YouSaid · the spoken record

Polyanskiy

lines on the record: 2,335
first: 2018-01-31
most recent: 2023-12-22
sittings or episodes: 300
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“That will mean nothing more than the assertions of our American colleagues that no one is doing more than they are to help the residents of Gaza, which is being destroyed by Israel with their assistance and silent consent. Instead, I will take advantage of the fact that this is probably the last open meeting of the Security Council this year, notwithstanding the vote, to thank Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, who are leaving the Council, and to welcome Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia and Sierra Leone, who are joining the Council for two years.”
2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source
“I will simply say that such actions grossly trample on the CWC’s consensus procedure for advancing candidacies, and those who organized this spectacle have taken a further step towards the definitive destruction of this once authoritative organization. We could provide many more unflattering facts for the OPCW today and mention the activities of the illegitimate Investigation and Identification Team. However, I will save the Council’s time, as well as my own, since first, I do not want to repeat things that are obvious and secondly, I do not see any point in wasting my breath in front of those who have long been putting together their anti-Syrian and anti-Russian statements and who are intent on continuing their shameful and mendacious show, which is harmful to the OPCW.”
2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source
“That was done under the strict control of the OPCW Technical Secretariat and with unprecedented assistance from States parties, as confirmed in 2016 in documents of the OPCW Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC. Everything else is simply opportunistic political speculation. Given the overall deep crisis in the OPCW, a consequence of its blatant politicization, it was no surprise that during the OPCW Conference of the States Parties a show was put on with roles assigned in advance, aimed at hindering the re-election of Russia to the Executive Council. I am not going to get into details.”
2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source
“The OPCW Director-General thus essentially has been given the power in the future to determine, at his own discretion, those countries that would allegedly be in violation of the CWC. In essence, Western countries have acquired yet another anti-Syrian toy that they will probably start playing with at today’s meeting. The statement of the United States representative is a confirmation of that. In that regard, I would like to underscore that insinuations that Syria has preserved its chemical warfare capacities are believed by only a limited number of anti-Syrian States. As is well known, Damascus fully complied with its obligations under resolution 2118 (2013) to eliminate its chemical warfare programme.”
2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source
“The decision of the Conference of the States Parties does not — and cannot— serve that aim. What is this other than another attempt to replace the norms of international law with certain rules that are tailored to a small group of States and convenient only for them? Syria’s foes in the OPCW are proposing to use the mechanism of the harshest sanctions, ignoring the fact that many of the substances from the annex to the United Nations document are actively used in agriculture and medicine. A ban on their supply would lead to further deterioration of the already dire humanitarian situation in Syria. Moreover, the decision stipulates the possibility of CWC States parties introducing any other restrictions against Syria in that area.”
2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source
“In their actions, they have also dealt a blow to the Charter of the United Nations. Indeed, by insisting on the adoption of collective measures in accordance with article XII of the CWC, they simply omit the fact that this article provides for the possibility of adopting collective measures exclusively in accordance with international law. And in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, the decision to fully or partially terminate economic relations with countries is the exclusive prerogative of the Security Council. The OPCW has no such mandate. Moreover, sanctions by the Council are not imposed in order to economically strangle an ill-favoured country, as the Western neo- colonialists seem to think. Rather, they are auxiliary tool for achieving a specific aim — the maintenance of international peace and security.”
2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source
“That includes the adoption at the twenty-eighth session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), held in The Hague from 27 November to 1 December, of a recommendation to impose collective measures against Damascus aimed at preventing the supply to Syria of the chemicals, dual-use equipment and technologies included in the annex to document S/2006/853, of 7 November 2006. That decision cannot be described as anything other than obvious arbitrary rule. It is telling that only 65 countries of the OPCW’s 194 members wanted to associate themselves with it. That is extremely indicative for understanding the crisis in the organization caused by the actions of Western countries that are gripped by anti-Syria and anti-Russian hysteria.”
2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source
“We had no illusions, however, that that would have any effect on the tone of statements by the United States and its allies today, since old and new fabrications about the involvement of the Syrian authorities in chemical incidents in their own country are the only thing they can use to try to justify their attempts to keep this topic artificially afloat in the Council. It is no secret that the OPCW and its Technical Secretariat have long been nothing more than an obedient weapon in the hands of a group of Western States, which now have to lay the ground for new anti-Syrian decisions.”
