YouSaid · the spoken record

Nakamitsu

lines on the record

465

first

2015-08-20

most recent

2023-12-15

sittings or episodes

46

sources

un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

1. “In view of that situation, and in pursuit of its ongoing efforts to implement its mandate, a reduced team consisting of some members of the DAT was sent to conduct limited in-country activities in the Syrian Arab Republic from 17 to 22 January. It is my understanding that the team was returning from the mission as of the date of the most recent report and that the mission’s outcome will be included in the next DAT report. I note that Director-General Arias may elaborate on the efforts to resolve the outstanding issues related to Syria’s initial declaration. I want to take this opportunity to reiterate the support of the United Nations for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW.”

   2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

2. “The efforts by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration and subsequent declarations of the Syrian Arab Republic have not progressed since the Council last met on this matter. Unfortunately, all the efforts by the OPCW Technical Secretariat to organize the next round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority are so far still unsuccessful. As Council members were previously informed, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has provided the Syrian Arab Republic with a list of the pending declarations and other documents requested by the DAT since 2019, with the aim of assisting the Syrian Arab Republic in resolving the 20 issues currently outstanding. However, I have been advised that the Technical Secretariat has not yet received the requested information.”

   2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

3. “I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate my appreciation to Director-General Arias and the OPCW for their professional and impartial efforts to uphold the norm against the use of chemical weapons and for our partnership in the pursuit of the elimination of those inhumane weapons. Since the Council’s last consideration of this matter (see S/PV.9235), and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with its counterparts at the OPCW on activities related to resolution 2118 (2013). In the light of Director-General Arias’s participation in this meeting, my statement will be very brief.”

   2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

4. “The United Nations, as Council members know, is mobilizing to support them with an emergency response, and it is time for all of us to show solidarity and work together in such an extremely difficult situation. I thank Council members for the opportunity to brief them on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical-weapon programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. It is a pleasure to be joined at this meeting today, albeit virtually, by Mr. Fernando Arias, Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as well as Mr. Santiago Oñate-Laborde, Coordinator of the OPCW’s Investigation and Identification Team (IIT).”

   2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

5. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: Before we begin, please allow me to express my deep sadness about the devastating earthquakes in Türkiye and Syria and to extend my condolences to the families of the victims. Türkiye is where I started my United Nations career in 1989 with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. I visited the areas that are now affected by the earthquakes countless times and witnessed the amazing generosity of the people there. I also visited Syria many times when I was Director of Asia and the Middle East of what was then the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. As we all know, many of the people there were already in dire need of humanitarian aid because of the ongoing conflict. My sincere sympathy goes to them all.”

   2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source

6. “The declaration marks a milestone in our efforts to better protect civilians from the consequences of armed conflict. I call on all Member States to give effect to the declaration. The past nine months have seen tremendous devastation, much as a result of the use of heavy conventional weapons. Attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure must stop. I also urge States to apply effective arms-control measures to address the risks related to arms transfers. I want to reiterate that preventing the diversion of supplied weapons and ammunition is essential to prevent fuelling conflict and insecurity in the region and beyond. The only way to end the suffering and devastation in Ukraine is to end the war. I appeal to all Member States to make every effort for peace.”

   2022-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9216 (2022) · source

7. “Under international humanitarian law, combatants must not direct attacks against civilians or civilian infrastructure and must take all feasible precautions in the conduct of military operations in order to prevent, or at least to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. Since 2007, two Secretaries-General have expressed their serious concerns about the humanitarian impact of explosive weapons in populated areas. They have consistently called on parties to conflict to refrain from using such weapons because they are highly likely to cause indiscriminate effects. Last month, on 18 November, more than 80 States adopted the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas.”

