YouSaid · the spoken record

Nakamitsu

lines on the record

465

first

2015-08-20

most recent

2023-12-15

sittings or episodes

46

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un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

1. “The Security Council can further strengthen that convergence by integrating the collection and analysis of sex- and age-disaggregated data on small arms and light weapons in related mandates, support civil society organizations, especially women’s organization, and encourage States to streamline national action plans in order to ensure a more active exchange of information among focal points for those respective portfolios. In addition, there are new and emerging themes related to small arms and light weapons and their ammunition that warrant the attention of the Security Council and Member States.”

   2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

2. “All small arms and light weapons control initiatives should therefore be carried out with due attention to their potential impacts on children’s rights, and vice versa. Conventional arms control, including small arms and light weapons control measures, is relevant to all four pillars of the women and peace and security agenda — participation, protection, prevention and relief and recovery — including in contexts of conflict- related sexual violence.”

   2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

3. “Global leadership, including that of the Security Council, will be vital to the Decade of Action and can support capacity-building efforts among States to gather information and report on the number of seized and collected small arms and light weapons. That would allow better tracking of the progress on Sustainable Development Goal indicator 16.4.2 with a view to achieving a significant reduction in illicit arms flows by 2030. Thematic discussions on issues such as children in armed conflict and the women and peace and security agenda are also important opportunities to reflect on convergence with small arms-related issues as part of the Security Council’s programme of work. Children continue to bear the brunt of armed conflict, often enabled and prolonged by the widespread availability of weapons.”

   2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

4. “That includes addressing the arms-crime-terrorism nexus as one interrelated and multifaceted security threat that requires complementary approaches and responses. Small arms control measures — in particular the development and implementation of border security and management strategies, efforts to detect and seize parts and components of weapons and ammunition, enhanced stockpile management and the fight against the illicit manufacture of weapons — are effective tools to disrupt the supply of illicit small arms and light weapons to terrorists. Another dimension to consider is the nexus between sustainable development and small arms, which is firmly anchored in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”

   2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

5. “Such efforts have provided an opportunity to introduce weapons and ammunition management-related commitments and measures that can address potential risks of arms diversion by security services, as well as illicit arms proliferation and misuse. Another welcome development is the Security Council’s employment of weapons and ammunition management as part of the benchmark assessments of arms embargoes. It is important to note that available standards and guidelines must be applied in such contexts to further improve national and regional implementation and enforcement of embargoes. I would like to encourage the Security Council to fully integrate considerations of weapons and ammunition into its work on both country-specific and thematic discussions.”

   2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

6. “The Aide-Mémoire was specifically developed by the Office for Disarmament Affairs to assist the Security Council in accurately and comprehensively reflecting state-of-the-art practices related to weapons and ammunition management in relevant Council decisions. The Aide-Mémoire has just been updated, and the second edition is now publicly available. Also of importance to the Security Council are the illicit transfers of small arms and light weapons in the context of arms embargo violations, which remain concerning. I also note the Council’s efforts to support States in the strengthening of national security services through adjustments to relevant arms embargoes.”

   2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

7. “Inadequately maintained stockpiles of weapons and ammunition constitute serious humanitarian hazards and are a known source of weapons diversion that negatively impacts peace and security beyond conflict and post- conflict settings. Internationally recognized tools such as the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC)and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines are increasingly being used by States for effective weapons and ammunition management. That was underscored in the publication Aide-Mémoire: Options for Reflecting Weapons and Ammunition Management in Decisions of the Security Council.”

   2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

8. “Hence, I commend the Council’s increasing consideration of the issue of small arms in its work, including the inclusion of arms-related provisions in recent peace operations mandates in Abyei, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Libya, Mali, Somalia, the Sudan, South Sudan and Yemen. The growing number of resolutions that take into account weapons and ammunition management and control measures for small arms and light weapons control is indicative of the role of the United Nations in supporting the control of those weapons in order to build and sustain peace. I encourage the Security Council to also integrate weapons and ammunition management considerations in its work on conflict prevention.”

