Dame Chi Onwurah
MP for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West · Labour · United Kingdom
“An extraordinary debate is going on right now inside and outside AI companies about whether the possibility of AI destroying humanity is more or less than 10%. The European Union is moving ahead with a comprehensive AI regulatory framework, but the UK continues to rely on existing regulation.”
“The Pope also highlighted how the billions of online digital twins constitute an unprecedented concentration of power in the hands of a small number of men. Among the many consequences of the 40 years of neoliberalism repeatedly called out by the Prime Minister is a libertarian attitude to technology.”
“But this stealth digital twinning violates the integrity, uniqueness and very personhood of our constituents and of all of us. Digital twins can take many forms, from content creation algorithms and deepfakes to chatbots that reflect aspects of our personalities back at us. It is particularly worrying when children are the target.”
“The automated version of our kids will grow with them, using the power of AI to target advertising and products at them, and worse. The Science, Innovation and Technology Committee has heard about some of the tragic consequences of online grooming by algorithms and chatbots—a vulnerable boy persuaded to kill himself; a vulnerable girl fed…”
“In the arts, entertainment and tech industries, many performers are agreeing to the creation and use of digital replicas as part of their work—think of ABBA Voyage. But performers increasingly encounter unauthorised digital replicas of themselves, which pose a threat to their career, livelihood and reputation.”
“Since then, deepfakes have proliferated. The hon. Member for Mid Norfolk (George Freeman) was shown crossing the Floor in Parliament to join Reform, to his constituents’ consternation and his own—it was a fake. Then there were the horrendous photos of naked women and girls that Elon Musk’s AI created on demand.”
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“During the evidence sessions last week, we heard from an academic expert witness that institutional capacity in this area usually involves a multi-agency review body. We heard from the former head of MI6 that “the co-ordination of Government Departments is one of the really big challenges”. –– [ Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 23, Q25.] I am sure everyone who heard Sir Richard Dearlove’s evidence was struck that his years at MI6 had clearly taught him that this is a big challenge and that it is important to have co-ordinated and organised multi-agency input.”
“I thank my hon. Friend for putting it so clearly, and I hope that addresses the concerns of the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine. We want the screening process to benefit from the knowledge of our intelligence agencies and others before the Secretary of State calls it in. Our national security depends on having those robust contributions from across Government and the agencies in guiding decisions. In some cases, this may rely on the established sensitive channels of information and access and communications that have marked the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee. That is the best way to guard our national security, relying on our world-leading intelligence agencies, diplomatic service and our civil service expertise across Departments and not just on a single Secretary of State.”
“It is no injustice to the Secretary of State and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to say that alone, they are not in a position to know that. Deciding from where in the world the great threats to our security may come is not purely technological, although it requires technological expertise, and it is not even purely geopolitical. Last night we heard a lot about China and Russia. In future, we may be looking at other emerging threats. This is an attempt to improve the Bill by ensuring that there is a multi-agency approach.”
“My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Perhaps I should have emphasised that point more. When we look at the examples of Huawei or DeepMind, which was allowed to be sold to Google in 2014, we are looking backwards. We now recognise the security implications. Artificial intelligence is a key security capability, as I think the Minister will agree, given that it is one of the 17 sectors for which notification will be mandatory. At that time, it was difficult and I take it—perhaps the Minister will contradict this—that the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills did not recognise the security implications of the acquisition. The key question is, what are the acquisitions now that will have security implications in five or 10 years’ time? That is what the Secretary of State needs to know in order to make the decisions we are discussing.”
“I do not think it would be appropriate to be prescriptive at this point. Some of the agencies I have in mind are the Intelligence and Security Committee, the National Cyber Security Centre and our security services—MI5 and MI6. I am very happy to hear from the hon. Gentleman what agencies should be involved, but the key point is that we need multiple agencies.”
