← LEADERSHIP TERMINAL

UK PARLIAMENT · SITTING

Stephen Doughty

MP for Cardiff South and Penarth · Labour (Co-op) · United Kingdom

IN THEIR OWN WORDS

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to set out the situation, the threats and the impact on our economy. Across this House, we share a desire to get the strait reopened.

STRAIT OF HORMUZ · 2026-09-01 · READ IN HANSARD

I thank my hon. Friend for his sustained and continued advocacy on behalf of his constituent, which is deeply powerful. I know it is of concern to many Members across this House. Despite some progress in Mr Johal’s legal proceedings, eight of the cases against him remain outstanding.

DETENTION OF UK NATIONALS ABROAD · 2026-09-01 · READ IN HANSARD

I share the hon. Gentleman’s horror at some of the things we have seen going on in those illegal settlements, and we have absolutely condemned the settler violence—the settler terrorism—that we have seen.

ARMS EXPORT LICENSING: ISRAEL · 2026-09-01 · READ IN HANSARD

I pay tribute to our Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office consular teams, particularly for their current work on the Nepal-China flooding crisis. It is also important to pay tribute to the work they do to support the thousands of British nationals who are arrested or detained abroad each year.

DETENTION OF UK NATIONALS ABROAD · 2026-09-01 · READ IN HANSARD

If I may, Mr Speaker, I want to start by acknowledging the devastating floods in Nepal. I know many Members are supporting constituents who have been affected by this tragedy, and our intention remains to support British nationals and the people of Nepal.

ARMS EXPORT LICENSING: ISRAEL · 2026-09-01 · READ IN HANSARD

The right hon. Gentleman raises important cases. I can assure him that we continue to support the clemency applications of Ryan Cornelius and Charles Ridley and to raise their case with the UAE authorities. In fact, I did so recently; the former Foreign Secretary did so as well and has met the families. As the right hon.

DETENTION OF UK NATIONALS ABROAD · 2026-09-01 · READ IN HANSARD

The complete record

Every one of 6,494 lines we hold for Stephen Doughty, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 47 of 130.

  1. It is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Mark. I thank the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) for securing this crucial debate at a critical time for Georgia and Ukraine, and I thank everyone for making excellent contributions. Three weeks ago, I was proud to attend the celebrations for the 30th anniversary of the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Georgia and the United Kingdom. I have been honoured today, and on many occasions recently, to speak for the Labour Front Bench in defence of the people of Ukraine, who continue to endure Russia’s barbaric invasion with heroism and great bravery. As has been mentioned, there are very warm relations between Georgia and the UK, but particularly with Wales.

    GEORGIA AND THE WAR IN UKRAINE · 2022-05-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  2. What are we doing to block the sale of that illegally seized grain, get the Black sea back open for trade, and ensure that Ukraine and others, including Georgia, can access their trade routes? Finally, what are we doing to build on and enhance the historic friendships and bilateral trade between the UK and Georgia? We have heard so much about that positive relationship. It is clear, in all the relationships that many of us have enjoyed, that the appetite is there from the UK and Georgia, and it is needed more than ever in these difficult times.

    GEORGIA AND THE WAR IN UKRAINE · 2022-05-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  3. However, we know that the threat can be anywhere in the near neighbourhood of Russia at any time, as seen in Putin’s actions. What is our medium and long-term strategy for the likes of Georgia or, indeed, as mentioned, the western Balkans? What are we doing to reopen the Black sea fully? It cannot be right that Russia alone is able to dominate that crucial maritime domain. We have heard about the impact on grain and trade, which affects Georgia and other countries bordering the Black sea. We have seen the despicable alleged theft of Ukrainian grain by the Russians in recent days, which has much wider consequences for the rest of the world, as rightly identified by the hon. Members for Huntingdon and for The Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown).

    GEORGIA AND THE WAR IN UKRAINE · 2022-05-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  4. I read the article by the hon. Member for Huntingdon that gave us a preview of his speech. It was a very interesting and important article. Fundamentally, if Georgia is to have the confidence to definitively support Ukraine’s resistance, and if the international community is to speak with one voice, clear assurances must come from countries such as the United Kingdom and others of support in multiple domains. If we want to ensure a network of liberty, democracy and peace, we have to invest in it urgently. With that, I have three questions, in conclusion, for the Minister. Can the Minister say what additional measures the UK is taking now to support Georgia diplomatically, economically and, crucially, in terms of security guarantees? The focus has rightly been on Moldova in recent days, given the imminent threat that country faces.