   2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

9. “I will start with the focus of today’s discussion, namely, the need to address the threats posed by illicit flows of small arms and light weapons in contexts of peace operations. The misuse, illicit transfer and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition remains a defining factor in undermining peace and security at the national, regional and global levels and has deeply aggravated situations for vulnerable populations already suffering from conflict. In contexts where United Nations peace operations have been mandated, illicit flows and the easy availability of arms can exacerbate and sustain conflict dynamics, render arms embargoes ineffective, endanger peacekeepers, humanitarian workers and local populations and complicate the implementation of peace agreements.”

   2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

10. “Since then, the Security Council has continued to recognize that the illicit flow and excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons compromise the effectiveness of its ability to discharge its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security. It was in that context that the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to report on small arms on a biennial basis beginning in 2008. Since that request, there have been seven reports of the Secretary- General on this topic. It is important to acknowledge that there are common themes that run throughout all the reports of the Secretary-General on this critical issue, including the most recent one. Let me highlight a few points from the report.”

    2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

11. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: At the outset, allow me to express my gratitude to Kenya for convening this very important meeting, and for giving me the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the occasion of the release of the Secretary-General’s biennial report to the Council on small arms and light weapons (S/2021/839). I applaud the Security Council’s commitment to address the issue of small arms and light weapons on a regular basis. This is the third time that I personally brief the Council on this agenda item, but the biennial consideration of small arms began 12 years ago with a 2007 presidential statement (S/PRST/2007/24).”

    2021-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8874 (2021) · source

12. “Before concluding, I wish to echo the Secretary- General’s remarks to the General Assembly in presenting Our Common Agenda on 10 September: “When we work together, there is no limit to what we can achieve”.”

    2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source

13. “I have been advised that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to complete all of those measures. I therefore reiterate once again my call on the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the OPCW Technical Secretariat in that regard. It cannot be repeated often enough: there is no justification for the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere or under any circumstances. There are no excuses for an inexcusable act. We must remain united and determined in preventing their use or the threat of their use. Those who have used chemical weapons must be identified and held to account. It is an obligation for all of us. It is my sincere hope that members of the Council will unite on this issue.”

    2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source

14. “I take this opportunity to once again state my full support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW. On 21 April, at its twenty-fifth session, the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention adopted decision C-25/Dec.9, entitled “Addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic”, suspending the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention. According to paragraph 8 of the decision, the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic will be reinstated by the Conference of the States Parties once the OPCW Director-General has reported to the Executive Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has completed all of the measures contained in paragraph 5 of Executive Council decision EC-94/Dec.2.”

    2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source

15. “The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) remains in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and continues to engage with the Syrian Arab Republic and other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention with regard to “a variety of incidents”. As previously reported, further FFM deployments will be subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. I understand that, following the issuance of its second report in April, the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) continues with its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic. The IIT will issue further reports in due course, subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic.”

    2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source

16. “The inspections of those facilities remain subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. I have been advised that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the detection of a Schedule 2 chemical at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC in 2018. With regard to the in-person meeting between the OPCW Director-General and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic, I note that the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the Syrian Arab Republic have appointed officials in charge of preparations. I hope that the proposed meeting will be an opportunity to strengthen dialogue and cooperation between both parties.”

    2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source

17. “I urge the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to facilitate arrangements for the deployment of the DAT as soon as possible. As has been stressed on numerous occasions, it is only through complete cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat that all outstanding issues related to the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration can be closed. As noted at many prior Council meetings, the confidence of the international community in the complete elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons programme depends upon those issues being finalized. The OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to plan to conduct two rounds of inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) in 2021.”

    2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source

18. “I have been informed that, with the aim of advancing the implementation of the Syrian Arab Republic’s obligations and the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s mandate, the Technical Secretariat has invited Syria to send a delegation for a meeting in the second half of this month with the DAT at the OPCW’s headquarters in The Hague. The OPCW Technical Secretariat has underscored that such a meeting cannot replace full- fledged deployments to the Syrian Arab Republic. As a result of the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to assess that, at this stage, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.”

