Dame Chi Onwurah
MP for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West · Labour · United Kingdom
“An extraordinary debate is going on right now inside and outside AI companies about whether the possibility of AI destroying humanity is more or less than 10%. The European Union is moving ahead with a comprehensive AI regulatory framework, but the UK continues to rely on existing regulation.”
“The Pope also highlighted how the billions of online digital twins constitute an unprecedented concentration of power in the hands of a small number of men. Among the many consequences of the 40 years of neoliberalism repeatedly called out by the Prime Minister is a libertarian attitude to technology.”
“But this stealth digital twinning violates the integrity, uniqueness and very personhood of our constituents and of all of us. Digital twins can take many forms, from content creation algorithms and deepfakes to chatbots that reflect aspects of our personalities back at us. It is particularly worrying when children are the target.”
“The automated version of our kids will grow with them, using the power of AI to target advertising and products at them, and worse. The Science, Innovation and Technology Committee has heard about some of the tragic consequences of online grooming by algorithms and chatbots—a vulnerable boy persuaded to kill himself; a vulnerable girl fed…”
“In the arts, entertainment and tech industries, many performers are agreeing to the creation and use of digital replicas as part of their work—think of ABBA Voyage. But performers increasingly encounter unauthorised digital replicas of themselves, which pose a threat to their career, livelihood and reputation.”
“Since then, deepfakes have proliferated. The hon. Member for Mid Norfolk (George Freeman) was shown crossing the Floor in Parliament to join Reform, to his constituents’ consternation and his own—it was a fake. Then there were the horrendous photos of naked women and girls that Elon Musk’s AI created on demand.”
The complete record
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“Labour would seek to support our sovereign capability in the space age and build on the UK’s proud history of technological innovation and space exploration. Labour is passionate about the long-term future and potential of the space sector. It provides high-skill, high-paid jobs, which are needed to address the major challenges of our time, but the absence of a clear and focused long-term space strategy raises many questions about how far we will benefit from the boundless possibilities of space.”
“First we were told it would be part of our sovereign GNSS—global navigation satellite system—programme, then it was not. We do not know what the Government have planned for OneWeb or whether this huge investment will even support jobs in the UK space sector, with the satellites continuing to be manufactured in Florida. The space sector provides the UK with so many opportunities to grow our economy, push technological boundaries and boost our soft power by developing strategic interdependence with our allies. What discussions has the Minister had about progressive partnerships in space exploration and research and development? A year ago, UKspace set out the urgent need for a coherent cross-Government space strategy. We still have not seen it.”
“There is no strategy for external investment, no strategy for skills—in particular diverse skills; space requires everyone, regardless of gender, ethnicity, region or age—no strategy for industry and manufacturing, and no strategy for sovereign satellite capabilities, or whether and how we will compete with SpaceX and others. Instead, we have the manifesto of a Government with their head in the clouds. Down on earth, as we have heard, the sector is still waiting to hear about the future of the new regulations introduced under the Space Industry Act 2018, particularly those dealing with administrative burdens and liabilities. Nothing better illustrates the lack of strategy and transparency than the purchase of OneWeb, despite the advice of experts and the concerns of the UK Space Agency.”
“Without a clear long-term space strategy, the hard work of our space sector—in developing spaceports and rocket launch pads, and space domain awareness projects and military-grade software, and embarking on satellite projects critical for our vital infrastructure—will not be fully realised. If we are to ensure the success of these programmes, we must understand whether we have the industrial capability to do so. Part of unlocking the potential of our space industry is knowing how we organise our industrial base to achieve our goals, and in turn where we will need further investment and finance to encourage outward investment in UK businesses.”
“Will the Minister publish the information that drove this decision, and set out the new remit for the UK Space Agency? What will she do with these new powers? The Government talk excitedly about “global Britain”, but Labour wants to see an interplanetary Britain powered by a booming space sector. Space is not just for the stars. As we have heard, it impacts every household in the country—from climate change and rural broadband to transport and agriculture. From our smart phones to our credit cards, the UK space sector helps us all to prosper. The Government have made commitments to develop a new space command, designed to “enhance the breadth of our space capabilities” and help to fund high-risk/reward innovation projects, but there has been no clarity on the support provided to space research from this new ARPA-style moonshot programme.”
