← LEADERSHIP TERMINAL

UK PARLIAMENT · SITTING

Dame Chi Onwurah

MP for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West · Labour · United Kingdom

IN THEIR OWN WORDS

An extraordinary debate is going on right now inside and outside AI companies about whether the possibility of AI destroying humanity is more or less than 10%. The European Union is moving ahead with a comprehensive AI regulatory framework, but the UK continues to rely on existing regulation.

EU-UK RELATIONSHIP · 2026-09-10 · READ IN HANSARD

The Pope also highlighted how the billions of online digital twins constitute an unprecedented concentration of power in the hands of a small number of men. Among the many consequences of the 40 years of neoliberalism repeatedly called out by the Prime Minister is a libertarian attitude to technology.

PERSONAL DATA (DIGITAL TWINS) · 2026-09-09 · READ IN HANSARD

But this stealth digital twinning violates the integrity, uniqueness and very personhood of our constituents and of all of us. Digital twins can take many forms, from content creation algorithms and deepfakes to chatbots that reflect aspects of our personalities back at us. It is particularly worrying when children are the target.

PERSONAL DATA (DIGITAL TWINS) · 2026-09-09 · READ IN HANSARD

The automated version of our kids will grow with them, using the power of AI to target advertising and products at them, and worse. The Science, Innovation and Technology Committee has heard about some of the tragic consequences of online grooming by algorithms and chatbots—a vulnerable boy persuaded to kill himself; a vulnerable girl fed…

PERSONAL DATA (DIGITAL TWINS) · 2026-09-09 · READ IN HANSARD

In the arts, entertainment and tech industries, many performers are agreeing to the creation and use of digital replicas as part of their work—think of ABBA Voyage. But performers increasingly encounter unauthorised digital replicas of themselves, which pose a threat to their career, livelihood and reputation.

PERSONAL DATA (DIGITAL TWINS) · 2026-09-09 · READ IN HANSARD

Since then, deepfakes have proliferated. The hon. Member for Mid Norfolk (George Freeman) was shown crossing the Floor in Parliament to join Reform, to his constituents’ consternation and his own—it was a fake. Then there were the horrendous photos of naked women and girls that Elon Musk’s AI created on demand.

PERSONAL DATA (DIGITAL TWINS) · 2026-09-09 · READ IN HANSARD

The complete record

Every one of 5,139 lines we hold for Dame Chi Onwurah, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 26 of 103.

  1. I thank the hon. Member for his kind words. Of course, the SNP amendments were simply agreeing with Labour’s amendments during Committee. We sought to improve—as we should do—from Committee to Report.

    ADVANCED RESEARCH AND INVENTION AGENCY BILL · 2021-06-07 · READ IN HANSARD

  2. Today we will hear many Members—although not as many as we had thought—raise a wide range of important issues such as climate change, regional and national economic development, international development and democratic accountability, but at the heart of this debate is science, which now plays such a critical part in all our lives. The UK has a proud tradition in science, engineering, innovation, research and development. We are renowned across the world for scientific breakthroughs and discoveries that pushed humanity forwards. From the discovery of penicillin to the invention of Stephenson’s Rocket in my constituency of Newcastle upon Tyne Central, again and again UK scientists pushed forward the boundaries of knowledge, shrinking the vast expanse of ignorance, which, as this pandemic has shown, may threaten humanity’s very existence.

    ADVANCED RESEARCH AND INVENTION AGENCY BILL · 2021-06-07 · READ IN HANSARD

  3. It is a pleasure and honour to follow the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May). I am certain that the current Conservative Government could benefit enormously from her championing and promotion of an industrial strategy, and I hope that they are listening. I thank all those who worked so hard to improve this Bill in Committee, particularly my hon. Friends the Members for Cambridge (Daniel Zeichner), for Brent Central (Dawn Butler), for Luton North (Sarah Owen) and for Sheffield, Brightside and Hillsborough (Gill Furniss), as well as the Clerks and House of Commons staff for their excellent support. It is vital that we get the Advanced Research and Invention Agency right.

