Dame Chi Onwurah
MP for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West · Labour · United Kingdom
“An extraordinary debate is going on right now inside and outside AI companies about whether the possibility of AI destroying humanity is more or less than 10%. The European Union is moving ahead with a comprehensive AI regulatory framework, but the UK continues to rely on existing regulation.”
“The Pope also highlighted how the billions of online digital twins constitute an unprecedented concentration of power in the hands of a small number of men. Among the many consequences of the 40 years of neoliberalism repeatedly called out by the Prime Minister is a libertarian attitude to technology.”
“But this stealth digital twinning violates the integrity, uniqueness and very personhood of our constituents and of all of us. Digital twins can take many forms, from content creation algorithms and deepfakes to chatbots that reflect aspects of our personalities back at us. It is particularly worrying when children are the target.”
“The automated version of our kids will grow with them, using the power of AI to target advertising and products at them, and worse. The Science, Innovation and Technology Committee has heard about some of the tragic consequences of online grooming by algorithms and chatbots—a vulnerable boy persuaded to kill himself; a vulnerable girl fed…”
“In the arts, entertainment and tech industries, many performers are agreeing to the creation and use of digital replicas as part of their work—think of ABBA Voyage. But performers increasingly encounter unauthorised digital replicas of themselves, which pose a threat to their career, livelihood and reputation.”
“Since then, deepfakes have proliferated. The hon. Member for Mid Norfolk (George Freeman) was shown crossing the Floor in Parliament to join Reform, to his constituents’ consternation and his own—it was a fake. Then there were the horrendous photos of naked women and girls that Elon Musk’s AI created on demand.”
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“Q Absolutely. I appreciate the response and I would like details of the Soviet case of the military-industrial complex that was dismantled, which you mentioned. That would be interesting to compare. You have talked about the relationship between the military-industrial complex, in the case of Russia, and economic development, specifically in the case of China. We have essential industries that are critical to our economy and there has been concern that BEIS is going to be overseeing the security implications. Where we have industries and technologies that are critical for national security, they are also critical for our economic security, so our national and economic security end up being linked. You have talked about some of those links in the case of Russia and China. How can we reflect those links effectively in the Bill?”
“The purchase was caught by a Government staffer who happened to notice on his LinkedIn account that somebody whom he knew, who had partially run 3Leaf, was now listed as a consultant for Huawei. That transaction had to be reviewed and retroactively unwound. At that point, of course, one must assume that the bulk of the damage had been done, but it goes to show the importance of having not just one agency looking at these cases and being responsible; a multiplicity is needed across the piece. If I have any concerns with the Bill, my primary concern would be that the institutional capacity and resources behind the review regime are not made clear.”
“The idea behind this is that—hopefully—any decision made will be viewed by the public as one that is truly based on national security concerns because of the debate that had to take place behind the scenes. That lowers the risk of politicisation and intervention, and again heightens the possibility of actually catching risky transactions in a way that otherwise can be difficult. One of the great examples of transactions in the US caught not originally in the regularised monitoring process, but by a CFIUS employee in one of the agencies, was the unwinding in 2011 of Huawei’s purchase of 3Leaf, which was a US-based cloud computing technology company that had gone bankrupt. The assets, employees and patents had been purchased by Huawei—bankruptcy assets were not consistently monitored by the regime at that time.”
“One of the key elements of CFIUS that has been very positive is that, as it has evolved, it has brought in more agencies, not less, so you have multiple opinions on the same potential transaction being brought to light and discussed before any decision needs to be taken by a Secretary or Head of State, depending on the question. In CFIUS, that responsibility ultimately lies with the President, but the idea is that you have had a multiplicity of views and, under the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernisation Act—the most recent update of US legislation—you have an ensured national security risk assessment made by the head of intelligence on detailed investigations of certain transactions.”
