YouSaid · the spoken record

Polyanskiy

lines on the record: 2,335
first: 2018-01-31
most recent: 2023-12-22
sittings or episodes: 300
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Yet there is no mention of the fact that it was at the behest of the Director-General of the OPCW that inspections were not conducted during the summer months. As we all recall, Mr. Arias said that the summer months in Syria were allegedly too uncomfortable for the members of the DAT to be deployed in the field. It appears that for him considerations of “comfort” outweighed the importance of holding these consultations. A similar attempt to shift blame can be found in the report on the 8 June air strike on a declared chemical facility on Syrian territory. Where is there even one word in condemnation of the aggression against the territory of a sovereign State? Apparently, this act of aggression seems irrelevant to the OPCW Director General.”
2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source
“Incidentally, much of the blame for the destruction of the good name and reputation of the OPCW lies with current Director-General Fernando Arias, who, instead of investigating the blatant case of machinations that occurred when the report on Douma was being compiled, attempts to silence OPCW experts and inspectors who dare to break the vicious circle and to sweep under the rug facts that are unflattering to the organization and to him personally. Such hypocrisy is evident even in today’s report. Delays in conducting the twenty-fifth round of inspections of the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) are again being blamed on the Syrians. The Technical Secretariat is extremely concerned about that issue.”
2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source
“The height of hypocrisy is the illegitimate IIT, whose armchair experts rubber-stamp, on the basis on pseudo-evidence and contrary to the laws of physics, chemistry, mathematics, new reports on the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Syrian leadership. We have repeatedly stated that we reject in advance the findings of any new IIT masterpieces, which are compiled using the same methodology that violates the principles and methodology of information-handling at the OPCW.”
2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source
“Not to mention the fact that we have long since given up attempting to find any logic in your assertions. If there were any logic to them, there would be no denial that the use of chemical weapons by Syrian forces would be unbeneficial for them even if they possessed them, because at that time they had a clear military advantage. Why look for any reason-based arguments at all if a shroud of fake information can simply be created around those events, designed to blame Syria and its leadership and promote cut-throats from among the Syrian opposition, whom you patronize as fighters for freedom and democracy? This fits well into your narrative, but has virtually nothing to do with reality.”
2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source
“At this rate, the OPCW can claim another Nobel Prize — this time in alternative physics for the discovery of new laws. Perhaps our understanding of the laws of chemistry is also different. For example, as we understand it, it is impossible for a cylinder to become half-corroded fewer than 12 hours after hitting the ground, although the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) states this happened in its report on Saraqib, to be half-rusted in fewer than 12 hours after hitting the ground. That again is a fantastical speed for a chemical reaction. Similarly, attempts to present as a chemical warfare agent the minuscule particles of chlorine found in Douma are not scientifically valid — the chlorine that was discovered in Douma could have had a multitude of applications, including household use.”
2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source
“That is to say that chlorine cylinders, allegedly dropped from the air in Douma in April 2018, would have exhibited similar damage, just as the bed on which one of them allegedly fell — not to mention the fact that, when smashing through the rafters, the cylinders’ valves would have been damaged. Another example is the crater from the alleged bomb drop at Khan Shaykhun, which from all appearances looks like the result of the detonation of a shell on the ground. Other examples would be the fantastical conclusions of the Fact-Finding Mission, according to which munitions fall into ventilation shafts that are exactly the same diameter, or unguided bombs, instead of free-falling, fly horizontally for five kilometres until they hit their target. Neither you nor OPCW inspectors seems bothered by this.”
2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source
“I am sure that, even today, my Western colleagues, as is their tradition and despite the facts and common sense, will rush to praise the decision and commend its alleged broad support of OPCW member countries. Well, if fewer than half of votes in favour and only six of 15 votes in favour from among the members of the Security Council indicates broad support for them, then I will not argue. It is clear that we were taught to do arithmetic in different ways. Regrettably, it is not just arithmetic, but also physics. In our textbooks, for example, we learned about the force of gravity. When objects fall from a height, they become deformed.”
2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source
“The Technical Secretariat, headed by the Director-General, is attempting to bury in the text, as deeply as possible, the obvious fact that Damascus, in spite of it all, continues in good faith to fulfil its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and does not refuse to cooperate with the OPCW. Despite the machinations of the Technical Secretariat, Syria demonstrates the political will and readiness to continue dialogue with it. Frankly, we admire the restraint and composure of our Syrian colleagues. We can only imagine how challenging it was for them not to be driven by emotions or yield to provocation following the decision that the delegations of the Western States pushed for at the Conference of the States Parties in April, in violation of CWC norms, to strip Syria of its rights in the OPCW.”