    ADVANCED RESEARCH AND INVENTION AGENCY BILL · 2021-06-07 · READ IN HANSARD

  4. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell), which sought to reverse that decision, has not been selected for debate, though a debate on the issue may follow; certainly, the debate is not going away. Particularly in relation to ARIA and the amendments before us, it is really important to emphasise that for UK science, research and credibility, these cuts have a significant impact. The UK has been the only G7 country to cut aid in the middle of a pandemic, and in so doing it has united hon. and right hon. Members across this House who are horrified by the harm done—harm such as, in the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, in Yemen, slashing aid by 60% without conducting an impact assessment, and harm such as cutting bilateral funding on water, sanitation and hygiene—

    ADVANCED RESEARCH AND INVENTION AGENCY BILL · 2021-06-07 · READ IN HANSARD

  5. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), and how that betrays the poorest among us and the critical challenges faced by us all. With over £4.1 billion slashed from overseas development aid, the £120 million cut from science and research programmes may appear minor, but that has already had a devastating impact on science here and abroad. Cutting funding from global challenges research fund hubs, for example, threatens researchers at Newcastle University in my constituency, as well as scientists in developing countries working together on water security. These cuts are a consequence of the Government’s decision to scrap the legally binding 0.7% of GDP target for overseas development aid. New clause 4 tabled by the right hon.

    ADVANCED RESEARCH AND INVENTION AGENCY BILL · 2021-06-07 · READ IN HANSARD

  6. Research by Oxford Economics commissioned by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy found that each £1 of public research and development—such as the money to be spent on ARIA—stimulates between £1.96 and £2.34 of private research and development, and we cannot recover from the pandemic without inspiring and initiating more private sector investment in research and development. Together, private and public sector research can help to address the key challenges facing humanity—from climate change to inequality, from pandemics to productivity. That brings us very neatly to the broken promises of this Conservative Government on overseas development aid, as raised by my hon.

    ADVANCED RESEARCH AND INVENTION AGENCY BILL · 2021-06-07 · READ IN HANSARD

  7. I pay tribute to the work of my hon. Friend’s all-party parliamentary group, with which I am quite familiar. I wholeheartedly agree with him about the importance of that research, and about the link between that important research and this agency. I will develop that point further in a few moments. As hon. Members have indicated, UK science is not only inspiring; it can also be groundbreaking and is a key economic driver. Our university research base alone contributes £95 billion to the economy, supporting nearly 1 million jobs in scientific institutes, charities and businesses of all sizes.

    ADVANCED RESEARCH AND INVENTION AGENCY BILL · 2021-06-07 · READ IN HANSARD

  8. ARIA can transform our scientific landscape and we can build an institution that furthers our societal aims for decades to come, but we have concerns, which our amendments seek to address, about the lack of direction, strategy and accountability in the Government’s current proposals. Without such improvements, we fear that the agency could be used to pursue vanity projects disconnected from the public interest. The first major issue with the Bill is the absence of a mission for ARIA, which has already been raised. What is ARIA for and what is it working towards? Labour’s amendment 12 would require ARIA to have a specific mission for ARIA’s first decade, and we want that mission to be climate change.

    ADVANCED RESEARCH AND INVENTION AGENCY BILL · 2021-06-07 · READ IN HANSARD

  9. I thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker, because that is exactly the point to which I am going—to the amendments. Just to say that the funding for coronavirus research, which is the kind of world-beating or leading research that we would hope ARIA will be looking at, has been cut by 70%, which will kill the project. A Government happy to withdraw support for vital research projects across the globe are not a Government who wish to act in the best interests of science, the country or the world. On ARIA itself, we have many serious concerns. We recognise the need for new mechanisms to support high-risk, high-reward research in our science sector, and as such ARIA is a step in the right direction.

    ADVANCED RESEARCH AND INVENTION AGENCY BILL · 2021-06-07 · READ IN HANSARD

  10. I thank the hon. Gentleman for seeking to aid Madam Deputy Speaker in determining what is in order. I am not sure whether that was necessary. On the hon. Gentleman’s intervention, I fail to see why he thinks that pedantry can make up for a lack of argument. Climate change is a core mission. We are not seeking to hem in the agency with absolute linguistic barriers for what exactly should be done, but we want it to have a direction. We want to know where it is going and what it is seeking to do. The core mission, as I intend to set out in detail, will be climate change. I do not intend to limit its interpretation of climate change, but I will set out the reasons why climate change will be its core mission.

