YouSaid · the spoken record

Nakamitsu

lines on the record: 465
first: 2015-08-20
most recent: 2023-12-15
sittings or episodes: 46
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Mrs. Nakamitsu: I simply want to say that I did not use any words such as “investigation” or “inspection”. I said that the Declaration Assessment Team’s mandate is to verify Syria’s initial declaration through means of bilateral consultations with the Syrian national authorities. I added that it was a means to assist Syria in that regard. I did not use the words “inspection” or “investigation”.”
2022-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9097 (2022) · source
“Let me end my further remarks by stating my hope that such meetings will be able to take place as soon as possible and contribute to the resolution of these unresolved discrepancies.”
2022-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9097 (2022) · source
“Of course, the Director-General has stated that he cannot justify travelling to a State party to the OPCW that has been deprived of certain rights by the Conference of States Parties to pursue a meeting that the Secretariat proposed in the first place. However, at the 100th session of the OPCW Executive Council, which was recently held — between 5 and 7 July — he also stated: “When the Syrian Arab Republic is ready to back its declarations of commitment with actions, including by engaging constructively on the venue and agenda, the Secretariat will be ready to engage accordingly.” I have also been informed that the Director-General’s Office is maintaining regular and direct contact with the Foreign Minister’s Office, so their engagements are still continuing.”
2022-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9097 (2022) · source
“The Security Council decided that “… the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with the OPCW and the United Nations, including by complying with their relevant recommendations, by accepting personnel designated by the OPCW or the United Nations, by providing for and ensuring the security of activities undertaken by these personnel, by providing these personnel with immediate and unfettered access to and the right to inspect, in discharging their functions, any and all sites, and by allowing immediate and unfettered access to individuals that the OPCW has grounds to believe to be of importance for the purpose of its mandate, and […] that all parties in Syria shall cooperate fully in this regard”. This is the reason why it is important that this member of the DAT be part of the rounds of consultations.”
2022-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9097 (2022) · source
“Now, while the issuance of a visa is normally a matter of national sovereignty, as Council members are all aware, paragraph 7 of resolution 2118 (2013) established very special arrangements in this regard.”
2022-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9097 (2022) · source
“I have been advised that the DAT expert has been part of the team and in direct contact with Syrian experts and officials ever since the DAT was established, that is, ever since April 2014. This DAT expert has deployed to Syria more than 20 times, so the expert is familiar with all details provided by the Syrian experts throughout the entire history of the assessment of the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration of its chemical-weapons programme, including all outstanding and also resolved issues. It should also be noted that the expert is fluent in Arabic. Accordingly, the OPCW considers this expert to be an indispensable member of the DAT.”
2022-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9097 (2022) · source
“Mrs. Nakamitsu: I had a specific request from His Excellency Ambassador Polyanskiy of the Russian Federation on some of the issues for further information. I will therefore try to respond. First, with regard to the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), whose mandate, as we know, is to verify Syria’s initial declaration through means of bilateral consultations with Syrian national authorities; it is therefore a means for verification. But it is also a means to assist Syria in its implementation of its obligations under Chemical Weapons Convention. Why are we insisting on this particular DAT expert whose visa has not been granted by the Syrian Republic?”
2022-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9097 (2022) · source
“With regard to OPCW Conference of the States Parties decision C-25/DEC.9, of 21 April 2021, entitled “Addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic”, I have been informed that, unfortunately, the Syrian Arab Republic has not yet completed any of the measures stipulated in paragraph 5 of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-94/DEC.2. The use of chemical weapons is a grave violation of international law and an affront to our shared humanity. We need to remain vigilant to ensure that those awful weapons are never used again and are eliminated, not only in Syria but everywhere. Let me conclude by assuring the Council of the commitment of the United Nations to work with all Member States to reinforce the norm against chemical weapons and ensure that those responsible for their use are held to account.”
2022-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9097 (2022) · source
“The proposed meeting would be an important opportunity to strengthen dialogue and cooperation between both parties. Further to previous updates to the Council, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) remains in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. I have been advised that the FFM is continuing its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic and other States parties with regard to a number of incidents and is preparing for upcoming deployments. I understand that the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) continues its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely were used in the Syrian Arab Republic. The IIT will issue further reports in due course.”
2022-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9097 (2022) · source
“I take this opportunity to once again reiterate my full support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW. I regret to inform the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the detection of a schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facilities of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre in November 2018. Regarding the in-person meeting between the OPCW Director-General and the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat is still awaiting the Syrian Arab Republic’s position on the latest version of the agenda.”
