YouSaid · the spoken record

Nakamitsu

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465
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2015-08-20
most recent
2023-12-15
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46
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un-security-council

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  1. As has been stressed on multiple occasions, due to the identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the OPCW Technical Secretariat continues to assess that, at this stage, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. I have no doubt that Director-General Arias will provide the Security Council members with an update on the efforts to ensure the timely resolution of those outstanding issues.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  2. However, despite continued restrictions, the Technical Secretariat has been able to pursue its mandated activities related to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme and its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in that regard. I welcome efforts to clarify all the outstanding issues regarding the initial declaration by the Syrian Arab Republic to the OPCW. Engagement and dialogue by the Syrian Arab Republic with the OPCW Technical Secretariat are essential to close the outstanding issues.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  3. Per established practice, I held a monthly call with the OPCE Director- General on 1 June 2021 to receive an update and ascertain his views. In the light of the participation of Director-General Arias in this meeting today, my statement will be brief. At the outset, I want to take this opportunity to reiterate my appreciation to Director-General Arias and the staff of the OPCW Technical Secretariat for the professional and impartial efforts to uphold the norm against the use of chemical weapons and for our partnership in the pursuit of the elimination of these inhumane weapons. The OPCW Technical Secretariat’s ability to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic remained subject to the evolution of the coronavirus disease pandemic.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  4. Mrs. Nakamitsu: I thank you, Sir, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council once again on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. It is so nice to be able to brief members back in the Chamber. It is also a pleasure to be joined here today virtually by the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Mr. Fernando Arias, who will update the Council on the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic chemical weapons programme. Since the previous Security Council meeting on resolution 2118 (2013), held on 6 May 2021 (see S/2021/446), the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been in regular contact with counterparts at the OPCW on activities related to this matter.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  5. As I have said many times before the Council, there is an urgent need to not only identify but also hold accountable all those who have used chemical weapons, in violation of international law. Without such an action, we are allowing the use of chemical weapons to take place with impunity. It is imperative that the Council show leadership in demonstrating that impunity in the use of such weapons will not be tolerated. The Office for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide whatever support and assistance it can. Before concluding, I wish to echo the Secretary- General’s appeal for a global ceasefire and for an end to hostilities across the Syrian Arab Republic.

    2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source

  6. I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat has yet to receive a response from the Syrian Arab Republic to the letter sent to the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic by the OPCW Director General on 20 July 2020 outlining the obligations of the Syrian Arab Republic under OPCW Executive Council decision EC-94/DEC.2 and indicating the readiness of the OPCW Technical Secretariat to assist the Syrian Arab Republic in the fulfilment of those obligations within the required period of 90 days. The OPCW Director General will report to the Executive Council and all States parties to the CWC within 100 days of that decision on whether the Syrian Arab Republic has completed all of the measures contained in the aforementioned decision.

    2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source

  7. As I have previously informed Council members, further deployments of the fact-finding mission will be subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on OPCW activities. The Investigation and Identification Team continues its investigations into incidents in which the fact-finding mission has determined that chemical weapons were used or likely used in the Syrian Arab Republic and will issue further reports in due course.

    2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source

  8. I note that the OPCW fact-finding mission in the Syrian Arab Republic is still in the process of studying all available information related to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and continues its engagement with the Syrian Government and other State parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) with regard to a variety of incidents. I was just informed by the OPCW Technical Secretariat that the fact-finding mission issued, on 2 October 2020, two reports on its investigation regarding separate incidents of the alleged use of toxic chemicals as a weapon in Aleppo on 24 November 2018 and in Saraqib on 1 August 2016.

    2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source

  9. I have been advised that the OPCW Technical Secretariat still plans to conduct two rounds of inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) in 2020. However, the undertaking of those inspections will be subject to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on OPCW activities. I understand that the Syrian Arab Republic has not yet provided sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to close the issue related to the findings of a Schedule 2 chemical detected at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC. The OPCW Technical Secretariat will continue to engage with the Syrian authorities and will inform the OPCW Executive Council of any progress in due course.