2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Today Mrs. Nakamitsu presented the ninety- sixth monthly — the most recent — report of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) (S/2021/842, annex). Those documents have long since been based on the same template and honed to achieve a single goal — giving the impression that Syria is allegedly attempting to hide something and mislead the international community with regard to its chemical dossier. The methodology of those documents has not changed.”
2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8872 (2021) · source
“Port-au-Prince needs responsible international assistance, and the current situation places particular responsibility on the United Nations presence in the country. Russia is prepared to continue to provide Haiti with all the necessary assistance, both bilaterally and multilaterally. In order to help mitigate the consequences of natural disasters, we have delivered medical and surgical kits as part of a joint effort with the World Health Organization. We intend to continue encouraging the Security Council to play a constructive role in normalizing the situation in Haiti, strengthening the sovereignty and self-sufficiency of the country and improving the lives and security of its citizens.”
2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8871 (2021) · source
“It is clear that the decision as to how the country can extricate itself from the crisis must be made solely by Haitians themselves, through a broad-based nationwide dialogue. We therefore welcome efforts to seek consensus among opposing social forces in the country about the issue of their future. We have taken note of the agreement reached on 11 September for elections to be held by the end of 2022. We are convinced that the imposition of any convenient solutions on the Haitian people by external actors or experts will only further complicate the situation. The United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti and its Head, the Special Representative of the Secretary- General, have been called upon to facilitate an inclusive intra-Haitian dialogue.”
2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8871 (2021) · source
“During discussions on the previous report in June, we all expressed the hope that the initial glimmers of a fragile nationwide political dialogue process would help facilitate proper preparations for, and the holding of, presidential and parliamentary elections. However, all our optimistic predictions collapsed in the wake of the abhorrent assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, on 7 July. Regardless of who was responsible for that crime, a blow was dealt to all Haitians. For that reason, there is an urgent need to identify and hold accountable the perpetrators of that grisly crime. The Secretary- General’s report (S/2021/828) mentions the request for the United Nations to assist with an investigation. There is an important need to ensure that all available means be used to help the Haitian people in that process.”
2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8871 (2021) · source
“The Government’s paralysis has created onerous obstacles for international cooperation and assistance. We note the efforts made by the United Nations system in very difficult circumstances, including the Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Fund, to support the country’s authorities in advancing crucial programmes to curb violence and achieve disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. It is clear that the dire situation in this coastal State requires consolidated international support, primarily from its neighbours in the region. In that connection, we are puzzled by the decision to forcibly return to Haiti those who cobbled together all they had to leave Haiti in search of a better life for their children. Plans to return to Haiti 14,000 individuals, in addition to the 8,000 Haitians who have already returned, are very troubling.”
2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8871 (2021) · source
“The absence of stable governance, required to effectively resolve day-to-day issues, has resulted in an intensificaiton in the activities of illegal armed groups that continue to fight for spheres of influence. As a result, a volatile mix has emerged — weak governance, a breakdown in the rule of law and ongoing violence by the groups I mentioned. The suffering of ordinary Haitians is exacerbated by recurring natural disasters. There is an urgent need to address issues common to all States, such as combating unemployment and improving overall standards of living. However, ordinary citizens are most concerned about the staggering absence of physical safety for the population. We are concerned by information contained in a World Bank report that in 2021, 60 per cent of Haitians will be living below the poverty line.”
2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8871 (2021) · source
“The failure over the past few years to establish effective mutually respectful dialogue among the key political forces has spawned a situation in which the levers of governance are concentrated in the executive branch. Internal political tensions could have been reduced by an effective legislature and judiciary, as well as professional, well-equipped and well-funded law enforcement agencies. Yet that has not transpired in the country. The absence of adequate political will has meant that the parliamentary elections required for the stabilization process to begin have been postponed for three years already. It is clear that the situation will not be resolved in the near future.”
2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8871 (2021) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Ms. Helen La Lime for her briefing on the very difficult situation in Haiti. We listened with interest to the statement delivered by Ms. Douyon. We welcome His Excellency Mr. Claude Joseph, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Haiti, to today’s meeting. Regrettably, alarming reports continue to emerge at every meeting of the Security Council concerning Haiti. In the three months since we considered the previous report (S/2021/559), Haiti has endured another major upheaval. We are very disappointed about the fact that the quest for a long-overdue solution to the protracted internal political crisis has again been deferred.”
