Dame Chi Onwurah
MP for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West · Labour · United Kingdom
“An extraordinary debate is going on right now inside and outside AI companies about whether the possibility of AI destroying humanity is more or less than 10%. The European Union is moving ahead with a comprehensive AI regulatory framework, but the UK continues to rely on existing regulation.”
“The Pope also highlighted how the billions of online digital twins constitute an unprecedented concentration of power in the hands of a small number of men. Among the many consequences of the 40 years of neoliberalism repeatedly called out by the Prime Minister is a libertarian attitude to technology.”
“But this stealth digital twinning violates the integrity, uniqueness and very personhood of our constituents and of all of us. Digital twins can take many forms, from content creation algorithms and deepfakes to chatbots that reflect aspects of our personalities back at us. It is particularly worrying when children are the target.”
“The automated version of our kids will grow with them, using the power of AI to target advertising and products at them, and worse. The Science, Innovation and Technology Committee has heard about some of the tragic consequences of online grooming by algorithms and chatbots—a vulnerable boy persuaded to kill himself; a vulnerable girl fed…”
“In the arts, entertainment and tech industries, many performers are agreeing to the creation and use of digital replicas as part of their work—think of ABBA Voyage. But performers increasingly encounter unauthorised digital replicas of themselves, which pose a threat to their career, livelihood and reputation.”
“Since then, deepfakes have proliferated. The hon. Member for Mid Norfolk (George Freeman) was shown crossing the Floor in Parliament to join Reform, to his constituents’ consternation and his own—it was a fake. Then there were the horrendous photos of naked women and girls that Elon Musk’s AI created on demand.”
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“The specialist base station chipsets are an important component, and if we can make them available at scale, which is something that we work on with our FAPI—our functional application programming interface—I think that will really help to fuel the diversity of equipment providers. That is one aspect. Another aspect—I am not sure how well it is coped with in the consideration of the supply chain—is diversification at service provider level. As I have mentioned, mobile operators are the main service providers for mobile services, but they partner with other providers, particularly ones that work in specialist environments. There is a particular type called neutral hosts that can offer multi-operator services.”
“Q I did have a question. I also wanted to say that I think Dr Bennett’s point is about transparency, but also about anticipation, responsiveness and a fast response regime. My question is to Mr Robson. You are the Small Cell Forum and you have put a big emphasis on diversity in the supply chain. I think you said—I do not want to put words in your mouth—that security requires diversity in the supply chain. You represent potential small providers. Is there anything that the diversification strategy needs to do that it does not do to better support the entry of smaller players? Julius Robson: Thank you for that question. I have mentioned chipsets, which are important, and lots of people have talked about software and open RAN.”
“I would say that all service providers are well accustomed to working with the level of security that the mobile operators and the regulatory regime demand, so we are happy with that. I just hope that we do not introduce new burdens with this legislation that stand in a way of diversification.”
“Q I would be interested to hear more about what is out of scope, because my understanding was that the Bill covered all aspects of telecoms security. Julius Robson: Just to make the point that you do not have to worry about every last resistor—components were mentioned—and every piece of equipment you have. As I pointed out, the radio airwaves themselves are also not secure. The whole system is designed to securely operate over an untrusted environment. In standards, we have the concepts of trusted and untrusted networks. Typically, you can operate your mobile network over the internet, which is considered untrusted. It is important that we recognise that paradigm.”
“We could talk about the arts subjects and the clampdown, or the influences, on the freedom of speech and the self-censorship there, but in the STEM subjects it is really very urgent that we give our universities good guidance on what subjects, what organisations and what people they can co-operate with in the China context. As some of the research has shown, in terms of what is going on in our universities, there are subjects that we perhaps should not be helping on. GAIT technology with Huawei is an example. What can GAIT technology be used for? Surveillance. Not always, but it is very important in surveillance when you cannot see someone’s face because they are wearing a mask or it is bad weather. We have to be very much more on the ball in that area.”
“I am more an expert on China than America, but nothing in the last couple of years has suggested to me that the Democrats will take a very much different position from the Republicans on the question of technology. I think they see it as a very great threat, as the Chinese have said. I think nothing will change there. On the question of academic influence, I really do not think we should underestimate that. I wrote a paper on it about two years ago and much of what I sketched out there exists. For that reason, if I may repeat the point I made earlier, a great deal of effort has to be made, particularly in the STEM subjects.”