2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source
“In our view, discussing them once a quarter is more than enough. In that regard, the added value of today’s meeting is also highly debatable. The United States delegation, which pushed for its inclusion in our programme of work, failed to provide arguments as to why it was necessary to include it in the programme of work. Another report (see S/2023/926) of the Director- General Fernando Arias of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) is not too different from the previous ones. Among the changes, it is worth noting the reference to the twenty-fifth round of consultations between the initial Declaration Assessment Team and the Syrian Arab Republic — our Western colleagues have been criticizing Damascus for quite some time for their failure to hold it.”
2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Given that this is the last Security Council meeting in December — with the exception of the upcoming vote today — I would like to pay tribute to the efforts of the Ecuadorian presidency which, despite the extremely turbulent situation in the Council, has been able to decisively carry out its functions. I would also like to thank the Brazilian and Chinese presidencies of the Council in October and November, respectively, for respecting the time of Council members by not including in the programme of work meetings on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013), on which there has long been no substantive development. Our country, like a number of other colleagues, has long called for optimizing the schedule of Council meetings on the Syrian chemical file.”
2023-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9519 (2023) · source
“We are counting on the success of the operation. After all, as they keep telling us, the humanitarian needs in areas outside Damascus’ control in that part of the country remain high. In general, we are compelled to note that our Western and Secretariat colleagues do not dispute the need for such convoys, but they are still not working. We see no particular zeal on their part to work with those whom they cowardly call “the authorities on the ground” to rectify what is an absolutely unacceptable situation, which undermines the premise that aid to Syrians in Idlib must be delivered by all means possible. The conclusion to be drawn from all that is that our Western colleagues do not care about the suffering of the Syrians, just as they do not care about the suffering of the Gazans.”
2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source
“On 13 January 2024, the temporary authorization for the United Nations to use the Bab Al-Hawa crossing will expire. Its further fate is a sovereign decision of Damascus, as part of bilateral dialogue between the Syrian Government and the United Nations. In any event, it is our understanding that the humanitarian potential of the Bab Al-Hawa crossing should not be used by United Nations personnel from the Office in Gaziantep for spontaneous visits to Idlib that are not coordinated with Damascus. OCHA should report strictly to the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic on the matter. We know that the United Nations is planning to finally send a cross-line humanitarian convoy to the north-western regions of Syria by the end of the year — the first since the non-renewal of resolution 2672 (2023).”
2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source
“The mandate to monitor the negative impact of sanctions applies to the entire country team, including OCHA. The Secretariat’s internal guidance note, entitled “Parameters and principles of United Nations assistance in Syria”, which explicitly links reconstruction work in that country to progress on the political track, should have been withdrawn long ago. It is nothing but the Secretariat directly catering to Western anti-Syrian attitudes, which casts a shadow on the impartiality of all United Nations staff, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. On 10 November, the Syrian Government extended the authorization for the United Nations to use the Bab Al-Salam and Bab Al-Rai crossings for another three months — that is, until 13 February 2024.”
2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source
“The lack of adequate funding, political conditions for donor contributions, sanctions pressure from Western countries and, indeed, the overall prohibitively politicized approach to humanitarian operations in that Arab country are all causing the situation on the ground to rapidly deteriorate. We call on the United Nations country team in Damascus to develop a more effective approach to assisting Syrians in need in all regions of the country, without discrimination. The United Nations Resident Coordinator is now required to demonstrate political will and submit a report on the negative impact of unilateral sanctions on the situation in that country. That is the mandate of a Second Committee draft resolution, which the General Assembly adopted the day before yesterday, on 19 December.”
2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source
“It also mentions the need to strengthen cooperation between the Syrian Government and host States in order to facilitate the process of the voluntary, dignified and safe return to their homes and an end to their plight, in coordination with the relevant United Nations agencies. The same document notes the importance of ensuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all Syrian regions, without politicization. However, with regard to the humanitarian situation in Syria, the reasons for alarm are only growing. Humanitarians working in the country also perceive the situation in the same way.”
2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source
“That decision by the leadership of the Syrian Arab Republic, in addition to the 2022 amnesty, is intended to facilitate the return of Syrian citizens to their homeland. Furthermore, the Syrian Government has demonstrated its readiness to facilitate civil reconciliation through concrete measures and to work on the detained and missing persons track, thereby contributing to the implementation of resolution 2254 (2015). The joint declaration of the sixth session of the Russian-Arab Cooperation Forum, held at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, also mentions the importance of surmounting the refugee crisis and its consequences, which are being faced by the Syrians themselves and host countries.”