2021-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8871 (2021) · source
“It should be borne in mind that a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing is a temporary, interim measure that cannot replace the legal obligations of States under an international treaty and underpin the strength of the world community’s collective action in the event of its violation.”
2021-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8865 (2021) · source
“We trust that this situation, which has become a necessary consequence of the CTBT’s non-entry into force, will not continue for several years or decades. We appeal to the leadership of the countries on which the future of the CTBT depends to show the political will and responsibility and to take concrete decisions on signing and/or ratifying it as soon as possible. It is essential that, until the CTBT enters into force, all States adhere to its letter and spirit. It is also crucial to ensure a moratorium on nuclear testing for the time being. Russia intends to maintain that moratorium in the future provided that other nuclear-weapon States take a similar approach.”
2021-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8865 (2021) · source
“Its main purpose is to verify compliance with the Treaty’s obligations, and the verification mechanism must be implemented in strict compliance with the provisions of the CTBT, the mandate of the Preparatory Commission and taking into account the realistic prospects for the Treaty’s entry into force. I would like to recall that, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the elements of the verification mechanism can function and operate only on a trial and provisional basis. Any participation by CTBTO Preparatory Commission member States in the relevant activities, including the transmission of data from International Monitoring System stations, is purely voluntary until such time as the CTBT has entered into force. By signing and ratifying the CTBT, we agreed to participate in it under those conditions.”
2021-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8865 (2021) · source
“In the light of some recent reports concerning the development of certain military technologies by some alliances, we are extremely concerned about the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Russian Federation is committed to the progressive development of the verification regime under the CTBT and is making a significant contribution to that end by establishing its second-largest national monitoring programme, which will comprise 32 facilities upon completion. Twenty-nine of those are already operational. The capacity of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission is unrivalled and has broad scope. However, that does not provide grounds for its unlimited and inappropriate use. The verification mechanism is set up for specific tasks, which are clearly set out in the Treaty.”
2021-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8865 (2021) · source
“We have already expressed our concerns about that situation during the twelfth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, held on 23 September of this year. Unfortunately, eight annex 2 countries, whose ratification is required for the Treaty’s entry into force, have so far not taken effective steps towards signing and/or ratifying it. That has created serious obstacles for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It is hardly a normal situation that international agreements cannot become fully operational 25 years after their conclusion. We believe that any attempt to secure strategic advantages by refusing to take part in key international agreements is unacceptable.”
2021-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8865 (2021) · source
“Its universal and unconditional ban of all nuclear tests, supported by an effective verification system, can provide a credible barrier against the proliferation and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. For the vast majority of countries, including Russia, the CTBT has become an integral part of international security and stability. We welcome the signing and the ratification of the CTBT by Cuba and its ratification by the Union of the Comoros. Each ratification is extremely important as another step towards the universalization of the Treaty. Nevertheless, the festive mood on the occasion of the anniversary is overshadowed by the fact that the CTBT has not yet entered into force and its prospects remain very uncertain. States that have opted for the Treaty cannot fully rely on it.”
2021-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8865 (2021) · source
“Since then, we have strictly observed its provisions and made a constructive contribution to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the CTBT, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a statement, in which he stressed that: “The drafting of this historic document, aimed at a dramatic strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, has confirmed that even the most difficult global security issues can and must be solved through talks.” Twenty-five years later, the CTBT has become almost universally accepted as the most advanced international legal instrument against nuclear testing.”
2021-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8865 (2021) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Russia is consistently committed to the goal of a complete and irrevocable cessation of nuclear testing throughout the world. Since 1991, our country has observed a moratorium on nuclear testing, and during that time has not conducted a single nuclear test. This year marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The agreement on the CTBT in 1996 was a major milestone in the context of international efforts to impose a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. The Russian Federation actively participated in drafting the Treaty and ratified it as early as 2000.”
2021-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8865 (2021) · source
“In conclusion, I wish to note that the Security Council is a very serious but not universal instrument at the disposal of the United Nations, and its use is liable to backfire with respect to our struggle to counter climate change. Let us not forget this. Let us not, for the benefit of the advancement of political agendas, disperse our efforts on this important track.”
