YouSaid · the spoken record

Nakamitsu

lines on the record

465

first

2015-08-20

most recent

2023-12-15

sittings or episodes

46

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un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

1. “It should be a basis on which to build trust and confidence, to address emerging threats and challenges, and to lay the ground for future gains in the pursuit of our collective goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Whatever a new arms control and disarmament approach in the twenty- first century might look like, one thing is clear - the NPT will still be at the centre of our collective security mechanism. It will have to stay fit for purpose. I remain convinced the 2020 Review Conference will be an opportunity to make headway on all of these goals and to make sure that this linchpin of international security remains fit for purpose through the next 25 or even 50 years.”

   2019-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8500 (2019) · source

2. “I see it more as a series of bargains or, rather, commitments made. It is important to recognize that they are all mutually reinforcing. Fourthly, we need creative thinking about what a successful outcome in 2020 will look like. Since 1995, review conferences have produced decisions, action plans, practical steps and measures to improve the effectiveness of the review process itself. In 2020, States parties will need to consider what possible outcome can both ensure success and drive forward implementation of the Treaty. The security benefits provided by the NPT have been manifest in times of relative stability. They should be even more so in an era of international turbulence. The NPT should be a mechanism through which to help create a safer and more secure world.”

   2019-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8500 (2019) · source

3. “In the short time remaining between now and 2020, I hope that States parties will consider four things. First, there is a need for demonstrated implementation by all States parties of commitments made during previous review cycles. Past commitments cannot be arbitrarily abrogated or else they become no more valuable than the paper on which they are written. The failure of implementation undermines potential future gains across all three of the Treaty's pillars. Secondly, we need genuine dialogue about our current predicament in international security and how the NPT can be a vehicle to reduce nuclear risk and enhance stability in ways that also take concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament. Thirdly, there is a need to ensure the strategic balance between the pillars. The NPT is often described as a grand bargain.”

   2019-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8500 (2019) · source

4. “I do not believe that the failure to achieve consensus in 2020 necessarily signals the demise of the Treaty, but it would set a poor precedent and it would further highlight divisions between States parties. It would raise questions about the willingness of States to seek collective security for all, rather than narrow, short- term and eventually unsustainable security benefits for individual States. I believe that we should avoid this situation. The year 2020 - the fiftieth anniversary of the NPT's entry into force and the twenty-fifth anniversary of its indefinite extension - presents a golden opportunity to make the practical gains that will ensure the Treaty's continued viability. A strong, political-level re-affirmation by all to the Treaty will be important.”

   2019-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8500 (2019) · source

5. “Rapid technological developments will begin to impact our international security environment in many different ways, including by potentially lowering barriers to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Last but not least, regional conflicts might heighten proliferation drivers. The disarmament and arms control framework upon which the gains of the post-Cold War era were made is eroding, but we have nothing else yet with which to replace it. As a result, the prospect of the use of nuclear weapons is higher than it has been in generations. Together, these developments are placing the NPT under increasing stress and are exacerbating the fault lines that have been clearly evident between States parties for some time now. In this context, the 2020 Review Conference will be a defining moment.”

   2019-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8500 (2019) · source

6. “They are measures to help prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict, and can and should be pursued in tandem with other peacemaking and security processes. The NPT has proven to be remarkably durable. However, that durability should not be taken for granted. Today, we find ourselves in an international environment defined by competition over cooperation, and the acquisition of arms prioritized over the pursuit of diplomacy. The disarmament success of the post- Cold War era has come to a halt. In its place, there is dangerous rhetoric about the utility of nuclear weapons and an increased reliance on these weapons in security doctrines. Expensive modernization programmes that will make nuclear weapons faster, stealthier and more accurate have effectively announced the arrival of a qualitative nuclear arms race.”

   2019-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8500 (2019) · source

7. “Reductions in nuclear arsenals, frameworks to reduce nuclear risk and efforts to drive forward multilateral nuclear disarmament are all effective measures under article VI, and every one of them helped to create an environment conducive to broader international cooperation for various global challenges of our time, from peace and security to development and climate change. Two pillars of the NPT - disarmament and non-proliferation - are two sides of the same coin. Backward movement on one will result in backward movement on the other. The implementation of commitments made under both strengthens mutual trust and advances the cause ofa world free ofnuclear weapons. As the Secretary-General has stressed, disarmament and non-proliferation are important mechanisms that help make the world safer and more secure.”