   2022-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9216 (2022) · source

8. “Most of the civilian deaths and injuries continue to be caused by the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects, including attacks by heavy artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems, missiles and aircraft. In addition to thousands of civilians killed and injured, we have witnessed the destruction of civilian and critical infrastructure and services, especially using missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles. In addition to the homes, schools, roads, and bridges that have been destroyed, hospitals and health facilities have also been impacted. Of particular concern are the disruptions to water, gas, heating and electricity caused by Russian attacks on energy infrastructure, with the onset of winter bringing a new dimension to the humanitarian crisis and putting millions of people at risk.”

   2022-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9216 (2022) · source

9. “The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, in addition to the Arms Trade Treaty, remains a key tool for enhancing transparency in arms transfers. It is also an important tool to track the influx of weapons and ammunition in conflict zones. Those are all widely accepted general policy approaches by Member States, which we encourage all to follow. Beyond addressing arms transfers, all parties to the conflict have a duty to protect civilians when conducting military operations. Since 24 February, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has recorded 17,181 civilian casualties, with the numbers incessantly rising.”

   2022-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9216 (2022) · source

10. “There have also been widespread and independently verified reports of the transfer of major conventional weapon systems to non-State armed groups involved in the conflict against Ukraine, including artillery rocket systems. The large-scale influx of weapons into any situation of armed conflict raises many concerns for peace and security, including risks of diversion as well as potential spillover and escalation. Measures to counter the potential diversion of weapons and ammunition will be key to post-conflict recovery and regional security and stability, as well as to conflict prevention in other regions. Such measures include pre-transfer risk assessments and post-shipment controls, including on-site inspections and end-user verification. Of equal importance is the need to safeguard and account for transferred military equipment.”

    2022-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9216 (2022) · source

11. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: I have been requested to brief on the issue of “supplies of lethal weapons to Ukraine and their consequences”. This follows a similar briefing I provided to the Security Council in September (see S/PV.9127). Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, a number of States have transferred weapons systems and ammunition to Ukraine for its defence forces. As I noted in September, that is a matter of public record. Information from Governments regarding their transfers is largely accessible through open sources. Such transfers have included heavy conventional weapons, including battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, missile systems and uncrewed combat aerial vehicles, as well as small arms and light weapons.”

    2022-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9216 (2022) · source

12. “The OPCW Technical Secretariat will continue to engage with the Syrian Arab Republic with regard to their completion and to report to the OPCW Executive Council, as mandated. The use of chemical weapons anywhere, by anyone, under any circumstances is intolerable and a serious violation of international law. There can be no justification for the use of those abhorrent weapons. We must remain united and determined in preventing their use or the threat of their use. It is imperative that those who use, or have used, chemical weapons be identified and held accountable. As the Secretary-General urged on the Day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare, commemorated on 30 November, we must honour them and reaffirm our commitment to achieving a world free from that threat.”

    2022-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9207 (2022) · source

13. “I have been advised that the FFM was deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic from 6 to 12 November to conduct interviews with witnesses regarding several of the incidents under review. I understand that the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) is continuing its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic. The IIT will issue further reports in due course. With regard to the decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (C-25/DEC.9), adopted on 21 April 2021, I have been informed that unfortunately the Syrian Arab Republic has not yet completed any of the measures stipulated in paragraph 5 of decision EC-94/DEC.2.”

    2022-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9207 (2022) · source

14. “Since then, as Council members were previously informed, communication between the focal points in charge of the preparations for the meeting between the Director-General and the Minister has been reinitiated by the Technical Secretariat, and the Syrian Arab Republic has responded. With regard to the tripartite agreement concluded among the OPCW, the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Syrian Arab Republic, it is my understanding that all the parties have agreed to sign a further extension for a period of six months. As per previous briefings to the Council, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) is still in the process of studying all the available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.”

    2022-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9207 (2022) · source

15. “Neither has it received the information requested from the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the unauthorized movement of the two cylinders, related to the chemical-weapon incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018, that were destroyed in an attack on a chemical-weapon production facility. I call on the Syrian Arab Republic to respond with urgency to all of the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s requests. With regard to the invitation to an in-person meeting extended by the OPCW’s Director-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic, I note that while the Technical Secretariat was still awaiting a response from the Syrian Arab Republic on the most recent version of the agenda, submitted in December 2021, the Syrian Arab Republic suggested holding a preliminary meeting in Beirut.”