    ADVANCED RESEARCH AND INVENTION AGENCY BILL · 2021-06-07 · READ IN HANSARD

  11. I have a huge amount of respect for the hon. Gentleman, but I fundamentally disagree with him on this issue. To go where no one has gone before is not a mission or a direction; it is a deliberate absence of direction. I spoke earlier about the vast expanse of ignorance that can present us with huge, existential challenges. The history of science has been about trying to reduce that huge expanse of ignorance, and for us to leave ARIA without any mission or direction in addressing that vast expanse of ignorance that is before us will severely limit its likelihood of success. That, together with other aspects of the Bill with regard to accountability and transparency, leave it open to cronyism as well as other issues.

    ADVANCED RESEARCH AND INVENTION AGENCY BILL · 2021-06-07 · READ IN HANSARD

  12. If she can think of something more important than climate change coming along in the next 10 years, would she like to intervene on me and suggest what that might be?

    ADVANCED RESEARCH AND INVENTION AGENCY BILL · 2021-06-07 · READ IN HANSARD

  13. I thank the hon. Lady for that intervention, which gives me the opportunity to clarify again that the difference between a flu virus and a coronavirus virus may be significant in medical terms, but it is not what we are talking about. We are talking about climate change—the existential challenge. We are not saying that it should be one part of climate change. To say that it is like preparing for one virus as against another virus is not an equivalent comparison. This is a much vaster challenge. Indeed, I think that she answered her own question. If something more important than climate change comes along in the next 10 years, with climate change being the existential challenge of our times, we would have significant issues to face as a Parliament.

    ADVANCED RESEARCH AND INVENTION AGENCY BILL · 2021-06-07 · READ IN HANSARD

  14. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark), raised concerns about ARIA’s lack of focus and purpose. The president of the Royal Society said that “£800 million is not a large sum of money, so if we have a plethora of missions, then I think we will go wrong. ARIA has to have focus of mission and a commitment to the model over the long-term”. –– [ Official Report, Advanced Research and Invention Agency Public Bill Committee, 14 April 2021; c. 63, Q62.]

    ADVANCED RESEARCH AND INVENTION AGENCY BILL · 2021-06-07 · READ IN HANSARD

  15. Absolutely. As my hon. Friend says, the UK has set the most ambitious climate change target, but the Committee on Climate Change has said that the Government are currently on course to miss their manifesto commitment of achieving net zero by 2050. Amendment 12 aims to support the Government in that mission. I now wish to make some significant progress in my comments, so I will not take any more interventions for a while. The lack of mission is a concern shared by many. The renowned economist Mariana Mazzucato suggested during the evidence sessions that achieving net zero should be ARIA’s mission. The Secretary of State said that ARIA needs a “laser-like focus”, but failed to provide it. The Institute of Physics said that a clear mission is “essential”, and the Chair of the Science and Technology Committee, the right hon.