   2019-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8500 (2019) · source

8. “That that has not happened is because of the value States parties continue to place in their membership of the NPT and the non-proliferation benefits it provides. We must today reconfirm that the security benefits that have been derived from the implementation of article VI - those related to nuclear disarmament - have been equally important. Under the leadership of the nuclear-weapon States, States parties' efforts to implement article VI helped ease global tension, reduced great Power conflict and built confidence among nuclear-armed competitors.”

   2019-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8500 (2019) · source

9. “Fourthly, its near universality provides clear authority and ensures almost global subscription to its normative framework. Throughout its long history, the NPT has provided tangible security benefits notjust for its States parties but for all States. That President Kennedy's dire prediction that there would be between 10 and 20 nuclear-armed States by the 1970s did not come true can largely be attributed to the NPT. That, there are only four States with nuclear-weapon capabilities, or suspected capabilities, outside the Treaty in 2019 remains one of the greatest success stories of multilateral diplomacy. We can all agree that the spread of nuclear weapons to a greater number of States equates with a greater possibility of their use.”

   2019-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8500 (2019) · source

10. “The NPT is widely acknowledged as the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation of nuclear disarmament. Its role as a pillar of our collective security is likewise an accepted fact. There are four key elements to the success of the Treaty. First, it includes verifiable non-proliferation obligations in the form of safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities. Secondly, it is the only treaty that includes legally binding commitments to pursue nuclear disarmament. Thirdly, the Treaty establishes a strategic balance across the three pillars of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in ways that seek to maximize their benefits for all States parties.”

    2019-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8500 (2019) · source

11. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: I congratulate the German presidency for convening today's briefing. The possible use of nuclear weapons, either intentionally, by accident or through miscalculation, is one of the greatest threats to international peace and security. The potential consequences of a nuclear war would be global and affect all Member States. Therefore, it is entirely appropriate that the Security Council discuss measures related to preventing such a catastrophic outcome, and in particular the one instrument that has perhaps played the greatest role in doing so. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been an enduring feature of the international security landscape for nearly 50 years.”

    2019-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8500 (2019) · source

12. “In a related matter, and before concluding, I want to note that allegations of a possible planned use of chemical weapons in Idlib continue to surface. The Secretary-General has made clear his concern about the continued use of chemical weapons, as well as the risks of a humanitarian catastrophe in the event of a full-scale military operation in Idlib province. He has called on all parties to exercise restraint. I want to once again underscore the vital importance of upholding humanitarian principles and the Chemical Weapons Convention in Syria.”

    2018-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8390 (2018) · source

13. “Although five years have now passed since the adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), there is still work to be done before it can be considered to have been fully implemented. Moreover, as long as the use of chemical weapons is ongoing or the threat of their use lingers, we must retain our focus on the issue and not allow ourselves to become inured to it. We will need unity in the Security Council if we are to collectively re-establish the norm against chemical weapons. The vitality and credibility of the broader disarmament and non-proliferation architecture depend on it. The use of these weapons must always be seen as a violation of a deeply held taboo. It is therefore imperative to identify those responsible and hold them accountable.”

    2018-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8390 (2018) · source

14. “At its fourth special session, in June, the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention decided, among other things, that the OPCW Secretariat "shall put in place arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic in those instances in which the OPCW Fact-finding Mission in Syria determines or has determined that use or likely use occurred, and cases for which the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism has not issued a report". The OPCW Director-General has now provided two progress reports in that regard to the OPCW's Executive Council and to the Secretary-General. He continues to make progress in implementing his mandate.”

    2018-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8390 (2018) · source

15. “is also investigating five additional reported incidents brought to the attention of the Director-General by the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic: two incidents in Kharbit Masasnah on 7 July 2017 and 4 August 2017; one incident in Al-Salamiyah on 9 August 2017; one incident in Yarmouk, Damascus, on 22 October 2017; and one in Souran on 8 November 2017. So far there is no indication of when a report on those incidents is likely to be issued.”

    2018-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8390 (2018) · source

16. “The conduct of the inspections is in accordance with the decision of the OPCW Executive Council taken at its eighty-third session, which required the OPCW to carry out two yearly inspections of those sites. With regard to the OPCW Fact-finding Mission (FFM) in the Syrian Arab Republic and its work in relation to the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma, the Director-General informed me that the FFM. is close to drawing its conclusions and will be issuing the report in due course. Like the Council, I look forward to receiving the final report on that incident. The FFM.”

