YouSaid · the spoken record

Nakamitsu

lines on the record: 465
first: 2015-08-20
most recent: 2023-12-15
sittings or episodes: 46
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Thirdly, of growing concern are the increased links between transnational organized crime, illicit small-arms trafficking and terrorism, as well as the mounting use of the Internet, including the "dark web", and of emerging technologies for illicit trafficking and production. The use of illicit previously deactivated firearms in the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015 is evidence of the need to restrict the supply of all types of weapons to terrorist groups. In this context, I welcome the work of the Council, including the adoption of resolution 2370 (2017), on denying terrorists access to weapons and urging States to undertake the national measures necessary to eliminate this supply.”
2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source
“Small arms are often used in the commission of human rights violations such as killing and maiming, rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, torture and the recruitment of children. More human rights violations and abuses are committed with them than with any other weapon, from the recruitment of children as soldiers to acts of sexual violence perpetrated in conflict. Small arms are often a common denominator in such circumstances. United Nations personnel are not immune from such tragedies. Small arms frequently play a role in the deaths of United Nations employees and peacekeepers, as well as workers from humanitarian and non-governmental organizations. The human cost of the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms runs very deep.”
2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source
“By way of example, I note the decision of the Security Council to empower the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei to confiscate and destroy weaponry and report on possible arms movements into the Abyei area through resolution 2287 (2016). This mandate is an effective response to the previous recognition by the Council of the threat to peace and security in the Abyei area arising from the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. Secondly, high levels of illicit arms and ammunition in circulation also contribute to violations of international humanitarian and international human rights law.”
2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source
“Significantly, firearms-related homicides in post-conflict societies frequently outnumber battlefield deaths. Small arms are force multipliers whose availability, ownership and use contribute to the initiation and sustainment of conflict, and they can facilitate all forms of conflict, including civil wars, inter-State conflict and the perpetration of violent crimes. They are key determinants in the lethality and longevity of conflicts. There are three key observations. First, arms flows into conflict-affected and violence-ridden societies exacerbate already fragile circumstances. It is important that the Council remain cognizant of the destructive effect of weapons and ammunition flows into these settings.”
2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source
“He offers to Council members a useful reflection on how small arms and light weapons, as well as their ammunition, impact threats to peace and security, and notes the various actions taken, including by this very body, to address these challenges. Like previous ones, this report paints a vivid picture of how extensive the implications of small arms and light weapons can be in the context of the Council's work. While the report notes some successes achieved in the past two years, the global picture of small arms is nonetheless sobering. The impact of the wide availability, misuse and destabilizing accumulation of small arms is vast and well documented. A significant portion of direct-conflict deaths are attributable to the use of small arms, and nearly half of all violent deaths are nowadays caused by firearms.”
2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source
“Effectively dealing with this growing threat requires a comprehensive approach, including action by the Security Council. I would encourage Council members to continue considering the role of all types of conventional arms in perpetuating conflict and in contributing to its humanitarian toll. I would now like to turn to the substance of the Secretary-General's report and highlight some salient points he raises in the substantive trends and developments section. The Secretary-General describes various trends and developments organized by substantive theme, inter alia, the protection of civilians and human rights; terrorism and violent extremism; and United Nations support for weapons and ammunition management.”
2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source
“The biennial reports of the Secretary-General, issued in 2008 (S/2008/258), 2011 (S/2011/255), 2013 (S/2013/503), 2015 and now 2017, offer a wealth of reflections that demonstrate just how critical small arms, light weapons and their ammunition are in the context of threats to international peace and security. While the focus of the report of the Secretary- General and my remarks here today is on small arms, recent Council discussions on the use ofheavy weapons and their impact on civilians are also demonstrative of the increasing salience of addressing conventional arms more broadly in contemporary conflicts. Furthermore, in many countries, attacks using improvised explosives now kill and injure civilians and combatants more than any other type of weapon.”
2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source
“I would certainly support that practice and encourage broader and deeper mainstreaming of relevant arms and ammunition considerations into the Council's work. While the Council has addressed small arms in the framework of its thematic and country-specific agenda items, its decision to take up this matter as a stand- alone agenda item, first in 1999, has created a new avenue that allows for an inclusive and comprehensive approach to small arms. This inclusive approach is vital given the relevance of small arms to a range of contexts - from arms embargoes, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), child soldiers and counter-terrorism, to the protection of civilians in armed conflict and transnational organized crime. The multidimensional and cross-cutting nature of small arms is indisputable.”