    2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source

19. “Unfortunately, on 23 September, the Syrian Arab Republic reconfirmed to the OPCW Technical Secretariat its refusal to issue an entry visa to one member of the DAT for the upcoming deployment. In its response, the OPCW Technical Secretariat recalled that the DAT expert had deployed to Syria on multiple occasions over the past seven years and further referred to the applicable legal framework, which does not entitle the Syrian Arab Republic to select experts on behalf of the Technical Secretariat. Given the regrettable situation, the Technical Secretariat confirmed that it would not deploy the DAT to the Syrian Arab Republic at this time.”

    2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source

20. “I note that, on 16 August, the Syrian National Authority responded to the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s request to schedule the twenty-fifth round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority. I understand that the Syrian National Authority has confirmed its readiness to hold the consultations from 11 to 27 October. The OPCW Secretariat informed the Syrian National Authority, on 25 August, that the DAT was prepared to deploy in October. It also expressed concern about how delays in the conduct of the consultations could impact Syria’s compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as the implementation of the Technical Secretariat’s mandate.”

    2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source

21. “I urge the Syrian Arab Republic to respond to the OPCW Technical Secretariat as soon as possible given that the damage caused to that facility is related to an outstanding issue recently opened by the Declaration Assessment Team. As I previously informed the Security Council, the Syrian National Authority also reported the destruction, in the attack on the chemical-weapons production facility, of two chlorine cylinders that were related to the chemical weapons incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018. In addition. the OPCW Technical Secretariat requested the Syrian Arab Republic to provide information regarding the unauthorized movement of the two cylinders and any remains of their destruction. The Technical Secretariat is still awaiting a response from the Syrian Arab Republic on that matter.”

    2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source

22. “In that context, the OPCW Technical Secretariat remains of the position that the Syrian Arab Republic must declare all chemical warfare agents produced and/or weaponized at the former chemical-weapons production facility that was declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used to produce and/or weaponize chemical weapons. I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has not yet received a response from the Syrian National Authority to the request for information and documentation regarding the damage caused to the declared former chemical-weapons production facility during the attack on 8 June, reported by the Syrian National Authority.”

    2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source

23. “As I previously informed the Security Council, the ongoing coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has impacted the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s ability to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic. Nevertheless, the Technical Secretariat maintains its readiness for deployments. Despite the continued travel restrictions, the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to undertake its mandated activities related to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in that regard. Efforts by the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) are still ongoing to clarify all the outstanding issues related to the initial declaration by the Syrian Arab Republic to the OPCW.”

    2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source

24. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: I thank Security Council members for this opportunity to brief them again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical-weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since the previous Security Council meeting on resolution 2118 (2013), held on 2 September (see S/PV.8849), the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with its counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) regarding its activities related to that matter. Per established practice, I held a monthly call with the OPCW Director-General on 1 October to receive an update and ascertain his views.”

    2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source

25. “The enhanced technical capability of the System to detect any and all nuclear tests would be a deterrent to any State that may harbour plans to develop nuclear weapons. Capacity-building activities undertaken by a number of States also contribute to the transfer of these technologies and expertise to developing countries. Today, we rightly celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of a hard-won victory in multilateral nuclear disarmament diplomacy that has consistently benefited the international community. I hope that today’s event will prompt us to reinforce the achievements made so far and provide a forum for the free exchange of ideas and suggestions on how to strengthen the monitoring regime, reinforce and solidify the global norm against nuclear testing and, of course, achieve the earliest possible entry-into-force of the Treaty.”

    2021-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8865 (2021) · source

26. “The forthcoming Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is one occasion to do so. The NPT and the CTBT are inextricably interlinked. A ban on nuclear tests is considered the critical component of both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as stated in the preamble of the CTBT. Some of the old hands in this Chamber may also recall that negotiation of the CTBT was an essential element of the agreement by States parties to indefinitely extend the NPT in 1995. The Review Conference will, I hope, provide impetus to strengthen support for the CTBT and the global ban on nuclear tests. Thirdly, we must continue to provide support for the IMS and further strengthen the CTBTO’s technical capabilities to detect activities related to nuclear testing.”

