YouSaid · the spoken record

Polyanskiy

lines on the record: 2,335
first: 2018-01-31
most recent: 2023-12-22
sittings or episodes: 300
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“The Technical Secretariat does not have any special prerogatives with regard to Syria’s initial declaration in accordance with article IV, paragraph 8, of the Convention. Contrary to Mr. Arias’s claims, the Convention does not grant the Technical Secretariat any right to apply more complex and politically motivated requirements regarding verification. However, that is what we are actually seeing. The more Syrians try to meet the Technical Secretariat halfway, hosting inspection teams in good faith and accepting intrusive verifications, the more criticism they receive.”
2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source
“We have yet to receive clear explanations from the Director-General about why the Technical Secretariat’s approach to the initial declaration of Syria is much stricter than towards other countries such as Libya or Iraq, which encountered similar problems yet were not barraged by the same amount of criticism as Syria, which joined the OPCW in exceptionally complicated circumstances of military and political instability and externally fuelled terrorism. Despite that, Syria complied with all its obligations in good faith, as the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council in June 2014. The fact that Syria’s chemical-warfare stockpiles were limited was confirmed by the Executive Council and the OPCW Conference of the State Parties in 2016.”
2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source
“Arias’s outright dismissive attitude shown during the June briefing towards two now former staff members of the Technical Secretariat, who, as fair and impartial civil servants should, were not able to accept outright forgeries and decided to shed light on the glaring manipulations in the conclusions of the Douma report. Contrary to Mr. Arias’s claims, both inspectors are highly qualified experts with a great amount of experience in the OPCW and were directly involved in the investigation of the Douma incident, of which we have documentary evidence.”
2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source
“They are biased in nature and pursue just one goal: not to paint a real picture of events but, rather, to make the facts fit the conclusions about Damascus’s guilt — in other words, essentially to carry out a political order. We therefore reject the conclusions on both the already issued reports of the IIT on Lataminah and Saraqib as well as any of its future so-called products. It is shocking that Mr. Arias essentially openly admitted that the OPCW technical criteria do not follow the CWC chain-of-custody methodology when conducting investigations and that instead it uses its own innovative methods of some sort. That is being presented not as a direct violation of the Convention but, rather, as a point of pride. We deplore Mr.”
2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source
“In practice, however, Mr. Arias and his team have essentially created the IIT themselves and developed its terms of reference. The OPCW Executive Council, in violation of paragraph 35 of article VIII, did not even consider any preliminary considerations in that regard. It was presented as a fact. What, then, is the strictly technical role of the Technical Secretariat of which Mr. Arias speaks? I want to emphasize that the Security Council has never delegated its exclusive attribution powers, as defined by the Charter, either to the OPCW or, of course, to its Technical Secretariat. It is not surprising that the reports of the illegitimate IIT were prepared in violation of CWC norms regarding methodology and data collection.”
2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source
“We believe that it is at the very least inappropriate for the Director-General to state that the calls contained in resolution 2118 (2013) to prosecute those responsible for the use of chemical weapons allegedly give legitimacy to the work of the so-called Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) established by the OPCW, in violation of article XV of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The decision of the fourth special session of the OPCW Executive Council in June 2018 only asked the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat to submit considerations for the involvement of external qualified experts with the relevant professional experience in OPCW investigations at the request of a CWC State party and in general to strengthen the secretariat’s capacity and means in order to better implement the Convention’s verification regime.”
2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source
“The Director-General was bold enough to assert that the Russian Federation initially agreed with the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (FFM) regarding the April 2018 Douma incident. In doing so, he selectively cited note No. 759 of the Russian Federation’s Permanent Mission to the OPCW, dated 26 April 2019. This is blatant fraud and misinformation because, in doing so, he omitted the main conclusion drawn in that note — that Russia insists on the staged nature of the incident because the analysis presented in the FFM report (S/1731/2019) does not allow for the conclusion that toxic chemicals were used as weapons.”
2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source
“Arias to the questions of Security Council members, and they were so blatant that we were forced to respond by circulating our arguments as an official Security Council document (S/2021/641). A similar step had to be taken by the Syrian delegation, in document S/2021/588. We call on all delegations interested in forming an objective view on the matter to study those materials. I will not go into detail now on all the contradictions we noticed in the statement of Mr. Arias. We expect to do that during the next briefing by OPCW leadership in the Security Council, which we hope will not be long in coming. I will mention only the most egregious ones.”