    2022-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9207 (2022) · source

16. “With regard to the inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre, I have been advised that the round of inspections scheduled for December was postponed due to operational reasons. The OPCW Technical Secretariat has started planning the next round of inspections, to be held in 2023. I regret to inform the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has not yet provided sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the detection of a Schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facilities of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre in November 2018.”

    2022-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9207 (2022) · source

17. “As has been stressed on a monthly basis for many years now, due to the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the Technical Secretariat continues to assess that, at this stage, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The OPCW Technical Secretariat remains fully committed to ensuring the complete implementation by the Syrian Arab Republic of all its declaration requirements and to assisting Syria in fulfilling its obligations under the Convention, OPCW policymaking organs’ decisions and resolution 2118 (2013). I take this opportunity to once again reiterate my support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW.”

    2022-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9207 (2022) · source

18. “The Technical Secretariat informs me that it will continue to engage on the matter and will revert to the Syrian National Authority on ways to implement the mandate it received from the policymaking organs. I note that, in November, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted to the OPCW Technical Secretariat the document entitled “The General National Document Regarding the Cooperation of the Syrian Arab Republic with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Between 2013 and 2022”. I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat will circulate that document once it is translated and analysed. Full cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is essential to closing all outstanding issues.”

    2022-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9207 (2022) · source

19. “However, I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not yet received the requested information from the Syrian Arab Republic. I have also been advised that, with the aim of advancing the implementation of the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s mandate, the Technical Secretariat proposed to hold a meeting with the Syrian Arab Republic in Beirut in November to identify limited in-country activities in line with the plan of activities agreed in 2019, to receive declarations or documents it had previously requested and to provide the Syrian National Authority with the results of the analysis of samples collected in April 2019, together with an assessment of an outstanding issue opened in 2016. However, it is my understanding that efforts by the OPCW Technical Secretariat to convene that meeting were unsuccessful.”

    2022-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9207 (2022) · source

20. “Efforts by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration and subsequent declarations of the Syrian Arab Republic have not progressed since the Council last met on this issue. Unfortunately, all efforts by the OPCW Technical Secretariat to organize the next round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority continue to be unsuccessful. As Council members were previously informed, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has provided the Syrian Arab Republic with the list of pending declarations and other documents requested by the DAT since 2019, with the aim of assisting the Syrian Arab Republic in resolving the current 20 outstanding issues.”

    2022-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9207 (2022) · source

21. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: I thank Security Council members for the opportunity to brief them again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since the previous consideration of this matter by the Council (see S/PV.9184), and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with its counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to resolution 2118 (2013). On 22 November, I held my usual monthly call with the OPCW Director-General to receive an update on developments and ascertain his views.”

    2022-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9207 (2022) · source

22. “As always, I take this opportunity to strongly reiterate Secretary-General Guterres’s message that the use of chemical weapons is intolerable and that impunity for their use is equally unacceptable. It is imperative to identify and hold accountable all those who used chemical weapons. The failure to do that not only means a failure to bring about justice for the victims of those inhumane weapons, but also continues the steady erosion of the taboo against the use of chemical weapons and sets a dangerous precedent. Only by attributing responsibility and holding perpetrators accountable can the taboo against such weapons be fully restored. It is my sincere hope that the members of the Council will unite on that issue. The Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can.”

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

23. “I understand that the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) continues its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic. The IIT will issue further reports in due course. On the decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (C-25/DEC.9), adopted on 21 April 2021, I have been informed that, unfortunately, the Syrian Arab Republic has not yet completed any of the measures stipulated in paragraph 5 of decision EC-94/DEC.2. I therefore repeat my call for the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the OPCW Technical Secretariat in that regard.”

