YouSaid · the spoken record

Polyanskiy

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2,335
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2018-01-31
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2023-12-22
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300
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un-security-council

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  1. More than likely, the European Union will once again try to hide behind the screen of their proclaimed exclusivity and will say that everything it does, by default, is in the interests of its neighbours, on the basis of the infamous logic of Europe being the wonderful garden in the jungle. We find that logic totally unsatisfactory, and we will continue to push for European human rights advocates to strictly comply with their commitments.

    2023-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9429 (2023) · source

  2. Unfortunately, the resolution adopted today does not give us reason to believe that the inhumane approach taken by the EU with regard to migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean will change, and the shameful practice of pushing vessels with migrants outside of the jurisdiction of the EU leads to the agonizing death of people in distress, including women and children. It is unlikely that the member States of the EU that tell us about the importance of cooperating of civil society will lift the ban on humanitarians and non-governmental organizations in order to help migrants and refugees or that they will stop jailing the sailors who allow those in distress to board and then end up with jail sentences and accused of human trafficking.

    2023-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9429 (2023) · source

  3. But, in this case, bound by the EU discipline, the coordinators refused to take our amendments on board. Protecting the European Union turned out to be more important to them than the practical steps needed to rectify the current intolerable situation. I will be very candid with the Council and say that we are very surprised by what we heard from some of our Western colleagues yesterday when they praised Operation IRINI, which, according to them, contributes greatly to the rescue of migrants at sea. It would seem that we are reading different reports. In any event, the report of the Secretary-General (S/2023/640) that we received shows very clearly that the contribution of the EU to rescues at sea is — shall we say — very modest.

    2023-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9429 (2023) · source

  4. Inaction under those circumstances would undermine the authority of the Security Council. The recommendations of the Secretary-General and his report are quite clear about what additional measures are needed in this situation. At a minimum, all rescued or intercepted persons at sea should have safe ports of disembarkation, in accordance with the international law of the sea. Furthermore, crimes committed against migrants and refugees must be investigated, access to justice for victims must be ensured, damages must be redressed and the perpetrators must be held accountable. We proposed that such language be included in the resolution. I would like to point out that our proposal is in keeping with the standard line of our Western colleagues with regard to greater accountability and combating impunity.

    2023-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9429 (2023) · source

  5. However, anyone with even a little knowledge of the situation in the region or who has read the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2652 (2022), (S/2023/640) understands that this is not enough and that the mechanism provided for in resolution 2240 (2015) and subsequent resolutions is not working. Human traffickers are evading criminal responsibility. Migrants are dying at sea or ending up in detention centres. During yesterday’s briefing, the representatives of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration’s Office to the United Nations provided us with facts and figures that clearly showed that the Mediterranean Sea had become a graveyard for many thousands of people fleeing Africa.

    2023-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9429 (2023) · source

  6. 2/323-28320 29/09/2023Maintenance of international peace and securityS/PV.9429 We did not prevent the adoption of the resolution solely out of respect for the efforts of the French and Maltese penholders, who have done a remarkable amount of work on the new text. This was preceded by consultations, held at our insistence, during which it became clear that it would be wrong to leave the text without changes and limit it to a technical rollover. Among other things, the penholders restored to the text of the resolution important provisions taken from resolution 2240 (2015), which was adopted eight years ago.

    2023-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9429 (2023) · source

  7. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation abstained in the voting on resolution 2698 (2023), prepared by France and Malta, which gives the European Union (EU) a mandate to conduct the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation IRINI to counter the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking. Yesterday’s briefing (see S/PV.9428), which was held at our request, did not, unfortunately, provide an answer to the question of why this resolution is needed if the European Union, as we saw once again yesterday, is not able to properly carry out the functions it asked for.