    ADVANCED RESEARCH AND INVENTION AGENCY BILL · 2021-06-07 · READ IN HANSARD

  16. SolarWinds is a very trusted vendor from a like-minded, close ally country, and yet it turns out to be a critical single point of failure across key, very sensitive Government Departments, both in the US and the UK. –– [ Official Report, Telecommunications (Security) Public Bill Committee, 19 January 2021; c. 74, Q88.] So I want the Minister to consider that in his response on this proposal.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  17. 162.] But I ask him: why does he not take this further? We need to ensure that we have a good understanding of our national assets and so can assess emerging threats. Doing so would have made Huawei’s dominance visible earlier and it would now enable warning signs of future concerns—and there are future concerns. Again, Emily Taylor said: “I feel a little like we have been fetishising 5G and a single company for the last two years, perhaps at the expense of a more holistic awareness of systemic cyber-security risks… Healthcare systems probably would not have been top of the list two years ago, but now they are. The SolarWinds attack shows that the identity of the vendor is not always the key risk point.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  18. It ensures that Ofcom has the human and informational resources to be forward looking. As I said, we are concerned that the Bill is backward looking and does not look to future threats. New clause 1 requires Ofcom to provide an assessment of emerging or future security risks based on its interrogation of network providers’ asset registers. I am pleased that the Government are taking steps—as I understand it from the Minister—to formalise existing best practice in the telecoms sector and ensure that national providers maintain asset registers. I can tell Members that that has not always been the case. As the Minister said during the Committee stage, asset registers are an “important part of the existing landscape” –– [ Official Report, Telecommunications (Security) Public Bill Committee, 21 January 2021; c.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  19. –– [ Official Report, Telecommunications (Security) Public Bill Committee, 19 January 2021; c. 72, Q84.] These skills are rare. The memo from the Minister, for which I am grateful, sets out how Ofcom and the National Cyber Security Centre will work. While it is welcome that they will work together, it did not provide the reassurance that we need. Indeed, it suggests that Ofcom will be entirely dependent on the NCSC for cyber skills and therefore, presumably, unable to understand the advice that it receives from the organisation. New clause 1 requires Ofcom to report annually on the adequacy of measures taken by network providers to comply with changes introduced in the Bill, empowering the Government to track the effectiveness of the legislation. However, new clause 1 does more than that.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  20. In January, in response to my written question, the Government stated that Ofcom would have the resources that it needs to do the job, in which case the Minister should be keen to support new clause 1, which requires Ofcom to report on the adequacy of its resources in fulfilling its functions under the amendments made in the Bill. Ofcom lacks experience in national security measures—this was discussed during the evidence stage—and the expansion of duties will require the recruitment of people with the required level of security clearance and experience. That is not going to be easy, as we heard during the evidence sessions. Emily Taylor of Oxford Information Labs said that Ofcom “will have to acquire a very specific set of skills and capabilities and that will require substantial investment and learning as an organisation”.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  21. We want Ofcom to have the resources and the will to monitor the evolution of our telecoms networks, so that future threats, wherever they come from, can be identified and we do not find ourselves forced, as we are now, to make a huge change to our networks, at a huge cost to our economy. I turn to new clause 1. As I said in my opening remarks, I joined Ofcom in 2004 when it was in its infancy as a slimline regulator. I kept a copy of the Communications Act 2003 on my desk. Since then, that Act has already doubled in size as Ofcom has acquired responsibility for critical national infrastructure: the BBC; the Post Office; online harms—that Bill is coming down the road; and, in this Bill, parts of national security as well. This latest expansion of Ofcom duties will necessarily add a strain not only to its budget, but to its resources.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  22. That follows a vast expansion of Ofcom’s remit over the past 10 years. We want to make sure that Ofcom is appropriately resourced to carry out its duties and to be forward looking, not simply looking back. One of the great failings of the Bill is that the Government are so fixated on fighting the last battle—the Huawei battle—they are not looking to the future. That is, in part, because various Government Back-Bench Members have very real concerns about the rise of China and its influence on our infrastructure. But these concerns, however well justified, seem to be blinding the Government to threats that are not Chinese in origin. We want to fix that.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  23. For a start, if our telecoms network is to be secure, there must be expert democratic oversight of the measures that make it secure—yet the Bill makes no provision for Parliament’s experts, the Intelligence and Security Committee, to be informed or consulted. We want to fix that. Secondly, the security of our network depends on an effective plan to diversify the supply chain. We are very concerned that the Bill does not even mention diversification and thus risks short-changing our national security, our technological sovereignty and our telecoms infrastructure. We want to ensure that progress is made in diversification as a prerequisite for the security of the telecoms network and a UK sovereign capability should be a part of that. Thirdly, the Bill gives many new responsibilities and powers to Ofcom.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  24. We agree that, as the Bill sets out, the Secretary of State should have powers to designate vendors of concern and require mobile network operators to take appropriate action, and that Ofcom should have the power to monitor and enforce those directions. However, we wish to improve the Bill in three key areas, which our new clauses 1, 2 and 3 seek to address. The first area is national security. Labour prioritises national security, and the sweeping powers that the Bill gives the Secretary of State must be used in the interests of securing our critical national infrastructure. Removing Huawei does not, in and of itself, make our networks secure now or protect them against future threats; that requires a number of additional measures, some of which are in the Bill and some of which are not.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  25. This lack of sovereign capability and absence of an effective telecoms strategy has resulted in our dependency on high-risk vendors, which the Bill seeks to address. I am sure that you will be pleased to know, Madam Deputy Speaker, that I will not repeat the same arguments on Huawei that have dominated the debate over recent years. Given where we are now, we support the aims of the Bill. National security is the first duty of any Government, and Labour will always put national security first. Our telecoms infrastructure is clearly critical to our defence and security, as well as our economic prosperity.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  26. The Government have been forced to require the removal of Huawei, at an estimated cost of £2 billion and a delay of two to three years to our 5G roll-out, after overseeing Huawei’s rapid rise to be the foremost supplier to the telecoms company that carries our country’s name and universal service obligation: British Telecom. The telecoms supply chain review found that there were no incentives for our mobile network operators to provide secure networks. Moreover, successive Tory Governments have squandered the world-leading position on broadband infrastructure left to them by Labour in 2010, as the United Kingdom has fallen down the league table from 27th to 47th in the world for average internet speeds.