“I thank my hon. Friend for that important point. I am reluctant to continuously mention China, because this is not an anti-China Bill per se, but we heard in oral evidence of the real concerns about Chinese influence in our higher education institutions. He is right that the Department for Education may have an important input to make about securing our future national security. In defining the agencies that need to be involved in this multidisciplinary approach, we could look at the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which has nine voting departments, two non-voting agencies and additional White House representation on its decision-making committee. I know that the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy has done some work on comparisons with other countries, in particular our Five Eyes allies.”
“I welcome this debate. If by that the hon. Member is asking whether I think human rights have a relationship to national security, that was very well debated yesterday in relation to the Telecommunications (Security) Bill. A number of his colleagues strongly made the point that there is a relationship between modern-day slavery and our national interest and national security. I do not have the expertise to identify what the agency should be. The Low Pay Commission is not an organisation that I had considered, but I am happy to take his advocacy for its being part of this multidisciplinary approach.”
“We have had the Enterprise Act since 2002, but there have been only 12 national security cases under it. That speaks very clearly to the lack of experience and an acute need for scrutiny as we now move up to almost 2,000 annual cases. Several witnesses in our evidence sessions emphasised that we were going from effectively zero—a standing start—to Formula 1 performance levels, and that as such, we needed to ensure that we put in place the resources, the expertise and the support to enable that to be effective and not unnecessarily impede our business, our economy and our foreign investment.”
“I refer again to the debates on the Telecommunications (Security) Bill and the Second Reading of this Bill, where members of the Intelligence and Security Committee demonstrated their understanding of the key issues around national security and their ability to make a contribution—I think it is fair to say that they are very willing to make a contribution. It is only right that we bring the same level of scrutiny to measures in this Bill, on matters of critical national security. The amendment would bring the scrutiny of the Intelligence and Security Committee to changes in the Secretary of State’s call-in powers, ensuring that these major powers consistently act to protect our national security. Scrutiny is especially needed in this area.”
“As part of our discussion this morning, we have talked about the way in which security threats evolve over time in the light of technological change—for example, security threats that we did not recognise in the past led to the Huawei debacle—and also, importantly, in the light of political changes, so it is understandable that our understanding of some of those changes will be imperfect and will rely on sensitive information. However, the critical point is that the fact that there will be change and its sensitivity should not preclude the need for accountability. In other areas of national security, the Intelligence and Security Committee holds Government to account through proper scrutiny and with access to sensitive information.”
“It would require the Secretary of State to consult with the Intelligence and Security Committee before publishing a statement under section 3, which sets out the scope and nature of how the Secretary of State would exercise the call-in powers. That statement would include details of sectors that might especially pose risks, details of trigger events and details of factors that the Secretary of State would consider in deciding whether to act. It would also include details of the BEIS unit’s resourcing, if amendment 9 were agreed to. The measures are a seismic shift in terms of the UK’s approach to mergers and acquisitions and it gives significant powers and discretion to the Secretary of State. It suggests that the Government may publish a statement setting out the scope of the call-in powers.”
“It enshrines credible decision making in law and, in doing so, protects our security and gives businesses confidence that the decision to call in has been grounded in evidence and expertise, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, who will find certain provisions of the legislation most burdensome and who may have the most to lose from lengthy processes once the call-in procedure happens—the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine referred to those processes. It grounds a mechanism for effective accountability for the call-in decisions of the Secretary of State. Amendment 4, which would amend clause 4, has a similar aim.”
“As always, I am immensely grateful to my hon. Friend, who does well to remind us that part of the underlying issue, which we will debate later, is the lack of any definition of national security. Rather than just considering the scepticism, let me focus on what we are trying to do. Given the lack of any definition of national security, is it not right that it should not be left to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to decide what the key issues are on national security? Fundamentally, I think that is the question that Committee members must consider. The amendment seeks to fill the gap that expert advice and international precedence highlight.”