    2023-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9429 (2023) · source

  8. In conclusion, I want to welcome the continued efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in preparing for the general elections in December and to wish it every success in organizing them. For our part, as a permanent member of the Security Council, we confirm our readiness to help resolve the crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo by promoting constructive dialogue between the States of the region. We are committed to working in close cooperation with the relevant institutions of the United Nations system and their representatives.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  9. We believe it is essential to take Kinshasa’s views into account within the framework of the Security Council’s upcoming negotiations on MONUSCO’s mandate in December. However, it will be vital to be guided primarily by rational considerations, taking into account the evolution of the situation on the ground and acting gradually and responsibly. We hope to receive full information as soon as possible from the Democratic Republic of the Congo authorities and the United Nations on the progress of the investigation into the tragedy of the MONUSCO helicopter shot down in the east of the country in March 2022. We all remember that eight peacekeepers died in the crash, including our countryman Alexey Mizyura, the leader of the Russian military observer team. We hope the perpetrators will be identified and brought to justice.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  10. We are concerned about the protests against the Blue Helmets’ presence, but while we condemn all forms of violence, we also call for respect for Congolese citizens’ right to protest peacefully. We have thoroughly reviewed the Secretary- General’s proposals for MONUSCO’s reconfiguration (S/2023/574) in the light of the work being done jointly with Kinshasa to revise the plan for the Mission’s withdrawal from the country. We have also carefully studied the letter addressed to the members of the Security Council (S/2023/648, annex), signed by Mr. Christophe Lutundula Apala Pen’apala, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which sets out the concerns and demands of the Congolese side.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  11. Only political solutions can lead to a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and the establishment of genuine conditions for sustainable stabilization, and we call for substantive measures to overcome tensions between Kinshasa and Kigali. We support the efforts of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and its leadership. We believe firmly that the Mission’s presence in the conflict zone continues to be an important stabilizing factor. In order to coordinate the work of protecting civilians more effectively, we hope to see greater coordination between the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo and MONUSCO, as well as other regional and national security forces on the ground.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  12. In that regard, it will also be important to continue working to fully implement the foundational 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes Region. We welcome the commitment of the African Union and the countries of the region to revitalizing the Framework Agreement. We support the activities of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, Mr. Huang Xia, aimed at establishing an intergovernmental dialogue for reducing tensions in that part of Africa. It is obvious that it is impossible to achieve long- term normalization in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes region solely through military measures.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  13. We note the significant role that United Nations agencies are playing in alleviating the humanitarian consequences of the crisis. We believe that achieving concrete results through regional leaders’ efforts through the Nairobi and Luanda processes will be crucial. We note the important contribution of the East African Community regional force and welcome the willingness of the Southern African Development Community to join the settlement process in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. We believe it is essential to continue combining complementary efforts and initiatives for regional assistance. The priority is to achieve a sustainable and long-term cessation of hostilities and create the conditions for a comprehensive and inclusive dialogue.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  14. We condemn the criminal activity of the Islamist Allied Democratic Forces and other illegal armed groups operating in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including the Coopérative pour le développement du Congo, the Résistance pour un état de droit au Burundi, the Mai-Mai and the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda. We call on them to refrain from violent action, lay down their arms and participate without preconditions in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. We are extremely concerned about the ongoing deterioration of the humanitarian situation, with rising numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees, human rights violations and the daily suffering of the civilian population.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  15. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Ms. Bintou Keita, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and the Permanent Representative of Gabon, in his capacity as Chair of the of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for their briefings. We listened carefully to Ms. Modi. We welcome the participation in today’s meeting of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Permanent Representative of Rwanda. We note with regret that despite the measures taken and the maintenance of a ceasefire between Congolese Government forces and the Mouvement du 23 mars (M- 23), the situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo remains extremely difficult.

    2023-09-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9427 (2023) · source