“The UK’s proud history in space exploration, research and development makes it an excellent launch pad for future growth, with the right leadership. The UK and its place in the world is changing. We have left the European Union, which meant turning our back on the Galileo project that we did so much to bring about, at a cost of £1.2 billion to the taxpayer. The Government then U-turned on their plans to develop a rival sovereign satellite system, at a cost of a further £60 million. Just this weekend, it was reported that the Secretary of State had decided to take control of strategy and policy away from the UK Space Agency, handing the almost £600 million budget directly to the Government. We are concerned that this constitutes a reactionary power grab following the controversy over the Government’s acquisition of OneWeb.”
“In 1957, British Skylark rockets were launched from Woomera in Australia. At the turn of the millennium, the British National Space Centre was the third largest financial contributor to the European Space Agency. The space industry is worth more than £14.8 billion per year and has grown five times greater than the wider economy since 1999. The success of this sector helps to drive prosperity across the UK. As we have heard, our UK space businesses spend around £750 million annually, with around 1,500 UK suppliers, based across every region of the UK. Many of the jobs created in space manufacturing are also highly productive, with the average salary of an Airbus UK space employee standing at £51,000, nearly 50% higher than the UK national average.”
“I thank the hon. Member for Midlothian (Owen Thompson) and the Backbench Business Committee for bringing forward this very important debate today. There have been so many excellent and well-informed contributions from all parts of the House and I am sorry that I cannot do them justice in my comments, but I will try to emulate their conciseness. Space and its many unanswered questions inspire awe and excitement. For nearly 70 years, the official British space programme has been seeking to answer the big questions of our universe, drawing on the expertise of our world-leading science and research sectors. In fact, the British Interplanetary Society is the oldest space advocacy organisation on Earth. As a nation, we have a proud history of space exploration and international collaboration.”
“One year after the UK’s first covid patient arrived at Newcastle’s Royal Victoria Infirmary, I know the Secretary of State will want to join me in congratulating Newcastle’s NHS staff, GPs, public health professionals, volunteers and all those leading the way in vaccinating so many, so quickly. Will he agree to reward such success by handing more resources and control over the failing test and trace programme to local public health teams, who are closer to communities and can better understand local transmission chains, which we need to do if we are to get the virus under control?”
“It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone, and to come back to this important Bill. I thank the Minister for writing to me and reassuring me on certain matters relevant to the clause. We accept the need for Ofcom to have powers to require information from vendors, but we would like a specific requirement whereby Ofcom can ask vendors for information on the diversity of their supply chains. I will leave further discussion on that for our new clauses. I will support this clause. Question put and agreed to. Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 7 Powers of OFCOM to enforce compliance with security duties Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Clause 11 Reporting on matters related to security”
“I will not detain the Committee long, as we are cracking on through the clauses. I will only emphasise that these clauses give Ofcom broad powers—very broad powers—and measures of enforcement, as well as placing duties on the network operators to all users of their network services. We support these broad powers, but it is incumbent on the Minister and indeed on the Committee to consider whether those powers will receive sufficient scrutiny, and sufficient oversight and input from our security services. We anticipate debating those particular questions in more detail later today. In the meantime, we will not stand in the way of these clauses standing part of the Bill. Question put and agreed to. Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 8 to 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.”
“I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 11, page18, line 26, at end insert— “(aa) an assessment of the impact on security of changes to the diversity of the supply chain for network equipment;” This amendment requires that network supply chain diversification is included in Ofcom reports on security.”
“I hope that, by accepting this amendment, the Minister will recognise that we are, as always, seeking to improve the Bill and to ensure that it provides a credible and effective means to secure our networks. With regard to clauses 11, 12 and 13 stand part, we recognise the importance of providing Ofcom with the appropriate powers to request information, but also to share information related to security. In that respect, these provisions are ones that we can support.”