“Q Can I just say that I had been a fan of the British Standards Institute for decades and am a more recent convert to RUSI? I start with a question to Mr Parton on behalf of Catherine West, which relates to the last point you made. As we know, the Government were moved to ban Huawei entirely from the network following US sanctions instigated by President Trump. What changes do you see the Biden Administration having on the US’s outlook on China, if any? Can you also squeeze in a reference to Chinese influence on academic research and development in this country? Then I have another question for Dr Steedman, which I will ask afterwards, if I may. Charles Parton: A very quick response to that.”
“And the BSI represents the UK in ISO/IEC JTC 1 and in and the European regional organisations, including ETSI. So there is a big opportunity for us to take those lessons that we have learned in influencing these great international organisations and extend that policy of influence through co-ordination of the UK voice in other spaces. The ORAN-ALLIANCE is one example of where we need to improve our co-ordination. Who is going to pay for it?”
“Our ambition, on the diversification taskforce, is to look to co-ordinate UK voices, which are currently fragmented in these multiple organisations, and to see what we can do to target, to focus, on the areas of standards development that we know are going to support the ambition of security, resilience and diversification in the UK—and, frankly, to allow other areas of standards development to carry on as they will. People write standards to suit themselves. But where we need formal standards to support a market structure in the UK, we must be absolutely sure that those standards have had UK stakeholder voices in the process, and that is part of the formal process. You mentioned the ITU-T. That is where the DCMS, of course, is representing the Government.”
“We need to pick those organisations that are doing the critical work, particularly perhaps the ones around security, and ensure that we have British voices in there. It is true that if you look at a consortia model, you will find that the consortia that develop standards are what we call pay to play: companies pay to join a consortium, and together they sit and write a standard. But actually there are other organisations that have more governance and more formal mechanisms for national representation, national voice and consumer voice, as well as industry voices. This spectrum is the piece that is often not well understood.”
“As I said, I am a massive fan of standards development. I have worked in the area, with the ITU. I agree that it is essential to enable open RAN and diversification. The Government have said that standards are driven by vendors. We heard this morning from the network operators that their standards presence was driven by their headquarters—their owners. We do not have a UK vendor. When you say that we need to improve our presence in standards bodies, who is going to do that and how is it going to be funded? Dr Steedman: Actually, we have excellent people in the UK who participate in international standards work. The challenge is that there is a huge breadth of organisations, fora, consortia and formal bodies that generate, develop and maintain the standards that are then used in the evolution of the equipment—hardware, software and so on.”
“We should consider a number of areas to address that, some of which have already been raised by the hon. Member for Stroud and my hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston. We should consider a requirement for companies to know their customers’ identities. Contrary to the Government’s position, requiring users to selectively share their identities with online platforms does not mean that users share their identities with the world at large. Platforms can still protect users’ anonymity on the public platform while having direct access to their identities in the event of harmful behaviour.”
“Why should we not reveal on the internet as much of our identity as is appropriate to the situation? In some ways, as well as a question of principle, this is a question of design, on the way in which permissions and information are required and set out for applications on the internet. It is up to the Government to support a debate about how a spectrum of identity and anonymity should be implemented. A key aim should be to increase the friction that cyber-criminals face when pursuing crime. I do not think anyone is arguing that putting in place identity requirements and appropriate measures to support identification will end cyber-crime or cyber-abuse, but it would increase the friction associated with the crime, and that would help to reduce it.”
“For example, people should be able to prove who they are when they need to. Companies, services and Governments have a right to ask for identity in certain circumstances, as we do in the physical world. Anonymity should not be treated as a zero-sum concept, but should be qualified by the question, “Anonymous to whom and for how long?” In real life, we can walk through a crowd without the people around us knowing who we are, but we accept that we are not permanently anonymous. If, for example, a police officer has a reason to review CCTV footage of the area, or we go into a bar and look young enough that we are asked about our age, we may be asked to prove our identity. We would not expect to be able to take out a loan or mortgage without proving our identity. Different degrees of anonymity apply to different situations in the real world.”