2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source
“Thomas Markram for presenting the ninety-fourth regular report (S/2021/692, annex) of the OPCW Director-General. Unfortunately, as is the case for previous reports, we cannot agree with many of the assessments contained in it. We were particularly surprised by the positive assessment of the June briefing by Mr. Fernando Arias, OPCW Director-General at the Security Council June briefing (see S/PV.8785). The report claims that Mr. Arias provided detailed answers to questions asked during the meeting. It is difficult to imagine a more absurd statement that would be further from the truth. There were so many inconsistencies and outright distortions in the responses of Mr.”
2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Like our American colleague, we would like to thank France for its successful presidency in July, and we wish you, Mr. President, the very best during your presidency this month. We stand ready to cooperate and pledge our help. We are especially grateful to you and your team for convening the Security Council today to discuss the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) in person. We are convinced that this is the most effective way to organize such a discussion. In the context of the Syrian chemical dossier, we believe that transparency is of fundamental importance, particularly given the line being pursued over the past few years by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Technical Secretariat. We also thank Mr.”
2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source
“The arms embargo, imposed in the initial stages of the conflict, now complicates efforts to rearm the security forces of the Central African Republic, which bear the primary responsibility for ensuring the safety of citizens. However, armed groups continue to replenish their weapons stockpiles through smuggling. We encourage Bangui to continue working to achieve the benchmarks of the arms embargo review so that, in a year, the Security Council will have every reason to lift it. For our part, we would like to assure the Council that Russia will continue to assist the Central African Republic, both in its national reconciliation process and in the strengthening and training of its security forces in order to stabilize the situation in the country.”
2021-07-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8828 (2021) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian delegation supported the adoption of resolution 2588 (2021), on the extension of the sanctions regime against the Central African Republic. We note that the Security Council responded to the legitimate request of the authorities of the Central African Republic to further ease sanctions. The simplified procedure stipulated in the resolution just adopted for the supply of 60-millimetre and 82-millimetre mortars for the needs of the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic is another step in providing support to Central Africans. At the same time, we would like to recall that the authorities in Bangui, supported by the countries of the region, call for the complete lifting of the arms embargo, and they have every reason to do.”
2021-07-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8828 (2021) · source
“We believe that it is important to pursue efforts to build an international consensus that favours resolving the Palestinian issue based on the two-State solution. We place special emphasis on the role played by the Middle East Quartet, which remains the only internationally recognized mechanism to support the Palestinian-Israeli process. We also highly value Egypt’s efforts to overcome the intra-Palestinian division, which is key to restarting the peace process. In that regard, we intend to continue efforts to bolster the activities of the Quartet. We call on our Quartet colleagues to take into account our well-known initiatives, including the convening of a ministerial meeting and consultations in an expanded format, with the participation of the States of the region.”
2021-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8826 (2021) · source
“Tackling them will no doubt contribute to stabilizing the situation. However, it is important to recognize that this kind of stabilization will not and should not mean that the international community should become complacent. Quite to the contrary, the events of last May confirm that, without movement towards a just solution to the Palestinian question, peace and stability will not be achieved either in Palestine or in the region as a whole. We believe that we should not lose sight of, or postpone until a more favourable moment, the task of reviving the political peace process, including relaunching direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations on all final status issues, based on the widely recognized international legal framework.”
2021-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8826 (2021) · source
“It is also very important to step up efforts aimed at offering assistance to the Palestinian authorities in overcoming socioeconomic difficulties. A particular influence on this aspect of life continues to be played by the coronavirus disease pandemic, with which the Palestinians cannot cope by themselves. In this regard, we are in favour of comprehensive humanitarian assistance for the Palestinians in the occupied territories and in neighbouring countries through United Nations specialized agencies, in particular through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, without politicization and without preconditions. The Palestinian-Israeli cooperation is of prime importance in this area. The challenges I have mentioned are urgent pressing tasks.”