2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source
“Given the wide-ranging impact of the misuse and illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons, an earlier report of the Secretary-General from 2015 (S/2015/289) recommended that the Security Council consistently address the arms situation when considering both geographic and thematic issues on its agenda. I can only reiterate that recommendation here today. The issue of small arms and light weapons is so essential to the full spectrum of the Council's work, that this organ requested the Secretary-General, through resolution 2220 (2015), to include in reports and briefings on country-specific situations more comprehensive and detailed information and recommendations relating to the impact of the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.”
2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source
“Ms. Nakamitsu: At the outset, please allow me to express my gratitude to Japan for convening this meeting on the issue of small arms and light weapons and for giving me this opportunity to brief the Security Council. I welcome the Council's commitment to considering small arms on a regular basis. At a time of deepening regional tensions, expanding terrorist and criminal networks and traditional and non-traditional conflicts wreaking havoc on communities, it is indeed important that Council members are meeting to discuss one of the key determinants of crises - small arms, light weapons and their ammunition. In that context, I am pleased to offer some remarks this afternoon, including some reflections on the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2OI7/1025) just circulated to Council members.”
2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source
“Allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria have not ceased and therefore nor has the need to identify and to hold accountable those responsible for their use. The unity of the Council will be necessary in order to prevent impunity for the use of those abhorrent weapons. As always, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs remains ready to provide any support and assistance that it can as we work together to restore the universal norm against chemical weapons and to strengthen the broader non-proliferation regime.”
2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source
“was able to determine the presence of sarin on samples that came from the alleged site of the incident; that causalities from that site and time period displayed symptoms and received treatment consistent with exposure to sarin; and that munition parts from the alleged site of the incident were consistent with the application of a chemical weapon. As a result, the FFM. was able to conclude that sarin was more than likely used at that incident. The FFM. is continuing its work on looking into other allegations ofthe use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. These most recent findings of the FFM. are deeply concerning, all the more so in view of the fact that the mandate of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism is set to end on 16 November.”
2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source
“While it is a positive step that the Government of Syria has chosen to declare additional laboratories in their rooms in the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre, the OPCW assessment remains that the declaration of the Centre is incomplete. On 2 November, the OPCW Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (FFM) submitted its report on the alleged incident of the use of chemical weapons at Ltamenah on 30 March. Last month, the Director General informed that environmental samples provided to the FFM. team, and reportedly connected to the 30 March incident at Ltamenah, showed the presence of sarin. The report of the FFM. stated that, given the limitations in some evidence, the FFM. was not able to determine with absolute certainty the use of a chemical weapon. However, the FFM.”
2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source
“As the Director General stated in his most recent note to the OPCW Executive Council, neither the information provided during the consultations nor the latest submissions by the Syrian Arab Republic have enabled the resolution of all identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies in Syria's declaration. Efforts to resolve those issues have been hampered by a lack of original historical records, as well as what the Director General has described as an "ongoing lack of access to and engagement with senior leaders/officials who have an overarching knowledge of the Syrian chemical weapons programme" (S/2017/916, para. 10).”
2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source
“Following a long-standing delay due to the security situation at the site, those two stationary above-ground facilities can now be accessed. The OPCW is currently conducting a visit to those two facilities in order to confirm their condition. That is the first step in the process of OPCW verification of the destruction of those facilities. I regret to note that the long-standing issue related to Syria's declaration and subsequent amendments remains, in spite of the fourth round of high-level consultations that took place in The Hague in September.”
2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source
“Ms. Nakamitsu: I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. As always, I have remained in contact with the Director General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to discuss matters related to this file. In anticipation of this briefing, I spoke to him yesterday. I have also received a written update from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations. With re gardto progress relatedto the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), there is one new development to report. As the Council is aware, two of the 27 chemical weapons production facilities declared by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic remain to be destroyed.”
2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source
“Addressing the threats and risks posed by weapons of mass destruction will also require new and creative efforts to complete unfinished business, including the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons. I end my remarks with the words of the Secretary- General at the opening of the General Assembly general debate two days ago: "There is an urgent need to prevent proliferation, to promote disarmament and to preserve the gains made in these directions. Those goals are linked: progress on one will generate progress on the other." (A/72/PV3, p. 2)”
2017-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8053 (2017) · source
“Turning to general approaches on non-proliferation, resolution 1540 (2004) continues to stand as a pioneering achievement in cooperative action to prevent non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and related material by strengthening national capacities. In maintaining the effectiveness of this instrument, it remains imperative to keep pace with global trends and emerging technologies that continuously lower the threshold for the acquisition and use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material. In concluding this survey, it is apparent that the most effective approaches to non-proliferation must involve a mixture of active, robust and wise diplomacy, strong international cooperation and a solid commitment to fully implementing the decisions of the Council.”