    2018-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8390 (2018) · source

17. “Efforts to clarify the outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic remain as I previously informed. Following the analysis by the OPCW of the information provided to it by Syria on 10 July, the Director-General wrote a letter to the Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister, dated 28 September, which reiterated the need to resolve the outstanding issues and invited Syria to continue working to clarify the remaining gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies. That message was underlined at working-level meetings that took place between the OPCW and the Syrian National Authority. In that context, I welcome the Director-General's news that the inspections at the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities are now under way.”

    2018-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8390 (2018) · source

18. “Ms. Nakamitsu: I thank the members of the Security Council for this opportunity to brief the Council again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. The Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on this matter. I spoke to the OPCW Director-General this past Thursday, 1 November, and look forward to seeing him in two weeks, when I travel to The Hague to deliver a message on behalf of the Secretary-General at the opening of the Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention. There have been some new developments related to this file in the past month; in other areas there has been little change.”

    2018-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8390 (2018) · source

19. “Before concluding, I wish to reiterate that it is of vital importance that humanitarian principles be upheld, that all relevant international disarmament and non-proliferation norms - most importantly the Chemical Weapons Convention - be fully respected, and that all sides work together to avoid further escalation in Syria, including in and around Idlib.”

    2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8344 (2018) · source

20. “I would like to recall the remarks made by the Secretary-General in this Chamber on 14 April, when he stated: "Any use of chemical weapons is abhorrent, and the suffering it causes is horrendous" (S/PV8233, p. 2). In that regard, I underline that the use of any toxic chemical, such as chlorine, as a weapon by any party and under any circumstances is totally unacceptable. Last week, the Secretary-General expressed his deep concern about the growing risks of a humanitarian catastrophe in the event ofa full-scale military operation in Idlib province.”

    2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8344 (2018) · source

21. “The Security Council holds the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, which is threatened by the use of weapons of mass destruction. The adoption of the June decision in the OPCW, therefore, does not lessen the need for unity in the Security Council. The Secretary-General has repeatedly expressed his willingness to assist the Council, and I reiterate his calls on Council members to work together to find a common approach to tackling this issue, which has become one of the most critical challenges to the maintenance of international peace and security. Like the Secretary-General, the Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to assist.”

    2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8344 (2018) · source

22. “The Secretary- General has taken note of the decision adopted at the OPCW Conference of States Parties in June and looks forward to the Director-General's next progress report, which will be issued to the OPCW's Executive Council at its eighty-ninth session, next month. The lack of a mechanism to attribute responsibility to those who have used chemical weapons has been deeply troubling and a missing step on the path towards accountability. The closure of the United Nations- OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism, which was mandated to identify the perpetrators of such acts, emboldened those who sought to carry out further attacks. Anyone who uses chemical weapons must be identified and held to account.”

    2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8344 (2018) · source

23. “At its fourth special session last June, the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, inter alia, decided that the OPCW Secretariat "shall put in place arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic in those instances in which the OPCW Fact-finding Mission in Syria determines or has determined that use or likely use occurred, as well as cases for which the OPCW- United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism had not issued a report". On 27 July, the OPCW Director-General provided a report to States parties and to the Secretary-General on the initial implementation of the decision.”

    2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8344 (2018) · source

24. “I reiterate my full support for the integrity and professionalism of the work of the OPCW and its Fact-finding Mission, and look forward to the final report on this incident. The FFM. has also requested and was provided with, documents pertaining to four reported incidents currently under investigation by the National Authority of the Syrian Arab Republic: two incidents in Kharbit Masasnah on 7 July 2017 and 4 August 2017; one incident in Al-Salamiyah on 9 August 2017; and another incident in Souran on 8 November 2017. The FFM. is continuing to translate and analyse the information contained in those documents.”

    2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8344 (2018) · source

25. “As the Council has been previously informed, on 6 July the OPCW Technical Secretariat issued a note entitled "Interim report of the OPCW Fact-finding Mission in Syria regarding the incident of alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Douma, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018", which was subsequently circulated to the Security Council through the Secretary-General. On 7 August, the OPCW received a note verbale from the Syrian Arab Republic that provided comments on the interim report. The Fact- finding Mission (FFM) continues to collect and analyse information with regard to the alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Douma and will provide a final report on its findings in due course.”