    2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source

  10. Furthermore, a representative of the Syrian Arab Republic visited the OPCW laboratory, where he observed the integrity of the seals and received related documentation. A technical meeting was subsequently convened with experts of the Syrian National Authority to agree on next steps. During the deployment to the Syrian Arab Republic concluded on 3 October 2020, the Declaration Assessment Team continued to address the outstanding issues related to Syria’s initial declaration as well as the information provided by the Syrian National Authority to the OPCW Technical Secretariat. The outcome of that deployment will be shared with the OPCW Executive Council in due course.

    2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source

  11. In response to the letter sent by the OPCW Director General on 21 April 2020, the Syrian National Authority provided information concerning eight of the 22 outstanding issues, including two amendments to its initial declaration, through a letter dated 25 August 2020. I have been advised that during its deployment in October 2019, the Declaration Assessment Team collected samples with a view to resolving one of the 22 outstanding issues related to the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration. However, a deterioration of the samples was observed at the OPCW laboratory. The OPCW Director General informed the Syrian National Authority and provided information on the measures taken by the OPCW Technical Secretariat to document and preserve the integrity of the seals applied to the samples.

    2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source

  12. As I have previously informed the Council, the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic continues to impact the OPCW’s ability to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic. Nonetheless, the Technical Secretariat has continued with its mandated activities related to the elimination of the Syrian chemical-weapons programme and its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic in that regard, including a new deployment of the Declaration Assessment Team to Damascus, which just concluded on 3 October. The OPCW Declaration Assessment Team is continuing its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the Syrian Arab Republic’s initial declaration to the OPCW.

    2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source

  13. Mrs. Nakamitsu: I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on the elimination of the chemical-weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Since my most recent briefing, on 10 September (see S/2020/902), the Office for Disarmament Affairs has continued to maintain regular contacts with its counterparts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on its activities related to this matter. To date, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has not received any further information from the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic concerning issues related to resolution 2118 (2013) for this period.

    2020-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8764 (2020) · source

  14. As the Secretary- General has said on several occasions, such an environment requires a new vision for disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. I hope that the Review Conference can serve as a springboard for thinking on how to address the nuclear weapons challenges of our time. The current Security Council includes many States that will be key players at the Review Conference. I believe, therefore, that a reaffirmation of Council members’ support for the Treaty and an expression of commitment to securing success in May would provide a significant boost to the Review Conference’s prospects. Given the stakes, I hope that they will work towards achieving that goal.

    2020-02-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8733 (2020) · source

  15. We should return to the logic of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought. Thirdly, the development of a package of risk- reduction measures that can help the world avoid the prospect of nuclear-weapon use and move it towards nuclear disarmament would be a significant confidence-building measure. Fourthly, States should recognize that challenges to non-proliferation are not static and that, therefore, the regime cannot be either. At a minimum, I would hope that States parties are able to endorse the additional protocol as the safeguards standard. Fifthly, as I noted earlier, we cannot hide from the fact that the world has changed.

    2020-02-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8733 (2020) · source

  16. Having said that, I do not believe that the issues necessarily preclude success at the Review Conference. In fact, I hope that those issues can be discussed constructively and in ways that can move them forward, as part of the full implementation of the Treaty. In terms of a forward-looking outcome, obviously that will depend on dialogue at the Conference itself. However, I think that there are several issues that should form a part of any consensus document. Let me mention some of those today. First, a high-level reaffirmation of commitment to the Treaty and to all obligations undertaken as a party to it seems fitting at its half-century mark. Secondly, there must be a recommitment to the norm against the use of nuclear weapons. The recent increase in rhetoric extolling the utility of nuclear weapons is dangerous and destabilizing.

    2020-02-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8733 (2020) · source

  17. We cannot skate over the fact that the world is a very different place than it was in 2015, let alone in 2010 — the last time a Review Conference produced a forward-looking outcome document. Relationships among States — especially nuclear- weapon States — are fractured. So-called great-Power competition is the order of the day. Division, distrust and a dearth of dialogue are increasingly the norm. The spectre of unconstrained nuclear competition looms over us for the first time since the 1970s. We are witnessing what has been termed a qualitative nuclear arms race — one based not on numbers, but on faster, stealthier and more accurate weapons. Regional conflicts with a nuclear dimension are worsening and proliferation challenges are not receding.