2017-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8053 (2017) · source
“Finally, the provocative and dangerous nuclear and ballistic missile activities by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continue to defy the decisions of the Council and the will of the international community. These acts have also undermined international norms against nuclear proliferation and nuclear testing. The Secretary-General has repeatedly and unequivocally condemned those acts, and called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cease further testing, comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions, and allow space for the resumption of sincere dialogue on denuclearization. The steady escalation of provocative acts must be immediately reversed. The continued unity of the Council remains essential to facilitate the resumption of diplomacy, leading to a peaceful settlement.”
2017-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8053 (2017) · source
“In Libya, timely action by the Council enabled the international inspectors to help the Government secure and remove vulnerable stockpiles of chemical agents. In the Syrian Arab Republic, successful engagement by the Russian Federation and the United States resulted in that country eliminating its declared chemical weapons programme under United Nations supervision and with unprecedented international cooperation. Regrettably, we continue to find evidence of the use of toxic chemicals as weapons, which we determined has been carried out by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. In order to uphold our shared norms of humanity, all those who have used those weapons must be held to account. The unity and action of the Council remain essential.”
2017-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8053 (2017) · source
“In responding to the invasion of Kuwait in 1991, the Council required Iraq to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction programme and mandated on-site inspections towards that end. It has since been confirmed, of course, that those obligations were carried out and the Council has effectively normalized Iraq's international non-proliferation obligations. With respect to the Iranian nuclear issue, direct engagement and a shared commitment to dialogue and cooperation resulted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which the Council endorsed in resolution 2231 (2015). Two years later, international inspectors continue to verify the implementation of Iran's nuclear- related commitments. A sustained commitment on the part of all participants remains essential to the long- term viability and success of that historic agreement.”
2017-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8053 (2017) · source
“Similarly, when the Council met for the first time at the level of Heads of State and Government in 1992 (see S/PV.3046), disarmament and arms control were a major focus, and importantly determined that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international Peace and Security. The disarmament and non-proliferation efforts of the Council over the past 25 years have achieved important and historic outcomes, even as the international community continues to grapple with isolated cases of proliferation and the unresolved question of disarmament. The Council has made use of a great variety of tools towards these ends. In this regard, I will briefly highlight a number of country- specific and general approaches.”
2017-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8053 (2017) · source
“Pursuant to this responsibility, the Council has sought various aims, including respect for the prohibition of the use of biological and chemical weapons, ensuring compliance with international norms and treaties, preventing non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and addressing specific cases of proliferation. The Council's engagement on weapons of mass destruction has always been grounded on a common understanding that measures for disarmament and non-proliferation are two sides of the same coin and are mutually reinforcing. The need to pursue both objectives while responding urgently to contemporary proliferation challenges was evident when the Council adopted the resolutions in support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”
2017-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8053 (2017) · source
“Ms. Nakamitsu: I thank you, Sir, for convening this very important meeting today. The Security Council has been directly engaged in matters relating to weapons of mass destruction for 65 years. This long priority work by the Council has rested on two mutually reinforcing pillars. One derives from the Council's responsibility for establishing a system for the regulation of armaments, as enshrined in Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations. This objective is closely linked with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and aims to promote international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources. The other derives, of course, from the Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”
2017-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8053 (2017) · source
“I strongly encourage the Council to use today's debate to be proactive and devise effective solutions to ensure the full and universal implementation of Member States disarmament and non-proliferation commitments.”
2017-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7985 (2017) · source
“Recent terrorist attacks have revealed shortcomings in interactions among security agencies, even in countries whose policies are otherwise deeply integrated. Coordination and information-sharing will be vital to overcoming these shortcomings. All Member States should further strengthen export controls, work to prevent any financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and ensure the security of sensitive goods and materials. It is clear that, despite the undeniable success of the past 13 years, we must remain vigilant. Much remains to be done. The United Nations is obviously fully committed to working with Member States in this area.”