2021-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8826 (2021) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to Deputy Special Coordinator Lynn Hastings for her briefing, and we carefully listened to Yudith Oppenheimer’s briefing. We believe that the main tasks for the upcoming period are to strengthen the agreements on the ceasefire and to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to all the victims, in particular those in the Gaza Strip who need it. Of key importance in that respect is that both sides show restraint and refrain from unilateral steps and provocative actions. This applies first and foremost to the forced evictions of Palestinians, the expropriation of houses and plots of land, the building of settlements, arbitrary arrests and any violence. It is important to guarantee respect for the special status and inviolability of the holy sites in Jerusalem.”
2021-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8826 (2021) · source
“For our part, we have always been and remain open to constructive cooperation with all the parties concerned. In particular, we should like to advise our colleagues on the Council against taking further destructive steps, especially with regard to supporting illegitimate candidates for the post of High Representative. Such short-sighted actions are only likely to complicate the internal political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, effectively undoing the achievements of the international community over the past 25 years, which would undoubtedly jeopardize the peace agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
2021-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8823 (2021) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We note with regret that today the Security Council was unable to adopt draft resolution S/2021/667, on the appointment of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the candidacy of Mr. Christian Schmidt was not approved by the Security Council. We have warned that any attempts by our colleagues to avoid involving the Security Council in this process are not only illegitimate but also dangerous. Therefore, following the resignation of Mr. Valentin Inzko, the post will remain vacant. There is no legal basis to what transpired. We call on the Western members of the Council not to exacerbate the situation and to return to normal and coordinated work in the framework of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council.”
2021-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8823 (2021) · source
“We hope that our colleagues in the Security Council will show the wisdom necessary to support draft resolution S/2021/667, thereby avoiding negative consequences concerning the appointment of the High Representative.”
2021-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8823 (2021) · source
“The Security Council continues to be involved in the post-Dayton peace process under Chapter VII and, in fact, in Bosnia and Herzegovina we hear those kinds of similar opinions. Guided by that and in the interests of strengthening peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Balkans in general, Russia and China have decided to put before the Council the draft resolution contained in document S/2021/667, which is aimed at eliminating the aforementioned illegal gaps and problems. As a gesture of goodwill and in the spirit of compromise, the draft foresees the final extension of the Office of the High Representative for another year while limiting his unjustified and essentially colonial type of powers.”
2021-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8823 (2021) · source
“The consequences of that decision could be unpredictable and quite dangerous. The positive achievements registered during the post-conflict period are now under threat of being destroyed. That kind of scenario, which no one would like to see, could be compounded by attempts to bypass the Security Council in appointing the new High Representative. We believe that the positions of certain representatives on the Steering Board are not sufficient for Mr. Schmidt to be considered as the new High Representative. The Dayton Agreement and the experience of the past 25 years demonstrates that the role of the Security Council in appointing a new High Representative is irreplaceable.”
2021-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8823 (2021) · source
“In a post-war situation, perhaps his role was justified by the necessity to reconcile the warring parties, but now the situation on the ground is completely different. The country has more than once demonstrated its sustainability, including as a non-permanttn member of the Security Council and the President of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, and no longer requires this kind of humiliating tutelage. Nevertheless, the High Representative is clinging to the role of tutelary authority that is inappropriate in all respects and continues to influence the process of the peace settlement, now in a negative way. That explains the lack of consensus among the Bosnian constituent parties regarding the appointment of Christian Schmidt of Germany by certain members of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council.”
2021-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8823 (2021) · source
“We are convinced that the goal of strengthening peace, stability, security and social development of Bosnia and Herzegovina can be achieved only through compliance with the fundamental principles of the Dayton Agreement: independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and equal rights for all three of its constituent peoples the two constituent entities with broad constitutional powers. It has been more than 25 years since the signing of the Dayton Agreement. During that time, the High Representative, who initially was supposed to play a stabilizing role in the country, has gradually acquired a complex web of powers and competences, including under the Bonn Powers, and has basically become a kind of unilateral czar and is allowed to “render justice” with impunity.”
2021-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8823 (2021) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation, as a responsible member of the international community and a permanent member of the Security Council, takes very seriously its responsibilities regarding post-conflict solutions and ensuring good-neighbourly intercommunal relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our country is a guarantor of the Dayton Agreement and a participant in the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council.”
2021-07-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8823 (2021) · source
“In our work, we will continue to consistently support close contacts with leading political forces from various regions in Libya and urge them towards compromise on key issues of the political process. We are ready for constructive cooperation with international partners.”