“I recognise that at the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, and I agreed with him until he said that there are already powers to “ensure scrutiny”. The powers that he describes might enable scrutiny, but I do not think they would ensure scrutiny. We are trying to ensure the scrutiny of the Intelligence and Security Committee by writing it into the Bill. I see him nodding, and I appreciate that we understand each other here.”
“I really cannot emphasise enough how broad those definitions currently seem. I know it is the intention that the definitions should be tightly drawn. However, I speak as a chartered engineer with many years’ experience in technology. Three or four decades ago, we might have talked about digital parts of the economy, but now the economy is digital. Similarly, in the future, parts of the economy not using artificial intelligence—from agriculture to leisure to retail to education—will be looking to use it.”
“Regulations made under clause 6 would likely define the sectors that pose the greatest national security risk and would come under mandatory notification requirements. With the amendment, the ISC would be able would to provide both scrutiny and challenge to these sector definitions. The Committee will understand that the driving reasons behind the amendment are similar to those behind amendments 3 and 4, which is of course why the amendments have been grouped together, and would seek to improve the Bill through putting in place a requirement for parliamentary scrutiny specifically on the definitions. As we have said, the Bill gives the Secretary of State major powers, and it demands mandatory notification of investments in large parts of the economy, with 17 proposed sector definitions already.”
“Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) and I emphasise it on behalf of the ISC—Committees in this place missioned to do just that need to play an important role.” —[ Official Report , 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 244.] We had support in the evidence sessions, support across the House and, most importantly, we have the support of the ISC itself, or at least its agreement that the amendment would be a constructive improvement to the Bill. Finally, I will say a few words on amendment 5, which would require the Secretary of State to notify the Intelligence and Security Committee before making regulations under clause 6 and would provide a mechanism for the Committee to respond with recommendations.”
“On Second Reading, the Chair of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), said that “there is a real role for Committees of this House in such processes and that the ability to subpoena both witnesses and papers would add not only depth to the Government’s investigation but protection to the Business Secretary who was forced to take the decision”. —[ Official Report , 17 November 2020; Vol. 684, c. 238.] I think that is powerful advocacy for the amendment. A member of the ISC, the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), said that “we need mechanisms in place to ensure that that flexibility does not allow the Government too much scope. That is why—this point was made by my hon.”
“Another excellent contribution from my hon. Friend, who raises a delicate, nuanced, important point. Governments of all colours may have trade and geopolitical agendas that lead to, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) described it, a “hug a panda” approach, whereas the ISC, which we have seen mark its independence of thought both as a Committee and in its contributions in parliamentary debates, has a duty, a responsibility and an understanding to see beyond short or even medium-term political ambitions and to focus wholeheartedly on the security of our nation. That is where its support is invaluable. I will finish my comments on the amendment by quoting some of our parliamentary colleagues with regard to the Intelligence and Security Committee.”
“Friend the Member for Aberavon said, upstream of the actual call-in notification. This is about the definitions of the sectors to ensure upstream scrutiny. Small businesses, particularly start-ups, seek finance, often foreign investment. There are enough barriers in their way and we do not want to create more unnecessarily, but our amendments are about clarifying and ensuring the robustness of the definitions before they hit the coalface of our small businesses and start-ups, whose interests I want to protect. The Opposition are champions of small businesses, are we not?”
“I welcome the hon. Lady’s intervention. It is great to have scientific knowledge in Committee and in the House. I welcome the contributions and scrutiny that a scientific background can bring. She is right that there is a tension. The technological environment is fantastic and innovative, with its start-up and enterprise culture. We have great centres of development and innovation, from Cambridge to Newcastle. I am sure hon. Members can mention other centres of great technological development that lead to lots of local start-ups in different areas. All or many of them may be caught by the provisions of the Bill, and that is a concern, but our amendments have been tabled to put in place parliamentary scrutiny. Parliamentary scrutiny of the call-in process should be, as my hon.”
