YouSaid · the spoken record

Nakamitsu

lines on the record: 465
first: 2015-08-20
most recent: 2023-12-15
sittings or episodes: 46
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Full cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is essential to closing all outstanding issues. As has been stressed repeatedly, owing to the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the Technical Secretariat continues to assess that at this stage the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat is planning to conduct the next rounds of inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) in the course of 2022.”
2022-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8990 (2022) · source
“It is my understanding that although the exchange of correspondence between the OPCW Secretariat and the Syrian National Authority on this matter continues, the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to confirm that all visas requested by the Secretariat will be issued. I have been informed that the OPCW Technical Secretariat stands ready to deploy the DAT to the Syrian Arab Republic subject to the issuing of visas to all DAT members as well as the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. I urge the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to facilitate arrangements for the deployment of the DAT and to comply with resolution 2118 (2013), including by allowing immediate and unfettered access for the personnel designated by the OPCW Secretariat as soon as possible.”
2022-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8990 (2022) · source
“Nor has it received a response to the request for information regarding the unauthorized movement and remains of two destroyed cylinders related to the chemical-weapon incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018. In that regard, I call on the Syrian Arab Republic to respond to the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s requests with the necessary urgency. I regret to inform Council members that the OPCW Technical Secretariat is still not in a position to conduct the twenty-fifth round of consultations in Damascus between the Syrian National Authority and the DAT owing to the continued refusal by the Syrian Arab Republic to issue an entry visa for one member of the DAT.”
2022-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8990 (2022) · source
“I have been advised that the OPCW Secretariat has not yet received the requested declaration from the Syrian Arab Republic on all undeclared types and quantities of nerve agents produced and/or weaponized at a former chemical-weapons production facility that was declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used to produce and/or weaponize chemical-warfare agents. I have also been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not yet received the requested further information and documentation from the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the damage caused during the 8 June attack on a military facility housing a declared former chemical-weapons production facility.”
2022-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8990 (2022) · source
“Despite continued travel restrictions, the Technical Secretariat continues to undertake its mandated activities related to the elimination of the Syrian chemical-weapons programme and its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic to that end. Efforts by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) are still ongoing to clarify all the outstanding issues related to the initial and subsequent declarations submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.”
2022-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8990 (2022) · source
“Mrs. Nakamitsu: I thank Council members for this opportunity to brief them again on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical-weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since my most recent briefing, on 28 February 2022 (see S/PV.8982), the Office for Disarmament Affairs has, as always, maintained regular contact with counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to this matter. As I have previously informed the Council, the ongoing coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has impacted the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s ability to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic. Nevertheless, the Secretariat maintains its readiness to deploy.”
2022-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8990 (2022) · source
“I therefore reiterate my call on the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the OPCW Technical Secretariat in that regard. Any use of chemical weapons is unacceptable, and the absence of accountability for the past use of such weapons remains a blight on the conscience of the international community. Impunity for the use of those weapons is intolerable. As the body with the primary responsibility for international peace and security, unity in the Security Council continues to be necessary if those identified as responsible for the use of chemical weapons are to be held to account. Such profound violations of international law cannot continue to go unaddressed and unresolved.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“I understand that the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) continues its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic. The IIT will issue further reports in due course, subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. I take this opportunity to reiterate my full support once again for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW. On the decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic”, (C-25/DEC.9), adopted on 21 April 2021, I have been informed that, unfortunately, the Syrian Arab Republic has not yet completed any of the measures stipulated in paragraph 5 of decision EC94/ DEC.2.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“On 31 January 2022, the OPCW Technical Secretariat issued the report of the FFM regarding the incident of the alleged use of chemicals as a weapon in Kafr Zeita on 1 October 2016 (S/2022/116, annex). According to the report, the incident involved two barrels containing toxic gas near a field hospital. The FFM obtained one of the industrial chlorine cylinders retrieved from the incident location in Kafr Zeita. The FFM report concluded that there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the chlorine cylinder was used as a weapon. The cylinder ruptured as a result of mechanical force and released a toxic irritant substance that affects the respiratory system and mucous membranes”. A copy of both FFM reports was shared with the members of the Security Council on 1 and 15 February 2022.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“Furthermore, the FFM is preparing for upcoming deployments, which remain subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. On 24 January 2022, the OPCW Technical Secretariat issued the report of the FFM in Syria regarding the incidents of the alleged use of chemicals as a weapon in Marea on 1 and 3 September 2015 (S/2022/85, annex). The FFM report concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that, on 1 September 2015, in Marea, a vesicant chemical substance from Schedule 1.A.04 of the Chemical Weapons Convention was used as a weapon. With regard to the incident that took place in Marea on 3 September 2015, the FFM report states that the results of analysis of all available data obtained up until the issuance of the report did not allow the FFM to establish whether or not chemicals were used as a weapon.