“Dr Alexi Drew, from Kings College, London, was asked whether it was possible to have a secure network without a diverse supply chain, and answered: “That is a great question that comes with a very simple answer: no. The worst-case scenario for creating a risk in this sense is when monopoly meets supply chain—insecure supply chain in this case. Arguably, the reason why SolarWinds was so successful is that it provided the same service to so many different organisations and departments in the United States. Therefore, if you access one—SolarWinds—you access almost all. That is the risk.”—[ Official Report, Telecommunications (Security) Public Bill Committee, 19 January 2021; c. 87, Q110.] That is a risk that, I am sorry to say, the Bill currently does not sufficiently address.”
“Given that the Secretary of State has said on a number of occasions that supply chain diversification goes hand in hand with the security of the network, it is essential that supply chain diversification is specifically mentioned in the Bill, so that we can have accurate and detailed reports from Ofcom on key aspects of network security. The amendment will help provide the Secretary of State with the information to update Parliament on the progress of the Government’s diversification strategy, depending on Ofcom’s findings. The Secretary of State has promised to give Parliament such updates, so this is an enabling amendment to ensure that the Secretary of State has the information he needs to provide the reporting that he has committed to. In support of the amendment, I would like to cite one of the witnesses in our evidence sessions.”
“My key question to the Minister is, how can Ofcom report on security if it is not reporting on supply chain diversification? The Minister may well say that Ofcom has the power to report on supply chain diversification and to request information on supply chain diversification. As I have said on a number of occasions, the powers in the Bill are broad. That is why effective scrutiny requires some specification of what will be reported upon. The security report to the Secretary of State should be made as “soon as practicable after the end of each reporting period” and “must contain… information and advice… to assist the Secretary of State in the formulation of policy”. It must also include the extent to which providers have complied with security duties. That is as an example of some of what may be included in the security report.”
“I am afraid it remains the fact that we have no reference to the diversification of the supply chain in the Bill, despite the fact that, as I will briefly outline, both the Secretary of State and experts during our evidence sessions emphasised that we could not have network security without effective diversification. We cannot have a robust and secure network with only two service providers. Supply chain diversification is absolutely vital to protecting our national security. If a vulnerability exists in one vendor or service provider, that intrusion may be limited to that one vendor or service provider alone. A diversity of suppliers in the supply chain limits the exposure of vital information. This amendment ensures that network supply chain diversification is addressed in Ofcom’s report on security.”
“As I said, we anticipate having a broader debate this afternoon on the importance of the diversification of the supply chain to security, as part of the debates on our new clauses, so I will only summarise our key points and concerns now. This amendment follows amendment 13, which sought to give Ofcom the power to request reports from operators on their supply and the progress of their supply chain diversification. We support steps to remove high-risk vendors from the UK networks, but they must go hand in hand with credible measures to diversify the supply chain.”
“However, we feel strongly that, given the speed at which we are providing the appropriate scrutiny, more time should be devoted to debating the Bill on the Floor of the House. We are cracking on in order to protect, as far as we can, the public health of Members of Parliament, staff, House officials and Clerks, who are doing an amazing job in the midst of a pandemic. Clause 11 makes provision for reporting by Ofcom on security matters. That includes a duty to provide an annual security report to the Secretary of State. Amendment 14, in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends, requires that network supply chain diversification is included in Ofcom’s report on security.”
“We start this debate where we ended our sitting on Thursday, on the diversity of the supply chain. But this is not groundhog day; this is a very different aspect of the diversity of the supply chain. I hope the Minister has noticed that there are three themes to our amendment: national security, diversity of the supply chain and appropriate scrutiny. Those are our key concerns about the Bill as it stands. We wish to see the Bill debated as speedily as possible. For the record, I reiterate my concern that, in the midst of a pandemic lockdown, where the advice is to stay at home, the Leader of the House requires that Members of Parliament should congregate in one room for several hours. With that in mind, we are cracking on as quickly as possible, and we have made significant progress only this morning.”
“Given that Ofcom will not make security decisions and that the diversification of the supply chain is essential for security, I am at a loss to understand why the Minister will not accept a reference to reporting on the progress of diversification. Although, unfortunately, the pandemic means that we are not at full strength on the Opposition side of the Committee, I wish to test the will of the Committee on the amendment. Question put, That the amendment be made.”