“I thank my hon. Friend for his eloquence. I reiterate that we are looking to make the Secretary of State’s life easier. We hope that, in the not-too-distant future, a Labour Member will be in that position. Our guiding principle is that we want every clause to be as effective as possible and our amendments are designed to make the Bill work as effectively as possible.”
“I think the hon. Member and I have the same aims, and we are looking to make the process work as effectively as possible. The Intelligence and Security Committee has clearly said that this is an area in which it can make an important contribution. Further, as my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon so eloquently said, this is about putting in additional security upstream. I do not envisage—I think I am right in saying this—that these measures would result in the Intelligence and Security Committee reviewing 1,800 call-in notifications; this is about putting in place the ISC’s expertise and scrutiny upstream.”
“We are trying constructively to find a balance on this important question, but I want to draw that balance in the interests of national security, small businesses and our business community who have to work with these definitions.”
“That is a really interesting point, and we could debate for some time the nature of the Government—the Executive—and the role of Parliament. So as not to exhaust your patience, Mr Twigg, I will just say that the role of Parliament is to scrutinise Government, but our proposal is actually about scrutinising decisions that the Government are taking—for example, the definition of the 17 sectors in the amendment that we are considering. I do not want to put words in the hon. Gentleman’s mouth, but I think his argument is that that parliamentary scrutiny should take place only after myriad companies have complained that the definitions are far too broad.”
“Perhaps I do not quite understand the point that the hon. Gentleman is making, because we propose that the Intelligence and Security Committee should provide that scrutiny. The scrutiny that the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee provides is necessarily limited to business. At the centre of this is the fact that we are putting in the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy a key issue of national security. Is it not right that those who have expertise and experience in security, as opposed to international trade or business, should be part of that?”
“I am struggling to see how that would happen. How would Parliament, after the Bill becomes law, decide that the Intelligence and Security Committee, as opposed to or in addition to the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, should have a role. How would that happen in practice?”
“I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, because I think we are getting to the nub of it. The amendment is necessary because, as I outlined, there is an inherent conflict of interest within the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy with regard to foreign investment and national security. In addition, there is a need for security-cleared knowledge. I do not know the security clearance of the current members of the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, but I doubt it is at the same level as the members of the Intelligence and Security Committee.”
“The hon. Lady makes a good point, in that much would be solved by the appropriate phone call at the appropriate time. Had Sir Richard Dearlove been phoned by the right person when the Huawei acquisition was going through, that issue would have been solved. Whichever Government are in power, we are continuously looking for ways to ensure a more joined-up approach to government. Given the importance of national security—I think we can all agree that national security is the first duty of Government—and given the reality of the conflicting pressures on Departments, I think these proposals to improve scrutiny by involving a multi-agency approach are necessary. I also point the hon. Lady to the approach of the US Government, who have found this to be necessary, as have others of our allies. With that, I will make some progress.”
“81, Q96.] We need to ensure that flexibility does not allow the Government too much scope, so flexibility must go hand in hand with accountability and transparency. The ISC, critically, has the skills, security clearance and expertise to provide that scrutiny and accountability.”
“The amendment would bring ISC scrutiny to notifiable acquisition regulations specifically up-front of any decision to call in or notify, so ensuring that these major powers consistently act to protect our national security. Again, that is an important point. Significant powers are being given to the Secretary of State to protect our national security. It is right that we should have security input into the definition of these sectors. In his oral evidence, Professor Martin, the former head of our National Cyber Security Centre, said: “I think that the powers should be fairly broad”, but “there should be accountability and transparency mechanisms”. –– [ Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c.”