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“Regarding the detection of a Schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC in November 2018, I regret to inform the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close that issue. I note that preparations for the in-person meeting between the OPCW Director-General and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic remain ongoing. The Technical Secretariat will keep the OPCW Executive Council informed of further developments on that matter. The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) remains in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and continues to analyse the information collected from recent activities.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“I reiterate my call to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to facilitate arrangements for the deployment of the DAT as soon as possible. As has been stressed on numerous occasions, it is only through complete cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat that all outstanding issues related to the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration can be closed. The confidence of the international community in the complete elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons programme depends upon those issues being finalized. I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat is planning to conduct the next rounds of inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) in the course of 2022.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“However, I regret to inform Council members that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not been in a position to conduct that deployment due to the continued refusal by the Syrian Arab Republic to issue an entry visa for one member of the DAT. I have been informed that the OPCW Technical Secretariat stands ready to deploy the DAT to the Syrian Arab Republic subject to the issuing of visas to all DAT members, as well as the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result of the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to assess that, at this stage, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“In that context, I have also been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not yet received information from the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the unauthorized movement and remains of two destroyed cylinders related to the chemical weapon incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018. I urge the Syrian Arab Republic to respond to the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s requests as soon as possible. It is my understanding that, for almost 10 months, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has attempted to schedule with the Syrian National Authority the twenty- fifth round of consultations with the DAT in Damascus.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not yet received the requested declaration from the Syrian Arab Republic on all undeclared types and quantities of nerve agents produced and/or weaponized at one former chemical weapons production facility that was declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used to produce and/or weaponize chemical warfare agents. The OPCW Technical Secretariat also expects to receive further information and documentation from the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the damage caused during an attack on 8 June 2021 to a military facility that housed a declared former chemical weapons production facility.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“Despite continued travel restrictions, the Technical Secretariat continues to undertake its mandated activities related to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic to that end. The OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) is continuing with its ongoing efforts to clarify all the outstanding issues related to the initial and subsequent declarations submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“Mrs. Nakamitsu: I thank Security Council members for the opportunity to brief them again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since my previous briefing, on 5 January (see S/PV.8943), the Office for Disarmament Affairs has continued to maintain regular contact with counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to this matter. Per established practice, I held a monthly call with the OPCW Director-General on 24 February to receive an update on developments and ascertain in his views. As I previously informed the Council, the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s ability to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic remains subject to the evolution of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic.”
2022-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8982 (2022) · source
“It cannot be repeated often enough: there is no justification for the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances. The use of such weapons with impunity and without accountability is a threat to international peace and security and a danger to us all. It is therefore imperative to hold accountable all those who have used chemical weapons. As we start the new year, I state my sincere hope once again that members of the Council will unite on this issue. The Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can.”
2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source
“The IIT will issue further reports in due course, subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. I take this opportunity to once again reiterate my full support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW. With regard to the decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (C-25/DEC.9), adopted on 21 April 2021, I have been advised that, unfortunately, the Syrian Arab Republic has not yet completed any of the measures stipulated in paragraph 5 of decision EC-94/ DEC.2. I therefore reiterate my call on the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the OPCW Technical Secretariat in that regard.”
2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source
“I have been informed that the FFM deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic between 28 November and 10 December 2021 to collect information and conduct interviews regarding the incidents that took place in Hama Governorate on 7 July 2017 and 4 August 2017 in Khirbat Masasinah; on 9 August 2017 in Qalib Al-Thawr, Al-Salamiyah; and on 8 November 2017 in Al-Balil, Suran. The FFM continues to analyse the information collected from recent activities and is preparing for upcoming deployments, which, as I noted, remain subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. I understand that the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) continues its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic.”