    2021-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8865 (2021) · source

27. “The CTBTO has made great strides in this area, with its CTBTO Youth Group initiative now counting nearly 1,000 participants. I look forward to hearing the Group’s representative speak today. For the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, young people are an integral part of our activities in promoting disarmament and arms control, including through our own Youth4Disarmament initiative. Its members were recently involved in various initiatives to commemorate the International Day Against Nuclear Tests. Secondly, we must not lose sight of the fact that the CTBT does not operate in a vacuum and that its full potential is realized when it works in tandem with other processes related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.”

    2021-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8865 (2021) · source

28. “As the global arms control regime has crumbled, multilateral nuclear disarmament diplomacy has atrophied. As relations continue to decline among States that possess nuclear weapons, we cannot take it for granted that the norm against nuclear testing will hold. Thus, a quarter of a century after States agreed to ban all nuclear tests for good, it is as important as ever to work towards upholding that norm and to pave a way to a world free of nuclear weapons. The best way to uphold the norm against testing is to reaffirm and enhance support for the CTBT — to reinforce its existing strengths and to strive to bring about its entry into force. We can do so on several fronts. First, we must empower the youth of the world, on whose shoulders rests the responsibility to carry on the important work of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.”

    2021-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8865 (2021) · source

29. “The cumulative result of these achievements is that no nuclear test conducted will ever evade the watchful eyes of the CTBTO, buttressing the strong global norm against any nuclear testing. Thanks to those States that have signed and ratified the CTBT, the Provisional Technical Secretariat has been transformed into a professional hub of scientific and technical expertise. I thank the staff of the Provisional Technical Secretariat for their enduring dedication to their cause. Yet, despite all these remarkable achievements, there are still many challenges that lie ahead of us. The CTBT will play an important role in addressing those challenges. In recent years, we have seen a worrisome trend towards the modernization and expansion of nuclear arsenals.”

    2021-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8865 (2021) · source

30. “Since its adoption by the General Assembly and opening for signature in September 1996, the Treaty has achieved near universal adherence, with 185 signatories and 170 ratifying States. It is one of the most widely supported treaties, not just in the disarmament and arms control field but in multilateral diplomacy. The International Monitoring System (IMS), which provides round-the-clock, real-time monitoring of any explosive nuclear activities on Earth, is now more than 90 per cent complete, with over 300 stations certified. The IMS is a towering achievement that has already demonstrated its worth on multiple occasions. The capacity-building benefits it provides are an excellent example of how multilateral disarmament instruments add value for all States and allow all States to participate in achieving their ends.”

    2021-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8865 (2021) · source

31. “It is for this reason that the CTBT is recognized as an essential element of nuclear disarmament and a building block for a world free of nuclear weapons — the United Nations highest disarmament priority. Negotiating the CTBT was not easy. Its gestation lasted years, and when negotiations finally did commence, it was only by bringing the Treaty to the floor of the General Assembly that success was achieved. Yet the negotiation of the CTBT also stands as a lesson for other multilateral disarmament initiatives — one of patience and one of determination, but also one of striking while the iron is hot. The twenty- fifth anniversary of the Treaty’s negotiation brings us reasons both to celebrate and to rethink what we can do to overcome the challenges that still lie ahead.”

    2021-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8865 (2021) · source

32. “Three decades in the making, a prohibition on nuclear testing has been a goal of the international community almost since the dawn of the atomic age. The CTBT represents the fulfilment of that goal. From the deserts of Nevada to the steppes of Semipalatinsk to the outback of Australia and the atolls of the South Pacific, nuclear testing has done lasting damage to pristine environments, human health and some of the most vulnerable communities in our international family. This alone should be enough to outlaw nuclear testing in perpetuity, yet the more than 2,000 tests that have been conducted since 1945 have also enabled the quantitative and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, announcing the arrival of new nuclear-armed States and facilitating dangerous growth in the arsenals of their predecessors.”