    GEORGIA AND THE WAR IN UKRAINE · 2022-05-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  5. Georgia has been forced into a very difficult position when it comes to the war in Ukraine, but, despite the expected tension between Kyiv and Tbilisi, I was encouraged to see Georgia’s support for the 2 March UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s illegal attack; support for Russia’s expulsion from the Council of Europe; and backing for the International Criminal Court probe into war crimes against the people of Ukraine. Those are encouraging signals, and we should absolutely recognise their significance. I certainly hope that Georgia can go further, but that requires us also to get involved and to proactively and consistently support all those who face these very difficult choices, particularly in the near neighbourhood of Putin’s Russia, and who need our support economically, diplomatically and in security terms.

    GEORGIA AND THE WAR IN UKRAINE · 2022-05-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  6. Rightly, since 2008, Tbilisi, under different Governments, has pushed strongly for closer links with the EU and NATO, to attain the diplomatic and military assurances that it would be protected should it face such threats again. Obviously, membership of either organisation is unlikely in the immediate future, despite the clear attitudes of the population, which have rightly been referenced, and the passion there for close alliance with us. We need to do all we can to facilitate that dialogue and direction.

    GEORGIA AND THE WAR IN UKRAINE · 2022-05-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  7. We cannot continue to make these mistakes if we are to end this diabolical trend of interference and invasion. And, of course, let us not forget the human cost. We saw the persecution of ethnic Georgians in Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the indiscriminate killing of civilians and the deliberate targeting of urban centres, the waging of a concerted information war to skew and misrepresent the actions of the invaders, and the displacement of 200,000 people. Does any of that sound eerily familiar? It is exactly what we are seeing yet again, so the warning signs were there and it saddens me greatly that we ignored them. We cannot afford to do that again and again.

    GEORGIA AND THE WAR IN UKRAINE · 2022-05-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  8. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to point to that history. It is of course the history of many others in the near orbit of Russia, including in the Baltics. Now, yet again, we see a false, so-called referendum being used next month to attempt to formally bring one of those illegally occupied regions into union with Putin’s Russia. The ceasefire agreed back in 2008 was undoubtedly tipped in favour of Putin and, in the weeks and months that followed, I am sorry to say, the west went back to a business-as-usual approach in its dealings with Moscow. We failed to implement tough enough sanctions or to punish such egregious behaviour. Indeed, the US led the way in “resetting” relations with the Kremlin, and continued to treat Russia as a wayward partner rather than a belligerent adversary.

    GEORGIA AND THE WAR IN UKRAINE · 2022-05-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  9. The hon. Gentleman puts an important question. I hope the Minister can address that point, because we must have those links open—not only for trade, but for relationships based on culture and friendship that we know are there—to enable people to travel easily between the UK and Georgia. I hope the Minister has something to say about that. Today we have covered two important countries and the implications of Russia’s actions towards both. The United Kingdom has to stand united and resolute with our allies and friends around the world, be that Ukraine or Georgia.

    GEORGIA AND THE WAR IN UKRAINE · 2022-05-24 · READ IN HANSARD

  10. We want the EU to show the necessary flexibility, to minimise all barriers, and to work with the UK Government and listen to all sides in Northern Ireland. That is the right approach, that is the responsible approach, and it is what is in the long-term interests of the people of Northern Ireland, and indeed of the whole of the United Kingdom.

    NORTHERN IRELAND PROTOCOL · 2022-05-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  11. We would use that to take VAT off Northern Ireland energy bills, funded by a one-off windfall tax on oil and gas producer profits, to help ease the cost of living crisis. If the Government are determined to plough on with the Bill that the Foreign Secretary has proposed, will they agree to prelegislative scrutiny by the Foreign Affairs Committee, and will they set out clearly to the House why this does not break international law? Labour wants to make Brexit work and for Britain to flourish outside the EU. We want the Government to take responsibility for the deal they signed, to negotiate in good faith and to find practical solutions, not take reckless steps to prolong uncertainty in Northern Ireland and damage Britain’s reputation.