2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source
“The declaration mentions the desire to resume work on the Syrian constitutional track, with assistance from the United Nations. In that regard, we trust that Mr. Pedersen will provide assistance to the Syrian parties to find a new, mutually acceptable platform for the Constitutional Committee, without, at the same time, dispersing efforts in other areas that are not supported by the Syrians themselves. We remain convinced of the need to ensure the fundamental right of return for Syrian refugees, as stipulated in resolution 2254 (2015), with strict coordination of those efforts with Damascus. In that connection, we should like to note President Bashar Al-Assad’s decree of 16 November on a general amnesty for the country’s citizens.”
2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source
“They must understand the risks that directly emanate from such reckless actions. We strongly condemn the ongoing strikes on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic as a flagrant violation of Syrian sovereignty and the basic provisions of international law, including international humanitarian law. In the context of advancing a Syrian political settlement through resolution 2254 (2015), we consistently and unwaveringly support the resumption of the work of the Constitutional Committee, under the mediation of the United Nations. Support for that has also been voiced in the joint declaration of the sixth session of the Russian-Arab Cooperation Forum, at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, which completed its work in Marrakech, Morocco.”
2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source
“We note that in the context of the situation on the Gaza Strip, our American colleagues are actively exploiting the premise of self-defence and combating the terrorist threat, asserting without justification that that right is enjoyed not only by Israel, the occupying Power, but also by Washington and its allies, which are illegally occupying parts of Syrian territory, allegedly under the pretext of combating the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Al-Qaida. At the same time, the United States continues to deny Damascus both the right to fight the Security Council-listed terrorist group Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham in Idlib and the right to self-defence against arbitrary Israeli attacks. Given the circumstances, the silence of our Western colleagues is deafening.”
2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source
“The increasing number of raids by the Israeli Air Force on Syrian targets, in particular at the airports in Damascus and Aleppo, which serve as the main gateways for the entry of United Nations humanitarian aid into Syria, as well as the increasing exchanges of strikes on the Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel, have the potential to drag Syria into a full-scale regional confrontation. That cannot be allowed to happen. At the same time, existing challenges in the country persist and are worsening — the terrorist hotbed in Idlib, clashes between Kurds and pro-Turkish formations and instability in the south, including the United States-controlled area near Al-Tanf.”
2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary- General for Syria, Geir Pedersen, and the Director for the Humanitarian Financing and Resource Mobilization Division in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Ms. Doughten, for their briefings on the political and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. The unprecedented escalation and number of casualties in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict zone is causing additional tensions in the friendly country of Syria. Against the backdrop of Israel’s brutal military operation in the Gaza Strip and ongoing armed raids in the West Bank, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of forces and formations in the region.”
2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9517 (2023) · source
“Once again, we recall that the relevant Council sanctions resolutions do not provide for the transfer of confiscated cargo to a third party to be used as intended, and the EU leadership’s reference to its own internal decisions appears to be an outright slap in the face to the Council’s authority.”
2023-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9510 (2023) · source
“However, one regional organization, the European Union (EU), has in fact usurped the broad possibilities of a special regime for vessel inspection. At the same time, the activities of EU naval Operation IRINI are far from ideal. We have repeatedly indicated its low level of effectiveness, the selective nature of the inspections and its lack of transparency. Despite our warnings, the situation remains the same. The few instances in which IRINI has confiscated cargo raise many questions, including in the context of the Operation’s conclusions about the military nature of the goods and ways to dispose of them. IRINI’s command has been very loose in its interpretation of the conditions of the Libyan special inspections regime.”
2023-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9510 (2023) · source
“As regards the latter, we advocate a synchronized, balanced, gradual and phased withdrawal of all non-Libyan armed groups and military units without exception. If the potential for political consensus is not realized soon, the country risks repeating the unfortunate scenario of the previous decade. The most important issue on the Libyan agenda is compliance with the provisions of the territorial arms embargo imposed by the Security Council. We recall once again that that measure, like other sanctions instruments of the Council, is intended primarily to stabilize the situation in the former Jamahiriya. The special inspection regime for the open sea off the coast of Libya, introduced by Security Council resolution 2292 (2016), of which Russia was an initiator, also serves the same purpose.”