“However, in the US with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, the idea behind having a multi-agency review body with multiple agencies and Departments across vast areas of Government is that you have the ability for regularised monitoring and feed-in from these agencies across the spectrum of possible threats, and you have dedicated staff within those agencies who have the necessary security clearances, training and specialised knowledge over time to keep an eye on potentially risky transactions and bring them to the awareness of the lead agency.”
“I think one of the most important elements of regimes as they have evolved—especially among the Five Eyes, but among our NATO allies and even in Russia and China—is the move to ensure that review mechanisms have the institutional capacity and resources that they really need behind them. Part of this institutional capacity usually involves a multi-agency review body of some type. There is always a lead organisation, and in the West—especially in the US, Germany and France—these tend to be in Treasury or in business or trade Ministries, and that lead body, like the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy in the Bill, receives the information and handles the day-to-day activity.”
“To answer it, I will first step back for a second and say that the Bill is a very important step in the UK’s alignment with its closest allies on this issue, and especially the Five Eyes, because there is clear evidence that states are trying to use the market and companies over which they have control and influence to gain economic, technological and even military power in foreign investment. During times of economic downturn and crisis when asset prices are low, the opportunities for that type of behaviour increase. Hence, we have seen these modifications to regimes not only in the West, but outside the West as well.”
“Q Thank you very much, Dr Lenihan, for putting your expertise at the disposal of the Committee. I am particularly interested in your expertise in the international aspects of the debate. As you are aware—the Bill responds to this—a number of the UK’s allies have national security and investment screening regimes, and almost all of them have updated their regimes in the light of the changing geopolitical and technological contexts. From your comparative work, what governance and decision-making structures have you found others adopting to ensure that all relevant Government expertise shapes national security and investment decisions? Are they appropriately reflected or considered in the Bill? Dr Lenihan: That is an excellent question.”
“There is a specific provision in FIRRMA, which is very clear that each of its agencies needs to hire under-secretaries in each agency just to be dedicated to this task. There are two elements. An inter-agency review team is needed. You need enough staff to actually handle and catch all the risks. You the need the proper resources to do so—the right access to the databases, the right security clearances, the right training. On top of that, the volume of mandatory notifications will be increased by the fact that this is not just focused on foreign investment. I do not think there is much you can do about the foreign cases that you will get. There will be a high volume of those, and you need to be ready for them, but it is an important national security risk that needs to be dealt with.”
“The EU framework for FDI screening encourages its EU members to adopt mechanisms that do not discriminate between third-party countries, but that does not mean that it takes the word “foreign” out of its legislation to target foreign investments as opposed to domestic ones. Part of that is about the volume of transactions. One thing I would highlight is that FIRRMA expanded the scope of covered transactions to include non-controlling investments of potential concern, as well as any other transaction or arrangement intended to circumvent CFIUS’s jurisdiction. But because it has had more cases to review on a detailed level in the past two or three years than in its history, since 1975, a major element of that Act is, again, around staffing and resources.”
“I am not sure why it is that we do not actually see the word “foreign” in the Bill, even though it is supposed to be based on foreign direct investment. Perhaps that is a concern about potential domestic threats down the road, but either way, it will lead to a much larger volume of mandatory notifications than most other national security FDI regimes—the US, Germany, Australia and other countries. Almost 17 have made changes in the past couple of years, and these have increased and been modified since the covid pandemic. I understand that the legislation may be written as it is to include domestic investors, perhaps to avoid appearing to discriminate against foreign investors. I would suggest that that is probably too broad a formulation for focusing on and identifying real risk.”
“Dr Lenihan: The Bill is arguably broader in scope on call-in powers than some other foreign direct investment regimes—I would argue that these perhaps even include the US regime—because it does leave wide latitude for call-in powers. The Bill also covers trigger events that are initiated by all investors, both domestic and foreign, and that is truly rare among Western FDI review regimes that are focused on national security. Usually, the concern is to focus the regime on investments from foreign-owned, controlled or influenced entities. Domestic entities and acquirers that have, for example, ultimate foreign ownership or influence in some ways should be able to be caught by any well-institutionalised and resourced regime.”