    NORTHERN IRELAND PROTOCOL · 2022-05-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  12. There is no long-term unilateral solution, and only a solution that works for all sides and delivers for the people and businesses of Northern Ireland will have durability and provide the political stability that businesses crave and the public deserve. We believe that should begin with a veterinary agreement that would eliminate the vast majority of checks on produce going from Great Britain to Northern Ireland. New Zealand has an equivalence agreement, and it should not be beyond the Government and the EU to negotiate one that reflects the unique circumstances in Northern Ireland. We would also negotiate with the EU for more flexibility on VAT in Northern Ireland, to fully align Northern Ireland VAT rules with those of Great Britain.

    NORTHERN IRELAND PROTOCOL · 2022-05-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  13. The rest of the world is looking at us and wondering whether we are a country that they want to do business with. When we seek to negotiate new deals abroad, do the Government want to make other countries question whether we will keep our end of the bargain? There are wide-ranging and damaging repercussions, undermining our ability to hold others to account for their own commitments, when we should be pulling together in support of Ukraine, for example, not fuelling divisions with our European allies. The right approach is for the Government and the EU to work together to find practical solutions to these problems, and to brief the media less and to negotiate more.

    NORTHERN IRELAND PROTOCOL · 2022-05-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  14. The right response to these challenges cannot simply be to breach our commitments. It is deeply troubling for the Foreign Secretary to be proposing a Bill to apparently break the treaty that the Government themselves signed just two years ago. That will not resolve issues in Northern Ireland in the long term; rather, it will undermine trust and make a breakthrough more difficult. It would drive a downward spiral in our relationship with the EU that will have damaging consequences for British businesses and consumers. It is Cornish fisherman, County Down farmers and Scotch whisky makers who will lose out, holding back the economy while growth forecasts are already being revised down. But this goes beyond matters of trade. Britain should be a country that keeps its word.

    NORTHERN IRELAND PROTOCOL · 2022-05-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  15. Everyone recognises that the situation in Northern Ireland is unique, and we want checks to be reduced to their absolute necessary minimum and for them to properly reflect trade-related risks. It cannot be right, for example, that goods leaving Great Britain that have no realistic prospect of leaving Northern Ireland, such as supermarket sandwiches, face excessive burdens, and the EU needs to understand that practical reality. Unnecessary barriers will only hamper business, inhibit trade and undermine confidence and consent. The Good Friday agreement was one of the proudest achievements of the last Labour Government. It is absolutely essential that it is protected. That is why we need calm heads and responsible leadership. We need a UK Government capable of the hard diplomatic graft to find solutions and an EU willing to show flexibility.

    NORTHERN IRELAND PROTOCOL · 2022-05-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  16. The Prime Minister negotiated this deal, signed it and ran an election campaign on it. He must take responsibility for it and make it work. The situation in Northern Ireland is incredibly serious. Power sharing has broken down, Stormont is not functioning and political tensions have risen, while people in communities across Northern Ireland face rising bills as the cost of living crisis deepens. The operation of the protocol has created new tensions that do need to be addressed by listening to all sides, as well as to business and to consumers, and both the UK Government and the EU need to show willing and good faith. This is not a time for political posturing or high-stakes brinkmanship.

    NORTHERN IRELAND PROTOCOL · 2022-05-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  17. We are grateful for advance sight of the statement from the Foreign Secretary, and I apologise on behalf of the shadow Foreign Secretary, who is unfortunately self-isolating due to covid. It is over two and a half years since the Government negotiated and signed the withdrawal agreement. That deal included the Northern Ireland protocol, which required, by its design, some trade barriers and checks in the Irish sea. That was clear from the outset and it was a choice by this Prime Minister and by the Government, yet now, barely two years later, the Government are trying to convince people that their flagship achievement was not a negotiating triumph, but a deal so flawed that they cannot abide by it. Either they did not understand their own agreement, they were not up front about the reality of it, or they intended to break it all along.

    NORTHERN IRELAND PROTOCOL · 2022-05-17 · READ IN HANSARD

  18. It was good to hear the Minister mention the situation in the western Balkans where, of course, democracy and stability are under threat not just from Putin’s Russia but from those who seek to generate chaos locally. I therefore welcome the sanctions that the Government have announced against the Republika Srpska leader Dodik and others. That is an issue that we raised back in March. Can the Minister say what wider discussions he is having with our allies and special representatives in the region, and with Serbia, to maintain peace, democracy and stability in Bosnia, Kosovo and beyond and to counter Russian and domestic threats to undermine all those?