2021-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8864 (2021) · source
“We believe it is counterproductive to include the climate component in the mandates of peacekeeping and special political missions. The assessment of climate-related risks, the conduct of the relevant analyses and the development of response measures should be carried out in specialized forums. Peacekeepers do not have the relevant expertise nor the necessary tools to propose viable solutions for climate change, given that experts have completed the requisite studies in this field and have the necessary training, but specialists in peace and security do not. Skills-building courses for the latter will not be enough. Moreover, expansion of the mandate of peacekeepers is liable to result in additional administrative and financial costs and can undermine the effectiveness of mandate delivery by Blue Helmets.”
2021-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8864 (2021) · source
“The question of climate change is fully applicable in this regard, owing to its specificities. It will not benefit in any way from incorporation into the Council’s agenda, and yet misunderstandings and duplications will be abundant in such a scenario. Turning to the consequences of climate change, Russia stands ready to discuss this subject solely vis-à-vis specific country and regional matters, relying on verified scientific data and taking into account the full picture of every specific incident. To be frank, there are many more such situations than there are agenda items on the Security Council. Moreover, let us not forget that climate is but one of a host of factors that make the economic and social situation for people in specific countries all the more difficult. I wish to emphasize the following.”
2021-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8864 (2021) · source
“We believe that the persistent and insistent attempts to advance the premise of climate change as a threat to international peace and security in the Security Council agenda at all costs introduces a completely unnecessary political component to an already complicated and sensitive discussion. Such an approach is also liable to artificially simplify the way we deal with the situation, which in turn is liable to result in one-sided or futile solutions that do nothing to strengthen stability worldwide. Perhaps our colleagues, by involving the Security Council, simply wish to raise the profile of the climate discussion. However, I think that they would agree that the inclusion or non-inclusion of any theme or issue on the Security Council agenda should not be a gauge of its importance or relevance.”
2021-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8864 (2021) · source
“In line with the principle of a division of labour at the United Nations, they have been designated to deal with the issue of combating climate change. We are increasingly witnessing attempts by our colleagues to add climate change to the Security Council’s agenda, as has been mentioned during many of the statements we have heard today. And yet we have a couple of questions: how effective is this in terms of resolving the tasks we have before us? And to what extent does the Council have the necessary mechanisms for this purpose without duplicating the main bodies of the United Nations, and, more importantly, without impeding their efforts? There is a Russian saying that illustrates this point: too many cooks spoil the broth. I will be frank.”
2021-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8864 (2021) · source
“We are in the process of finalizing our Low Emission Strategy for the Socioeconomic Development of the Russian Federation until 2050. We are also paying special attention to reducing methane emissions. We stand ready to cooperate with all interested parties. Since climate change concerns us all, we believe it must become a kind of unifying agenda for the international community. That is the only way to ensure that the issue can be effectively addressed for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind. Indeed, the development of such cooperation is the focus of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Relevant efforts are also under way in the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the High- Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, the Peacebuilding Commission and in other specialized bodies.”
2021-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8864 (2021) · source
“The recent meeting organized by the Secretary-General together with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom for members of the Group of Twenty and the most vulnerable countries was once again an opportunity to make sure we are on the same page and engage in a constructive exchange of views. That will undoubtedly have a positive impact on preparations for the upcoming twenty-sixth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Glasgow. We also commend the targeted engagement by Mr. Guterres with Member States on that matter, taking into account national specificities. For our part, we are committed to fulfilling our international obligations in the climate sphere. The Government of the Russian Federation is taking consistent steps to reduce the carbon footprint of the national economy.”
2021-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8864 (2021) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation wholeheartedly shares the international concern regarding the issue of climate change. According to our calculations, the climate in Russia is warming 2.5 times faster than the global average. At the same time, we are witnessing increasingly destructive natural phenomena. The need to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions and adapt to the negative consequences of climate change is therefore clear to us. We welcome the Secretary-General’s consistent calls for the mobilization of political will and resources to reach effective agreements on the climate track.”
2021-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8864 (2021) · source
“Resolution 2595 (2021) aims at giving all countries an opportunity to find a common denominator with regard to the work of UNSMIL in the upcoming, complex stage in the political process in the country. Our main aim now is to help the Libyan people adhere to the established timetable for the parliamentary and presidential elections to be held on 24 December. All of our efforts should be aimed towards that end. We hope that is a goal shared by all members of the Security Council.”