    2021-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8865 (2021) · source

33. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: At the outset, I would like to thank the Irish presidency of the Council for its initiative in convening today’s event. I also would like to congratulate Mr. Floyd on his recent appointment as Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Allow me also to commend him on the successful conclusion of the twelfth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) — or the Article XIV Conference — which was held last week in a virtual format for the first time in the Conference’s history. The norm against nuclear testing is one of the most hard-won gains of the post-Cold War era. Yet it exists today — violated by only one State in this century — because of the CTBT.”

    2021-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8865 (2021) · source

34. “In the end, the OPCW Technical Secretariat agreed to the three-month extension, which means that the agreement will be valid through 31 December 2021. The Technical Secretariat also conveyed to the Syrian Arab Republic that an extension of such a limited duration will have an impact on the OPCW’s ability to plan and conduct the activities mandated by the OPCW’s policymaking organs, especially those that have to be conducted on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic.”

    2021-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8849 (2021) · source

35. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: I believe the representative of Mexico posed a question regarding the extension of the current tripartite agreement. I will gladly address that issue. As the Security Council knows, the current tripartite agreement is valid through the end of this month, until 30 September 2021. Towards the end of July, the three parties — the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Technical Secretariat, the United Nations Office for Project Services and the Syrian Government — held a video-teleconference to discuss the further extension of the agreement. The OPCW Technical Secretariat proposed a nine-month extension, whereas the Syrian Arab Republic proposed a three-month extension.”

    2021-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8849 (2021) · source

36. “If we cannot do so, we allow the use of chemical weapons to take place with impunity — something that must not be tolerated. It is my sincere hope that the members of the Council will unite on the issue and reinforce the essential norm against the use of such horrific weapons. The vitality and credibility of a broader disarmament and non-proliferation architecture depends upon it. The Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can.”

    2021-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8849 (2021) · source

37. “I take this opportunity to reiterate once again my full support for the integrity, professionalism, impartiality, objectivity and independence of the work of the OPCW. With regard to the decision entitled “Addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic”, C-25/Dec. 9, adopted on 21 April, I have been advised that the Syrian Arab Republic has not completed any of the measures stipulated in paragraph 5 of decision EC-94/Dec. 2. I therefore reiterate my call on the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the OPCW Technical Secretariat in that regard. Any use of chemical weapons is totally unacceptable and a serious violation of international law. Those responsible for the use of chemical weapons must be held accountable, no matter who they are.”

    2021-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8849 (2021) · source

38. “I note that the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) remains in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and continues to engage with the Syrian Arab Republic and other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention with regard to “a variety of incidents”. Further FFM deployments will be subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. Following the issuance of its second report, in April, I understand that the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) continues with its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic. The IIT will issue further reports in due course, subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic.”

    2021-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8849 (2021) · source

39. “The OPCW Technical Secretariat also recalled that it had previously advised the Syrian Arab Republic that it was not to open, move or alter the containers or their contents, in any way, without seeking the prior written consent of the Technical Secretariat. I understand that the Syrian National Authority did not notify the OPCW Technical Secretariat that the cylinders had been moved to a new location until the report of their destruction. Accordingly, in a note verbale dated 15 July, the OPCW Technical Secretariat requested Syria to provide all relevant information regarding the movement of the two cylinders and any remains following their destruction.”

    2021-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8849 (2021) · source

40. “The Syrian National Authority also reported the destruction of two chlorine cylinders that were related to the chemical weapons incident that took place in Douma on 7 April 2018. In its reply to the Syrian National Authority, the OPCW Technical Secretariat requested further information regarding the damage caused to the declared site, as it was related to one outstanding issue, recently opened by the Declaration Assessment Team. The OPCW Technical Secretariat also recalled that, during its previous inspection of those cylinders, in November 2020, the cylinders were stored and inspected at another declared site, approximately 60 kilometres from the location at which they were reportedly destroyed on 8 June.”