2017-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7985 (2017) · source
“The emergence of countless suppliers, along with developments in international trade and sophisticated procurement networks, make concealment easier, allowing illicit trafficking networks to circumvent national and international controls. This means that better international cooperation is essential if we are to prevent terrorist access and use of weapons of mass destruction. In the worst-case scenarios where these weapons are used, seeking accountability will be critical. The international community must uphold the norms that have been established in this area and prosecute those responsible for committing or supporting such acts. My third point relates to the importance of national capacities in our joint endeavour to prevent proliferation.”
2017-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7985 (2017) · source
“Dual use is further complicating our efforts to address the risks posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We must keep in mind that many of the technologies, goods and raw materials required for developing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery derive from legitimate commercial applications that benefit many people. Striking the right balance between commercial opportunity, on the one hand, and our collective security and the need to prevent proliferation, on the other, is important. This brings me to my second point, which is the importance of international cooperation and the need for continuous and enhanced dialogue with industry as well.”
2017-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7985 (2017) · source
“Terrorist groups evolve and spread their destructive ideologies in cyberspace, and illicit networks develop new tactics. Technology once perceived as the domain of military experts is now freely available to broader audiences. Non-State actors, including terrorist organizations, will exploit any loophole to obtain these technologies. While there are still significant technical hurdles that terrorist groups need to overcome to effectively use weapons of mass destruction, a growing number of emerging technologies could make that barrier easier to cross. Several new areas of concern have emerged, such as the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, 3D printers and the exploitation of the so-called dark web. The global reach and anonymity of dark web provides non-State actors with new marketplaces to acquire dual-use equipment and materials.”
2017-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7985 (2017) · source
“In my very brief remarks today, let me highlight three key issues in our joint efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. First, we need to closely examine the emerging nexus between rapidly advancing technologies and weapons of mass destruction in the globalized and connected world, and identify actions to grapple with its impact on non-proliferation. While globalization obviously brings new opportunities for economic growth and development around the world, it also facilitates the rapid movement ofmaterials, technologies and the latest discoveries in science and technology, as well as of personnel with relevant expertise to use and potentially exploit them with malicious intent. These risks are ever-changing.”
2017-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7985 (2017) · source
“Ms. Nakamitsu: Mr. President, I thank you very much for having convened this important open debate today. The possibility of non-State actors, including terrorists, acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) remains a significant threat to global security, and the international community must step up its efforts to ensure that the disastrous scenario of WMD terrorism is avoided. Since its adoption in 2004, resolution 1540 (2004) has played and continues to play a vital role in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its delivery systems to non-State actors. Substantial progress has been made over the past years by Member States in their efforts to minimize proliferation risks; however, we are increasingly witnessing new and even more complicated threats in this area.”
2017-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7985 (2017) · source
“Those responsible for their use must be held accountable. Many things have changed in the years since 1925; this View of chemical weapons should not be one of them.”
2017-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7973 (2017) · source
“This is to the detriment of all of us. We have, collectively, worked to create regimes for disarmament and non-proliferation in order that our security will be enhanced. If we, collectively, permit the erosion of those regimes, so too will our security be eroded. Nearly 100 years ago, the 1925 Geneva Protocol stated that "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world". Nearly 100 years later, we must continue not only to speak but to act in accordance with that View. We cannot go backwards. The Chemical Weapons Convention calls upon us "to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons". Such use remains wholly indefensible and is a threat to international peace and security.”
2017-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7973 (2017) · source
“The Leadership Panel expects to make a decision on conducting an in-depth investigation into this incident upon receipt of the Mission's final report. As I noted at the outset, the smooth working relationship between the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the JIM. has continued. The Office for Disarmament Affairs continues to work to support and facilitate the work of the JIM, while fully respecting its independence. Both Mr. Mulet and I continue to urge the members of the Security Council to avoid politicizing this issue. In addition, as the Secretary-General states in his most recent letter to the Security Council, the continuing use of chemical weapons in Syria is not only horrific in its own right, but also profoundly damaging to the international community's confidence in its non-proliferation architecture.”
2017-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7973 (2017) · source
“Stefan Mogl and will be advising the Panel on political matters. As stated in the Secretary-General's most recent letter to the Security Council (S/2017/469) following its assessment of the report of the OPCW Fact-finding Mission, the JIM. has started an in-depth investigation into the 16 September 2016 incident in Umm Hawsh. The Council will recall that the OPCW report concluded that blood sample analyses of two female casualties reported to have been involved in the alleged attack indicated exposure to sulphur mustard, as did a munition that was also reported to be connected to the incident. The JIM. is also preliminarily assessing the status update report of the Fact-finding Mission, and other available material, on the allegations of the use of chemical weapons at Khan Shaykhun, to which I referred earlier.”