“I will follow your guidance, Mr Twigg. Under the amendments, the Government would have to publish notifiable acquisition regulations to define sectors and notification rules in greater detail. From time to time, those sectors and rules will need to change, with new regulations made to keep up with changing technological, security and geopolitical risks, as we have discussed. To guard our security, not all those risks should be discussed in public, but the need for change and for sensitivity does not preclude the need for accountability—a point I have made a number of times. In other areas of national security, the ISC holds the Government to account through proper scrutiny and with access to sensitive information. It is only right that we bring the same scrutiny to bear here, on matters of critical national security.”
“I thank the Minister for giving way and again congratulate him on his new role. I also thank him for his constructive tone. I sense a contradiction in the point he is making. He is saying that the Business Secretary will call on a wide range of advice and expertise, but that if he is required to call on a wide range of advice and expertise, it will upset the process.”
“The review would be required before issuing a call-in notice. The impact assessment mentioned about 1,830 notifications, but only 90 call-in notices. It is not accurate to say that the amendment would require about 1,800 reviews. It is only for those that would lead to a call-in notice, which is a much lower number.”
“We therefore propose the amendments to ensure that that input, scrutiny and expertise are in the Bill. Question put, That the amendment be made.”
“I thank the Minister for his response and the generally constructive tone with which he laid out the aims of the amendments and the reasons he did not feel able to accept them. There is, however, as I suggested in an intervention, a sense of the Minister playing both sides at once. He says that the scrutiny proposed in the amendments, by the ISC and through the multi-agency approach, should take place, but that it would be wrong to require it because it will take place. The hon. Member for South Ribble said that the challenges and the need for input scrutiny could be addressed by the right phone call at the right time. That is true, but there are many reasons why that might not happen. For example, the Minister might be looking at vaccine delivery at the time the phone call was being made.”
“Clause 2 Further provision about call-in notices”
“At each step, the Opposition will plug gaps left by the Government in coherent policy making, to champion British creativity and innovation. It is the least our small and medium-sized enterprises deserve. Finally, we will stand for effective scrutiny of the Government of the day. That is why we tabled the amendment, which has unfortunately not been accepted by the Committee. However, we will find proportionate, robust and democratically legitimate means of seeking accountable action to protect our national security. Our amendments will stand up for British security, and for competent and coherent decision making. Clearly, we regret the Committee’s decision on our amendment, but we will not oppose the clause standing part of the Bill. Question put and agreed to. Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.”
“In scrutinising the Bill and this clause, we will champion clarity and support for our prized SMEs and innovative start-ups—the engine of British jobs and British prosperity. We have already heard from market participants that the Government’s belated rush with this Bill has created huge uncertainty and concern over the ability of BEIS to operate the new investment screening regime that the Minister set out. The Government’s impact assessment notes that 80% of transactions in the scope of mandatory notification will be by SMEs. We heard from our expert witnesses that the impact assessment fails to account for the costs faced by the acquired companies, and for the overall impact on funding for our start-ups. The Opposition will not turn a blind eye to those costs for our small and medium-sized enterprises.”
“We have seen only 12 national security screenings in 18 years, and not a single instance of the Government acting decisively to block a takeover and guard our national security. In the context of what other countries are doing and how rapidly technologies progress from being economically strategic to becoming security threats, we must not just consider a narrow national security test, but pursue a road to sovereign technological capability and much more ambitious and robust routes to protecting national security and strategic interests. The Opposition will therefore put the security of our citizens first. We will not shy away from regaining national sovereign capability, and we assure our citizens that Britain will have the technology and the capability to protect its national security.”
“There are understandable concerns that too broad a test might result in a drop in investment for the UK’s start-ups and businesses, and these concerns note an economic challenge in expanding our national security powers. At the same time, however, there is widespread agreement that national security and economic security are not entirely separate. They are deeply linked. A national security expert told us that a narrow focus on direct technologies of defence, for example, was mistaken, and that we should look at the defence of technologies that seem economically strategic today and might become more strategic in future. Our concern is that we have a Government who are years behind our allies in even contemplating the new national security investment regime.”