“As we know, however, the sheer scale of online abuse and extremism means that there is more that we could and should do. This is not a new issue. As I may have said in the past, my background before coming into Parliament was working in technology, particularly on the networks that now form the internet, for 20 years. The rights and wrongs of anonymity on the internet is a question that is as old as the internet itself, which we should remember is now decades old—it is no longer a rebellious teenager. Three years ago, I attended a conference held by Ditchley on our rights and responsibilities on the internet, and the right to identity was a particular issue. One of the things that I want to emphasise to the Minister is that, as well as considering the right to anonymity on the internet, we must also consider the right to identity.”
“It means a failure to look at victims of abuse online—young people, minority communities and our fellow Members of Parliament—and a failure to assure them that we will do better by them. It is a failure to stand by the victims in these horrendous examples. It does not have to be this way. Protecting whistleblowers does not need to come at the cost of protecting people who perpetrate abuse. We could do things differently. Indeed, there are already legal provisions that seek to balance anonymity and online responsibility. Norwich Pharmacal orders, or NPOs, can help obtain the identity of a party in court cases where there is alleged wrongdoing. The regulations in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 give public authorities the ability to access communications data for potential criminal investigations.”
“They are free and widely available, and they allow communication across generations, geography, countries and all kinds of barriers. Simply banning online anonymity is unlikely to be workable or desirable. We have to be sensitive to the trade-offs here. Protecting privacy is as much a priority in those cases as protecting against harm is in abuse cases. However, I would say to the Minister that inaction is the worst trade-off of them all. The Secretary of State said: “It is a challenging area, this point about anonymity,” and that the Government will do nothing on it in the proposed online safety Bill, “But of course we will continue to keep it under review.” —[ Official Report , 15 December 2020; Vol. 686, c. 157.] The Government are evading tough trade-offs altogether. That inaction means turning a blind eye to misinformation online.”
“We know from several colleagues, from the valuable testimony of groups such as the Antisemitism Policy Trust, and from painful personal experience that online anonymity too often accompanies online abuse. Like almost all Members of Parliament, I have experienced abuse online, particularly when I dare to say something that some people might consider to be controversial. I have never been able to find out who was behind the most violent instances of such abuse. As the Government note, there can be trade-offs in regulating online anonymity. Anonymity can be a shield for brave whistleblowers, for victims finding online refuge, or for children and minorities finding courageous self-expression. We must not forget that the internet and social media applications have many positive consequences for people who can use them.”
“We do not have to rely on academic work or the OECD to know the pain and harm that online anonymity can cause. The hon. Member for Stroud set out some of her experiences, and I would just like to say how sorry I was to hear of them. My hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston (Justin Madders) set out some of his experiences with Twitter, and it is highly regrettable—it is not the first time I have heard it—that Twitter does not take complaints from Members of Parliament or members of the public seriously enough. Just last month, we heard the strong testimony of my right hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Dame Margaret Hodge), who highlighted over 90,000 posts aimed at her. Many were antisemitic, misogynistic and ageist, and many were posted by people hidden behind anonymous screens.”
“Member for East Hampshire, who is aware of the challenge of online anonymity for bullying and negative self-perception among young people. He has spoken often about that, and he noted that in 2018 the OECD found that English schools have the highest reported rates of cyber-bullying out of 48 countries. As we debate online anonymity today, we have to keep in mind the deeply troubling human impact that anonymous presence online can have, not least on our young people. The Government ought to know about the challenge of online anonymity, because their own Commission for Countering Extremism published academic work in 2019 that noted: “Increased anonymity is associated with increased extremist …language” on Twitter and YouTube. Tackling abuse and extremism online must mean tackling the worst parts of anonymity online.”
“It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship for the first time, Ms McVey. I look forward to doing so on many further occasions. I thank the right hon. Member for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds) for securing this exceptionally important debate. I also thank the hon. Member for Stroud (Siobhan Baillie) for her opening remarks, which were more than those of a stand-in. They set out the concerns and the personal experience really well and illustrated why this is such an exceptionally important topic to debate. I am sure that many more Members would be here had it not been for the confusion about whether this debate would be taking place. I know that this is an issue of personal, professional and constituency concern to many Members on both sides of the House; it is not a party-political issue. I want to start by citing the right hon.”