    2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8344 (2018) · source

26. “As I have noted on many occasions, the confidence of the international community in the full elimination of Syria's chemical weapons programme depends upon the OPCW being able to close those outstanding issues. The complete implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) is critical not only to finding a long-overdue end to the ongoing conflict in Syria, but also to stability in the region in the longer term. In this regard, I welcome the news conveyed to me by the Director-General of the renewal of the Tripartite Agreement between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, the OPCW and the United Nations Office for Project Services. This will allow the OPCW to continue its activities in Syria using the same logistics procedures and support as in the past.”

    2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8344 (2018) · source

27. “Efforts to clarify the outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic are ongoing. As members are aware, on 10 July the OPCW received a letter from the Syrian Arab Republic in response to questions regarding chemical weapons- related activities conducted at the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre. Those questions were attached to a 10 April letter from the OPCW Director- General. The OPCW'S Declaration Assessment Team is continuing to analyse the answers provided by the Syrian Arab Republic and will report in due course to the OPCW Executive Council. The Secretary-General continues to urge cooperation by the Government of Syria with the OPCW in resolving the outstanding issues related to Syria's declaration.”

    2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8344 (2018) · source

28. “Ms. Nakamitsu: I thank the members of the Security Council for the opportunity to brief them on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. As per long-standing practice, I met yesterday with the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic in advance of these consultations. In addition, I remain in regular contact with the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and spoke to him this past Tuesday, 4 September. As the Council was informed in July (see S/2018/745), the OPCW Technical Secretariat has verified the destruction of all 27 chemical weapons- production facilities declared by the Syrian Arab Republic. That is an important step towards the full implementation of resolution 2118 (2013).”

    2018-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8344 (2018) · source

29. “The Secretary-General has expressed his deep concern about the assessment that a nerve agent was employed in a targeted manner aimed at inflicting harm or death. On many occasions, the Secretary- General has also expressed his support for the work of the OPCW. In that regard, he welcomed the request of the United Kingdom to independently verify the toxic chemical that was used in the incident. The use ofnerve agents - or any other chemical weapons - by any party under any circumstances is unacceptable and is a serious violation of international law.”

    2018-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8237 (2018) · source

30. “The OPCW has also prepared and made publicly available a summary of the report. Speaking at a meeting of the OPCW Executive Council today, the Director-General underscored that the reliability and technical capabilities of the OPCW- designated laboratories have been subject to close and rigorous scrutiny over the years. He added that the States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention can be assured of the credibility and integrity of that network. He further noted that the work of the technical assistance visit in relation to the incident was carried out by the OPCW independently without the involvement or support of other States parties and that it was not part of the United Kingdom's own internal investigation.”

    2018-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8237 (2018) · source

31. “Finally, the results of the analysis by the OPCW-designated laboratories of the environmental and biomedical samples collected by the team of the OPCW technical assistance visit confirm the findings of the United Kingdom relating to the identity of the toxic chemical that was used in Salisbury on 4 March. The technical assistance visit team noted that the toxic chemical in question was of high purity. Based on the results of the sample analysis by four OPCW-designated laboratories, the OPCW Technical Secretariat prepared a report containing and elaborating on the information that I have just shared. On 12 April, that report was transmitted to the United Kingdom and, at the request of the United Kingdom, to all other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention.”

    2018-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8237 (2018) · source

32. “It reviewed the analytical results and data from chemical analysis of biomedical samples collected by the United Kingdom authorities from the affected individuals and of environmental samples collected on site. The OPCW has since stated that the results of the analysis of biomedical samples conducted by OPCW- designated laboratories demonstrate the exposure of the three affected individuals to that toxic chemical. In addition, the results of the analysis of environmental samples conducted by OPCW-designated laboratories demonstrate the presence of the toxic chemical in the samples.”

    2018-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8237 (2018) · source

33. “In the course of its work, the team received information on the medical conditions of the three individuals affected and collected blood samples from those individuals, under full chain of custody, for delivery to the OPCW laboratory and subsequent analysis by OPCW- designated laboratories. In addition to those activities, the team conducted on-site collection of environmental samples, again under full chain of custody. The team also requested, and received, splits of samples taken by British authorities for comparative purposes and to verify the analysis of the United Kingdom. The team was briefed on the toxic chemical that had been identified by the United Kingdom.”