    2020-02-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8733 (2020) · source

  18. It would, however, serve to undermine the value that so many United Nations Member States place on it and, in turn, devalue the review cycle as a way to strengthen not only the implementation of the NPT, but the regime as a whole. It could further entrench divisions within the Treaty, with long-term ramifications. Consequently, I continue to encourage all parties to approach the Review Conference with a spirit of flexibility and a willingness to engage in real dialogue in order to create an atmosphere conducive to success. Success at the Review Conference faces many challenges, not least of which are the varying definitions of what success entails, as well as the geopolitical context in which we find ourselves.

    2020-02-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8733 (2020) · source

  19. It has produced important confidence-building and transparency measures, including an unequivocal effort to totally eliminate nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament. The 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT — marking both the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty’s entry into force and the twenty-fifth anniversary of its indefinite extension — presents both a symbolic and a practical opportunity. It is the perfect occasion to celebrate the NPT’s many achievements and the role that it has played in making the world a safer place. It is also an opportunity to ensure that the Treaty remains the lynchpin of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime and continues to enhance all States parties’ security. Failure to secure a successful outcome in 2020 would not doom the Treaty or the non-proliferation regime.

    2020-02-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8733 (2020) · source

  20. It remains an enduring example of the value of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation measures as supporting pillars of international peace and security, no matter the climate of the day. The Treaty continues to successfully constrain the proliferation of nuclear weapons through a verifiable safeguards system that is almost universally subscribed to. We should not forget that at the time of the NPT’s negotiation, it was estimated that by 1975 there could be some 20 nuclear-armed States. The success of the NPT should not be taken for granted. In addition to the legally binding disarmament commitments under article VI of the Treaty, the NPT has also functioned as a de facto negotiating forum for nuclear disarmament.

    2020-02-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8733 (2020) · source

  21. Mrs. Nakamitsu: I would like to congratulate the Belgian presidency on convening this meeting and building on last year’s initiative by Germany. The Council’s continued attention to nuclear weapons and to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in particular, are testament to the role of both in international peace and security. It is entirely fitting that this organ consider the achievements and the future of the NPT. After all, the NPT is a pillar of international peace and security. Few multilateral treaties, let alone security treaties, can lay claim to the record of success that the NPT can. For 50 years now, it has provided collective security benefits to all its States parties.

    2020-02-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8733 (2020) · source