“Q Thank you, Dr Lenihan. That is absolutely fascinating. The need for different agencies to be involved needs to be recognised. In terms of your work on investments, and the investment regime, is there not a risk that it ends up capturing a host of investment transactions? I am particularly thinking of the burden and impact on our innovative tech start-ups. The likely definitions of the sectors to be involved include artificial intelligence and data infrastructure. Based on your experience of other countries’ introduction of new investment screening rules, have you found patterns in how similar changes have affected foreign direct investment, and potential trade deals, which is a topical subject? Do you have any thoughts on ways to mitigate the burden and impact, particularly on start-ups?”
“The volume can be much higher. It can potentially poison venture capital innovation. This is best balanced by not having a threshold for dollars, as you do with the no de minimis threshold, but then making sure that regulators have the ability to review these matters extremely quickly. The pace of investment in emerging technologies requires a very short timeframe. It is not like a large public company transaction, which has extended timelines. As long as one implements a very rapid review process and has the officials in Government to keep up with that potential backlog, I think those two interests can be effectively balanced.”
“Michael Leiter: Thank you for the question; it is quite a good one. It is one that the United States has struggled with, as have other countries and their regimes. We suggest a couple of approaches. First, one piece that I think the Bill does quite well—although there is a countervailing concern that has to be addressed—is not having a de minimis threshold, in terms of dollars. The Bill is quite strong in that regard, because as you note in your question, just because someone acquires a start-up company for a relatively modest amount—a few million pounds—it does not mean that that company and that technology does not have, or will not have, very significant national security implications. The flipside of that is, of course, that without the de minimis threshold, it becomes a far more difficult regime to manage.”
“Q Thank you, Mr Leiter, for joining us and sharing your extensive expertise with the Committee. I wanted to look at strategic and critical industry. There are a series of cases where nascent or strategically important industries might become critical to national security in the future, but they are important to industrial and economic strategy now. For example, it was not clear that there was a direct national security threat from Deep Mind’s artificial intelligence algorithms in 2014, but it is clear that the company was important for the UK then, and it is clear that artificial intelligence is important for national security now. That is reflected in the Bill. Based on other countries, how do you think the Bill can capture these forward-looking public interest or industrial strategy concerns within national security grounds for acting?”
“Another case where your Bill goes much farther than anything I have seen, and certainly much farther than anything in the United States, is in encompassing not just acquisition and investment in businesses but acquisition and investment in supplies, goods, trade secrets, databases, source code and algorithms, so it is tangible and intangible objects, rather than businesses. That scale is very difficult to predict, and if one is more in the mood for incremental change, so as to see how a Government can handle change, including those elements poses some real risk for management.”
“Even in CFIUS under FIRRMA, although there is not an increase in the overall number of long-form notices, in the short-form declaration process, there was an increase. That was relatively modest, an increase of about one third, so the US now reviews approximately 240 full cases, and about another 100 short-form. When you talk about going from a few dozen to 1,000, you have to be very sure that you have both the resources and the expertise to process that. I would be concerned by that.”
“Q To follow up on your point about notifications, the Government impact assessment for the Bill suggests that up to 1,830 notifications might come in each year under this new regime. I am concerned that they look at the impact on the acquirer, and they do not capture the fact that almost every start-up seeks capital investment at some point. What impact do you foresee on the overall UK investment climate, and what might FIRRMA and CFIUS changes lead us to expect in our case? Michael Leiter: This is very important. I was rather taken aback by two things about the Bill. The first is the projection of over 1,000 matters, going from the very, very few that the UK has traditionally had; this is an explosive increase in matters. I am concerned that no Government are ready for that rate of change.”