2022-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9097 (2022) · source
“Full cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is essential to closing all outstanding issues. As has been stressed repeatedly, due to the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the Technical Secretariat continues to assess that, at this stage, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The OPCW Technical Secretariat remains fully committed to ensuring the full implementation by the Syrian Arab Republic of all its declaration requirements and assisting Syria in fulfilling its obligations under the Convention.”
2022-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9097 (2022) · source
“In his letter, Syria’s Foreign Minister also acknowledged that such an exchange could not replace consultations between the Syrian National Authority and the DAT, while at the same time reiterating that the exclusion of the DAT’s lead technical expert was a condition for holding the twenty-fifth round of consultations. I urge the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate with the OPCW Technical Secretariat, as set out in paragraph 7 of article VII of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and to facilitate arrangements for the deployment of the DAT, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 2118 (2013), including by allowing immediate and unfettered access for all personnel designated by the OPCW Technical Secretariat as soon as possible.”
2022-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9097 (2022) · source
“Moreover, I have been advised that the Syrian National Authority has stated that the exclusion of the same DAT expert from a limited round of consultations in Beirut, as proposed by the Technical Secretariat, is a condition for its participation in those consultations. I have also been advised that, in response to the Technical Secretariat’s note verbale dated 20 May, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic sent a letter to the OPCW Director-General on 31 May, agreeing with the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s proposal to address the shortcomings in the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration through an exchange of correspondence for the time being.”
2022-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9097 (2022) · source
“I have been advised that the Technical Secretariat has not yet received a response to the request for information regarding the unauthorized movement and the remains of two destroyed cylinders related to the chemical weapon incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018. The Syrian Arab Republic must respond with urgency to the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s requests. I regret to inform Council members that the Technical Secretariat is still not in a position to conduct the twenty-fifth round of consultations in Damascus between the Syrian National Authority and the DAT due to the repeated refusal by the Syrian Arab Republic to issue an entry visa for the DAT’s lead technical expert.”
2022-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9097 (2022) · source
“The OPCW Technical Secretariat has yet to receive the requested declaration from the Syrian Arab Republic on all undeclared types and quantities of nerve agents produced and/or weaponized at a former chemical weapons production facility that was declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used to produce and/or weaponize chemical warfare agents. The OPCW Technical Secretariat also expects further information and documentation from the Syrian Arab Republic regarding damage caused during the 8 June 2021 attack on a military facility housing a declared former chemical weapons production facility.”
2022-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9097 (2022) · source
“Mrs. Nakamitsu: I thank Security Council members for this opportunity to brief them again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since the Council’s previous consideration of this matter (see S/PV.9026), and consistent with established practice, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with its counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to this matter. Efforts by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) to clarify all the outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration and subsequent declarations of the Syrian Arab Republic have not progressed since the Council last met on this issue.”
2022-07-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9097 (2022) · source
“The Chemical Weapons Convention calls upon us to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons. The Convention has been the most important step in achieving that goal. But as events continue to prove, we cannot take its success for granted. I hope that the Security Council will take seriously its responsibilities in safeguarding this invaluable instrument and the norm against chemical-weapon use.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“I understand that the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) continues its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic. The IIT will issue further reports in due course, subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. With regard to the decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (C-25/DEC.9), adopted on 21 April 2021, I have been advised that, unfortunately, the Syrian Arab Republic has not yet completed any of the measures stipulated in paragraph 5 of decision EC- 94/DEC.2. I therefore repeat my call on the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the OPCW Technical Secretariat in this regard.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“I note that an initial agenda has been negotiated for the in-person meeting between the OPCW Director- General and the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates. However, the OPCW Technical Secretariat is awaiting the Syrian Arab Republic’s position on the latest version of the agenda. The proposed meeting would be an important opportunity to strengthen dialogue and cooperation between the two parties. Consistent with previous updates to the Council, the OPCW FFM remains in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. I have been advised that the FFM is preparing for upcoming deployments that remain subject to the evolution of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“I understand that the Syrian Arab Republic has agreed to the limited round of consultations, while at the same time requesting the exclusion of one OPCW expert. Let me state yet again: until these outstanding issues are closed, the international community cannot have full confidence that the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical-weapons programme has been eliminated. To this end, I regret to also inform the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the detection of a Schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre in November 2018.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“This deployment has been delayed owing to the continued refusal by the Syrian Arab Republic to issue an entry visa for one DAT expert. I understand that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has repeatedly stressed that the applicable legal framework does not entitle the Syrian Arab Republic to select experts. The DAT will only be in a position to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic once entry visas are issued to all DAT experts. I have been informed that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has proposed a limited round of consultations in Beirut, Lebanon. These consultations would allow for an assessment of the status of all outstanding issues, discussions on the possible way forward, and receipt of documents requested by the Secretariat.