“I want my constituents to be able to have trust and confidence online, and in those they meet and engage with online. I want them to feel secure in their online and digital lives, because without that they will be handicapped and prevented from engaging as full citizens in what is increasingly a digital world. I ask the Minister to ensure that that digital world is as safe for everyone as the real world is.”
“Platforms would be able to verify users easily, law enforcement authorities could pursue justice appropriately, those hiding online abuse behind anonymity would be deterred and, most of all, users would navigate online platforms with far greater assurance of no abuse or extremism. With that final point, I will close, because the pandemic has demonstrated that our lives are lived online to an extent never before seen. Even when we return to social contact—we all hope soon—as opposed to social distance, the internet, the web and social media platforms will continue to play a greater part in our lives. The hon. Member for Stroud set out the enormous increase in online activity that we have seen as a consequence of the pandemic.”
“Should Ofcom’s oversight of platforms’ duty-of-care performance cover how effectively companies work with law enforcement authorities? I understand, for example, that Twitter charges law enforcement officials to provide information on the identity of its users. Will the Minister verify that? Thirdly, what confidence do we have in the jurisdictional coverage of existing and potential identity verification requirements? Do those apply to the range of internationally headquartered and popular platforms, or are Facebook, YouTube, Instagram and Twitter able to evade coverage as a result of country-of-origin principles? I hope that the Minister will answer those questions, as the right answers could materially improve our public sphere and address the examples of online harm and abuse that have been raised in this debate.”
“Inaction, which is the Government’s current default of delaying action in this area, is a choice that evades trade-offs, avoids actions and lets victims down, so I ask the Minister to use this moment to tackle online anonymity head-on. We must grasp this opportunity, and to do so we must answer three questions. First, what is the right identity verification required to place on online platforms with user-generated content? Can we ensure that those cover what might be needed for effective action against illegal and, in some instances, harmful behaviour? How can those requirements on platform companies have impact, with the right mix of incentives and sanctions for companies? Secondly, how can we ensure that those online platforms are best co-ordinated with law enforcement authorities, where needed?”
“None of them would require companies to identify customers on their platforms to other customers. Some of them would not even require companies to have the identity data themselves, allowing the possibility of secure identity solutions held outside of these companies. Some of them are likely to be practices that already happen, but voluntarily and not systematically. The point is not to pursue one specific policy. The point is for the Government to have a consultation and a debate that sets out policies that achieve those objectives, with a robust set of sophisticated digital identity options that can be statutorily enforced.”
“Perhaps she will tell us why she does not feel a more proactive duty to prevent and deter harm and abuse would not be appropriate, as it would require platforms to know their customers. It is important to recognise that people are always customers. Even if those who use Twitter and Facebook are not paying for the service, they are still customers and are effectively paying in an exchange of data, so I feel that the model of “know your customer” is particularly appropriate. We could also consider imposing appropriate forms of liability on companies in the event that they are unable to provide identity information where courts and law enforcement require it. None of those policies would obstruct the privacy of whistleblowers, children expressing themselves or victims finding solace and solidarity online.”
“At the same time, identity would be available to relevant law enforcement authorities in the event of suspected wrongdoing. The very act of requiring a “know your customer” check would also deter malicious agents from using the cloak of anonymity and would therefore increase the friction in the system. As a complement to those ideas, we could require platform companies to put up deterrents against abuse and harm, ensuring that customers know that their identity could be shared with law enforcement agencies in the event of wrongdoing. I know that the Minister’s online safety legislation, which is in development, will put a duty of care on the large platforms.”
“There are real concerns about the consolidation and monopoly control of data, which are not within the remit of this debate, but, as he suggests, the idea that these organisations cannot obtain and protect effectively the identity of their users is clearly ridiculous. Such checks would not even require platform companies to hold user identity data themselves. Instead, as in financial services, secure, expert identity verification services could allow users to share only aspects of their identity—the minimum required to access online platforms. Again, anonymity would be guaranteed relative to other users. The fact that my bank did a “know your customer” check would not mean that my bank data was suddenly accessible to other customers. I think we accept that principle.”