2021-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8858 (2021) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation supported the technical resolution submitted by the United Kingdom on extending the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) until 30 September (resolution 2595 (2021). At the same time, we would like to underscore our unstinting support for the efforts of the United Nations, in particular by way of UNSMIL, to continue to make progress on a settlement in Libya. Russia supports the international consensus that the United Nations has a central role in that process. We are focused on finding mutually acceptable solutions to the outstanding issues regarding UNSMIL’s future operations.”
2021-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8858 (2021) · source
“We are convinced that the most important thing right now is to preserve all the progress made to date and the capacity of the Mission, especially during the pre-election stage, which is so important for the country. We believe that the United Nations should focus its efforts on this very track instead of spreading itself too thin.”
2021-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8855 (2021) · source
“We trust that this initiative will make a significant contribution to Libyan reconciliation. In conclusion, I would like to note that we continue to be concerned by the problem of illegal migration and the proliferation of weapons in Libya, which affects security in both the country itself and the Sahelo- Saharan region overall. We hope to see more effective inspection efforts off the coast of Libya, which should be carried out in strict observance of international law. At the same time, we would like to underscore that international restrictions should help the political process and the return of stability in Libya rather than harm it. Work is currently under way to extend the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). We will be careful about revising the objectives and the structure of UNSMIL.”
2021-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8855 (2021) · source
“We are convinced that there is no alternative to a comprehensive, peaceful settlement of the Libyan crisis under the auspices of the United Nations. We welcome the initiatives of Special Envoy Kubiš and Libya’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the State of Libya, Mrs. El Mangoush, aimed at stabilizing the security situation in the country. We are ready to interact constructively with our international partners. We also believe the humanitarian initiative of the President of the Presidency Council, Mr. Mohamed Al-Menfi, to be important. That initiative involves launching a comprehensive national reconciliation project in the framework of which some concrete steps have already been taken to restore trust among Libyan forces.”
2021-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8855 (2021) · source
“The full opening of the coastal route between the west and the east of the country is also awaiting final agreement. Meanwhile, the parties are blaming each other for any failure to meet obligations. That precarious situation is directly related to the unresolved issue of the foreign military presence in Libya. We support an incremental and time-synchronized withdrawal of all non-Libyan armed groups and divisions. At the same time, it is important to maintain the current balance of power on the ground, thanks to which no new threat of a fresh cycle of confrontation has emerged. It is also important not to overlook the interests and experience of Libya’s neighbours when it comes to the repatriation of foreign combatants.”
2021-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8855 (2021) · source
“We are convinced that the success of the future elections and the political process as a whole will directly depend, among other things, on the degree of inclusiveness, which implies the involvement of all the leading political forces of the country, representatives of all regions and the former authorities. We note, on the military track, that the cessation of hostilities more than a year ago was a major achievement. However, further progress towards a comprehensive and final settlement of the armed conflict in Libya requires active efforts. The decisions taken within the framework of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, which plays an important role in unifying the country’s armed forces and generally stabilizing the security situation, remain largely on paper.”
2021-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8855 (2021) · source
“During the Forum meetings held in July and August, participants were not able to reach a consensus on the adoption of a legislative framework for organizing the national elections that are scheduled for December. At the moment, discussions continue within the framework of the Forum. We hope that the Libyans will be able to overcome the differences that have accumulated and to find common ground, because the future of the Libyan people is at stake. It is regrettable to hear that some are already advocating postponement of the presidential and parliamentary elections or of their division into two stages. Such a development could nullify all the cumulative progress made in recent months.”
2021-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8855 (2021) · source
“Thanks to the signing of an agreement on the cessation of hostilities in October last year, a general ceasefire has been maintained, which has made it possible to move forward on the political settlement track. The necessary conditions were created for the formation in February and March of joint transitional authorities. Libyans have begun gradually to overcome the mutual mistrust caused by the protracted conflict and to take joint steps to unify State structures and institutions. At the same time, we cannot but be concerned at the fact that the implementation of the road map for the settlement endorsed by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum has begun to falter.”
2021-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8855 (2021) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary- General, Mr. Ján Kubiš, for his briefing on the situation in Libya. We also thank the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011), concerning Libya, Ambassador Tirumurti, for his briefing on the work of that subsidiary body of the Council. We also listened carefully to Ms. Asma Khalifa. We have been cautiously monitoring potential developments in the military and political situation in Libya. On the one hand, the situation in the former Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has improved remarkably as compared with the previous period.”