2023-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9510 (2023) · source
“Inclusiveness is indispensable for the political process to be a success — it should include all of the main Libyan players, including representatives of the former authorities. There is no time to waste, for the situation on the ground is far from stable. The window of opportunity is closing rapidly. The east of the country is still reeling from the aftermath of the devastating natural disaster that struck in September. Clashes among armed groups occur with alarming regularity. Against that backdrop, the activities of the 5+5 Joint Military Committee are key to deepening the coordination of the parties on the military track and to forming a unified security architecture, including on the issue of putting an end to the foreign military presence.”
2023-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9510 (2023) · source
“We believe that significant progress in Libya can only be achieved through the joint efforts of all Libyan stakeholders and influential global and regional players, with the United Nations playing a central role. We support the efforts of Special Representative Bathily, who is actively seeking solutions to the Libyan political crisis. A fundamental issue in that context is the organization of general presidential and parliamentary elections. We believe that holding them simultaneously would be preferable from the point of view of maintaining stability in the country. We firmly believe, however, that the organization of the electoral process should not be subject to additional conditions, nor should it exclude political figures who enjoy significant support from the population.”
2023-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9510 (2023) · source
“In that regard, it is important to continue working on formalizing the legislative framework for the electoral process between the High State Council and the House of Representatives. Unfortunately, those structures have not reached an agreement, despite the generally successful completion of the work of the joint 6+6 committee in late May 2023. We hope that the parties will soon be able to reach the necessary agreements. Libyans are tangled in a knot of contradictions, but they themselves must untie that knot. Without domestic political consensus on a legislative framework, any initiatives from international mediators or foreign States, particularly separate ones, will not work and will only lead to the further fragmentation of society.”
2023-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9510 (2023) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We would like to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, Mr. Bathily, and the Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan, who spoke in his capacity as representative of the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011), concerning Libya, for their briefings. Against the backdrop of the dual governments in Libya, the prospects for achieving a sustainable settlement are unfortunately not yet in sight. Holding national elections and the resulting creation of unified government institutions with fair representation of all Libyan regions is the only way to overcome the domestic political deadlock.”
2023-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9510 (2023) · source
“However, we hope that the overwhelming majority of Member States realize who really bears the responsibility for violating international agreements in that area.”
2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source
“We have repeatedly presented the Security Council with evidence of those facts, including material evidence, while the accusations that we have heard in the Council against Russia and other countries of supplying military-use goods in violation of Council resolutions have not been supported by any convincing arguments. By all accounts, Western countries are not yet ready to refrain from the harmful practice of flooding Kyiv with weapons, despite the damage it is clearly doing to their reputation in the world. The current tragic situation for Ukraine, which they worked for many years to create, is too useful to them. In any case, Russia is entirely capable of repelling any of the weapons being used against it.”
2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source
“Against that backdrop, we would like to remind the Council that the Arms Trade Treaty signatories and the countries of the European Union are obliged to prevent the weapons that they supply from being used to create threats to international peace, security and stability, violations of international humanitarian law, the commission of acts of violence, the escalation of armed conflicts, the commission of repression and genocide, and so on. However, contrary to those principles, Western countries have continued to supply weapons to a regime that has been using them to carry out attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure for many years.”
2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source
“That is far from the only example of how arms supplied to Ukraine, including small arms and light weapons, end up on the black market, to the delight of terrorist and criminal groups around the world. That was mentioned more than a year ago by President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria, who reported that his country’s authorities had found weapons intended for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the hands of extremists there. However, that is no surprise, given how profitable this dangerous business is for the United States and its allies. Their desire to fight to the last Ukrainian is simply being driven by the financial gain they are deriving from it.”
2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source
“Russia has repeatedly convened the Council to discuss the harmful consequences of flooding the Kyiv regime with arms, in violation of obligations related to the control of military-use goods. The risks that this creates are not specifically linked to the area of our special military operation but are rather relevant to large parts of the world. Western countries continue to supply Ukraine with arms, despite the fact that its leadership is simply unable to control the consignments and arsenals sent to it. Let me remind the Council how ammunition with the markings of a military unit from the Armed Forces of Ukraine based in Mukachevo in Zakarpattia oblast ended up on the border with Israel, as a result of which the Ukrainian security services, having come to their senses, conducted searches and made a number of arrests.”
2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source
“It does not include provisions regulating the re-export process for goods intended for military use, which means that the risk of weapons falling into the hands of criminals or terrorists remains. There are very serious questions about the application of the ATT in practice. There is a bitter irony in the fact that some States that are party to it continue to directly or indirectly supply military- use goods to conflict zones, resulting in an entirely self-contradictory situation. On the one hand, we are urged to accede to the Treaty, while on the other we are essentially being led to understand that its standards can be interpreted extremely selectively. In that context, we cannot omit to draw the Council’s attention to a subject that we have been regularly addressing in the context of the events in Ukraine.”