2021-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8820 (2021) · source
“We hope that the JMC will be able to agree as soon as possible on the opening of the strategic transport route between the west and east of the country. Another vitally important question today is the foreign military presence. We would advocate a gradual and coordinated withdrawal of all foreign forces and divisions from Libya. At the same time, it is vital to ensure that the existing balance of forces on the ground, which is currently preserving calm in the country, is not broken. We need to ensure that there is no threat of a new military escalation. We also need to bear in mind the security interests of Libya’s neighbours and refer to their experience on this issue.”
2021-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8820 (2021) · source
“To achieve that objective, we need to ensure the adoption of the relevant constitutional foundations. This in turn requires compromises to be reached between the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum and the House of Representatives. We strongly believe the success of this process will depend on the level of inclusiveness and transparency of the political process as a whole, including of the elections. This implies the involvement of all leading political forces in the country, representatives of all regions, as well as representatives of former authorities. We support the work of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC), which has an important role to play in unifying the armed forces of the country and ensuring general security.”
2021-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8820 (2021) · source
“Significant progress has also been achieved by Libyans on the political track. New authorities have been appointed to the Presidency Council and the Government of National Unity for an interim period . Ongoing efforts are under way to ensure the functioning of unified State structures and financial and economic institutions. This progress was reflected in the outcome communiqué issued following the second International conference on Libya, which was held in Berlin in June. We understand that achieving all the provisions of the road map will not be easy. This is also clear from Mr. Kubiš’ briefing. The main challenge before the current transitional authorities in Libya is holding universal elections within the established time frame, that is, on 24 December 2021.”
2021-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8820 (2021) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We welcome you, Minister Le Drian, to the President’s seat at today’s Security Council meeting. We would also like to welcome Prime Minister Dbeibah of Libya, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia and Germany and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Mr. Ahmed Aboul Gheit, and other high-level representatives We would like to thank Mr. Ján Kubiš for his detailed and informative briefing on the situation in Libya. We are cautiously optimistic about perspectives for development in the situation. The main achievement, of course, was the signing by Libyan parties of the ceasefire agreement in October 2020. Warring sides have gradually begun to overcome the mutual distrust caused by many years of conflict provoked by external interference in 2011.”
2021-07-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8820 (2021) · source
“We trust that the implementation of the recommendations in the Secretary-General’s reports will continue to be a top priority, along with the commitments under the Final Agreement. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia stands ready to continue to support the Colombian peace process in order to ensure that it is sustainable and irreversible.”
2021-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8818 (2021) · source
“Support for the Agreement by the international community shows a kind of vote of confidence in the people of Colombian, with the understanding that the provisions of the document would be unswervingly upheld. We sincerely wish all Colombians peace. However, it is important to remember that peace is not a voluntary declaration by one side, but a painstaking task in progress — an ongoing process based on ongoing dialogue to take into account the entire spectrum of views. We commend the role of the United Nations Verification Mission in the country and the personal efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General in promoting peacebuilding in Colombia.”
2021-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8818 (2021) · source
“In this context, it is heartening to hear of the establishment of the first contacts in a long time between the Government, the United Nations Mission and the representatives of the National Liberation Army. We hope that the Colombian parties will manage to return to comprehensive reconciliation negotiations. Very soon Colombians, along with the whole world, will mark the fifth anniversary of the signing of the historic Final Peace Agreement, which not only embodied the desire of Colombians for reconciliation and their own national responsibility for the future of their own country, but also insured that the peace process enjoyed the support of the Security Council, the Secretary-General and the guarantor States.”
2021-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8818 (2021) · source
“We all know that growth in drug production unavoidably leads to an increase in violence and corruption. With regard to the work of transitional justice, it is regrettable that while the former leaders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces are giving evidence in the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, there have not yet been any reports of similar evidence being given by representatives of the Government. This cannot fail to raise questions as to whether a balance can be struck in establishing truth and justice, especially because we are talking about responsibility for the killing of civilians and other extrajudicial killings. We have frequently drawn attention to the fact that a comprehensive peace is only possible with the involvement of all parties and with due account being given to a whole range of viewpoints.”