2021-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8855 (2021) · source
“We are already used to the fact that our Estonian colleagues sometimes have delayed reactions to certain facts and events, so I should like to recall, if he has not yet noticed, that the story concerning the so-called poisoning of Mr. Navalny long ago became toxic not for Russia but for our Western colleagues, who continue to fail to respond to all of our questions. Therefore, raising this issue, I think, does not work to his advantage at this point, and I would advise him to tell his colleagues in Tallinn to update their playbooks. Time marches on.”
2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source
“In fact, Damascus had every reason to be concerned about the integrity of those cylinders if they were transferred to The Hague after OPCW experts failed to protect the phosphorus trichloride samples during the twenty-second round of consultations, in October 2019. Those samples mysteriously vanished; that happened in a certified OPCW laboratory. I want to remind everyone of that and note that the Secretariat never found out the reason for the disappearance; in fact, it covered up that disappearance for several months. I wish also to touch on the statement of my Estonian colleague, who mentioned the so-called poisoning of Mr. Navalny.”
2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I have asked for the floor once again only to express my surprise at the stance taken by our Western colleagues in connection with the incident involving an air strike and cylinders related to the incident in Douma. I already spoke about this in my main statement, so I just want to once again say that as we expected, a number of Council members are disregarding the fact that a certain third party destroyed that evidence and that there were many questions in that respect concerning the quality of the work being done by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Syria had no reason to seek their destruction, not if we view the matter following basic common sense.”
2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source
“All of this creates a serious threat to the organization and casts a shadow on one of the main pillars of the weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation regime and undermines the effectiveness of the realization of the OPCW’s mandate. Unfortunately, it seems that the situation is something that Mr. Arias is quite happy with; otherwise, it is very difficult to explain his behaviour, which has already worsened the situation when it comes to the OPCW implementing its mandate, and, unfortunately, we do not see any further reasons for optimism at this time.”
2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source
“In conclusion, I would like to note that all that Russia is calling for is strict compliance with the CWC, both by Member States and the Technical Secretariat, along with the Director-General. He is called upon to act as a fair broker together with the OPCW. Instead, we see a paradoxical situation where the Technical Secretariat itself violates it, and the Director-General, instead of clamping down on such violations, seems to boast about them. We are seeing increasingly dangerous politicization in the OPCW, which is growing every month, turning the OPCW from an unbiased and independent guardian into an instrument for punishing undesirable Governments in order to pursue and advance the geopolitical aims of certain States.”
2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source
“I should like to recall that less than half of Member States voted in favour of it and only the six Western States in the current Council voted in favour. The others either voted against or abstained, and a number of former Council members took the same position. That is an obviously unjust decision whose only goal is to make Damascus an outcast and destroy the motivation for any other State to cooperate with the OPCW. However, despite all that, Syria is continuing to pursue cooperation and is showing openness to dialogue between the leadership of the Technical Secretariat at the highest level, as confirmed in the current report of the Director-General. In our view, that is the best illustration of the fact that any claims about the dialogue between Syria and the OPCW faltering are completely untrue and unfounded.”
2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source
“We believe that we should now be concerned by another issue entirely. Whom did this air strike really benefit? It certainly did not benefit the Syrians themselves. It is difficult to imagine that they would seek such a complicated way to rid themselves of those cylinders. It seems much likely that this was an attempt by external forces to cover up their tracks in the light of the many public discussions regarding the manipulations in the Douma report. We have repeatedly warned about the destructive impact that the punitive decision to strip the Syrian Arab Republic of its rights — which the delegations of the Western States pushed for — could undermine the authority of the OPCW, as we know it was not considered in the Executive Council and violates the principle of consensus.”
2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source
“I would like to particularly touch upon something mentioned in the report (S/2021/692, annex), namely, an air strike on a former declared chemical-weapons production facility in Syria on 8 June during which two cylinders connected to the Douma incident in April 2018 were destroyed. It is very strange, at the very least, to see the report focus on the fact that the Syrian party moved those cylinders without any assessment of the very fact of that air strike. Even if the Syrian party did move them within its own territory, which as we understand, Syria has full rights to do, does that mean that the air strike, which is essentially an act of aggression against a sovereign State, was justified? And yet this is exactly how some of these paragraphs in the report currently read.”
2021-08-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8830 (2021) · source