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

24. “As Council members were previously informed, since then, communication between the focal points in charge of the preparations for the meeting between the OPCW Director-General and the Syrian Minister has been re-initiated by the OPCW Technical Secretariat, and the Syrian Arab Republic has responded. Consistent with previous updates to the Council, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission remains in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. I have been advised that the FFM continues to engage with the Syrian Arab Republic and other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention with regard to a number of incidents and preparing for upcoming deployments.”

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

25. “With regard to the invitation extended by the OPCW Director-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic to an in-person meeting to identify ways to ensure that the Syrian Arab Republic complies in the shortest time possible with all of its obligations under the Convention, I note that, while the OPCW Technical Secretariat was still awaiting a response from the Syrian Arab Republic on the latest version of the agenda submitted in December 2021, the Syrian Arab Republic suggested a preliminary meeting in Beirut.”

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

26. “I regret to inform the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has not yet provided sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the detection of a Schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facilities of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre in November 2018. Neither has it received the requested information from the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the unauthorized movement of the two cylinders related to the chemical weapon incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018, which were destroyed in an attack on a chemical weapons production facility. The Syrian Arab Republic must respond with urgency to all the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s requests.”

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

27. “As has been stressed on a monthly basis for many years now, due to the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the Technical Secretariat continues to assess that, at this stage, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The OPCW Technical Secretariat has assured me that it remains fully committed to ensuring the complete implementation by the Syrian Arab Republic of all its declaration requirements and to assisting Syria in fulfilling its obligations under the Convention, OPCW policy-making organs’ decisions and resolution 2118 (2013). I take this opportunity to reiterate my support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW.”

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

28. “Unfortunately, all efforts by the OPCW Technical Secretariat to organize the twenty- fifth round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority continue to be unsuccessful. As Council members were previously informed, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has provided the Syrian Arab Republic with the list of pending declarations and other documents requested by the DAT since 2019, with the aim of assisting the Syrian Arab Republic in resolving the 20 outstanding issues. I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not yet received the requested information from the Syrian Arab Republic. Full cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is essential to closing all outstanding issues.”

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

29. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: I thank the members of the Security Council for the opportunity to brief them again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. In the brief time that has elapsed since the Council’s previous consideration of this matter (see S/PV.9164), and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with its counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to this matter. Efforts by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) to clarify all the outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration and subsequent declarations of the Syrian Arab Republic remain as previously outlined.”

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

30. “With regard to the decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (C-25/DEC.9), adopted on 21 April 2021, I have been informed that unfortunately the Syrian Arab Republic has not yet completed any of the measures stipulated in paragraph 5 of decision EC-94/ DEC.2. The OPCW Technical Secretariat will continue to engage the Syrian Arab Republic with regard to their completion and will continue to report to the OPCW Executive Council as mandated. It cannot be repeated often enough: there is no justification for the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, under any circumstances. There are no excuses for an inexcusable act. We must remain united and determined to prevent their use or the threat of their use. Those who have used chemical weapons must be identified and held to account.”

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9164 (2022) · source

31. “As per previous briefings informing the Council, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission remains in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. I have been advised that the Fact-Finding Mission continues to engage with the Syrian Arab Republic and other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention with regard to a number of incidents and preparations for upcoming deployments. I understand that the Investigation and Identification Team is continuing its investigations into incidents where the Fact-Finding Mission has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Investigation and Identification Team will issue further reports in due course.”

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9164 (2022) · source

32. “With regard to the invitation extended by the Director-General of the OPCW to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic to an in-person meeting to identify ways to ensure that the Syrian Arab Republic complies with all of its obligations under the Convention in the shortest time possible, I note that while the OPCW Technical Secretariat was still awaiting a response from the Syrian Arab Republic on the latest version of the agenda submitted in December 2021, the Syrian Arab Republic suggested a preliminary meeting in Beirut. I have been advised that since then, communication between the focal points in charge of preparations for the meeting between the Director-General and the Syrian Minister has been reinitiated by the OPCW Secretariat and the Syrian Arab Republic has responded.”