2017-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7973 (2017) · source
“I am further informed that the OPCW Fact-finding Mission team recently Visited Damascus and may do so again. In addition, planning is still under way for the deployment of a team to the site of the incident. As always, any such deployment will depend upon the most stringent security assurances for the OPCW team. The OPCW was not able to say with certainty when the Fact-finding Mission team will be able to submit its conclusions on this incident, only that it will do so when it considers that it has sufficient information and evidence. With the appointment of Ms. Judy Cheng-Hopkins, the Leadership Panel of the JIM. is now complete. Ms. Cheng-Hopkins had a long and distinguished career at the United Nations, including most recently as the head of the Peacebuilding Support Office. She joins Mr. Mulet and Mr.”
2017-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7973 (2017) · source
“The decision also called upon the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to provide full and unfettered access to the Centre. The first inspections were duly carried out from 26 February to 5 March. Four samples were taken at the Centre - two from each facility. The results of the sample analysis indicated that there were no unscheduled chemicals present in the samples. The OPCW is planning a second inspection to take place in the second half of this year. I am informed by the OPCW that the Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic continues investigations into the allegation of the use of chemical weapons in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April. Last month, a status update on this investigation was transmitted by the OPCW Director General to the Secretary-General and subsequently circulated to the Security Council.”
2017-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7973 (2017) · source
“Plans for a fourth round of high-level consultations are continuing, but as yet no new dates have been set. The last such consultations took place a year ago, in June 2016. The Secretary-General continues to urge cooperation between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the OPCW to resolve these issues in order for the OPCW to be in a position to verify that activities are in accordance with the obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and consistent with the information provided in declarations. This in turn will allow the international community to have full confidence in the same. In November 2016, the OPCW Executive Council decided that the OPCW would conduct inspections at the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre.”
2017-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7973 (2017) · source
“The Secretary- General's last letter noted the unchanged situation with regard to remaining declared chemical weapons production facilities. As members recall, one hangar remained to be destroyed and the OPCW Technical Secretariat had yet to verify the condition of two aboveground stationary facilities. The lack of progress in this regard was due to the prevailing security situation, which precluded safe access to these sites. On 6 June, the remaining aircraft hangar was destroyed. The destruction was observed by an OPCW team. As of yet, however, there is no change to the lack of safe access to the site of the two above-ground stationary facilities. The long-standing issues related to Syria's declaration and subsequent amendments also remain.”
2017-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7973 (2017) · source
“Since my last briefing (see S/PV.7946), I was able to meet in person with the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to discuss matters related to this file and to continue the good and constructive engagement that has been established. In addition, the Director General, Mr. Mulet and I spoke by phone yesterday, in anticipation of the briefing. I have also spoken with the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations and have now met with most members of the Council. All these discussions have allowed me to deepen my understanding ofthis complex and challenging portfolio. Although there is little new to report since my last briefing on 23 May, there have been small changes and, I am pleased to note, some progress.”
2017-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7973 (2017) · source
“Ms. Nakamitsu: I thank you, Sir, and the other members of the Security Council once again for the opportunity to brief you on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. As before, I will also provide them with an update on the activities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM). Mr. Mulet, Head of the JIM. Leadership Panel, will join me at next month's briefing. I will first turn to the progress related to resolution 2118 (2013) and the elimination of Syria's declared chemical weapons programme.”
2017-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7973 (2017) · source
“Their re-emergence is indefensible and cannot be Viewed as anything other than a violation of the most basic international law and a serious deviation from the internationally agreed broader path towards the goal of a world free of chemical weapons. As such, this is not an issue to be politicized. The international community must have confidence that this goal is one that remains within our reach and that those who stand in its way will be identified and held accountable. Its importance is greater than ever.”
2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7946 (2017) · source
“In his letter to the Security Council of 28 April, the Secretary- General called upon all States to support the critical OPCW FFM. and the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. I likewise call on all to support the Mechanism's important task and extend their full cooperation. We must not allow ourselves to become inured to the ongoing allegations of the use of chemical weapons. This is an issue about which the United Nations cannot be neutral. The use of chemical weapons by any party, Government forces, terrorist groups or armed opposition groups, for that matter, cannot and will not be justified regardless of provocation or any circumstances.”