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“The OPCW Technical Secretariat also expects further information and documentation from the Syrian Arab Republic regarding damage caused during the 8 June 2021 attack on a military facility housing a declared former chemical weapons production facility. I have also been advised that the Technical Secretariat has not yet received a response to the request for information regarding the unauthorized movement of remains of two destroyed cylinders related to the chemical weapon incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018. The Syrian Arab Republic must respond with urgency to the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s requests. Since April 2021, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has attempted to schedule the twenty-fifth round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“I regret to inform Council members that there has been little, or no, change in the past month on issues related to this file. Efforts by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team to clarify all the outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration and subsequent declarations of the Syrian Arab Republic remain as previously informed. I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not yet received the requested declaration from the Syrian Arab Republic on all undeclared types and quantities of nerve agents produced and/or weaponized at a former chemical weapons production facility that was declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used to produce and/or weaponize chemical warfare agents.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“I assure the Council that the United Nations will continue to strive with partners, such as the OPCW Technical Secretariat, and all its Member States to restore the norm against chemical weapons and to ensure that those responsible for their use are held to account. Turning to my regular briefing on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has continued to maintain regular contact with counterparts at the OPCW on its activities related to that matter. As per established practice, I held a monthly call with the OPCW Director-General on 27 April 2022 to receive an update on developments and ascertain his views.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“The objective and professional nature of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, including its Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) and Investigation and Identification Team, must be respected. Its work is crucial to reinforcing the CWC and bringing the perpetrators of chemical weapon use to justice. Secretary-General Guterres has repeatedly called on the international community to act. Yet the Security Council has not fulfilled its responsibility to hold the perpetrators of those heinous acts accountable. The use of chemical weapons anywhere, by anyone and under any circumstances is unacceptable. We must act together to shore up the norm against the use of chemical weapons and strengthen the CWC, which remains integral and necessary bedrock of the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“I can assure Council members that both the OPCW and the United Nations have worked, and will continue to work, closely to respond to those challenges and in defence of the CWC. No example showcases that damage better than the numerous documented instances of chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic. The OPCW confirmed the complete destruction of all chemical weapons declared by Syria on 4 of January 2016. Unfortunately, despite the accession of Syria to the CWC, the OPCW continues to document instances of chemical weapons use in Syria. Those reports are a wake-up call to the international community about the continuing threat posed by those inhumane weapons. The horrific images of the victims of chemical weapons, including hundreds of injured and casualties, should haunt us all.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“I am proud of the robust and long-standing partnership between the United Nations and the OPCW Technical Secretariat, which is dedicated to achieving the elimination of chemical weapons. That close cooperation and the mutually reinforcing nature of our work were exemplified by the United Nations investigation into the allegation of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, the OPCW- United Nations Joint Mission and the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. I would like to express my appreciation for the leadership shown by OPCW Director-General Fernando Arias and commend the OPCW Technical Secretariat for its professionalism, dedication and perseverance. It is an unfortunate fact that today many of the CWC’s historic accomplishments have been overshadowed by the continued use of chemical weapons.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“The Convention is nearing universality, with 193 States parties and 165 signatories. Thanks to the hard work of the OPCW and its staff and the cooperation of States, 99 per cent of the chemical-weapon stockpiles declared by possessor States have been verifiably destroyed. The Convention has significantly benefited from its partnership with industry, including its unique role in the negotiation of the CWC. Industry has played a vital ongoing role in facilitating the technological and economic benefits of chemistry and advancing chemical safety and security. Industry’s role in the CWC is a fine example, which should be replicated in other relevant negotiations, including those related to emerging technologies.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“The unprecedented large-scale use of toxic chemicals during the First World War shocked the entire world and prompted negotiations on a number of instruments meant to prevent such a recurrence, most prominently the 1925 Geneva Protocol to The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which banned the use of chemical and biological weapons. The CWC, in prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer and, of course, use of chemical weapons, created a more far-reaching and comprehensive prohibition. When we think back to the horrors of chemical warfare, from the victims from the fields of Flanders to the Middle East, it is obvious that the CWC has made the world not only a safer place, but also a more humane one. The past 25 years have seen much accomplished in pursuit of the elimination of chemical weapons.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“Mrs. Nakamitsu: It is an honour to address this Security Council meeting commemorating the twenty- fifth anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). I would like to take this opportunity to extend my thanks to the United Kingdom for its long-standing support to both the Convention and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. The Chemical Weapons Convention is one of the most important achievements in the history of disarmament. The prohibition and scheduled elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction 25 years ago was a truly remarkable outcome. It was not easy, but it is an outstanding example of what the international community can achieve when it is united in purpose.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“As Secretary-General Guterres said: “We need an immediate cessation of hostilities and serious negotiations based on the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. We need peace — peace for the people of Ukraine, peace for our world. We need peace now.””