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  27. I declare an interest: many provisions in the Bill deal with the regulator Ofcom, and my last telecommunications role was with Ofcom. I joined it in 2004 just a few weeks after it was born, when it was to be a light-touch regulator, small and nimble. As a consequence of my time in the sector, I have been calling for greater security, particularly for our mobile networks, since I first entered this place in 2010. The Labour party and I welcome the intention behind the Bill, but a number of areas in it need to be addressed. We are here today because of the Huawei debacle of the Government’s making.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  28. It is a great pleasure to speak in this debate on Report. As I may have mentioned before, I am a chartered electrical engineer; before I entered Parliament, I worked for 20 years helping to build out the networks—fixed wireless and mobile—that became the internet. I am proud of that work and of the immense contribution that the telecommunications sector makes to our society, our economy and our security. I am very pleased that today we are dedicating parliamentary time to our telecommunications sector. I thank all Members across the House who served on the Bill Committee for our many hours of fruitful debate as we strove to secure improvements to the Bill. I also thank the officials of this House, particularly in the Public Bill Office and the Library, who have provided such excellent support.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  29. It was as if referring in the Bill to diversification would limit the meaning of diversification; if that were the case, we would be unable to refer in any Bill to many of its intentions or outcomes. I remain convinced, and there is agreement on all sides of the House, that we need to ensure that diversification of our telecoms supply chain goes hand in hand with ripping out Huawei and reducing our dependence on the two remaining providers. It is very important that we take this opportunity to change the Bill so that the diversification of our telecoms networks is an integral part of Ofcom’s reporting on the progression of those networks, so I will also press new clause 3 to a vote.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  30. Member for South Holland and The Deepings about the impact of the unaccountable power of monopolies. Again, since the Bill does not mention a diversification plan or diversification strategy, we cannot see that it will do anything to address that issue. The hon. Member for Bracknell (James Sunderland) said that the Bill supports network diversification. I know that that is the intention, but without our new clause I cannot see how it will actually achieve it. The Minister reiterated the diversification plans, which are not a plan—as I set out, they have no detail and no action. As for his attempt to explain why the Government have omitted from the Bill any reference to diversification, I have to say that I found it entirely incomprehensible.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  31. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) about how telecoms markets have been constructed to enable the consolidation and monopoly power of particular players, and particularly Huawei. Unfortunately, he did not go on to say how in the Bill the Government would deliver on a UK sovereign capability, but he was absolutely right about how the market has effectively failed. The hon. Member for Wealden (Ms Ghani) used her experience on NATO’s science and technology committee and on this Parliament’s Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee to encourage the Minister to truly examine our network resilience. New clause 3 is designed to ensure the ongoing ability to examine network diversification and resilience. We heard from the right hon.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  32. It seems very wrong that it should be excluded from involvement in scrutinising how the Bill is implemented, given that it is the only parliamentary grouping with the appropriate security clearance. Although I appreciate the Minister’s constructive tone, I do not think that he answered the questions raised or sufficiently justified the Government’s aversion to ensuring a process for ISC scrutiny, so I will press new clause 2 to a vote. Finally, the most complex of our new clauses is new clause 3, which would ensure that the diversification of our telecoms networks was achieved as a prerequisite for their security. We heard from the right hon.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  33. On new clause 2, members of the Intelligence and Security Committee—its Chair, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis); the right hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart); and the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings—eloquently articulated many of the arguments for why the ISC needs to be part of the scrutiny of this Bill. Indeed, the right hon. Member for Beckenham was particularly detailed in his description of the very room requirements for assessing national security issues. Having worked at Ofcom, I know its rooms very well, and I do not think that they meet the requirements that he set out. It is worth noting that the ISC was one of the first parliamentary organisations to raise issues around Huawei, back in 2013.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  34. The new clause seeks to ensure that we have an understanding of the resourcing as it continues—as threats evolve in the future—and particularly that we are able to look forward to new and evolving threats on the basis of a thorough understanding of the assets in each network operator’s network. Indeed, the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) emphasised the step change in the requirements of Ofcom that the Bill represents. The Minister implied that Ofcom would be able to do everything requested in the new clause when it comes to looking at asset registers, for example. I simply do not understand his reluctance to put that in the Bill, given the important role that Ofcom is to play in our telecoms security. I am afraid that I do not feel that he answered my points on new clause 1.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  35. I thank the Minister for his response and for the tone in which the debate has been conducted. However, I will say briefly, with regard to new clause 1, which seeks to ensure that Ofcom has the skills and expertise needed to undertake its new duties in the midst of all the other responsibilities that Parliament is asking, as well as reviewing future provision and threats to the network, that the Minister’s comments on the increase in the cap on Ofcom’s budget did not begin to address our concerns. We have, effectively, a snapshot of the financial resourcing available now.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  36. This has been a very well-informed debate. I am sorry if my own digital connectivity did not enable my contribution to be heard as perfectly as it should have been, but I hope we have corrected that. There were many excellent contributions from both sides of the House. It is important to note that the House is in quite rare agreement on a number of questions regarding the Bill, particularly on the importance of national security. The representatives of each of the parties in the debate—the hon. Members for Aberdeen South (Stephen Flynn), for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Jamie Stone) and for Strangford (Jim Shannon), and the Minister himself—shared support for the primacy of national security and recognition of the importance of our telecoms networks in our national security, and I was pleased to listen to their contributions.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  37. If our networks became dependent on one cloud service provider, such as Amazon Web Services, how would we know? To conclude, we support the Bill as a necessary measure to protect our telecoms national security interests, but we are concerned that the Government have allowed ideology to undermine effectiveness when it comes to this Bill, and we will continue to seek to improve it.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  38. We put the Government on notice that we will be holding them to account on that. Thirdly, the Bill gives sweeping new powers and responsibilities to Ofcom. This follows a vast and continuing expansion of Ofcom’s remit. Ofcom lacks experience in national security, and changes to its duties will require the recruitment of people with the required level of security clearance and experience. The Minister and the Government have sought to evade scrutiny on that. We will seek to hold them to account. As part of that, we are very concerned that the Bill in its current form is not forward thinking enough. It lacks the processes to provide the foresight needed to ensure that we are not in this same position again. Where is the horizon-scanning function to identify emerging threats and potential weaknesses in UK telecoms providers’ asset registers?