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9164 (2022) · source

33. “I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not yet received the requested information from the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the unauthorized movement of the two cylinders related to the chemical-weapon incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018, when they were destroyed in an attack on a chemical-weapon production facility. The Syrian Arab Republic should respond with urgency to the Technical Secretariat’s requests.”

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9164 (2022) · source

34. “I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate my support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW. I have been informed that the outcome of the ninth round of inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) conducted by the OPCW Technical Secretariat from 11 to 18 September will be reported on in due course. With regard to the detection of a Schedule 2 chemical at those facilities in November 2018, I regret to inform the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue.”

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9164 (2022) · source

35. “As has been stressed every month for many years now, owing to the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the continuing assessment of the Technical Secretariat is that at this stage, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate or complete in a way that accords with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The OPCW Technical Secretariat remains fully committed to ensuring the complete implementation by the Syrian Arab Republic of all its declaration requirements and to assisting Syria in fulfilling its obligations under the Convention, the decisions of OPCW policymaking organs and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013).”

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9164 (2022) · source

36. “The efforts by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team to clarify all the outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration and subsequent declarations of the Syrian Arab Republic have made no progress since the Council last met on the issue. Unfortunately, all efforts by the OPCW Technical Secretariat to organize a twenty- fifth round of consultations between the Declaration Assessment Team and the Syrian National Authority continue to be unsuccessful. As Council members were previously informed, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has provided the Syrian Arab Republic with a list of pending declarations and other documents requested by the Declaration Assessment Team since 2019, with the aim of assisting the Syrian Arab Republic in resolving the 20 outstanding issues.”

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9164 (2022) · source

37. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: I thank members for the opportunity to brief the Council on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical-weapon programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since the Council’s previous consideration of the matter (see S/PV.9141), and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with its counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to the matter. Yesterday, on 24 October, I held my monthly call with the Director-General of the OPCW to receive an update on developments and to ascertain his views.”

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9164 (2022) · source

38. “The OPCW Technical Secretariat will continue to engage with the Syrian Arab Republic with regard to their completion and will continue to report to the OPCW Executive Council as mandated. The preamble of the Chemical Weapons Convention calls on us to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons. Such use is indefensible and constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Those responsible for the use of chemical weapons must be identified and held accountable. It is an obligation that applies to all of us. I reiterate my call for unity in the Council, a body that has demonstrated how much it can accomplish when it is determined to work towards a common goal. The Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can.”

    2022-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9141 (2022) · source

39. “I have been advised that the FFM is continuing its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic and other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention with regard to a number of incidents and is preparing for upcoming deployments. The Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) continues its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic. The IIT will issue further reports in due course. On the decision entitled “Addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (C-25/DEC.9), adopted on 21 April 2021, I have been informed that, unfortunately, the Syrian Arab Republic has not yet completed any of the measures stipulated in paragraph 5 of decision EC-94/ DEC.2.”

    2022-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9141 (2022) · source

40. “With regard to the invitation extended for an in-person meeting between the OPCW Director-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic, I note that, while the Syrian Arab Republic has suggested the meeting place in Beirut, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has requested clarifications from the Syrian Arab Republic, as it has not yet received a response on the latest version of the proposed agenda submitted on 20 December 2021. Further to previous updates to the Council, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) remains in the process of studying all information available related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.”

    2022-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9141 (2022) · source

41. “I have been informed that the OPCW Technical Secretariat is currently planning the 2022 rounds of inspections of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre. With regard to the detection of a schedule 2 chemical at those facilities in November 2018, I regret to inform the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close this issue.”

    2022-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9141 (2022) · source

42. “As has been stressed on a monthly basis for many years now, due to the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the Technical Secretariat continues to assess that, at this stage, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The OPCW Technical Secretariat remains fully committed to ensuring the full implementation by the Syrian Arab Republic of all its declaration requirements and to assisting Syria in fulfilling its obligations under the Convention. I take this opportunity to reiterate my full support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW.”