“I would also say that that for some of the companies that you mentioned there, while certain of their activities might well be included within the scope of this new Bill, it would be very difficult in certain instances to suggest that they had a direct impact on our national security. Of course, that would be up to the new investment security unit to determine, based on a full representation of the facts. If that unit was at all concerned, a procedure is set out in the Bill whereby it would be able to call for as much evidence as it felt was necessary in order to be able to reach a balanced determination on whether investment by an overseas entity did indeed constitute a real threat to our national security. I think that is the point here.”
“David Petrie: The Government have been very clear that the purpose of this legislation is to focus on protection of national security. The guidance notes they have issued, which accompany the Bill and are intended for market participants, are very clear on that aspect. I would suggest that probably all the factors you listed in your question extend beyond a simple matter of national security—if national security can be a simple matter; no doubt that this Committee has heard this afternoon about the difficulties associated with defining national security. Many of the factors that you set out there, important elements though they are to all stakeholders in a company, are not necessarily matters of national security.”
“Q Welcome, Mr Petrie, and thank you very much for placing your expertise at the disposal of the Committee. You have experience of mergers and acquisitions, and I am sure you will be aware that we have seen several transactions in this country—I will name GKN and Melrose, SoftBank and Arm, and indeed I will include the failed Pfizer-AstraZeneca case—where it appeared that the Government had no legal powers to secure jobs, pensions, research and development and key UK industries, relying instead on behind-the-scenes soft power. That created uncertainty and lack of clarity for investors. Do you think that is a problem for both Government and investors, and how do you think we could effectively tackle that gap?”
“As the Bill is set out and as the sectors in scope are drafted—of course, the Government will consult over the next month or so on those definitions and whether they should be adjusted or whether they are as wide-reaching as they should be—a business like that would be captured. The investment security unit and, presumably, the security services would have an opportunity to review whether or not to allow that to go ahead.”
“It is difficult to protect against the actions of malign actors, but critical infrastructure already has systems and processes, and invests heavily in capital equipment, to ensure that there is not an interruption of supply. The question would be the extent to which ownership of that asset physically gave the owners of the shares the ability to get in and interrupt supply. That almost implies mechanical breakdown or some deliberate and malign disconnection. Again, companies have cyber-security systems in place to ensure that critical infrastructure does not fail. The point you made was about whether suppliers of that sort of service to our critical infrastructure and their ownership should be subject to review.”
“I was struck by that example, in that it suggested that service had failed, or a malign actor had decided not to provide the necessary services to the airport. I think a broader question here is what might happen in reality. Those services would be procured through a commercial contract, which in turn would, presumably, be backed by insurance. If it were an absolutely critical service, I would expect that the airport would have a back-up system, whether power supplies or a parallel running system, as they do for air traffic control. There are commercial protections for the actual operating activities of critical infrastructure, which should work.”
“Economic security and national security end up being linked. Do you think that should be reflected in the Bill, and how do you think it can be reflected? David Petrie: I have read the impact assessment, which included that example. It is a difficult situation, as described in the example. In accordance with the way that this new legislation is drafted and the number and extent of the sectors that are regarded as mandatory—the sectors in scope such that their operating activities would require a notification of the unit—the example set out in the impact statement would indeed require screening by the investment security unit. The Government would likely have the opportunity to review a potential acquisition in that software company.”
“Q Thank you for your response. If we look at GKN-Melrose and, indeed, even SoftBank-Arm, we could consider that they had national security implications. I suppose the point is that there are essential industries that are directly critical for our economy, but that at first may not seem directly critical for national security because they are evolving technologies, as in the case of Arm and the ongoing takeover by Nvidia, or because they are indirectly critical as suppliers to downstream industries that support national security. Indeed, in the response to the Government’s consultation for this Bill, an example is given of the undermining of the functioning of an airport by a software manufacturer, which would be within the transport sector but would not necessarily immediately appear to be directly concerned with national security.”