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  39. I am going to say this once more for the Minister: we need a diversified supply chain and that means a diversity of suppliers at different points of the supply chain. Britain has great start-ups that are just desperate to help address this issue. Where is the support for them? The future of telecoms networks is moving away from closed, proprietary boxes to open interfaces and innovation in the cloud. That provides a real opportunity for some of our innovative companies, but the Government have still not laid out how this is to be realised, as their own diversification taskforce report recently made clear. Is the UK going to benefit from the costly debacle of ripping out Huawei—an integrated supplier? Right now, the only beneficiaries would appear to be Ericsson, Nokia and lawyers.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  40. The first is national security. Labour prioritises national security. The Secretary of State and the Minister both agreed during the proceedings that the Bill needed to include sweeping powers to address matters of national security, so we remain concerned that the Committee that provides parliamentary oversight on matters of national security is being excluded from oversight of the measures in the Bill. Secondly, the security of our networks depends on an effective plan to diversify the supply chain. As our amendments have fallen, the Bill still does not even mention supply chain diversification or the diversification taskforce, even though we all agree that we cannot have a robust and secure network with only two service providers, which is the number that we will have left once Huawei is removed from our networks.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  41. Unfortunately, the holes that remain in this Bill will do just that. Let me emphasise how important this Bill is in ensuring that we get regulation and investment right for a sector that contributes so much to our economy, as well as to our work and social lives. We must make sure that we do not find ourselves in a similar position again, and that our telecoms network and supply chains are resilient and protected in future—even, critically, as the geopolitical environment evolves. Our telecoms infrastructure lacks security and resilience. The Government have taken no steps to maintain or develop a sovereign telecommunications capability, and their broadband strategy—if we can call it that—has far more U-turns, dither and delay than meaningful policies. The Bill is passing to the other place with significant failings.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  42. The pandemic has since proved beyond doubt that telecoms is an essential utility, but, although our telecoms infrastructure has held up during the pandemic—I congratulate telecoms operators on that—it could have been so much better. Many in rural areas or unable to afford decent broadband will not thank me for praising our telecoms networks. When Labour left office, we had world-leading infrastructure. That is no longer the case. We are now 47th in the world for broadband speeds. I say that to emphasise the significance of the upheaval that the sector is facing after the Government’s decision to strip Huawei out of the network, at a cost of £2 billion and two to three years delay to 5G roll-out. It is a decision that we supported and continue to support, but we cannot let solving one problem give rise to numerous more.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  43. From driverless cars to advanced manufacturing, digital connectivity is essential. Indeed, we can argue that the pandemic has given us a taste of the future and moved the future closer. It has shown us how important good, fast, stable connectivity is, with millions still depending on it to work from home and stay in contact with friends and family. The pandemic has encouraged—indeed, required—a mass migration online, with businesses that were not digital-ready suddenly forced to operate online. It is salutary to recall that before covid there was a question of whether broadband was a vital utility. That was a matter of debate; it was debated as part of the Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Act 2021.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  44. Successive Conservative Governments have allowed the telecoms sector in the UK to be dominated by a high-risk vendor. Competition on price rather than security has become the rule for the telecoms operators. The market failed, but Ministers did not notice; they thought that security could be left to the market. This is at a time when digital has become part of every part of our lives. We now spend a quarter of our waking hours on the internet. The UK telecoms industry contributes £32 billion to the economy and directly provides nearly a quarter of a million jobs. It has an impact on all our lives. As we are experiencing during the pandemic, it is an enabler of almost everything we do, and in the future—by which I mean in the next few years—it will bring about even more significant changes to how we live, work and engage with one another.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  45. We recognise that national security is the first duty of every Government, and we support the measures to promote national security in the Bill. At every stage of the Bill’s passage, we have seen an engaged and informed level of debate. As a chartered telecoms engineer, I particularly welcome the time that the House is spending on considering our telecoms infrastructure, even in these circumstances, which are to be regretted: we should not have got here. Parts of our debate have resembled a wake for the telecoms sector we could have had with a UK sovereign capability. The telecoms sector should have been subject to a more active, proactive interest for years now—or, shall I say, 10 years? We have lacked a telecoms industrial strategy and that, together with a focus on foreign investment over national security, is why we are here.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  46. I thank the Minister for his statement and echo his remarks in thanking all the Clerks and officials of the House and the Department who worked on the Bill, as well as our security services for the protection they provide day and night and for the input of the NCSC and GCHQ to the Bill. I want to make it clear that the Labour party supports the Bill as a necessary step in protecting our telecoms national security. It is important that we legislate to ensure that Government have the power to act when faced with circumstances such as those presented by Huawei or, even better, to prevent dependency on high-risk vendors from arising in the first place. We will therefore not oppose the Bill on Third Reading.