    2018-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8237 (2018) · source

34. “As the Council is therefore aware, and as part ofits response to this incident, the United Kingdom requested technical assistance from the OPCW Technical Secretariat under article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which states that the Technical Secretariat shall provide technical assistance and technical evaluation to States parties in the implementation of the provisions of the Convention, including evaluation of scheduled and unscheduled chemicals. Accordingly, the OPCW Director-General decided to dispatch a team to the United Kingdom for a technical assistance visit. The technical assistance team deployed to the United Kingdom on 19 March for predeployment and from 21 to 23 March for full deployment.”

    2018-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8237 (2018) · source

35. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: I thank you, Sir, for the invitation to brief the Security Council on the incident in Salisbury, in the United Kingdom, on 4 March 2018. As I have no independent information on this issue, I will be conveying information kindly provided by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The Council has met previously to discuss the 4 March incident in Salisbury involving a toxic chemical - allegedly a nerve agent - and the poisoning and hospitalization of three individuals as a result.”

    2018-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8237 (2018) · source

36. “That makes abundantly clear our continuing and collective responsibility to ensure that those responsible are held to account. New reports by the Fact-finding Mission are pending. Should they conclude that there has been the use, or likely use, of chemical weapons in any of those alleged incidents, our obligation to enact a meaningful response will be further intensified. It is my hope, and the hope of the Secretary-General, that such a response will favour unity, not impunity. As always, the Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can.”

    2018-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8174 (2018) · source

37. “In addition, another Fact-finding Mission team has been looking into allegations of the use of chemical weapons brought to the attention of the OPCW by the Government of Syria. At the time of our previous briefing, a Fact-finding Mission team was in Damascus, at the invitation of the Government, to look into several of those allegations. I am informed that a report in that regard is also pending. There is still work to do before resolution 2118 (2013) can be considered to have been fully implemented, and for the international community to have shared confidence that the chemical-weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic has been fully eliminated. Moreover, allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria have continued, including just this past weekend in the town of Saraqeb.”

    2018-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8174 (2018) · source

38. “The Director- General will submit a report in that regard to the next session of the OPCW Executive Council, which will take place in March. Further to its routine inspections in Syria, samples taken by the OPCW team during its second inspection at the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre are currently being analysed by two OPCW-designated laboratories. The Executive Council will be informed of the results of the inspection via a separate note from the Director-General to the next session of the Executive Council. The OPCW Fact-finding Mission continues to look into all allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the majority of which involve the use of toxic chemicals, such a chlorine, in areas not under the control of the Government. The Fact-finding Mission expects to submit a report on the allegations very soon.”

    2018-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8174 (2018) · source

39. “I am informed that the OPCW, working with the United Nations Office for Project Services, is currently at the stage of finalizing a contract with a private company to carry out the destruction, which I understand could be completed within two months. There have been some developments on the issues related to Syria's initial declaration and subsequent amendments. The translation and analysis of documents that were provided to the OPCW by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in November have been completed. The OPCW has indicated that this information provided clarifications on some issues. However, the OPCW is continuing to follow up with the Government of Syria on the remaining gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies.”

    2018-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8174 (2018) · source

40. “Ms. Nakamitsu: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council once again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic's chemical-weapons programme. I remain in regular contact with the Director- General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to discuss matters related to this issue; I spoke to him last week. In addition, I met with the Charge d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations this past Friday. At the time of my previous briefing, planning was under way with regard to the destruction of the remaining two stationary above-ground facilities of the 27 declared by the Syrian Arab Republic.”

    2018-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8174 (2018) · source

41. “When international security is challenged, that is precisely when such control efforts should be pursued with even greater urgency.”

    2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source

42. “President, I would like to say a word on the Secretary-General's approach to conventional weapons, including small arms. The Secretary-General is deeply committed to crisis prevention, which he has placed at the centre of his reform agenda. We believe that investing in the effective management of small arms and light weapons, including their ammunition, is to invest in conflict prevention. Disarmament and arms control are key enablers of sustainable peace, and have long played a role in preventing conflict, easing international tensions and creating space for dialogue. Owing to the breadth and depth of their impact, adequate controls for small arms and their ammunition are vital. When armed conflict rages, effective arms and ammunition management is imperative.”