“Our proposed amendment to clause 1 would have ensured broad input into the considerations, such that our national security was not threatened as a result of insufficient expert advice or by the pure, ministerial market ideology of recent record. Our group of amendments sought to bring legal powers, multi-agency expertise and proper decision making to bear in putting British security first. There has already been significant discussion of the right national security powers, both on Second Reading and in the Committee evidence sessions. An essential part of that discussion has been focused on the merits of giving the Government powers to protect our national security by using a public interest test.”
“I thank the Minister for his remarks on clause 1 stand part and for setting out the Bill’s aims and ambitions. We largely agree with those aims and ambitions, and in that spirit I will give further clarity on the Opposition’s overall position. We stand in support of the need for the Bill, and indeed we sought it years ago. We support the need for the new powers to protect our national security, as set out by the Minister, and the need for those new powers in the context of changing technological, commercial and geopolitical realities. Our approach to the Bill is therefore one of constructive challenge and is guided by three principles, the first being the security of our citizens. We do not want narrow legal definitions.”
“I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 3, page 3, line 1, leave out “may” and insert “shall”. This amendment would make it obligatory for the Secretary of State to include certain matters in a statement about his/her exercise of the call-in power.”
“Indeed, that is why we have needed this legislation for some years now, and why Labour has been calling for it. The amendment again seeks to make the Secretary of State’s life easier, by encouraging him—or her, in the future—to provide guidance on the factors that might form part of national security assessments. That would not tie the Government’s hands by ruling anything out; it simply asks them to guide businesses with clarity on the sort of factors that might matter, giving flexibility to the Government and clarity to our small and medium-sized enterprises in particular.”
“We discussed earlier the conflict of interests between the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy welcoming foreign investment and the national security interests perhaps saying that there should not be foreign investment. That is especially challenging in the light of the major increases in interventions expected—as we have heard, we expect to go from 12 interventions to 1,830. We believe strongly that we owe our citizens and businesses clarity on what will guide this increased intervention, but it is also right for the Government to retain flexibility for action and not to have their hands tied with a precise, narrow definition of national security, as security risks change due to technological, economic and geopolitical changes.”
“Amendment 2 “provides that a statement from the Secretary of State about the exercise of a call-in power may”— not “must”— “include his/her definition of national security.” We are trying very hard to reflect the advice from certain experts that too closely defining national security would limit the powers of the Secretary of State, would not allow it to evolve with the threats and would give indications that could in some respects be gamed, but at the same time we are trying to address the vacuum that no definition creates. That vacuum risks creating major uncertainty for businesses and arbitrary powers for politicians to intervene without appropriate scope for that intervention.”
“Then one can be quite sure one has not accidentally lost an asset where there are national security issues.” –– [ Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 105, Q130.] As I have referred to on a number of occasions, I think the loss of DeepMind to Google and of the Centre for Integrated Photonics to Huawei show that we can lose strategic assets through a lack of clarity about what might constitute a national security threat.”
“25, Q31.] David Offenbach said: “National security is not defined in the Bill, which I actually approve of, because once it becomes too closely indicated, then it is not easy to decide what should be in it, or what should not be in it. I would like to see a definition that includes what Lord Heseltine said when Melrose took over GKN, that research and development should be a subject of importance; it should be included.” –– [ Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2020; c. 99, Q106.] He also said: “The only way to make sure that something does not slip through the net is to have a slightly wider definition. There is no definition of national security itself in the Bill, which is perhaps why strategic, research and development, innovation or other issues should be brought in.”
“Certainly, I found it a very good and informative debate, hearing from a wide range of experts with different levels of experience in different aspects of national security, from Sir Richard Dearlove to academics, and their views on the importance of and the concerns with defining national security. Sir Richard Dearlove said that he would certainly see a definition of national security as “advantageous, because it defines a clear area where you start and from which you can make judgments about the involvement of foreign firms being given space or activity in those areas. That is not a bad idea at all, actually.” –– [ Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c.”