36. “The OPCW Technical Secretariat remains fully committed to verifying the full implementation by the Syrian Arab Republic of all its declaration requirements and to assisting Syria in fulfilling its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, decisions by OPCW policy-making organs and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). However, as has been previously emphasized, full cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is essential to closing all outstanding issues. Considering the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, at this time the OPCW Technical Secretariat assesses that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.”

    2023-03-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9275 (2023) · source

37. “This includes the complete declaration of activities at the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) and the declaration of quantities of nerve agents produced at one chemical weapons production facility that was declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used to produce chemical weapons. Owing to this situation, and in a further attempt to implement the mandate, a reduced team comprised of some members of the DAT deployed to conduct limited in-country activities in the Syrian Arab Republic from 17 to 22 January 2023. It is my understanding that these activities did not involve any technical consultations with the Syrian National Authority. The outcome of that mission will be included in the next report of the DAT.”

    2023-03-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9275 (2023) · source

38. “Unfortunately, all efforts by the OPCW Technical Secretariat to organize the next round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority continue to be unsuccessful. As Council members were previously informed, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has provided the Syrian Arab Republic with the list of pending declarations and other documents requested by the DAT since 2019 that could assist in resolving the current 20 outstanding issues. However, I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not yet received any such pending declarations or other documents from the Syrian Arab Republic.”

    2023-03-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9275 (2023) · source

39. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: I thank Council members for the opportunity to brief them on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since the last consideration of this matter by the Council, and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with its counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on activities related to resolution 2118 (2013). Efforts by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration and subsequent declarations of the Syrian Arab Republic have not progressed since the Council last met on this matter (see S/PV.9255).”

    2023-03-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9275 (2023) · source

40. “I reiterate the General Assembly’s call to support the de-escalation of the situation and a peaceful resolution of the conflict, with respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders and in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United Nations stands ready to support all genuine efforts to that end.”

    2023-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9256 (2023) · source

41. “With the one-year anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine looming ahead, I want to renew the call of the United Nations for peace. The past 12 months have seen immense loss and devastation. The Secretary- General warned on Monday that the prospects for peace keep diminishing (see A/77/PV.58). Regrettably, at the moment the prospects for a negotiated settlement of the conflict would seem to be slim as long as the current military logic continues to prevail. The further escalation and prolongation of the conflict will only bring more intolerable suffering. The transfer of military equipment in support of Ukraine must not derail the aspiration for peace.”

    2023-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9256 (2023) · source

42. “All feasible measures must be taken to avoid and at the very least minimize civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. The Secretary- General has unambiguously urged the parties to the conflict to refrain from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas due to the high likelihood of indiscriminate harm. In November of last year, more than 80 States adopted the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas. It marked a milestone in our efforts to better protect civilians from the consequences of armed conflict. I therefore reiterate my call on Member States to implement it. Attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure must stop.”

    2023-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9256 (2023) · source

43. “In addition to the thousands of civilians killed and injured, we are witnessing widespread effects on critical civilian infrastructure and services with direct humanitarian consequences for civilians. Aside from the homes, schools, roads and bridges that have been destroyed, hospitals and health facilities have also been attacked. The disruption of water, gas, heating and electricity created by Russia’s attacks on energy infrastructure is causing the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine to reach even more dire dimensions. Those attacks constitute an unacceptable escalation of the war, and civilians are paying the highest price. Humanitarian principles must be upheld. Any attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure are unacceptable.”

    2023-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9256 (2023) · source

44. “I call on Member States to participate in those transparency mechanisms, because predictable and transparent State behaviour can build mutual confidence and help prevent conflict. I also want to reiterate the responsibility of all the parties to the armed conflict to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. Since the beginning of the current military offensive, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has recorded 18,657 civilian casualties, a total that includes 7,110 killed and 11,547 injured. The actual figures are likely considerably higher. Most of the civilian deaths and injuries are caused by explosive weapons with wide-area effects, including heavy artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems and missiles.”

    2023-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9256 (2023) · source

45. “In accordance with international norms, any transfers of arms and ammunition should involve pre-transfer risk assessments and post-shipment controls such as on-site inspection and end-user verifications. Preventing diversion also requires cooperation and information exchange between importing, transit and exporting States and appropriate accounting and safeguarding of arms and ammunition, as well as customs and border- control measures. Transparency in armaments is a crucial confidence-building measure that can serve to reduce tensions and ambiguities between Member States. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the Arms Trade Treaty remain key instruments in that regard.”

    2023-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9256 (2023) · source

46. “Most recently, States have announced the transfer of progressively heavier modern systems, such as main battle tanks. There have also been reports of States transferring weapons, such as combat drones, to the Russian armed forces for use in Ukraine. Other reports have indicated the transfer of major conventional arms, including artillery rocket systems, to a private military security company involved in the conflict. The large-scale influx of weapons into any situation of armed conflict amplifies concerns regarding the escalation of the conflict and risks of diversion. Measures to counter the potential diversion of weapons and ammunition will be key to post-conflict recovery and regional security and stability, as well as to conflict prevention efforts in other regions.”

    2023-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9256 (2023) · source

47. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: We are approaching a tragic anniversary. Almost one year has passed since the military offensive in Ukraine by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, inflicting untold suffering on the Ukrainian people and creating ripple effects across the globe. According to information on weapons flows obtained through publicly available media sources, over the past months a number of Governments have announced that they were providing military assistance to Ukraine for its defence needs. That assistance has included the transfer of heavy conventional armaments and munitions, including infantry fighting vehicles, air defence capabilities, large-calibre artillery systems, uncrewed combat aerial vehicles and missile systems, as well as small arms and light weapons.”

    2023-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9256 (2023) · source

48. “I am sure that the Director-General and the Coordinator of the IIT will say more about the report’s conclusions and will provide an update on when it will be considered by the OPCW Executive Council. In closing, I would like to reinforce what the Secretary-General has repeatedly stated. There is an urgent need to not only identify but also hold accountable all who would dare to use chemical weapons in violation of international law. Any use of chemical weapons is unacceptable, and the absence of accountability for their use is a threat to international peace and security and a danger to us all. It is my sincere hope that members of the Council will unite on the issue and show leadership in demonstrating that impunity in the use of the chemical weapons will not be tolerated.”

    2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

49. “I have been advised that the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission is still in the process of studying all the available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. In the context, I understand that the Fact-Finding Mission was deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic from 6 to 12 November 2022 and is currently preparing upcoming deployments. I look forward to any updates from Director-General Arias on that matter. On 27 January, the OPCW Technical Secretariat submitted to the OPCW Executive Council and to the Secretary-General a note entitled “Third Report by the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 ‘Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapon Use’”. The Secretary-General has shared the report with Council members as document S/2023/81.”

    2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

50. “With regard to the inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre, I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to plan the next round of inspections, to be held this year. As Council members will recall, the OPCW Technical Secretariat requested that the Syrian Arab Republic provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the detection of a Schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facilities of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre in November 2018. I regret to inform the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide that information. Mr. Arias may be able to provide Council members with an update on efforts to ensure the timely resolution of that issue.”

    2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source