  22. If threats to international peace and security are to be adequately addressed, small arms and light weapons must be considered regularly and across issue areas. It is a matter of urgency for the United Nations, the Security Council and the broader international community to focus on the root causes of illicit arms flows with a view to preventing, mitigating and resolving conflict.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  23. The report assesses the relevance of small arms and light weapons considerations to several key thematic items on the Council’s agenda, namely the protection of civilians in armed conflict, peace operations, arms embargoes, women and peace and security, children and armed conflict, counter-terrorism and transnational organized crime. The assessment offers concrete and conceptual linkages, including practical recommendations on how to integrate small arms and light weapons considerations in those areas of work. In conclusion, allow me to reiterate that the compartmentalized treatment of the small arms and light weapons issue is not sufficient to address the seriousness and magnitude of the challenges arising from those weapons.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  24. I would like to conclude my briefing by reiterating the need for mainstreaming small arms and light weapons considerations across the work of the Security Council. A key denominator in all issues of the Security Council, both geographic and thematic, is that the wide and easy availability of small arms, light weapons and associated ammunition are key determinants of crisis dynamics. Given the wide-ranging impact of those weapons, section II of the Secretary-General’s report contains an assessment of several of the Council’s thematic areas of work that are particularly pertinent to small arms and light weapons considerations.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  25. The United Nations is undertaking concrete action to support the African Union in achieving its goal of a conflict-free continent, including by supporting the upcoming September 2020 Africa Amnesty Month for the surrender, collection and destruction of illegally acquired weapons. The Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations are also continuing to support more effective weapons and ammunition management, including in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration contexts. Over the past two years, the United Nations has supported national authorities in weapons and ammunition management in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali. The proper management of arms and ammunition is fundamental to the safety and security of communities, especially those impacted by conflict.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  26. Equally important, efforts at the regional and subregional levels have continued to reinforce and enhance coordination in the area of small arms and light weapons control. Regional efforts are especially critical with regard to combating cross-border trafficking. In particular, efforts in Africa, a region severely affected by the small arms scourge, have continued in the framework of the Silencing the Guns by 2020 initiative. The Security Council, through the adoption of resolution 2457 (2019), has outlined means to ensure robust support for that important initiative.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  27. He laments the continued rise in global military expenditure and the role that small arms and light weapons continue to play in hindering peace, security and sustainable development. At the same time, the Secretary-General recognizes the considerable efforts undertaken at the global, regional, subregional and national levels in support of small arms and light weapons control. Such efforts include work in the framework of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and its International Tracing Instrument, in particular the outcome of the 2018 third Review Conference of the Programme of Action, the Firearms Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Arms Trade Treaty.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  28. To support enhanced effectiveness of small arms control measures, the Office for Disarmament Affairs is implementing a multi-year project, with the financial support of the European Union, to promote small-arms approaches that include systematic gender analysis, the integration of gender perspectives and the promotion of women’s empowerment. The development of a training manual and the conduct of various national and regional capacity-building activities are among the concrete outputs to be delivered over the coming three years. Before concluding, I wish to make a few additional remarks on the report of the Secretary-General (S/2019/1011). The Secretary-General provides an overview of significant trends and developments over the past two years.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  29. The deeply societal characteristics of the small arms and light weapons issue necessitate a comprehensive mainstreaming of gender perspectives in legislative, policy and programmatic frameworks. To date, gender has not been sufficiently integrated into policies regulating small arms and light weapons, nor has there been sufficient research and data collection. Without the benefit of evidence-based information on the gendered implications of small arms and light weapons, small- arms control interventions will remain gender-blind, thereby hampering policy development, reinforcing gender inequalities and impeding the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for sustainable Development.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  30. To facilitate this work, the Secretary-General established the Saving Lives Entity, the so-called SALIENT trust facility, in his Peacebuilding Fund. The SALIENT fund is intended to serve as an effective tool for the realization of sustainable peace as a basis for longer- term development. Pilot projects will be initiated this calendar year, in collaboration with respective United Nations country teams. I would be remiss not to also underscore the highly gendered nature of small arms and light weapons. The Security Council has paid increasing attention to the gendered aspects of small arms and light weapons control, including the full and effective participation of women in all policy and practice, as well as the differentiated impacts of illicit arms on women, men, girls and boys.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  31. In tandem, by virtue of the adoption of target 16.4, which includes a significant reduction of illicit arms flows, States acknowledged the role of effective small-arms control in reducing armed violence and thereby enabling communities to better pursue sustainable development. In his Agenda for Disarmament, the Secretary- General prioritizes disarmament that saves lives, including a call for deeper and more coherent efforts on small arms and light weapons at the national level. To that end, the Office for Disarmament Affairs is partnering with the United Nations Development Programme to support country-level, small-arms control and armed violence reduction initiatives through a holistic approach, including a gender lens.