2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source
“However, the Russian Federation believes essentially that it is the sovereign prerogative of States to manage the circulation and stocks of small arms and light weapons, determine standards for ensuring their physical security, marking, accounting and inventorying, and decide on the methods and technology needed to destroy surplus arms. With regard to the calls for strengthening the role of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which entered into force in 2014, we feel obliged to point out that as an instrument it is extremely weak and simply not able to fully achieve its stated aims. For example, it does not contain direct prohibitions on the unlicensed manufacture of weapons or the transfer of weapons to non-State actors.”
2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source
“My country has consistently proposed specific measures that could facilitate the practical realization of joint efforts to stop the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons. They include introducing a universal ban on the transfer of all forms of small arms and light weapons to actors not authorized by the Governments of the recipient States; ensuring the strict regulation and direct control by States on territory under their jurisdiction of brokerage activities related to arms exports and limiting the number of such brokers as much as possible; introducing a strict prohibition on the re-export or subsequent transfer of imported small arms and light weapons without the written consent of the State that first exported them, meaning that having end-user certificates would be mandatory for arms export deals; and preventing the manufacture of small arms and light weapons on expired licences or without a licence from a country possessing the technology for its manufacture, including stopping the practice whereby countries that previously produced weapons under licence modify them slightly without the developer’s consent and then export them as their own product.”
2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source
“There are serious doubts about a number of the report’s recommendations, including those that have nothing to do with the subject of small arms and light weapons, such as recognizing sexual violence as a standalone criterion for the imposition of all targeted sanctions regimes. We believe firmly that State efforts to strengthen control over the circulation of small arms and light weapons should be aimed at building cooperation in the framework of the Programme of Action under the auspices of the General Assembly. It is simply superfluous to initiate discussions on the subject in the Security Council in the absence of a connection to specific violations of a Council embargo on the supply of weapons to individual countries and regions. That issue is dealt with effectively and very productively within the relevant Sanctions Committees.”
2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source
“We are frankly surprised that the concept note for today’s meeting (S/2023/954, annex), prepared by the Ecuadorian presidency, pays very little attention to the Programme of Action, especially in the context of the outcomes of the very successful meeting of the eighth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action, held in 2022, and the Review Conference of the Programme of Action to be held next year. A similar situation can be seen in the report of the Secretary-General on small arms and light weapons that was referred to today (S/2023/823), which includes unrelated initiatives alongside the Programme of Action.”
2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source
“We are consistently strengthening our national legislation in that area and are ready to share our experience in that regard. We support relevant regional initiatives in Africa and Latin America. Regarding the United Nations efforts in this area, the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects remains the only specialized global document on combating illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons.”
2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source
“The manufacturing of small arms and light weapons under expired licenses or without any licenses at all from the countries that own the relevant technologies continues to be a serious problem. Those weapons, as a rule, are exported to third countries, and the facts of such deliveries are carefully concealed. That lack of transparency objectively creates a risk of flows of weapons to undesirable end-users, including terrorists, illegal armed groups and organized criminal groups, as well as to countries that are subject to Security Council arms embargoes. We believe that all those problems require the closest attention. The Russian Federation has always paid considerable attention to the issue of control over the supply of military-use goods, including small arms and light weapons.”
2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source
“Often, international transfers of small arms and light weapons benefit non-State actors who have not received the necessary authorization from their Governments. Often, in the pursuit of profit, or even political expediency, the supplier does not think about where and for what purposes their shipment of small arms and light weapons will be used and in whose hands it will end up. Moreover, the numerous brokerage structures operating in the market do not demonstrate the necessary responsibility. States that have accumulated excessive stocks of small arms and light weapons are also not always selective enough with their small arms and light weapons supply. For them, selling their surplus is a profitable alternative means for their disposal.”
2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source
“Of all weapons, they cause the highest number of human casualties resulting from their use in combat. Terrorist and criminal groups are constantly expanding and improving their illegal arsenals of small arms and light weapons, and they are trying to realize their criminal objectives primarily in regions and countries with unstable military and political situations. Ultimately, the main victims of that are the civilian population. That is clearly evident in the examples of countries in various regions of the world — in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. Among the factors contributing to the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons are the excessively liberal national legislation in that area and persistent gaps and breaches in national export- control regimes.”