    DEMOCRACY: EASTERN EUROPE · 2022-04-26 · READ IN HANSARD

  19. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairpersonship today, Ms Elliott. I thank the Minister and the civil servants at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office who have worked to bring the sanctions into effect. I know that they are making substantial efforts at the moment, and I hope that they take my questions and criticisms in that spirit.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  20. Given that they relate to extending existing financial sanctions, what has been done to ensure that those linked to Putin’s regime are not able to transfer through proxies assets that would have been sanctioned? We have raised that issue regularly, not least because earlier this month the Financial Times reported that oligarch Alexei Mordashov had swiftly transferred billions of dollars of stock holdings out of his name, and Alisher Usmanov is reported to be avoiding sanctions through a variety of offshore companies and business associates. Until the Government get a proper grip on the use of proxies, with robust legislation to ensure enforcement, we will be issuing sanctions with one hand tied behind our backs. Could the Minister say what he will do about that issue?

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  21. Has that now been expanded, and have additional resources been brought in so that we do not have to go back and retrospectively correct mistakes, and so that we can move much more quickly? I will make some points about the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation in due course, but we have to have the necessary drafting and advisory resources in the FCDO, as well as the necessary advisory resources for those who will have to implement these sanctions. We cannot have a game of catch-up all the time, and the Government have the Opposition’s support in bringing that to an end, but we have to act with conviction and speed. I want to ask some specific questions about the instruments.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  22. There is a danger that the Government are spending time bringing these measures forward, when the people of Ukraine, who are suffering the brunt of this murderous war, do not have time. We are still plugging loopholes and papering over cracks that, frankly, should not exist. The explanatory notes mention that the regulations have to correct a number of defects. The Minister said that regulations are being prepared at speed, but I have to ask some fundamental questions about resourcing. It is clear that officials are working hard, and I certainly do not want to undermine in any way the work they are doing, but I have asked a number of times for clarity on the resourcing of the FCDO sanctions unit and the implementation units. The latest figures I could find show that just 40 to 49 staff were working in the sanctions unit in December 2021.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  23. 8 regulations, particularly on a whole range of critical dual-use technologies, energy technologies, iron and steel products, and the luxury goods that the Minister referenced. As we have argued, limiting Russia’s exporting capability and denying oligarchs their luxuries are critical, but we must make sure that President Putin feels every wall closing in on himself and on those who continue to sustain his regime. Again, however, the shadow Foreign Secretary wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 27 February calling specifically for a luxury goods ban and the widening of export and trade controls. The Secretary of State for International Trade announced those measures on 15 March, but they are being implemented only now.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  24. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), called for specific measures to address these concerns on 22 February, yet they are being brought into effect only now. The Minister has given some reasons for the delay, but I hope he can say a little more about why we did not take this fairly obvious step more quickly. We need to be proactive and not just to react to things, particularly when what Putin was going to do could have been easily predicted, and given that these areas were invaded illegally as far back as 2014. We do not need to see further evidence of the brutality of the Putin regime or its willingness to break international law to justify introducing the very harshest of sanctions. Similarly, the Opposition welcome the measures in the No.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  25. As I said, we welcome the regulations and will not divide the Committee, but we have some significant questions. On the No. 7 regulations, extending the existing sanctions relating to Crimea to the so-called people’s republics in the Donbas is integral to making sure that our sanctions target Russia’s economy effectively and dismantle the capacity to continue waging war. The occupation of non-Government controlled Ukrainian territory cannot become an economic enabler for Putin’s regime, and the Government are right to recognise that and to introduce these measures. However, Putin took the illegal step of recognising the so-called republics in Donetsk and Luhansk over two months ago, and the shadow Foreign Secretary, my right hon.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  26. In the Minister’s response, will he set out the FCDO’s assessment of the total value of what has been frozen or impacted under the existing sanctions regime to date to give us an idea of the scope and scale of what we have done so far? We are now at the stage where we need answers to essential questions. Where are we? What has the impact been? How much further do we need to go? The Government should be forthright with those figures here and, indeed, with the wider public, not least given the impact on their lives through energy prices, as well as the impact on many of our allies, some of whom are being hurt much more severely than us as a direct result of the sanctions. We are all united, but we need to understand the impact of the sanctions, that they are working and why they are necessary.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  27. The way to do that is to implement the broadest and deepest regime of sanctions ever levelled at President Putin and those around him. The Government can be assured that, on expanding, deepening and broadening sanctions, they can continue to count on the official Opposition’s support. We will not seek to divide the Committee today. However, I have a series of questions and concerns. The last time I stood opposite the Minister, when we debated the previous set of sanctions, I made it clear that we could not afford a sanctions gap. Although passing the economic crime Act will hopefully speed up bringing forward and imposing measures, I fear that we are still lagging behind what we could do.