2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source
“With regard to the in-person meeting between the OPCW Director-General and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic, I note that the officials in charge of preparations continue to discuss the date, location, agenda and composition of the delegations. Consistent with previous updates to the Council, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) remains in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.”
2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source
“I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat conducted the eighth round of inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) from 10 to 17 December 2021. The outcome of that round of inspections will be reported in due course. I am also advised that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the detection of a Schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC in November 2018.”
2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source
“I urge the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to facilitate arrangements for the deployment of the DAT and to comply with resolution 2118 (2013), including by allowing immediate and unfettered access to the personnel designated by the OPCW Technical Secretariat as soon as possible. Full cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is essential to closing those outstanding issues. As has been stressed on numerous occasions, owing to the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to assess that at this stage, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.”
2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source
“As I have previously informed the Council, since April 2021 the OPCW Technical Secretariat has attempted to schedule with the Syrian National Authority the twenty-fifth round of consultations with the DAT in Damascus. However, I regret to inform Council members that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not been in a position to conduct that deployment owing to the continued refusal by the Syrian Arab Republic to issue an entry visa for one member of the DAT. I also regret to inform the Council that efforts by the Technical Secretariat to convene a limited meeting with Syrian experts at the OPCW’s headquarters in The Hague in late October 2021 were unsuccessful.”
2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source
“I have also been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not yet received a response from the Syrian Arab Republic on the requests for information and documentation regarding the damage caused during an attack on 8 June 2021 against a military facility that housed a declared former chemical-weapons production facility. Nor has it received a response to the request for information regarding the unauthorized movement and remains of two destroyed cylinders related to the chemical-weapon incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018. In that regard, I call on the Syrian Arab Republic to respond to the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s requests as soon as possible.”
2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source
“As noted by the OPCW Technical Secretariat, the substance of these outstanding issues is of concern and involves, inter alia, undeclared research, production and/or weaponization of unknown quantities of chemical weapons, and significant quantities of chemical-warfare agents or precursors and chemical munitions whose fate has not yet been fully verified by the OPCW Technical Secretariat. I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not yet received the requested declaration from the Syrian Arab Republic on all undeclared types and quantities of nerve agents produced and/or weaponized at the former chemical-weapons production facility that was declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used to produce and/or weaponize chemical-warfare agents.”
2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source
“Any gaps, inconsistencies or discrepancies are raised and discussed with the Syrian National Authority and reported to States parties as outstanding issues. Once the Syrian National Authority has provided sufficient information and explanations related to an outstanding issue, the DAT considers the related outstanding issue to be resolved and, if needed, assists the Syrian Arab Republic in amending its initial declaration. I understand that the Syrian Arab Republic has submitted a total of 17 amendments and a number of supplements to its initial declaration. However, out of the 24 outstanding issues opened by the DAT in 2014, 20 remain unresolved.”
2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source
“Nevertheless, the Technical Secretariat maintains its readiness to deploy. Despite continued travel restrictions, the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to undertake its mandated activities related to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in that regard. Efforts by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) are still ongoing to clarify all outstanding issues related to the initial and subsequent declarations submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. I have been informed that in order to assess the completeness and accuracy of the Syrian Arab Republic’s declarations, the DAT conducts an assessment of all incoming information submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as information generated through other activities.”
2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source
“Per established practice, I held a monthly call with the OPCW Director-General on 29 December 2021, to receive an update on developments and ascertain his views. In addition, the Office for Disarmament Affairs received a letter from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic, dated 27 December 2021, referring to a letter sent by the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates to the OPCW Director- General concerning the information contained in his latest reports on the progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme. That information was studied carefully and forwarded to the OPCW Technical Secretariat. As I have previously informed the Council, the ongoing coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has impacted the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s ability to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic.”
2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source
“Mrs. Nakamitsu: I thank Security Council members for the opportunity to brief them again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. I also take this opportunity to welcome the new non-permanent members of the Council — Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates. I look forward to working closely with all members on this important issue. Since my previous briefing, on 8 December 2021 (see S/PV.8921), the Office for Disarmament Affairs has continued to maintain regular contact with counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to this matter.”