“One of the suggestions we would like to commend to this Committee is something we have seen work particularly well in Japan, which considered a similar raft of legislation: a blanket exclusion for investment—not for takeovers, obviously, but for portfolio investment, where the investment industry wants to support unlisted or listed companies, and it is clear that there is not a desire to take them over, involve ourselves in the management of those firms, seek a position on the board or secure the intellectual property, but where we are just performing the role of long-term investor. That has been judged as being outside the scope of the legislation, but we commend that to the Committee as a practical step that takes forward the principles of the Bill and secures the “investability” of the UK’s investment landscape.”
“Certainty about those 17 sectors is particularly important as well. That is why we have wanted to maintain a really close dialogue with the officials—the team that has sponsored this Bill—to make sure that no inadvertent barriers have been erected to us deploying that investment in the right way.”
“The other is publicly available information, such as analysts’ reports—the type of thing that we as investors would look to receive and interrogate, and on the back of which we would then make an investment decision. We are really looking for whether the Bill helps make the UK more attractive; whether it helps us funnel savings into productive investment that can help companies grow, create jobs and so on; and whether it is adding to the legal certainty of our investments. You are right to ask about SMEs; our members who invest in higher-growth companies are really keen to make sure that the process is as friction-free as possible, and that there are no surprises. Being very clear about a pre-notification regime is especially important to us, as is something like the five-year review period that could come after a deal has ended.”
“We look for individual institutions that we regard as high-performing—that is, high-performing over a long period of time, because we are patient investors, tending to take a long-term view, unlike colleagues in other parts of the industry, who are more high-frequency, or looking at a two to three-year earn-out period. To help us do that, we need two things. The first is legal certainty around the investment climate here in the UK, so that we understand the rules of the game, so to speak. This particular Bill is helpful in establishing greater clarity about the rules of the game; we do have one or two caveats, but it is helpful.”
“They tend to be pension funds and insurance companies—institutional investors. Of that £8.5 trillion I mentioned that we manage, about 80% to 85% comes from institutional investors; the other 15% or so comes from retail: people on the high street saving in individual savings accounts and so on. Our view on the Bill is about how we can continue to do our work to help finance companies in the UK and internationally with the investment collateral that we can bring to bear. We do that in the two major parts of the market: listed companies and unlisted companies. Perhaps I can address the point you made about small and medium-sized enterprises. We make investments in unlisted companies—of course, small and medium-sized enterprises are not listed organisations—by developing an understanding of sectors and industries.”
“What do you foresee will be the overall impact on the UK investment climate, and in particular on the ability of our most innovative start-ups to raise capital? I am often told that access to finance is the key barrier to start-ups growing, and staying in the UK as they grow. Chris Cummings: Thank you; that is such a pertinent question. Before I address the substance of it, I want to try to describe the work of many of my members, which is broadly portfolio investments. They seek not to acquire a company but to invest, taking a very small stake—a fraction of a percent—of those companies. That provides an opportunity for those companies to receive the investment they are looking for, and enables us as investors to invest in a company, an industry or a whole sector in order to generate a return for the investors whose money we are managing.”
“Q Thank you, Mr Cummings, for sharing your expertise with us. We all recognise the importance of inward investment, and indeed of the Investment Association, to our economy. The impact assessment for the Bill estimates that up to 1,830 notifications might come in each year under the new national security and investment regime, but those numbers do not capture the fact that almost every start-up seeks capital investment at some point. The requirements to notify are put on the acquirer, but I would like your thoughts on the impact that may have on start-up companies. As part of that, I imagine it will be especially hard to hold merger and acquisition auctions while checking on the outcome of these processes.”
“The notification percentages are slightly different: it is 25% in the Bill, and 30% in the Takeover Panel, so ensuring that there was no accidental misalignment would be most useful.”