    TELECOMMUNICATIONS (SECURITY) BILL · 2021-05-25 · READ IN HANSARD

  47. The Minister says that no one should be left behind, but 60% of over-50s with household earnings under £20,000 per year are not online; more than half of adults who are not online are disabled; 2 million households in the UK have been without internet access during lockdown; and there are up to 900,000 children without devices. Yet the Government’s digital inclusion strategy was last updated in 2014 and there is still no target for inclusion. Why will the Minister not tell us what proportion of the population she is happy to leave behind in this digital age?

    DIGITAL INCLUSIVITY · 2021-05-20 · READ IN HANSARD

  48. The Government face a slew of allegations over contracts for mates, lobbying, conflicts of interest and influence. Does the Minister think now is the time to exempt a new Government agency, the Advanced Research and Invention Agency, with £800 million of public money from existing procurement and freedom of information rules? When faced with sleaze, surely the response is to stop the sleaze, not the scrutiny?

    MINISTERIAL CODE/REGISTER OF MINISTERS’ INTERESTS · 2021-05-18 · READ IN HANSARD

  49. I have spoken to people at Newcastle’s Hindu temple who have emphasised just how distressing these desperate scenes from India are for those with friends and family living there and, indeed, for all of us. We have known of the concerns for some time now. That is why the Prime Minister cancelled his visit. Given our special links to India, what conversations has the Minister had with counterparts in the United States and the European Union to ensure that international assistance is co-ordinated and effective?

    GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR INDIA · 2021-04-28 · READ IN HANSARD

  50. Labour, the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the Chair of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, many Government Back Benchers and cross-party consensus in the other place all agree that the ISC is best placed to provide national security oversight. Why are the Government determined to stand alone in risking our national security in this case?

    NATIONAL SECURITY AND INVESTMENT BILL · 2021-04-28 · READ IN HANSARD