2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source
“Identifying those responsible and holding them to account is of paramount importance. We have a responsibility, particularly to the victims, to ensure accountability for the use of these heinous weapons. “The United Nations supports all efforts to uphold the norm against chemical weapons, and to relegate these dreadful weapons to history.””
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“According to paragraph 8 of that decision, the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic will be reinstated by the Conference of the States Parties once the OPCW Director-General has reported to the Executive Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has completed all of the measures contained in paragraph 5 of Executive Council decision EC- 94/DEC.2. I have been advised that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to complete all those measures. I urge the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the OPCW Technical Secretariat in that regard. Before closing, I wish to echo the Secretary- General’s message on the Day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare, commemorated on 30 November: “Any use of chemical weapons is unacceptable and a clear violation of international law.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“I take this opportunity to once again reiterate my full support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW. As I previously informed the Council (see S/PV.8872), on 21 April the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, at its twenty-fifth session, adopted the decision C-25/DEC.9, entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic”, suspending the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“Consistent with previous updates to the Council, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) remains in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and continues to engage with the Syrian Arab Republic and other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention with regard to a variety of incidents. Further FFM deployments will be subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. I understand that, following the issuance of its second report in April, the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) continues its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic. The IIT will issue further reports in due course, subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“I am also advised that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the detection of a Schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC in November 2018. With regard to the in-person meeting between the OPCW Director-General and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic, I note that the officials in charge of preparations continue discussing the date, location, agenda and composition of the delegations.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“I reiterate my call on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to facilitate arrangements for the DAT’s deployment as soon as possible. As has been stressed on numerous occasions, it is only through the complete cooperation of the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat that all outstanding issues related to the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration can be closed. The confidence of the international community in the complete elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons programme depends upon those issues being finalized. I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat is planning for inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) in December. However, the inspections of those facilities remain subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“However, I regret to inform Council members that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not been in a position to conduct that deployment, due to the continued refusal of the Syrian Arab Republic to issue all the requested visas to members of the DAT. I also regret to inform the Council that efforts by the Technical Secretariat to convene a limited meeting with Syrian experts at the OPCW’s headquarters in The Hague in late October were unsuccessful. As a result of the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to assess that, at this stage, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“I have also been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not yet received a response from the Syrian Arab Republic on requests for information and documentation regarding the damage caused to the declared former chemical weapons production facility during the attack on 8 June, nor has it received a response to the request for information regarding the unauthorized movement and remains of the two destroyed cylinders related to the chemical weapon incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018. In this regard, I call on the Syrian Arab Republic to respond to the OPCW Technical Secretariat as soon as possible. Since April, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has attempted to schedule with the Syrian National Authority the twenty-fifth round of consultations with the DAT in Damascus.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“The OPCW Technical Secretariat remains of the position that the Syrian Arab Republic must declare all types and quantities of chemical warfare agents produced and/or weaponized at the former chemical weapons production facility that was declared by the Syrian Arab Republic to have never been used to produce and/or weaponize chemical weapons. I have been advised that the OPCW Secretariat has not yet received the requested declarations from the Syrian Arab Republic.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“I want to highlight that the Technical Secretariat’s role is to assess whether explanations provided by Syrian experts for gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies in the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration are scientifically plausible. Once these assessments are conducted, the OPCW Technical Secretariat assists the Syrian Arab Republic in amending its initial declaration, as required, to ensure an accurate and complete declaration. I understand that the Syrian Arab Republic has submitted a total of 17 amendments and a number of supplements to its initial declaration. However, out of the 24 outstanding issues opened by the DAT in 2014, 20 remain unresolved.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“This information was studied carefully and also forwarded to the OPCW Technical Secretariat. As I have previously informed the Council, the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s ability to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic remains subject to the evolution of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. Despite continued travel restrictions, the Technical Secretariat continues to undertake its mandated activities related to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in that regard. The OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) is persisting with its ongoing efforts to clarify all the outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration by the Syrian Arab Republic to the OPCW.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“Mrs. Nakamitsu: I thank Council members for the opportunity to brief the Council again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since the previous Security Council meeting on resolution 2118 (2013), held on 11 November, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with its counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to this matter. Per established practice, I held a monthly call with the OPCW Director-General on 3 December to receive an update on developments and ascertain his views. Additionally, the Office for Disarmament Affairs received information from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic concerning chemical weapons issues for this period.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“That would enable United Nations peace operations to be substantially more involved in supporting the systematic collection, centralization and analysis of small arms-related data and ensure evidence-based policymaking and programming on the ground. I hope the Security Council will consider such measures to further maintain international peace and security.”