    2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source

43. “While Goal 16 is the most explicit in recognizing the relationship between peace and development, the entirety of the 2030 Agenda can be viewed in the framework of peace. At the sixth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms, States noted that the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons has implications for the realization of several SDGs in addition to Goal 16, including those related to poverty reduction, economic growth, health, gender equality and safe cities. As the development agenda was intended to be a comprehensive and inclusive framework, the mainstreaming of security-related issues into implementation efforts is most logical. Before I conclude, and with your permission, Mr.”

    2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source

44. “Secondly, by virtue of that target, States have acknowledged that arms regulation is not only relevant for national security and defence sectors, but it also benefits communities by mitigating the proliferation of illicit weaponry, thereby creating the security conditions conductive to social and economic development. Thirdly, the new development agenda demonstrates that arms regulation, more than ever, should be pursued through policies and actions anchored in a measurable way. The Secretary-General encourages the integration of measurability in all small arms-control related activities and has suggested that the development of indicators on that topic in the context of the SDGs is an excellent means of monitoring concrete and demonstrable signs of progress towards a specific goal.”

    2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source

45. “The report of the Secretary-General on small arms and light weapons notes the significance of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) because of their explicit recognition of the link between arms regulation and development, as well as between the illicit trafficking in arms and organized crime. As members are aware, one of the targets under Goal 16 includes a significant reduction in illicit arms flows. As the Secretary-General points out in his report, the significance of target 16.4 is threefold. First, it closely connects adequate arms regulation with proper functioning institutions, which thereby ensure the sustainability of implementation over the long- term.”

    2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source

46. “The Secretary-General has examined various mechanisms that the United Nations has instituted in its field missions and drawn best practices from those experiences for the consideration of Council members. I would be remiss if I did not underscore the particular significance of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its relationship to peace and security. In a 1999 presidential statement, the Security Council acknowledged that "the challenge posed by small arms is multifaceted and involves security, humanitarian and development dimensions." (S/PRST/1999/28) That statement could be seen as a foreshadowing of the critical acknowledgement in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of the inextricable link between peace and development.”

    2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source

47. “Consideration is also given to gender mainstreaming and to the value of applying international standards and guidelines. The actions suggested are intended to be as concrete and specific as possible. I would encourage Council members to review the suggested actions identified by the Secretary-General and consider their operationalization. Annex II of the report is submitted to the Council pursuant to the request made in resolution 2220 (2015) for the Secretary-General to compile best practices and arrangements that could be used by United Nations peacekeeping operations and other relevant Council- mandated entities to guide the implementation of tasks related to arms embargoes.”

    2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source

48. “While the majority of actions are directed towards States, either Security Council members or the broader United Nations membership, the Secretary- General also identifies actions for the United Nations system and relevant entities. Forty eight concrete recommendations have been made to the Council on how best to address small arms, light weapons and ammunition in the context of this organ's work. Many of those recommendations remain highly relevant. While not all 48 recommendations are included in the table, the table represents a solid mix of suggested actions on the key areas of concern for the Council, including weapons and ammunition management, peacekeeping, arms embargoes, community safety and law enforcement, the protection of civilians, and armed violence.”

    2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source

49. “The United Nations stands ready to continue supporting States in this regard. I would like to point out the table on pages 5 and 6 of the report of the Secretary- General, which provides several examples of United Nations support to managing arms and ammunition in peacekeeping settings. I would like also to highlight the table of recommendations included as annex I to the report under the Council's consideration. The table reflects an effort to assist States in the operationalization of many of the small-arms-related recommendations that have been previously made to the Council through the four previous reports of the Secretary-General on this topic.”

    2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source

50. “The issue of improvised explosive devices is, of course, of relevance in this regard, and I would underscore in particular the potential diversion of ammunition and explosives for the manufacture of such devices. On a positive note, weapons and ammunition management has become a critical component of United Nations peacekeeping operations and in Security Council activities to address conflict-affected situations more generally. Attention to this issue was often reflected in DDR programmes or physical-security and stockpile-management activities. For example, in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali, DDR components have established weapon-registration and marking systems to ensure the traceability of all weapons and ammunition collected during the DDR process. This is a welcome trend.”

    2017-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8140 (2017) · source