“We undoubtedly recognise the spirit in which this legislation is drafted, but Governments change, as does public opinion. The strength of this Bill is that it is focused around national security. Perhaps a definition of national security may go a little further in helping investors as well, because we could not really strike upon a catchy, well-turned phrase that defined national security, and have a reluctance to move away from national security; we would hate to see the Bill being widened into more public interest ability. A final point to note would be the interplay between this legislation and the Takeover Panel, which has a different and distinct role to play.”
“In terms of definitions, we find the Japanese definition quite attractive, and again we commend it to the Committee. It clearly differentiates out investors such as the ones we represent, who are looking to provide capital for a company and share in its success for the benefit of the investors whose money we manage, but are not seeking to take an active role in the management of those companies. We are not looking to put somebody on the board; we are not looking to intervene directly in day-to-day management decisions. Our relationship is with the board chairman and so on, in order to engage in a constructive and strategic discussion, but we stop short of securing assets or taking an active role in management. That is a system that works well. Turning to our caveats, I mentioned the five-year review period.”
“Q Thank you very much. I note your suggestion regarding the blanket exception for investment funds. I had two quick follow-up points: first, could you say how they would be defined in such a way that would exclude, for example, foreign sovereign investment funds and so on, which might give cause for concern? Also, you said you had a couple of caveats. I take it that is one; what is your other caveat? Chris Cummings: Forgive me: I noticed that I missed the point about mergers and acquisitions. We regard the pre-approval facility that officials have mentioned—I believe the last witness mentioned it, as well—which is a way in which the team responsible could be approached ahead of a deal being put together, as a very sensible, practical step forward, as long as confidentiality was absolutely rigorously maintained.”
“Further- more, when we think about the next generations—6G and 7G—the UK has the opportunity to lay the foundations to make us a leading telecommunications country once again. Let us remember that we invented both fibre and the web in the UK. I urge the Minister to obtain the political will and set out the plan that ensures our diverse telecoms sector has the confidence and the investment that it needs to grow and to lead the world.”
“I called for a communications Catapult centre, and for next-generation research and development projects. BT used to have a major lab, developing and looking far ahead at new telecommunications technology. Is the Minister considering something like that? Can he give us more details? I also called for support for standards development, to support interoperability. We have heard nothing about that. He needs to look at non-5G wireless technologies. What is the Minister doing to support those in all the regions of the UK? The UK has an opportunity to build a highly resilient, secure and diversified 5G network, unlocking opportunities for business and innovation across the country.”
“This is a good opportunity for many smaller UK firms, but it cannot be a one-off. What is the Government’s strategy to ensure that UK firms can forge strong partnerships with international firms? It takes investment as well as strategic vision to diversify our supply chain after so many years. I am afraid that both of those seem to be sadly lacking. Will the Minister take the chance to tell us today how much additional funding the Government will provide for telecoms research, development and innovation? At the same time, can he say how much will be going to the north? We have excellent science-based and technological opportunities to be found. Indeed, in March, as a constructive Opposition, I offered the Minister a five-point plan to help diversify our supply chain.”
“The decision to remove Huawei from the network was based on national security, exhibiting one of the many synergies between telecoms and defence, with many UK companies supplying both the telecoms and defence markets. For example, semiconductor fabricators II-VI, a north-east company based in County Durham, or INEX Microtechnology, in Sedgefield, provide critical infrastructure to both the telecoms and defence markets. We will see immediate action from operators to replace high-risk vendors and a long-term replacement strategy in UK 5G infrastructure, opening doors for businesses. Japanese firms such as NEC, which the hon. Member for Wakefield mentioned, have already agreed to set up a UK telecommunications centre to help provide immediate alternatives to high-risk vendors, providing NEC with a springboard into the European market.”