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  28. From the beginning, Labour has wholeheartedly supported the Government in their efforts to sanction the Putin regime for the illegal, unprovoked and murderous attack on Ukraine and its people. That remains true, as we continue to bear witness to acts of heinous aggression and atrocities on a daily basis. The scenes that we have seen in recent days of mass graves, the reports of the atrocities committed north of Kyiv and in Mariupol, and, of course, the indiscriminate and brutal attacks on civilians in Odesa mean that we must act resolutely and in a unified way across the House. We must, therefore, as the Minister said, do all we can, alongside our allies and partners, to bring the Russian economy and its war machine grinding to a halt. We must seek to match the courage shown by our friends in Ukraine with action.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  29. Therefore, I hope that the Minister can perhaps provide some correction; I hope that the number is far more if we look at the recent figures, but we do need to understand how these sanctions are having an impact, both financially and on individuals.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  30. Of course, this relates not just to the current crisis that we are seeing in Ukraine and the sanctions that we are implementing on Russia; it applies to the implementation of many of the other sanctions regimes that we have debated regularly in Committees here. It is crucial, because when it comes to enforcement, OFSI has quite a low enforcement rate for breaches of sanctions and, when fines have been imposed, they have generally been low. I think that between 2018-19 and the present, OFSI has issued only seven monetary penalties to six entities. That strikes me as remarkably low, given the number of different sanctions regimes and measures that we are bringing forward.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  31. Obviously, I appreciate that the US is a larger economy and has substantially more citizens, but that does raise the question of whether we have enough people in OFSI and whether we are acting robustly enough. For example, in the US in 2022, Congress has supported funding levels of $5.5 million for the Treasury, State and Justice Departments just to implement the global Magnitsky sanctions programme and other related programmes. Therefore, I think that we need to start having some clarity from Ministers here about what resources are being put in. We know that there have been cuts across Government. We know that there have been cuts in the FCDO and we know that, of course, there have been cuts to the aid budget, but we must not be under-resourcing at such a critical time.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  32. I have previously raised issues relating to the overseas territories and Crown dependencies. I am pleased to see that many of them are implementing the measures, often immediately, but they all have different processes, so I hope that the Minister can clarify what is happening there. To come to the point that was raised a few moments ago, I have asked the Minister before about the resourcing of the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation. Written answers that we received from the Treasury revealed that, apparently, fewer than 40 full-time officials were working in OFSI last year. In comparison, the US has 259 full-time equivalent staff members at the US Office of Foreign Assets Control, which is the US equivalent.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  33. The Minister can correct me if I am wrong, but I understand that at present a company that is 49% owned by one sanctioned individual and 49% owned by another sanctioned individual would avoid sanctions, despite being almost entirely controlled by sanctioned individuals. That is not only completely illogical; it leaves us out of step with the US and the EU, which decide whether to sanction a company by assessing the aggregate ownership of companies by sanctioned individuals. I hope that the Minister can clarify that point, because it is crucial that we do not allow people to slip through the gaps in any way at all. As I said, I am happy to be corrected if that is a wrong interpretation, but it is certainly our understanding. If it is a loophole, I hope that the Minister will commit to closing it as urgently as possible.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  34. I wholeheartedly agree with the hon. Gentleman’s comments, and I will come to specific points about that matter in due course. The issue is not just resourcing in the FCDO, which is drafting these measures; crucially, it is about enforcement and about the investigation. That is a much wider question, as the hon. Gentleman says, but it does relate specifically to the measures that we are debating today if they are to have effect, particularly given that some of them are designed to target some of the richest oligarchs and those who are propping up the Putin regime. As I said, I hope that the Minister can answer the question about proxies, but another loophole that the Opposition have repeatedly expressed concerns about relates to companies owned by sanctioned individuals.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  35. I am thinking not just of the Germanys of this world, which have had extensive discussion about their energy issues, but about some of the smaller countries, particularly in the Balkans, south-east Europe and elsewhere, who are in Putin’s crosshairs, and to whom he has issued threats. Can the Minister explain what we are doing to support them? I would also like an answer to my question about whether the issue was raised during the Prime Minister’s visit to India. We support the regulations. We want to act in the toughest way against Putin’s regime. I hope that the Minister can answer some of my questions about the gaps and potential loopholes and that he can reassure me that they are either not there or are being dealt with.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  36. One of the Minister’s last points was about the importance of bringing onboard other allies and countries to support this global sanctions effort and response to Putin’s illegal and murderous war in Ukraine. Can the Minister tell us whether the Prime Minister specifically raised the question of joining the sanctions regime with Modi on his visit to India? As I understand it, India and a number of other countries with whom we have strong trading and historical relationships are refusing to take part in the global sanctions regime. It is crucial that we support those countries that have been harder hit than us. There is a real risk that Putin will seek to undermine some of those countries, because of the impact on their economy. What are we doing for some of our European allies and partners who will be hard hit?