“If diversification is a prerequisite, why is the Minister so reluctant to refer to it? If he is so confident in the plan to diversify our supply chains, why is he so reluctant to insert any requirements to report on the progress of that diversification? I listened intently: the Minister said that Ofcom has the powers to report on whatever it considers to be relevant to security. During the evidence session, we heard from Ofcom itself, very clearly and repeatedly, that it is not for Ofcom to make decisions on national security. It will not make national security decisions. That is not within its remit and responsibilities; the witnesses from Ofcom stated that repeatedly and clearly. I would be happy to read from Hansard if that point is in question.”
“I thank the Minister for his comments. Although we agree on many things in many areas, I think that in this case he is trying to have his cake and eat it, inasmuch as he is saying that amendment 14 is not necessary because Ofcom already has the powers, but he is reluctant or is refusing to specify that those powers will be used for the objective of reporting on the progress of diversification of the supply chain. It was good to hear the Minister reiterate the importance of diversification of the supply chain, but I remain confused about whether he agrees with the evidence and, indeed, with his own Secretary of State that diversification of the supply chain is a prerequisite of the security of our networks and, indeed, our national security—that is what we are discussing with regard to our telecoms networks.”
“It was only when Parliament became aware of and was able to give its full-throated input on concerns about the dominance of high-risk vendors in our telecommunications market that the Government took action. We do not want to be in the position of finding again that there has been a dramatic change in the security of our networks without appropriate scrutiny. Clause 14 states that the Secretary of State must “carry out reviews of…impact and effectiveness” and that the report must be laid before Parliament for parliamentary scrutiny. However, we are to wait up to five years before it will be made possible to give parliamentary scrutiny to a Bill that is so important to national security, as both the Minister and the Secretary of State, and indeed the security services, have emphasised. We are not to review its effectiveness for five years.”
“As we have previously emphasised, we are sure that the Minister and the Secretary of State are inclined to exercise the powers in a proportionate and accountable way, but they will not be in their posts forever, and perhaps not for the entire first five years of the legislation’s operation, so it is important that the Bill requires that Parliament be able to scrutinise its effectiveness, as that is so important to our national security. In that sense, this amendment follows amendments 5, 9 and 10 with respect to the requirement for appropriate oversight and accountability. I emphasise—I am sure that you will understand, Mr Hollobone—that in some ways we are here because of a lack of effective parliamentary scrutiny of the presence and growth of high-risk vendors in our networks.”
“Clause 14 requires the Secretary of State to review the impact and effectiveness of clauses 1 to 13 at least every five years. Our amendment would require the report to be published every year for the first five years after the legislation is passed, and then up to every five years after that. As we have said, the Bill gives the Secretary of State and Ofcom sweeping powers. We want to ensure both that they are proportionate and that there is accountability.”
“I beg to move amendment 15, in clause 14, page 21, line 28, leave out from beginning to end of line 30 and insert— “(3) The reports must be published not more than 12 months apart for the first 5 years, then not more than 5 years apart. (4) The first report must be published within the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.”. This amendment requires the Secretary of State to report on the impact and effectiveness of clauses 1 to 13 every year for the first five years after the Act is passed, and then every five years following . The amendment reflects another of our key concerns about the Bill, which is the level and extent of appropriate scrutiny for such broad and sweeping powers. It seeks to ensure appropriate scrutiny.”
“We are the party of national security and we want to ensure that, in this context, national security is brought to Parliament to be debated, discussed and reviewed at least every year.”
“The hon. Lady is absolutely right. The clause enables the Minister or Secretary of State to choose to lay a report more frequently. Again, I do not want to impute anything against the Minister or the Secretary of State, but given the importance of the subject and of parliamentary review, why not ensure that it is more frequent? I am sure that the hon. Lady will agree that Parliament has many things to consider, and so does the Secretary of State. There is competition for parliamentary time, particularly in a pandemic and in view of the challenges that we shall face in the next few years. How can I put this? We have concerns that the priority may slip in the face of, for example, economic challenges, investment challenges and recovery challenges. We want to be sure what is happening.”
“On a point of clarification, I have the impression that the Minister anticipates that the first report under the Bill would only happen once all the requirements had been implemented. I think that that implies that it would only happen once a high-risk vendor, specifically Huawei, had been removed from the network.”