2022-03-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8999 (2022) · source
“The civilian casualties continue to rise: as of 16 March, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights had recorded 2,032 civilian casualties, including 780 killed, of whom 58 were children. The actual number of casualties is believed to be much higher. Most of these casualties are caused by the use of explosive weapons with a wide impact area. These include attacks using heavy artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems, ballistic and cruise missiles and air strikes. I also want to reiterate that attacks directed at civilians are prohibited by international humanitarian law. We must find a diplomatic solution to this war to put an end to the violence.”
2022-03-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8999 (2022) · source
“The IAEA has reported that, according to the Ukrainian authorities, 8 of the country’s 15 reactors remained operating. I understand that, with regard to nuclear safeguards, the IAEA is still not receiving remote data transmission from its monitoring systems installed at Chornobyl, but such data was being transferred to IAEA headquarters from the other nuclear power plants in Ukraine. I take this opportunity to reiterate the Secretary-General’s support for efforts by the IAEA to establish a framework on the safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities and urge all parties to work towards this end. I also wish to highlight the terrible toll this conflict is having on civilians.”
2022-03-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8999 (2022) · source
“Turning to the issue of the safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear power facilities, the Director- General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported that, according to the Ukrainian authorities, all safety systems at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant remained fully functional as of yesterday, following the site’s loss of connection to a third external power line linking it to the national electricity grid. Although officials from Russia’s State nuclear power company were present at the facilities in southern Ukraine, Ukrainian staff continue to operate the plant. The Chornobyl power plant remains connected to the national electricity grid, following reconnection on 14 March. However, Ukrainian operators and guards have not been able to rotate for three weeks now.”
2022-03-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8999 (2022) · source
“As I mentioned last week, the BWC needs to be operationalized and institutionalized to ensure that it is properly equipped and resourced to face future challenges. The Convention’s upcoming ninth review conference presents the ideal opportunity for its States parties to comprehensively strengthen the Convention. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to support any procedures under the Biological Weapons Convention that States parties may decide to use.”
2022-03-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8999 (2022) · source
“The Biological Weapons Convention contains several measures to which concerned States parties can have recourse in order to address situations in which they have concerns or suspicions about the activities of their peers. Pursuant to article V of the Convention, its States parties undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems. Such consultation and cooperation can take place on a bilateral basis between the concerned States parties, or it can be undertaken through appropriate international procedures. One such international procedure that has been elaborated within the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention is the convening of a consultative meeting. Other possibilities for addressing concerns between States parties also exist under article V of the Convention, as well as under article VI.”
2022-03-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8999 (2022) · source
“Mrs. Nakamitsu: I am aware that the Russian Federation has submitted documents regarding allegations of biological weapons programmes in Ukraine. As I informed the Council last Friday (see S/PV.8991), the United Nations is not aware of any such biological weapons programmes. I would also like to note that the United Nations currently has neither the mandate nor the technical or operational capacity to investigate that information. As I previously informed the Council, the relevant instrument of international law is the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which effectively prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological and toxin weapons. The Russian Federation and Ukraine are both States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention.”
2022-03-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8999 (2022) · source
“I would like to echo the Secretary-General’s support for IAEA Director-General Grossi’s efforts to develop a framework to ensure the safety and security of Ukraine’s facilities and welcome the constructive meetings that he held in Turkey on 10 March with the foreign ministers of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.”
2022-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8991 (2022) · source
“An accident involving the nuclear facilities in Ukraine could have severe consequences for public health and the environment and all steps must be taken to avoid it. The possibility of an accident caused by failure of a reactor’s power supply or the inability to provide regular maintenance is growing by the day. The forces in effective control of nuclear power plants in Ukraine must ensure their safe and secure operation. I am extremely concerned that four of the seven pillars of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the safe and secure operation of facilities are reportedly not being implemented at Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhya. Communications must be fully restored, and operating staff must be allowed to properly carry out their duties and to do so free of undue pressure.”
2022-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8991 (2022) · source
“I would therefore encourage BWC States parties to consider making use of the available procedures for consultation and cooperation in order to resolve these issues. Situations such as this demonstrate the need to strengthen the BWC, to operationalize it and to institutionalize it. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to encourage its States parties to come to the Convention’s ninth Review Conference, scheduled to take place in Geneva later in 2022, committed to a serious overhaul of the Convention to ensure that it is properly equipped and resourced to deal with the challenges ahead. To conclude my statement, I would like to take this opportunity to address the worrying issue of the safety and security of nuclear power plants in Ukraine.”