2021-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8818 (2021) · source
“Given this, the short-sighted policy of rejecting contacts with Caracas even on such important issues as border control only serves to worsen the security challenges. There are not many grounds for optimism in the report’s data about ongoing problems with agrarian reform, land restitution and crop substitution. Local communities have confirmed they have only gotten 3.5 per cent of the overall amount of land promised for agricultural needs. No more than 7 per cent of families that have upheld in good faith commitments to destroy drug crops have received the compensation provided for them in the final agreement. Despite the cuts in the acreage of drug plantation, cocaine production is increasing annually nonetheless. This has been confirmed by observations by relevant United Nations entities.”
2021-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8818 (2021) · source
“Unfortunately, the report notes no serious progress on any of these points. Furthermore, right at the beginning of the electoral period leading up to the 2022 elections, there is not much ground to hope that there will be significant progress in the near future. Of course, the safety and security of civilians remain a serious problem. Fighting between groups for territorial influence over the past three months has led to a further 7,500 internally displaced persons and the deaths of an additional 15 participants in the peace process and 49 human rights defenders. Furthermore, over recent months, there has been a significant deterioration in the situation in the areas bordering Venezuela.”
2021-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8818 (2021) · source
“The reason for these protests, as we see from the report, was the security policy, as well as the policies dealing with the reintegration of peace process participants, education and agrarian reforms — in other words, areas that are directly linked to the comprehensive implementation of the Final Agreement. We are concerned that 54 civilians and two police officers were casualties of the clashes. We would urge the Colombian authorities to be more professional and to ensure that there is no disproportionate use of force. We support the five areas earmarked in the latest report of the Secretary-General as priorities for the Colombian Government, specifically the security of the population, the reintegration of the participants in the peace process, the State presence in rural areas, intra-Colombian dialogue and lasting reconciliation.”
2021-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8818 (2021) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, Mr. Carlos Ruiz Massieu for presenting the report of the Secretary- General on the situation in the country (S/2021/603). We welcome the Vice-President and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia, Ms. Marta Lucía Ramírez. Unfortunately, in the current report we see once again a worsening situation in the country. This is due to a deteriorating security situation and a lack of progress in implementing the key commitments set forth in the Final Peace Agreement. A stark example of this were the large-scale protests in the country, which involved not only opposition forces but also an unprecedented number of young people, as well as indigenous people and women’s human rights organizations.”
2021-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8818 (2021) · source
“In those conditions, we believe that preserving Security Council sanctions against Guinea-Bissau, in other words, measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, which are provided for only in the case of threats to international peace and security, is absurd. We call for the steady dismantling of those sanctions. Russia welcomes Mr. Annadif’s commitment and efforts aimed at helping the countries of West Africa, the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin overcome the current difficulties. We have no doubt that the results of UNOWAS’s work will deserve the highest appraisal.”
2021-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8814 (2021) · source
“Such as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Group of Five for the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin Commission. We trust that in its work UNOWAS will take into account the important decisions concerning economic development and security in the region adopted at the ECOWAS summit held in Accra on 19 June. On some issues, including the fight against piracy and the demarcation of the Cameroonian-Nigerian border, the requirement of UNOWAS’s cooperation with its southern brother, the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, is evident. After the closing of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, in 2020, the monitoring of events in that country fell under the purview of UNOWAS.”
2021-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8814 (2021) · source
“In the context of the situation, in Mali we expect that all the obligations previously taken up concerning the transitional period, including the conduct of a constitutional referendum and general democratic elections according to the pre-established timeline, will be observed. The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) faces vast and difficult challenges: supporting the resolution of regional crises, participating in political mediation, providing assistance in the strengthening of State institutions and implementing the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, as well as playing a coordinating role for other United Nations presences on the ground. The effectiveness of the Office’s efforts directly depends on how well it is able to work with other regional organizations.”
2021-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8814 (2021) · source
“Because of security problems and the coronavirus disease pandemic, many social institutions, schools and medical centres were not able to open. Although the States of West Africa have been able for the time being to hold back the spread of the pandemic, it is clear that its consequences for economic development will not go unnoticed. Despite the myriad difficulties faced by many States in the region, they have nevertheless managed to successfully go through the election cycle. We trust that the elections planned for the second half of 2021 in a number of countries in the region will also take place in conditions of democracy, transparency, legitimacy and law and order, with strict respect for national sovereignty. There must be no interference in those processes by outside players.”