“If the Minister will give way briefly, he may find it saves time. To clarify: for the first report we will not necessarily have to wait until all the provisions of delegated legislation associated with the Bill are in place. As for the infrastructure reports that Ofcom publishes, to which he refers as a form of alternative scrutiny, will they, might they or will they not reflect progress in the diversification of the supply chain?”
“I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham for an exciting intervention from his phone, and I thank the Minister for his comments. As I think I have said, I spent six years working for Ofcom with the Communications Act 2003 on my desk. I know the importance that our independent regulator places on the words of the Minister during such debates as this. As he has indicated that the reports would do well to include reference to everything that appertains to security, including the diversification of supply chain, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 15 Designated vendor directions”
“Friend the Member for North Durham in paying tribute to our security services, which do such great work to keep us secure across a wide range of threats and challenges—both present and evolving—and on whose continued work and effectiveness the Bill is highly dependent. As my right hon. Friend set out, we want to ensure that national security is absolutely at the heart of the Bill.”
“I will speak to amendments 18 and 19, standing in my name and those of my hon. Friends, and to clauses 15 to 17. As the Minister set out, the clauses are about key powers in the Bill that seek to secure our networks and to regularise requirements already in place, albeit informally or not legally, to remove Huawei as a specific high-risk vendor from our networks. The clauses give Government the powers to do what they have said they will do. On the clauses, I will not repeat what the Minister said, and I congratulate him on clearly setting out their powers, which the Opposition believe are necessary. I also join the Minister and my right hon.”
“Thank you for the clarification, Mr Hollobone. I see that we are discussing whether clauses 15 and 16 stand part. I support those clauses and look forward to the Minister’s response to the amendment.”
“The point I am making—clearly, I did not make it effectively—is that that sector is becoming this sector. The cloud sector is becoming the telecoms sector. The reason we need this Bill in addition to the National Security and Investment Bill is to address the security concerns of the telecoms sector specifically. The cloud sector is becoming part of the telecoms sector, yet the Bill does not address those concerns.”
“The new section states: “The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a copy of— (a) a designated vendor direction; (b) a designation notice; (c) a notice of a variation or revocation of a designated vendor direction; and (d) a notice of a variation or revocation of a designation notice.” So far, so good—we have that scrutiny. However, the new section also says: “The requirement in subsection (1) does not apply if the Secretary of State considers that laying a copy of the direction or notice (as the case may be) before Parliament would be contrary to the interests of national security.””
“I would like the Minister to comment specifically on the level of security clearance required for members of the Committee that he has identified as being the location for scrutiny of important issues of national security. What level of security clearance do its members have? Would that enable the scrutiny that we all agree is in the best interests of the Bill? I would like the Minister to respond to a specific example. Amendments 20, 22, 23, 24 and 25 are designed to require that the Intelligence and Security Committee has access to the appropriate information. There is a requirement for the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a copy of a designated vendor direction, as set out in clause 15, which inserts new section 105Z11 into the Communications Act 2003.”
“Ofcom made it clear that it does not consider itself in a position to make national security decisions, which is understandable, and that some of the decisions and considerations about national security with regards to telecommunications networks would require people who have STRAP clearance. Ofcom’s group director for networks and communications pointed to the fact that she had had STRAP clearance previously, and she said that if the NCSC “feels that that is needed for the type of information that we may need to handle, we would make sure that happened.” –– [ Official Report, Telecommunications (Security) Public Bill Committee, 14 January 2021; c. 90, Q115.] To my knowledge, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee members do not have STRAP clearance.”
“The first is to reiterate a point made previously: our security threats are changing, evolving and, unfortunately, diversifying. We see that in changes to our defence spending, in changes in the national review of our defence capabilities, and in changes in the evolution of the geopolitical landscape—the potential source of threats. However, the Minister does not seem able to support reflecting that by ensuring that, rather than keeping to our existing modes of parliamentary scrutiny, we enable parliamentary scrutiny of issues of national security by those who are best placed to carry out such scrutiny—undoubtedly members of the Intelligence and Security Committee. I want to point briefly to a discussion in the evidence sessions.”