    2022-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9141 (2022) · source

43. “I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not yet received the requested information from the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the unauthorised movement of the two cylinders related to the chemical weapon incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018, which were destroyed in an attack on a chemical weapons production facility. The Syrian Arab Republic must respond with urgency to the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s requests. Full cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is essential to closing all outstanding issues.”

    2022-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9141 (2022) · source

44. “In the light of that situation, and subject to a change in attitude by the Syrian Arab Republic, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has proposed to address the shortcomings of Syria’s initial declaration through the exchange of correspondence, even if such exchanges demonstrably bring about fewer outcomes when compared to the DAT’s deployments to the Syrian Arab Republic, as was the case for the period between June 2016 and April 2019. With the aim of assisting the Syrian Arab Republic in resolving the 20 outstanding issues, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has provided the Syrian Arab Republic with the list of pending declarations and other documents requested by the DAT since 2019.”

    2022-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9141 (2022) · source

45. “Efforts by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) to clarify all the outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration and subsequent declarations of the Syrian Arab Republic remain as previously outlined. Unfortunately, the Syrian Arab Republic continues to place conditions on the DAT’s deployment, in contravention of its declaration-related obligations as well as its obligations to cooperate with the OPCW as stipulated under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the decisions of the OPCW policymaking organs and relevant resolutions of the Security Council. Consequently, the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s attempts to organize the twenty-fifth round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority in Damascus continue to be unsuccessful.”

    2022-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9141 (2022) · source

46. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: I thank Security Council members for the opportunity to brief them again on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since the previous consideration of this matter by the Council, and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with its counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to this matter. Per established practice, I held a monthly call with the OPCW Director-General on 23 September to receive an update on developments and ascertain his views.”

    2022-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9141 (2022) · source

47. “Under international humanitarian law, combatants must not direct attacks against civilians or civilian infrastructure and must take all feasible precautions in the conduct of military operations to avoid, or at least to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. On 24 August, the Secretary-General addressed the Council (see S/PV.9115), marking the sad and tragic milestone of six months since the invasion of Ukraine. Throughout that period, we witnessed tremendous devastation, with thousands of civilians killed and injured, most as a result of the use of heavy conventional weapons. The time to end that suffering is now. Let us resolve to keep working for peace, in line with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.”

    2022-09-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9127 (2022) · source

48. “Most of the civilian casualties recorded were caused by the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects, including attacks by heavy artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems, missiles and aircraft. The war also continues to drive large-scale displacement, with more than 6.9 million people internally displaced and more than 7 million refugees recorded across Europe. The Secretary-General has consistently highlighted the severe humanitarian impact of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas and has repeatedly called on parties to conflict to avoid their use in populated areas. I would like to strongly reiterate that call here today.”

    2022-09-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9127 (2022) · source

49. “As a matter of general statement, any large-scale influx of weapons to conflict-affected zones raises many concerns, including the potential for diversion. Those concerns should be taken with due regard, and the international community has some instruments, such as the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, to enhance transparency in arms transfers. I encourage States to make use of those mechanisms. Beyond the matter of the supply of weapons, we must focus on how those weapons are used, in particular considering the devastating impact on civilians and civilian infrastructure caused by the use of heavy weapons in Ukraine. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has recorded 13,917 verified civilian casualties since 24 February. The actual numbers are believed to be significantly higher.”

    2022-09-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9127 (2022) · source

50. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: I have been requested to brief on the issue of “the supply of lethal weapons to Ukraine”. It is a matter of public record that, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which started on 24 February, Ukraine has received for its defence force transfers of weapons systems and ammunition from a number of States. Information about transfers of such material has been widely publicized by the Governments involved. Those transfers have included heavy conventional weapons, including battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems and uncrewed combat aerial vehicles, as well as small arms and light weapons. There have also been widespread and independently verified reports of the transfer of major conventional weapon systems to local armed groups in Ukraine, including artillery rocket systems.”

    2022-09-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9127 (2022) · source