“My hon. Friend makes an excellent point, and one that I was just about to make by citing the “know your customer” verification requirements in financial institutions, which are part of efforts to prevent money laundering, for example. Financial institutions, although they have improved immensely in technology over the past few years, are nowhere near as knowledgeable as the great tech giants such as Facebook, Twitter and Google in scooping up and managing data, although they tell us that they manage the data in privacy-conscious ways. As my hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston said, their business models are driven by access to data.”
“I did not mean to interrupt the Minister in full flow; indeed, I am grateful for the way in which she is responding to the many issues that have been raised. There was an exchange today about whether or not exceptions to the online harms legislation would be enabled through trade deals with the US, for example, and there seemed to be some confusion over that. I wondered whether the Minister would like to take the opportunity to clarify that point.”
“I thank the Minister for giving way again, and thank her again for the tone in which she is responding to issues. May I summarise the position—without putting words in the Minister’s mouth—by saying that online anonymity is not currently directly addressed in the proposed legislation, but it could be if there was thought to be sufficient reason to do so? Is that a fair summary?”
“What steps her Department has taken to help tackle the disproportionate effect of the covid-19 outbreak on black, Asian and minority ethnic communities.”
“The disparities impact report did not say that race was not a factor. What it actually said was that data were not being collected. Has the Minister ensured that ethnicity data, including on test-taking, positive tests, vaccinations and deaths at a national and regional level, are being collected to enable the robust monitoring of the impacts of covid-19 on black, Asian and minority ethnic communities? If she has, we will see whether her deep-rooted reluctance to acknowledge the role that structural racism plays is actually justified.”
“As a proud Unison member, I ask the Secretary of State to join me in congratulating Christina McAnea on being elected the first female leader of the country’s biggest union. Many of Unison’s members effectively work for the Secretary of State, including care assistants, hospital porters, nurses and cleaners, and they are now under huge stress and facing mental and physical challenges that we, fortunately, cannot imagine. Does he agree with another recently elected leader, Joe Biden, who said to health workers:“It’s not enough to praise you. We have to protect you, we have to pay you.””
“As a city of sanctuary, Newcastle seeks to support those fleeing war and persecution, but all too often the Home Office places them in accommodation that is unsuitable, inadequate or plain disgusting, and where they may be targeted by far-right groups, as happened recently in Newcastle, and then leaves them for months or years without proper consideration of their case, at great cost to the mental wellbeing of those who are already vulnerable. Am I right to think that the Minister’s solution to this is now to arbitrarily reduce the cases considered, rather than actually fixing the process?”
“Of the £5 billion of new online spend resulting from the pandemic, 40% has gone to one website, Amazon. Many small businesses are afraid that they will not make it through the winter because of a lack of Government support, and they have Brexit and climate and technological change to deal with too. So I want to ask the Minister this: what is the plan for small businesses to survive covid and build back smarter and greener? I am talking not about vague promises, but about firm commitments to help businesses invest in new technologies, which Make UK has called for, or to target procurement to support net zero businesses, as the Institution of Civil Engineers proposes. Or are the Government just going to let business down again?”
“I hope the Secretary of State recognises the sacrifices Geordies have made to successfully reduce transmission rates here, but I want to ask about vaccine prioritisation. Public Health England has reported that those with learning disabilities have covid-19 deaths up to six times higher than those of the general population, and it is obviously extremely difficult to maintain covid-security in care homes whose residents cannot understand social distancing, yet I am told that they are being deprioritised for the vaccine because JCVI guidelines prioritise care homes for the elderly only, and that is interpreted as being those over 80. Can the right hon. Gentleman confirm whether that is the case, and will he give greater flexibility to local public health authorities to reflect risk?”
“I do not want to anticipate what the Minister will say, but he has said, with regards to similar amendments, that stating that the Secretary of State will do something does not mean that he definitely must do it. Does my hon. Friend agree that for the sake of clarity—for us in Parliament but also for businesses, particularly those affected by this—changing that one word would greatly improve the understanding of how the Bill will work?”
“It is an honour to serve under your chairship again, Mr Twigg. I detect a slight rise in temperature, at least on this side of the Committee Room. I do not know whether that is due to the heated exchanges over “may” and “should”—”
“It is because we recognise the importance of the clause that we wish it to have some effect in law, as opposed to being the gentle suggestion it seems to be at the moment.”