2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7946 (2017) · source
“team would be accompanied by the most stringent security assurances. I will speak very briefly on the work of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. Since our recent respective appointments, Mr. Mulet and I have been in regular contact, and we intend to ensure a smooth coordination between the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the JIM. The Office for Disarmament Affairs fully supports the work of the JIM. and fully respects its independence. The JIM. has been provided with the two recent reports of the OPCW FFM. of which I have just spoken. I am informed that the Mechanism is now studying these reports and will keep the Security Council informed of its next steps. In addition, the Mechanism will be reaching out for information of interest to its investigation, as was done in the past.”
2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7946 (2017) · source
“team has collected information and conducted interviews, and all materials and information are currently being analysed. The Director General also indicated to me that the FFM. team is planning for a possible visit to Khan Shaykhun. As Council members are aware, Khan Shaykhun is not under Government control. In an exchange of letters, the OPCW Director General requested, on 29 April, the support of the United Nations in the form of security, logistical and operational assistance. On 4 May, the Secretary- General, in his letter of reply, indicated his willingness to provide such support and indicated that planning within relevant offices of the Secretariat was already under way. In this regard, I remain in regular contact with the Director-General in order to help ensure that any visit to the site by the FFM.”
2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7946 (2017) · source
“The team was deployed to a neighbouring country, where it conducted interviews with casualties and witnessed the collection of biomedical samples from casualties from the alleged incident. The team also received biological-environmental samples from dead animals reported to have been close to the site of the incident and received environmental samples from close to the suspected impact point. The team attended the autopsies of three alleged victims, witnessed the extraction of biomedical samples from those bodies and received the autopsy reports. As the Director General has announced already, the analysis of samples showed exposure to sarin or a sarin-like substance. This is not a final report; there is still work to be done. The FFM.”
2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7946 (2017) · source
“team also reviewed blood-sample analyses of two female casualties reported to have been involved in the alleged attack. In addition, the FFM. team conducted a non-destructive evaluation and sampling of a mortar reported to be connected to the alleged incident. This mortar was handed over to the team by experts of the Russian Federation's chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological team. Laboratory analysis indicated that the mortar contained sulfur mustard. The Secretary-General has also circulated to the Security Council a letter from the OPCW Director General (S/2017/440, annex)), attaching a status update of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic regarding a reported incident in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April. After having undertaken a preliminary assessment, an FFM. team was mobilized to investigate the incident.”
2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7946 (2017) · source
“First, on 2 May, the Director General transmitted the report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria regarding the incident of 16 September 2016. This report was produced further to an investigation by an FFM. team into an allegation of the use of chemical weapons in the area of Um-Housh, in the Aleppo countryside, on 16 September 2016. Following a request for an investigation, by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, an OPCW FFM. team deployed to Damascus on two occasions: from 11 to 19 December 2016 and from 6 to 12 January 2017. During these two deployments, the team conducted interviews, collected testimonies and reviewed documents and other information provided by the Syrian authorities. Owing to the prevailing security situation, the FFM. team was not able to visit the site of the alleged incident. The FFM.”
2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7946 (2017) · source
“However, it was decided that these consultations should be temporarily postponed in order to ensure that the discussions would be as fruitful and productive as possible. New dates for the resumption of the high-level consultations have not yet been decided upon. The Secretary-General has repeatedly encouraged cooperation between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the OPCW on resolving these outstanding issues. I turn now to the work of the OPCW Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (FFM) in Syria. Since the time of the last briefing to the Council on this issue (see S/PV.7915), two reports of the Fact-finding Mission were transmitted to the Secretary-General by the Director-General and subsequently circulated to the Security Council.”
2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7946 (2017) · source
“The work to address unresolved issues related to Syria's declaration and subsequent amendments had been expected to move forward with the resumption of high-level consultations in The Hague. Three rounds of such consultations had previously taken place between April and June 2016, with the aim of resolving all outstanding issues related to Syria's declaration. The OPCW Director General then submitted a report to the OPCW Executive Council in July 2016, which noted that those issues remained unresolved and which urged a change in approach by the Syrian Arab Republic. In March, the Director General sent a letter to the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Syrian Arab Republic, His Excellency Mr. Faisal Mekdad, inviting him and his delegation to resume these high-level consultations in early May.”
2017-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7946 (2017) · source