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  32. Armed violence perpetrated with small arms and light weapons erodes legal and peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms. And contemporary armed conflict is also a primary driver of displacement and food insecurity. In Yemen, as of the end of 2019, an estimated 4 million people were internally displaced amidst devastating conflict, facilitated by steady arms flows. The Secretary-General has recognized the relationship between high levels of armed violence and challenges to achieving sustainable development. With the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the international community recognized that sustainable development cannot be realized without peace and security.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  33. It is in this spirit that the Secretary-General has consistently encouraged the Security Council to consider small arms and light weapons, including their ammunition, in the context of both country-specific and thematic agenda items. As echoed by the Security Council in its 2007 presidential statement, the excessive accumulation of, illicit trade in and misuse of small arms and light weapons have wide-ranging consequences touching upon all core pillars of the United Nations work: peace and security, humanitarian actions, human rights, the rule of law and development. Small arms continue to facilitate a vast spectrum of acts that constitute human rights violations, including the killing and maiming of children, rape and other forms of sexual and gender- based violence.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  34. South Sudan is similarly suffering from steady flows of weapons and ammunition, a reality that is affecting the safety of United Nations personnel and hindering the ability of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya to carry out its mandate. In Haiti, where there are over 270,000 illicit firearms in the possession of civilians, violent crime has reached unacceptable heights. I turn now to the second central theme. The negative impact of illicit small arms and light weapons flows is cross-cutting and multidimensional. Illicit small arms and light weapons have a multitude of implications for security, human rights, sustainable development, gender equality and conflict prevention.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  35. This is a welcome development indicative of the importance of proper weapons and ammunition management in reducing violence. Diversion remains a major source of weapons and their ammunition for gangs, criminal organizations and terrorist groups. Illicit small arms, light weapons and their ammunition originate from varied sources, from poorly-managed State-owned stockpiles, battlefield capture or loss following State collapse. There are also ample diversion opportunities along the supply-chain, from manufacture through end-use. We are witnessing the serious impact of such illicit arms flows, including in relation to violent extremism, throughout the Sahel and parts of the Central African subregion. A continued influx of weapons, including by sea, into Libya remains a serious concern.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  36. In 2018 alone, the Security Council raised the challenges posed by small arms, light weapons and ammunition in the framework of United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions in Afghanistan, Abyei, the Central African Republic, Haiti, Libya and Somalia. Currently, the mandates of nine peacekeeping operations and special political missions address conventional weapons-related issues, including, inter alia, small arms and light weapons control and weapons and ammunition management. In this context, I wish to highlight the mandate of the newly-established United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, that provides for advisory capacity on gang violence, community violence reduction and weapons and ammunition management.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  37. This translates into more than 200,000 deaths each year. With an estimated 1 billion small arms in circulation worldwide, the use of these weapons in lethal violence, whether in conflict or non-conflict settings, is prevalent across regions and subregions from the Americas to Africa to southern Europe. No State is immune from the challenges posed by illicit arms flows: Small arms and light weapons are the weapons of choice in intra-State conflicts and for terrorism, organized crime and gang warfare. Current and past crises that have been addressed by the Council, from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Haiti and Mali, have all been aggravated by the widespread availability and uncontrolled flow of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  38. These two fundamental themes have been consistently raised throughout the biennial reports of the Secretary-General, as well as in the context of the two thematic resolutions adopted on small arms and light weapons, namely, resolutions 2117 (2013) and 2220 (2015). Let me highlight a few points, drawing upon the content of the latest report of the Secretary-General from last year (S/2019/1011). First, the destabilizing accumulation, illicit transfer and misuse of small arms and light weapons continue to initiate, sustain and exacerbate armed conflict and pervasive crime. In situations of conflict and post- conflict, the majority of acts of violence are carried out with small arms and light weapons. On a global scale, small arms were used in nearly 50 per cent of all violent deaths between 2010 and 2015.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  39. It is important to acknowledge that there are common themes that run through all the reports of the Secretary-General on this critical issue, including the most recent one issued in December 2019 (S/2019/1011). Such commonalities are indicative of the depth and scope of the problem of small arms and light weapons. In this regard, I wish to address two themes of high relevance to the work of the Security Council: the role of illicit small arms, light weapons and their ammunition in conflict and pervasive crime; and the deeply cross- cutting and wide-ranging impact of illicit small arms and light weapons flows.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  40. The Council noted with grave concern that the destabilizing accumulation and illicit manufacture, trade and circulation of small arms and light weapons increase the intensity and duration of armed conflicts, undermine the sustainability of peace agreements and frustrate prevention efforts. In sum, the Council recognized that the illicit flow and excessive accumulation of such weapons compromise the effectiveness of the Security Council in discharging its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security. In view of the gravity of the challenges, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to begin reporting on small arms on a biennial basis beginning in 2008. Since that request, there have been six reports of the Secretary-General on this topic.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  41. Mrs. Nakamitsu: At the outset, allow me to express my gratitude to Belgium for convening this very important meeting and for giving me the opportunity to brief the Security Council. I applaud the Council’s commitment to addressing the issue of small arms and light weapons on a regular basis. This is only the second time that I am briefing the Council in person on this agenda item (see S/PV.8140), but the biennial consideration of small arms began 12 years ago with the 2007 presidential statement S/PRST/2007/24. In that statement, the Security Council articulated the deeply negative consequences of excessive and poorly controlled small arms and light weapons (see S/PV.5709).