“Warm exchanges. It is certainly something to be welcomed. I would like to say a few words to clause 53 stand part. As my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Test observed, this is another example of a “may” rather than a “will”. The clause exists purely to enable the Secretary of State to make regulations—that is its function—and yet it places no requirement on the Secretary of State to do so. While the Minister gave a warm response, saying that he and my hon. Friend are on exactly the same page and so on in our desires, I remind him that the Bill is not about our desires; it is about a legislative framework that protects our national security and gives, as much as possible, clarity and certainty to those impacted by it.”
“I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 54, page 34, line 9, leave out “which appears to the Secretary of State” and insert “which, on a reasonable enquiry, appears to the Secretary of State”. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to only share information, acquired in the course of national security reviews, if the Secretary of State has first undertaken reasonable enquiry.”
“The amendment seeks to address the wide definition of the overseas public authorities to which the Secretary of State might disclose information. The Minister has previously asserted that Labour Members are looking to give more and more powers to the Secretary of State, but here we wish to help the Secretary of State, which is the motive behind all our amendments. We wish to aid the Secretary of State by somewhat subscribing the persons or organisations with which he—in this case, at the moment, the relevant Minister is a “he”—is allowed to share information, by inserting in clause 54 the words “which, on a reasonable enquiry, appears to the Secretary of State”. Therefore, the amendment would not simply leave the process open, as it were, to appearances only, without any inquiry.”
“In clauses 54 and 55, we consider the disclosure of information by the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, and, in clause 55, information held by HMRC. Clause 54 specifies the circumstances in which information may be disclosed. Subsection (1) provides an information gateway for public authorities to disclose information to the Secretary of State for the purpose of facilitating the exercise of his function under the Bill. Subsection (2) permits the Secretary of State to disclose information received under the Bill to any UK or overseas public authority for specified purposes. Subsection (9) states: “‘overseas public authority’ means a person in any country or territory outside the United Kingdom which appears to the Secretary of State to exercise functions of a public nature”.”
“We recognise the importance of that, and we do not want to hinder it unduly, but we expect that the Secretary of State should, and importantly, should be seen to, exercise those powers on the basis of evidence. It is only right that we have clear evidential requirements. Although the 2002 Act uses similar language, it is right that we in this Committee clean up that language based on 19 further years of experience.”
“For example, Chris Cummings from the Investment Association said: “There is so much around any investment process and the acquisition process that has to remain entirely confidential, that investors would require and would be looking for reassurance that these conversations could be held in the strictest of confidence and that nothing would appear until the right time.” –– [ Official Report, National Security and Investment Public Bill Committee, 24 November 2020; c. 66, Q78.] I ask the Committee to consider whether sharing data on the basis of appearances gives that reassurance. The clause will give information-sharing powers to the Secretary of State.”
“Under it, the Secretary of State would have all the relevant powers of data sharing with relevant persons so long as the Secretary of State had reason, based “on a reasonable enquiry”, to think the person to be a relevant public authority. It is critical that the UK has a national security regime that is grounded in national, competent exercise of state power to protect our security. The amendment would help to build success in that direction by removing a reliance on the use of appearance and instinct, by successive Secretaries of State, and grounding decisions in “reasonable enquiry” instead. The expert evidence sessions provided support for that view.”
“I hope the Minister also agrees that we are moving to a much expanded national security screening regime. In 2002, Facebook was a year old or just being born. We are no longer in the place we were in 2002 when it comes to the issues of importance, volume, security and privacy associated with data and data sharing. I hope he will not rely on the 2002 Act as a justification, particularly as we are moving to an expanded national security screening issue and we are in a different data environment. The strategy says that data is the economic engine, and we must be much better in assuring businesses and investors of their data protection. Instead of relying on appearances, the amendment holds up the standard of reason.”
“I anticipate that the Minister will talk about the language in the Enterprise Act. Not only is that 18 or 19 years old, which is one reason that this Bill has been needed for so long, but the person exercising the functions and powers in the Competition and Markets Authority is not a political appointee or political figure. The Bill refers to a political figure, the Secretary of State, so it is all the more important that he or she should be seen to act on the basis of evidence, not on the basis of appearance or instinct.”