2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source
“Those mechanisms reflect regional realities, priorities and ownership and direct the work of the Regional Centres in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific. I would like to conclude my briefing today by reiterating the need for mainstreaming small arms and light weapons considerations across the work of the Security Council and highlight a recommendation from the Secretary-General’s report that is particularly pertinent to today’s discussion. Wherever a mission is mandated to provide support to the host State and competent national authorities in the processing of recovered weapons and the treatment of ammunition recovered from the illicit sphere, the Security Council is encouraged to consider the establishment or designation of a dedicated component, unit or cell within the mission.”
2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source
“In the regional context, the United Nations will support the implementation of the decision by the African Union Commission to extend until 2030 the Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa, including the voluntary surrender of illicitly owned weapons by civilians under the September Africa Amnesty Month programme. In that regard, I also welcome the efforts made in the establishment and the implementation of regional policy frameworks and strategies on small arms, among them the Western Balkans road map, the Caribbean road map and the five-year plan of implementation of the Economic Community of West African States Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons.”
2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source
“Considerable efforts have been undertaken at the global, regional, subregional and national levels in support of small arms and light weapons control, including in the framework of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and its International Tracing Instrument. Let me highlight in particular the outcome of the seventh Biennial Meeting of States on the Programme of Action, which was chaired by Kenya, and the Firearms Protocol to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, as well as the Arms Trade Treaty. The United Nations will continue to advocate for the universalization of the Firearms Protocol and the Arms Trade Treaty and the full and effective implementation of politically binding instruments, such as the Programme of Action on Small Arms and the International Tracing Instrument.”
2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source
“In line with the Secretary-General’s priorities and with a view to providing effective, efficient and coherent United Nations assistance, two concrete initiatives have been launched. First, partners of the United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms are developing system-wide guidance on country-level approaches to integrate small arms control into the common country analysis and sustainable development frameworks, in line with the guiding principle of national ownership. In addition, the Saving Lives Entity is now operational as an immediate response facility within the Peacebuilding Fund and has begun the allocation of grants to catalyse more comprehensive approaches to small arms control and armed violence reduction efforts in several countries.”
2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source
“A growing number of States have advocated for concrete, more consistent action to address the potential impact on peace and security posed by climate change, including how it might facilitate illicit weapons flows. In his Agenda for Disarmament, the Secretary- General laid out his priorities for the impacts of the destabilizing accumulation, illicit transfer and misuse of small arms and light weapons. That includes advancing country-level approaches to small arms problems, integrating arms into conflict prevention and management, managing poorly maintained stockpiles and rethinking unconstrained military spending. All that requires a deeper institutional understanding of small arms problems and challenges, as well as creative and comprehensive solutions to address them.”
2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source
“In additon, we are seeing a shift in weapons purchases, in particular their parts and components, through the darknet and through online platforms, resulting in a significant increase in the use of postal and courier services to traffic those items, making detection and criminal investigations of these illicit transfers more difficult. The early adoption of measures to address those emerging challenges would ensure that small arms control remains effective and responds to these new realities. States, civil society and relevant expert organizations are also encouraged to consider how climate change affects the use of conventional weapons and how conventional arms availability and use affect climate-related security risks.”
2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source
“New and emerging technologies on illicit trafficking and the production of small arms, light weapons, their parts and components and ammunition may pose novel challenges and opportunities to the effectiveness of small arms control measures and should therefore be seriously considered in both global policy discussions and operational programming. Moreover, States have continued to express concern over the illicit reactivation of poorly deactivated small arms. In response to that growing threat, the United Nations has issued specific guidance in a dedicated MOSAIC module.”
2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source