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  37. I am sure the Minister will agree that we need to procure more steel and sovereign steel production capability here in the UK, and it was welcome to see the support for the UK steel charter in Parliament last week. On shipping, will the Minister clarify whether the sanctions will forbid crewing companies working with Russian crews? Will they also forbid freight exchanges from working with Russian cargo and prohibit ship engine producers from supplying parts to Russian companies, which could in principle be used for warships? It looks like that is the case, from the detail of the regulations, but it would be helpful to have clarification on that. Crucially, are all state shipping companies now sanctioned, as well as all Russian flagged vessels, those owned by Russian individuals and those operating in Russian ports?

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  38. That means that billions of pounds of assets belonging to corrupt actors, human rights abusers and those facilitating them remain frozen and unable to be used, rather than being used to compensate victims or to support some of the measures we all want to see put in place for those suffering the brunt of this conflict. Could the Minister say a little about how we could use assets that have been confiscated? The points made about the steel and iron industries are crucial. The Minister will know my interest in the steel industry—I declare an interest as a member of the all-party parliamentary on steel and metal related industries, and I have a steel plant on my own patch.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  39. I am glad we are getting closer to equality with our allies, and I hope that that continues and that we maintain that crucial unity across the board. At the same time, questions have to be asked about why we did not move quickly enough. There is a crucial point about the confiscation and repurposing of sanctioned assets. The Minister will be aware that there have been requests from across the House for assets frozen under sanctions to be confiscated and repurposed to support the victims of this conflict. The Foreign Secretary said on 28 February that she would look into that, following a question from the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and others have made similar proposals. Under the current system, it is quite difficult to confiscate and repurpose assets frozen under sanctions.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  40. The point that I would put back to the hon. Gentleman, of course, is that we were one of the ones warning that this was going to happen. We were the ones leading the world in terms of our intelligence, and arguing that others should take seriously the threat of a Russian invasion on this scale. Therefore I do have to question why it took the FCDO so long to get the regime in place and to get the emergency measures that had to be brought in into the economic crime Act. I am glad that they were brought in, and we supported them, but why did it take so long to get that infrastructure in place when we had been arguing on these issues for many, many years? Committees of this House had argued that action needed to be taken against oligarchs, illicit assets and everything else—we had multiple reports from multiple Committees.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  41. I thank the Minister for that clarification. Will he write to me to clarify that the specific scenario that I raised cannot be used, and will he point to the relevant legislation? As I say, we are trying to ensure that the regime is as robust as possible and that there are no gaps that anybody can slip through.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  42. Again, I am heartened to hear what the Minister says. To be clear, will he, perhaps in writing, separate the resourcing for the drafting and development of the sanctions packages from the resourcing for the OFSI and other bodies involved in enforcement, because those are two separate things? They are both crucial and we want to see that resourcing has gone up in both.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  43. I thank the Minister for being generous in taking interventions. I also asked him some specific questions about shipping. I do not expect him to riff off his notes on the detail, but perhaps he could write to me. I am awaiting a letter, so perhaps an omnibus letter covering all the points he has promised to write to me about could be forthcoming. I asked more questions orally today because we are approaching Prorogation, when written questions will fall, so I hope the Minister will be generous in writing back to respond to my specific technical points.

    RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 7) REGULATIONS 2022 RUSSIA (SANCTIONS) (EU EXIT) (AMENDMENT) (NO. 8) REGULATIONS 2022 · 2022-04-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  44. I thank the Minister for what he is saying. He will be aware that I have had significant issues in my constituency, with many affected developments. In respect of the Celestia development in particular, there have been long-standing challenges in getting answers to the questions that residents are asking. Redrow wrote to the Secretary of State to say that it will now take responsibility for paying, but it has not made clear whether that applies to Wales—the letter refers only to England. Will the Minister clarify whether he understands that such commitments are going to be UK-wide, given that it is a UK-wide issue? If they are not, what pressure will he put on Redrow to make sure that that commitment applies to Wales as well?

    BUILDING SAFETY BILL · 2022-04-20 · READ IN HANSARD

  45. I thank the Minister for his generosity in giving way again. What is his advice to leaseholders who believe that they have been wrongly charged for unnecessary works, or works that are not actually required in the way that he is describing? Many residents have raised concerns with me about what has been put forward and whether it was actually required. What should they do? What is the Minister’s practical advice?

    BUILDING SAFETY BILL · 2022-04-20 · READ IN HANSARD

  46. The Home Secretary has been repeatedly asked this afternoon about the costs of this totally wrong policy. She said that she knew the costs involved in chartering aircraft from examples of our existing removals scheme, so can she tell us today what the cost will be of chartering one return flight to Rwanda and what the cost will be per person deported? Will she admit that this policy will cost far in excess of the £120 million that she said was just for development costs?

    GLOBAL MIGRATION CHALLENGE · 2022-04-19 · READ IN HANSARD

  47. Labour will always support what it takes to protect victims of sexual violence in Britain and Ukraine and across the world.

    RAPE AS A WEAPON OF WAR IN UKRAINE · 2022-03-31 · READ IN HANSARD

  48. What are we learning from past examples, particularly in the Balkans and elsewhere, about what we can do to ensure that evidence is collected and collated so that people can be brought to justice? How are we working with human rights organisations and others? What is her assessment of access for such organisations? Will she back Labour’s call for a special tribunal so that all war crimes, including the crime of aggression, can be prosecuted? Will she explain the detail of how humanitarian aid is being used in particular to support women in crossing the borders? We have heard concerning reports about cuts to health and conflict in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, which are crucial areas that affect the situation for women and girls. Will she assure us that they will not take place?

    RAPE AS A WEAPON OF WAR IN UKRAINE · 2022-03-31 · READ IN HANSARD

  49. Most of these women have either been executed after the crime of rape or they have taken their own lives.” Every part of the House will condemn those appalling crimes, but condemnation is not enough. We need accountability and justice must be done. Putin and his cronies, and all those breaking international laws of war in his name, must face the full force of the law for the crimes and atrocities that they are, no doubt, committing. The Minister made a number of important points, but will she set out clearly the steps that the Government are taking, crucially to gain the evidence to document these incidents? She mentioned the role of the Metropolitan police and other initiatives.

    RAPE AS A WEAPON OF WAR IN UKRAINE · 2022-03-31 · READ IN HANSARD

  50. It is because of those heinous examples, and countless others, that rape and sexual violence have had to be explicitly prohibited under international humanitarian law and the Geneva conventions. As war ravages Europe once again, the grim reality is that we hear horrific reports of rape and sexual violence being used as weapons of war once more. This week, one Ukrainian woman told The Times that she was raped on multiple occasions by Russian soldiers in her family home after they murdered her husband and while her four-year-old son was in tears nearby. That is utterly horrific and heinous. As the hon. Member said, we have also heard direct testimonies in the House. We were told: “We have reports of women gang-raped. These women are usually the ones who are unable to get out. We are talking about senior citizens.

    RAPE AS A WEAPON OF WAR IN UKRAINE · 2022-03-31 · READ IN HANSARD