“I rise to support the excellent comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for City of Chester and my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham. I did well to delay my remarks till after my right hon. Friend had spoken, because he has set out very effectively, based on his considerable experience as a long-standing member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, both why it is important that that Committee should be consulted and receive the reports, and why it is hard to understand the Minister’s reluctance both in this Bill and in the National Security and Investment Bill to involve a source of such credible security expertise and, importantly, security clearance in key issues of national security. I want to add two points to those made by my right hon. and hon. Friends.”
“We support clause 17 and our amendments are intended to make it more accountable to Parliament and therefore more successful and effective in securing our national security.”
“Thank you, Mr Hollobone. It is sometimes confusing to know exactly what is being discussed at what point. With that, I ask the Minister to respond to our concerns about the scrutiny of the powers in the clause.”
“Given the breadth of the requirements, it is notable that there is nothing on progress on the diversification strategy. Nor, if my memory serves me correctly, does the impact assessment reflect the potential costs to either the network operators or Ofcom in exercising these powers. The clauses do not set out the impact and they emphasise once again the importance of Ofcom having the appropriate resources to enable it to carry out the requirements effectively. I hope that the Minister will bear those limitations in mind in his ongoing review of the Bill. Question put and agreed to . Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Clauses 19 to 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 24 Further amendment concerning penalties Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Mr McCabe. I will not detain the Committee long with a consideration of the clauses, and I thank the Minister for so ably setting out what the clauses aim to achieve. Indeed, we on this side recognise the importance and the necessity of clauses 18 to 23 in establishing the process and ensuring the powers to obtain information and enforce direction as part of that process. We only reiterate a small number of important points to draw attention once again to the breadth of the powers, which enable the Secretary of State to require information to an almost unlimited extent. Given the breadth of the powers, the information and progress on the telecommunications diversification strategy is, once again, notable by its absence.”
“I support and second the comments and contributions of my hon. Friend the Member for the City of Chester (Christian Matheson) and of my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Kevan Jones), who tabled new clauses 3 and 7. I would also like to congratulate the Committee on having made it through, as it were, the thickets of the Bill as it stands to the sunlit uplands of our new clauses, which are designed to improve it in a constructive and supportive way. New clauses 3 and 7 both address the challenge of Ofcom’s resources. As Members of the Committee know, I joined Ofcom in 2004. I know that we are not allowed to use props in debates in the Chamber, but the Communications Act 2003, which I am holding in my hand, is the Act with which the Bill is concerned. The changes that the Bill makes are mainly adding to that Act.”
“That is possibly true, but I still think this important issue would be improved by clarity. As we know, there is a significant pressure on Ofcom’s resources, which changes week by week and month by month depending on what the issues are in the many and increasing domains in which it operates. If these principal duties of Ofcom do not reflect our national security, the concern is that having no direct reporting mechanism to Parliament could mean these resources being used opaquely, with no direct requirement to prioritise national security. I hope the Minister will agree that new clauses 3 and 7 solve a problem the Bill will have in practice. I hope that if he will not agree to the clauses as they stand, he will agree to consider how Ofcom’s prioritisation of national security interests can be made clearer.”
“All Opposition Members are clear that national security must be the first priority of Government, and therefore the first priority of Ofcom. This is all the more relevant as I pick up the Communications Act 2003, in all its weightiness, where we find the general duties of Ofcom in section 3: “It shall be the principal duty of OFCOM, in carrying out their functions—(a) to further the interests of citizens in relation to communications matters; and (b) to further the interests of consumers in relevant markets, where appropriate by promoting competition.” Security is not mentioned—national security or telecommunications security. During the evidence sessions, the argument was made, although I forget by whom, that security was a necessary part of furthering the interests of citizens in relation to communication matters.”
“My right hon. Friend makes an excellent point. This debate is important for the Bill and important for our new clauses. It is also important that the Minister clarifies what the duties and priorities of Ofcom should be. Having worked for Ofcom at a different point in its history, I can tell hon. Members that when there is, say, a complaint about the behaviour of somebody in the “Big Brother” household that is hitting all the headlines in all the newspapers, that attracts the sudden concentration of resource—unnecessarily, one might argue. There needs to be a counterweight, if you like, to those headline-driven resourcing bottlenecks, which would be either ring-fencing or reporting on how resource is being used to support national security.”