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  42. Moving forward, there is an urgent need for new international approaches, potentially including legally binding multilateral approaches, consensus and agreement in dealing with the various problematic aspects of missiles. The Council's increased attention to those challenges can give impetus to those efforts.

    2019-08-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8602 (2019) · source

  43. The Security Council has been seized in particular of activities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which is actively augmenting its missile capabilities, contrary to the Council's resolutions. As the Secretary-General made clear in his agenda for disarmament, published last year, measures for arms control and disarmament, including in relation to missiles, played a crucial role in conflict prevention, risk mitigation, de-escalation and tension reduction at the height of the Cold War. Preventing the spread and emergence of destabilizing weapons remains a vital unfinished task for the international community in our shared endeavour to preserve international peace, security and stability.

    2019-08-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8602 (2019) · source

  44. Measures such as the Missile Technology Control Regime and The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, while of clear value, are not sufficient to deal with every aspect of the threat that missiles and their proliferation pose to international peace and security. The three United Nations panels of experts on missiles that met in the 2000s provided useful syntheses ofthe various security issues related to missiles, as they attempted to deal with the matter in a comprehensive manner. However, the First Committee has not adopted a resolution on the issue since 2008. More and more countries, including those outside of existing multilateral arrangements, continue to acquire and develop their ballistic-missile capabilities.

    2019-08-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8602 (2019) · source

  45. The INF Treaty's ending should not be the catalyst for renewed and unconstrained competition in missile development, acquisition and proliferation. I echo the Secretary-General's call for all States to avoid destabilizing developments and deployments and to urgently seek agreement on a new common path for international arms control. It is important to note that despite the various alarming developments I have mentioned, there remains no universal norm, treaty or agreement regulating missiles. Today only the Russian Federation and the United States are subject to legally binding restrictions on the number of certain missiles they may possess.

    2019-08-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8602 (2019) · source

  46. And concerns regarding ballistic missiles remain unresolved in connection with resolution 2231 (2015), which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Terrestrial-based and air-launched missiles have been used to destroy satellites in Earth orbit, including three times over the last decade, the most recent having occurred earlier this year. The recent collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty removed one of the few constraints on the development and deployment of destabilizing and dangerous classes of missiles. As the Secretary-General rightly noted, that Treaty played an important role in reducing risk, building confidence and helping to bring the Cold War to an end.

    2019-08-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8602 (2019) · source

  47. And resolution 1540 (2004) required all States to prevent the proliferation to non-State actors not only of weapons of mass destruction but also of their means of delivery. Moreover, conventionally armed missiles today feature in the arsenals of many States and some non-State actors and have been used as area- bombardment weapons, often aimed at cities. Advances in technology are enabling conventional missiles to become more accurate at longer ranges, thereby facilitating their increased development, transfer and use. The development of weapons systems using missile technology that can manoeuvre at hypersonic speeds could further undermine security and spark a destabilizing arms race. The launch of ballistic missiles into Saudi Arabia by Houthis in Yemen has been particularly troublesome.

    2019-08-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8602 (2019) · source

  48. Yet today more than 20 countries possess ballistic missiles with capabilities that exceed the threshold for "nuclear-capable", as defined in the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime. And nuclear- armed States are actively pursuing novel missile and missile-defence capabilities, with unclear and potentially negative consequences for international peace and security. We have also seen increased use ofballistic missiles in armed conflict over recent decades, most notably their indiscriminate use against cities during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Following the subsequent discovery of the extent of Iraq's weapons-of-mass-destruction programme in the 1990s, the Security Council prohibited that country from producing, acquiring or stockpiling ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres.

    2019-08-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8602 (2019) · source

  49. Today missiles add a dangerous and destabilizing element to regional flashpoints from North-East Asia to South Asia, the Middle East and Europe. They directly contribute to renewed strategic- arms competition and hamper the achievement of broader disarmament objectives. For decades, the role of ballistic missiles as a means of delivering weapons of mass destruction has been a central concern for the nuclear-disarmament process. For example, the preamble to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons states that its purpose is "to facilitate the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery". That is why they have been the focus of bilaterally agreed limitations and reductions of strategic arms for over four decades.

    2019-08-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8602 (2019) · source

  50. Ms. Nakamitsu: l have been asked to brief the Security Council today on the issues of missiles. Missiles have constituted an acute concern for international peace, security and stability ever since the first V-2 rockets were fired indiscriminately at cities in England during the Second World War. Indeed, it was the movement of nuclear-capable missiles in the Caribbean that sparked the most serious crisis of the Cold War, almost 57 years ago. Since that time, the acquisition, proliferation, deployment and use of missiles have continued to play destabilizing - even escalatory - roles in international relations, with concerning implications for crisis management, including between nuclear- armed States, and, in some instances, causing serious civilian harm.

    2019-08-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8602 (2019) · source