2021-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8814 (2021) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. Mahamat Saleh Annadif, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel, and Ms. Chantal Ayemou, President of the Ivorian Network for the Protection of Children’s and Women’s Rights, for their briefings. We share the concerns over dangerous challenges that many countries in West Africa, and particularly the Sahel, are facing. In this region, terrorist activity continues to run rampant. Over the first half of 2021, we received tragic reports of the deaths of individuals as a result of bloody terrorist attacks. We express our support to all of those who are waging the difficult struggle against terrorism in the region.”
2021-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8814 (2021) · source
“Under such difficult circumstances, it is crucial for the Security Council to send a unified message in support of national dialogue. Russia stands ready to provide Haiti with all necessary support so that the work of the Security Council can result in genuine normalization of the situation in Haiti and the strengthening of its sovereignty and self-sufficiency.”
2021-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8799 (2021) · source
“Such a radical and simultaneous change to the State system should be backed by broad public support, but currently there is, to be frank, no evidence of such support. Port-au-Prince needs responsible international support and the current situation imposes a particular responsibility on the United Nations presence in the country. We hope that, while acting strictly within the limits of its mandate, BINUH will continue to contribute in an impartial manner to the search for a national consensus, with the broadest possible involvement of the key political players. I would also like to stress that we should not disregard the issue of resolving political differences while we focus on the efforts to ensure security of civilian population, as that could undermine the effectiveness of our efforts.”
2021-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8799 (2021) · source
“We note attempts by President Moïse to establish an inclusive political dialogue to develop unified national approaches to the most important requirements for normalizing the situation, including the completion of constitutional reforms and the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections. We regret to note that to date those steps have not yielded any results. We were surprised and concerned to learn, following the issuance of the Secretary-General’s report (S/2021/559), about the postponement of the vote on the constitutional referendum scheduled for 26 June. The process of drafting changes to the Constitution is itself a subject of public criticism, since it is being conducted in the absence of the Parliament.”
2021-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8799 (2021) · source
“There are more and more cases of human rights violations, attempts to put pressure on the judiciary and restrictions on civil liberties. Against that background, widespread public disapproval has been compounded by the increased activity of criminal groups. We are convinced that this steep downturn is the result of the paralysis of the political system, against the background of the suspension of the work of the Parliament more than one year ago. It is clear that governing the country by decree is not easing tensions but on the contrary is largely provoking them, as evidenced by the public rejection of a number of decisions that under normal circumstances would have been taken in consultation with the Parliament.”
2021-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8799 (2021) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to Ms. Helen La Lime, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), for her briefing on the situation in the country and the work of BINUH. The situation on the island is a source of growing concern. The security situation continues to deteriorate; the socioeconomic situation is deteriorating; there is no unity on the issue of the launch of the constitutional process; and State institutions and the entire system of central and regional governance are weak. The humanitarian situation is also deteriorating, partly owing to the spread of the coronavirus pandemic, for which the country’s medical system was unprepared for obvious reasons.”
2021-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8799 (2021) · source
“In conclusion, as the issue of the right of the veto was raised today, I would like to underscore that it does not pertain to Security Council working methods but rather is the cornerstone of the entire architecture of the Security Council and key to achieving balance in Council decisions and ensuring that they have a good chance of being implemented as effectively as possible.”
2021-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8798 (2021) · source
“The issue of Council visits was also raised. We support the resumption of that useful practice. Visits help Council members not only to be heard but also to form their own impressions of what is happening on the ground and to engage with key stakeholders in any given situation on the Council’s agenda. That is important to all of us without exception. At the same time, we must also understand that the lack of representation of certain States during those visits could be construed as a political signal. That is why I believe that it would be optimal for missions to include all members. With regard to virtual and hybrid visits, they hardly allow us to achieve the goals that we set for such visits.”
2021-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8798 (2021) · source
“Nevertheless, many drafts continue to be received late without justification, which does not allow for a comprehensive expert assessment, let alone meaningful consultations. One sometimes has the feeling that the penholders do that deliberately, believing that in their haste their colleagues may simply not notice problematic points in the texts. The wording of Security Council resolutions is sometimes changed a few minutes before the vote. The resulting output consists of half-baked products that do not address the concerns of Council members and provide unclear instructions to the Secretariat. All that is unacceptable. We will continue to fight against such tactical tricks. We do not rule out the possibility that in the end we will be forced to evaluate the effectiveness of penholders’ work according to those parameters.”
2021-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8798 (2021) · source