“We have to have a diversification strategy, not only to ensure the opportunities in different sectors and different parts of our country in terms of economic development, but to make that network secure. Where is the diversification strategy? How can we have a Bill that does one thing, which is to secure the network, that is so dependent on a strategy that does not appear to be mentioned? I turn to the opportunities in Open RAN defence and international collaboration. I thank the right hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan for the explanation of Open RAN. The market is estimated to be worth £47 billion by 2026 and the UK can gain a significant amount of that if we build on our existing strengths, such as compound semiconductors, radios and software for disaggregated networks.”
“The absence of any telecoms systems developers on the telecoms taskforce is a real loss, as is the lack of any representation for any organisation or person from north of Bristol. Can the Minister set out how he intends to ensure that we have a truly representative task force, able to make use of the talents and innovation throughout the relevant sectors and throughout the country? The Telecommunications (Security) Bill was published this afternoon. I have not had time to assess all its clauses in full, but it does not seem to refer to the diversification strategy that we are promised. The official Opposition welcome the measures taken to secure our network, but without the diversification strategy, our network will not be secure because we will be so dependent on perhaps two vendors.”
“I have put many questions to the Minister on this point, and he has confirmed that the Government plan to prioritise open source and Open RAN technologies, which the right hon. Member mentioned, as part of their plan to build market resilience. However, we still lack any clear strategy for the diversification of our telecoms infrastructure. Yes, we have the names of those on the telecoms taskforce, but no telecoms systems developers are among them. The Minister said that was because the focus was on cyber-security; I should say that while we are taking steps to hopefully secure our network, we need a network that is innovative, effective and resilient as well as secure.”
“I understand that they are happy to pass the cost of their mistakes, indecision and poor planning on to the operators, stating, for example, that the costs of removing Huawei are “commercial decisions that are for the mobile operators to make”— costs that the sector worries could top £7 billion and cause delays of up to three years to 5G roll-out, harming growth and innovation. We should not accept such a delay, which harms UK productivity and sends a message to innovators that they should look elsewhere. Can the Minister confirm that there will be no delay to the target of rolling out 5G to the majority of the country by 2027? The right hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan and the hon. Member for Wakefield were right to emphasise the opportunities of an effective diversification strategy.”
“That was a consequence of the industrial strategies pursued under the then Government, Thatcher’s Conservative Government, and under the current Conservative Government, with not enough having been done in the intervening Labour years. I agree with both the right hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan and the hon. Member for Wakefield (Imran Ahmad Khan) in their characterisation of the opportunities presented by 5G, which we hope can transform and bring broadband to every corner of our country—which is so much lacking now—and allow us to have real on-the-go mobile broadband, together with the opportunities presented by the internet of things and the vast increase in connected devices that we will see. That is why it is such a shame that the Government find themselves in such a 5G mess.”
“There has always been closeness between the north-east and Wales, and leading in the diversification of the telecoms supply chain would simply be another example of that. I should also declare an interest: as some Members may know, I worked as a telecoms engineer for 23 years before coming into Parliament, and my very first job was with a telecoms equipment supplier called Nortel—Northern Telecom—who, when I joined it, had just bought one of the last two British telecoms suppliers, that being STC; Marconi stayed around a little bit longer. It is a real shame that having worked for Nortel, and having spent my entire career in telecoms, I never went on to work for a British telecoms supplier.”
“It is a great pleasure to be here to serve under your chairship for the first time, Ms Eagle. I thank the right hon. Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Alun Cairns) for securing this really important debate, and it is a pleasure to have the opportunity to talk about such an important subject. I am very grateful to him for that, and for his opening comments: rarely have I heard a speech from the opposing ranks with which I agreed so fully, and almost entirely. I appreciate his comments about the importance of 5G and its opportunities; I also appreciated his reference to Dr Andy Sellars, who is making important advances in this area, and his comments on photonics in the north-east of England.”
“I appreciate the Minister’s comments and look forward, as always, to the publication of the Bill. Will the diversification strategy have the same legislative structure, content and meaning as the Telecommunications (Security) Bill? Will it have legislative power that is binding on the Government?”