2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Under-Secretary-General Izumi Nakamitsu, Deputy Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Cécile Aptel and Executive Director of the Women’s Institute for Alternative Development Folade Mutota, for their briefings. The situation in the world clearly demonstrates the importance of controlling transfers of conventional arms and military-use goods, including small arms and light weapons. The risks of the proliferation and illicit trafficking of those weapons, and of them falling into the hands of terrorists and criminals, are growing every day. Small arms and light weapons remain one of the most widely used forms of weapons in regional and local conflicts.”
2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source
“Nevertheless, I can assure the representative of the United States that this story will, without a doubt, come to an end soon enough, and both the United States and other Zelenskyy regime apologists will not like the outcome — but it will happen whether they like it or not. What can they do? They have worked hard towards such an end and deserve it. I would advise that they prepare for it and draw the necessary conclusions as soon as possible, before the sinking Kyiv regime drags them down into its vortex.”
2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9501 (2023) · source
“Meanwhile, the American authorities have not lifted even a finger to free an American citizen who is being detained and tortured in Ukraine and who is in mortal danger. Has anything I have said bothered the representative of the United States at all? I am sure members will agree that it is very similar to the plot of a Hollywood action movie — during the finale, good and just forces must intervene and correct an intolerable situation. But life is not a movie. In real life, sometimes it is the villains who lecture others and feign to teach them about democracy and human rights.”
2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9501 (2023) · source
“Thanks to the popular American journalist Tucker Carlson, it became known just yesterday that journalist Gonzalo Lira, an American citizen who lived in Kharkiv and revealed the truth about the Zelenskyy regime in his blog, has been detained by the Security Service of Ukraine and tortured since July this year. The United States authorities have done nothing to obtain his release and have generally completely ignored his fate, despite repeated appeals from his father. I would like to once again summarize the current situation for the representative of the United States. The American authorities are shelling out tens of billions of dollars to a dictatorship mired in corruption, supplying it with weapons, including depleted uranium shells and cluster munitions, causing civilians to suffer.”
2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9501 (2023) · source
“Simply using Russian in public is grounds for punishment, despite the fact that its status as an official language is enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine. Here I would recall the arrest of the Ukrainian human rights activist and anti-fascist Elena Berezhnaya by the Security Service of Ukraine as far back as 16 March last year. She had repeatedly spoken at the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other international forums, but the fate of that 67-year-old woman remains unknown. Among those being persecuted are not only Ukrainian citizens, but also foreigners.”
2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9501 (2023) · source
“I have already mentioned the cancellation of the presidential elections and flagrant violations of the right to freedom of religion, in addition to corruption and nepotism. The Western media, however, is now rehashing those stories in various ways. Information has also come to light regarding the fight against dissent and opposition, including the ban on opposition media. All of those phenomena under the Zelenskyy regime have grown to unprecedented proportions, even for Ukrainians, and began long before the start of our special military operation. Thousands, if not tens of thousands, of people in Ukraine are being imprisoned and subjected to torture just for their beliefs and for simply reading the news in Russian or listening to Russian music, etc..”
2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9501 (2023) · source
“All of our colleagues at the United Nations who are following the narrative can see that for themselves and can see that there is no benefit or positive outcome for Ukraine from everything that is happening. As we have repeatedly warned, Ukraine finds itself a bargaining chip in someone else’s geopolitical game. One final point: perhaps some of our colleagues will be set on edge by the fact that we are referring to the head of the Kyiv regime as not only a Western puppet, but also a dictator. After all, it is clear that assisting dictators is not accepted in Western political culture — with the exception of that of the United States, which, as history shows, does not care who it helps — but they should judge for themselves how the situation stands in Ukraine with respect to democracy. We have seen more and more evidence of that of late.”
2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9501 (2023) · source
“Indeed, in order to convince America’s Congress of the need to allocate new volumes of assistance to Zelenskyy and his clique, United States officials have finally dropped their masks and discarded all of their apparently unnecessary verbal fluff about democracy, freedom, human rights and so on. They have finally told the truth, which is what we warned about from the very beginning: military assistance to Ukraine is a commercial project that benefits the United States, with 90 per cent of the allocated funds returning to the United States, including through job creation, tax revenue increases and the rearmament of the armies of the United States and its allies through the disposal of obsolete military equipment in Ukraine. That is precisely how it is being presented now, in an extremely cynical manner.”
2023-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9501 (2023) · source