2022-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8991 (2022) · source
“Article VI of the Convention states: “Any State party to this Convention which finds that any other State party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council.” If agreed by the Security Council, an investigation on the basis of the complaint received could be initiated. Article VI of the Convention has never been activated. While those provisions have not been regularly used, they are nonetheless internationally agreed procedures that are available to be used to defuse tensions and to address and resolve any concerns relating to compliance with obligations under the BWC in a multilateral setting.”
2022-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8991 (2022) · source
“States parties must declare information about relevant facilities and activities on their territory in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions between them. The Russian Federation and Ukraine both participate annually in the confidence-building measures. The annual reports submitted by the Russian Federation and Ukraine are available to all BWC States parties for the purposes of transparency and reassurance. In addition, and also within the framework of Article V of the Convention, States parties have developed procedures for clarifying ambiguous and unresolved matters, including the possible convening of a formal consultative meeting to consider such matters.”
2022-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8991 (2022) · source
“Despite the lack of an international verification regime, the Biological Weapons Convention does, however, contain several measures to which concerned States parties can have recourse in order to address situations in which States parties have concerns or suspicions about the activities of their peers. For example, article V of the Convention states: “The States parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.” Within the framework of article V, States parties have established an annual exchange of information based upon the submission of confidence-building measures.”
2022-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8991 (2022) · source
“All States parties to the Convention have undertaken to never, in any circumstances, develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain biological weapons. Biological weapons have been outlawed since the BWC entered into force in 1975. A total of 183 States have now joined the Convention and biological weapons are universally seen as being abhorrent and illegitimate. The BWC lacks a multilateral verification mechanism overseen by an independent organization, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Therefore, assessing compliance with its obligations is a task for its States parties.”
2022-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8991 (2022) · source
“Mrs. Nakamitsu: I thank Council members for the opportunity to brief them this morning. I am aware of reports that certain public health facilities are in areas impacted by armed conflict, putting the safety of those facilities at risk. I appeal to all parties to the conflict to ensure the safety of all such facilities in Ukraine. I am aware of media reports regarding allegations of biological weapons programmes. The United Nations is not aware of any biological weapons programmes. That is largely thanks to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological and toxin weapons. The Russian Federation and Ukraine are both States parties to the Convention. In addition, the Russian Federation is a depositary Government under the Convention.”
2022-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8991 (2022) · source
“Let me close by assuring Council members of the commitment of the United Nations to work with all Member States to restore the taboo against chemical weapons and to ensure that those responsible for their use, who have violated such a profound international norm, are held to account.”
2022-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8990 (2022) · source
“With regard to the decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (C-25/DEC.9), adopted on 21 April 2021, I have been informed that, unfortunately, the Syrian Arab Republic has not yet completed any of the measures stipulated in paragraph 5 of decision EC-94/ DEC.2. I therefore reiterate my call on the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the OPCW Technical Secretariat in this regard. The use of chemical weapons is a grave violation of international law and an affront to our shared humanity. We need to remain vigilant to ensure that these awful weapons are never used again and are eliminated, not only in Syria, but everywhere.”
2022-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8990 (2022) · source
“The FFM is preparing for upcoming deployments, which remain subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. I understand that the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) continues its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic. The IIT will issue further reports in due course, subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. I take this opportunity to once again reiterate my full support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW.”
2022-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8990 (2022) · source
“I note that the OPCW Director- General’s monthly report (see S/2022/181) refers to the FFM reports issued by the Technical Secretariat on 24 and 31 January 2022, which concluded that sulfur mustard was used in Marea on 1 September 2015 and that a chlorine cylinder was used as a weapon in Kafr Zeita on 1 October 2016, respectively. Copies of both FFM reports were circulated to members of the Security Council last month. I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat planned to deploy the FFM to the Syrian Arab Republic from 22 January to 4 February 2022 to collect information and conduct interviews with regard to incidents in the Aleppo governorate in 2016. However, due to confirmed positive coronavirus disease (COVID-19) cases identified within the support team in Damascus, the deployment had to be postponed.”
2022-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8990 (2022) · source
“With regard to the detection of a Schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC in November 2018, I regret to inform the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close this issue. I note that preparations for the in-person meeting between the OPCW Director-General and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic remain ongoing. The Technical Secretariat will keep the OPCW Executive Council informed of further developments on this matter. Consistent with previous updates to the Council, the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) remains in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.”
2022-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8990 (2022) · source