    2021-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8849 (2021) · source

41. “The objective of the meeting between the Director- General and the Minister is to hold a comprehensive and results-orientated substantive exchange on relevant developments and on the way forward regarding the OPCW Technical Secretariat’s mandated activities in the Syrian Arab Republic. I hope that the meeting will be an opportunity to strengthen the dialogue and cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the OPCW Technical Secretariat. As reported during the Security Council meeting held on 4 August (see S/PV.8830), the Syrian National Authority informed the OPCW Technical Secretariat about an attack that took place on 8 June, targeting a military facility that housed a declared former chemical weapons production facility.”

    2021-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8849 (2021) · source

42. “With regard to the Schedule 2 chemical detected at the Barzah facility of the SSRC in 2018, I have been advised that the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close that issue. I am informed that the OPCW Director-General has nominated a representative to initiate preparations for the proposed in-person meeting between the Director-General and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic. I have also been advised that the new Deputy Head of Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the OPCW has been appointed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs as the contact point for organizing the possible meeting.”

    2021-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8849 (2021) · source

43. “As has been stressed on numerous occasions, owing to the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to assess that, at this stage, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. As previously reported, the OPCW Technical Secretariat still plans to conduct two rounds of inspections of the Barzah and Jamraya facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) in 2021. The inspections of those facilities remain subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic.”

    2021-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8849 (2021) · source

44. “I have been advised that, on 9 August, the Syrian National Authority was informed by the OPCW Director-General of his intention to deploy a Declaration Assessment Team to Damascus from 2 to 17 September to conduct the twenty-fifth round of consultations. However, on 16 August, the Syrian National Authority requested that the upcoming round of consultations be held in October 2021, after the high-level week of the seventy-sixth session of the General Assembly. Full cooperation by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat is essential to closing the outstanding issues.”

    2021-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8849 (2021) · source

45. “Despite continued travel restrictions, the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat has been able to pursue its mandated activities related to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in that regard. The OPCW Declaration Assessment Team is pursuing its ongoing efforts to clarify all the outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration by the Syrian Arab Republic to the OPCW. In that context, the OPCW Technical Secretariat remains of the position that the Syrian Arab Republic must declare all chemical warfare agents produced and/or weaponized at the former chemical weapons production facility that was declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used to produce and/or weaponize chemical weapons.”

    2021-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8849 (2021) · source

46. “Mrs. Nakamitsu: I thank Security Council members for the opportunity to brief them again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Consistent with established practice, the Office of Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with its counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to this matter. Also per established practice, I held a monthly call with the OPCW Director-General on 31 August to receive an update and ascertain his views. The OPCW’s Technical Secretariat’s ability to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic remained subject to the evolution of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. Nevertheless, the Technical Secretariat maintains its readiness for deployments.”

    2021-09-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8849 (2021) · source

47. “The Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can in the hope that those dreadful weapons can be truly relegated to the past.”

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

48. “A copy of that decision was shared with the Security Council and General Assembly members as document A/75/871- S/2021/425, pursuant to paragraph 12 of the aforementioned decision of the Conference of the States Parties. I look forward to Director-General Arias’s update on the next steps for the implementation of that decision. There is an urgent need not only to identify but hold accountable all those who have used chemical weapons in violation of international law. It is an obligation on all of us. Without such an action, we are allowing the use of chemical weapons to take place with impunity. Unity in the Security Council is required to re-establish the norm against chemical weapons.”

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

49. “As previously reported, further FFM deployments will be subject to the evolution of the coronavirus disease pandemic. I also understand that following the issuance of its second report, in April, the Investigation and Identification Team is continuing its investigations into incidents in which the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic and will issue further reports in due course. As I previously informed the Council, on 21 April 2021 the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, at its twenty-fifth session, adopted decision C-25/Dec.9, entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic”, suspending the Rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention.”

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

50. “I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat intended to deploy the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) to Syria last month and was rescheduling the next round of consultations with the Syrian National Authority in the absence of confirmation from the Syrian Arab Republic with sufficient time to finalize the necessary preparations. I look forward to Director-General Arias’s update on this matter. I note that the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) remains in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and continues its engagement with the Syrian Government and other States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention with regard to “a variety of incidents”.”

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source