  16. It is obvious that Syria, alongside a number of other countries in need, has been enduring the cruellest discrimination from Western donors, whose sole concern is to sponsor weapons deliveries to Ukraine. It is important not to lose sight of that reality as we listen to disingenuous statements from a host of our Western colleagues about their concern for ordinary Syrians, whom they are not only not helping but instead are attempting to strangle with illegal unilateral sanctions.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  17. In the oil sector alone, Damascus’ losses as a result of United States crimes are estimated at $115.2 billion. Every day, the United States exports approximately 150,000 barrels of crude oil, in a situation where, owing to fuel shortages in Syria, humanitarian workers are forced to scale back their operations, including through the World Food Programme. That is the embodiment in Syria of the ubiquitously vaunted principle of United States humanism. The Secretary-General and the Secretariat have remained disgracefully silent on that issue. We regard as telling the critical situation that has developed as a result of the fact that the United Nations humanitarian response plan for Syria for the current year is funded at less than 30 per cent.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  18. We see the Idlib thugs’ blatant sabotage and the disgraceful silence on the situation on the part of the Secretariat and our Western colleagues. Unfortunately, that is not the only issue that is being ignored. Against the backdrop of the suffocating unilateral sanctions imposed on Damascus by Western countries, the Secretariat appears to have preferred to attempt to sweep under the rug the report of the United Nations country team in Syria on the negative impact of those illegal measures on the humanitarian situation in the long-suffering country. That also includes the fact that the United Nations has not noticed Washington’s occupation of the area beyond the Euphrates and the looting of Syria’s national resources by the United States.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  19. In that way, people in the enclave who are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, which the United Nations and others harp on about incessantly, have once again been taken hostage by internationally listed Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham terrorists, who played pretend diplomacy with the Deputy Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Syria Crisis, Mr. David Carden, who is a British citizen. That all reflects very poorly on the work of the United Nations office in Gaziantep. Next on the agenda is the resumption of humanitarian aid deliveries to north- west Syria from Damascus through the Sarmada and Saraqib crossings on the line of contact. The continued blockade by terrorists of such humanitarian deliveries is completely baseless.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  20. We believe that outstanding issues — akin to those that arise in the context of United Nations cross-border deliveries from Chad to the Sudan or from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan — will be resolved through direct dialogue between the United Nations and Damascus without external interference, including from the Security Council. At the same time, we are seriously concerned that, despite the capabilities that have long been available to humanitarian workers, humanitarian deliveries to Idlib through the Bab Al-Hawa crossing resumed only a month and a half after the agreements were reached with Damascus.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  21. The Bab Al-Salam and Al-Rai border crossings remain open to the United Nations until 13 November of this year, while the Bab Al-Hawa crossing will remain open for a whole six months, that is, until 13 March 2024. Thus, the capabilities of the United Nations to deliver humanitarian supplies to north-west Syria now exceed those provided for by the Security Council’s cross- border resolutions. On the whole, the architecture for cross-border deliveries to Syria has taken the form generally accepted in world practice — henceforth, it will be within the framework of consent from the national Government and is no longer micromanaged by the Security Council. We welcome the fact that international humanitarian assistance to Syria now aligns with the guiding humanitarian principles enshrined in General Assembly resolution 46/182.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  22. In August alone, there were three strikes targeting Damascus and Aleppo, including from the Golan Heights airspace, as a result of which the Aleppo airport was again put out of service. For our part, we consistently believe that long-term peace and security in Syria can be achieved only through the full restoration of Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, including the Syrian authorities’ control over their national borders and natural resources, while continuing counter-terrorism operations. Turning to the humanitarian situation in Syria, first and foremost, we wish to welcome the agreements reached between Damascus and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on the use of three border crossings on the border with Türkiye for the delivery of humanitarian supplies.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  23. Those alarming trends were a direct consequence of the foreign intervention of Washington and its allies in order to further destabilize the situation in Syria and create a border buffer strip. Along with Kurdish groups under their control, Western countries illegally present in Syria under the pretext of fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant have long since ceased to combat terrorism. Instead, they are actively using the fighters in service of their own aims against the Syrian military and their allies and have been attempting to whitewash the Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham terrorist group, which has seized Idlib. In addition to the provocative actions of Western countries, the Israeli authorities are also exacerbating the situation by increasing the frequency of arbitrary air strikes targeting Syria.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  24. At the same time, we continue to believe that the key decisions regarding the modalities of the Committee’s continued operation and the venue for subsequent rounds of consultation need to be made by the Syrian people themselves. The situation on the ground in a number of regions of Syria not under Damascus’ control remains fraught with tensions. That state of affairs is a consequence, first and foremost, of the ongoing illegal military presence of the United States in the area beyond the Euphrates River and in Al-Tanf. Clashes between Kurds and Arab tribes in Deir ez-Zor governorate are of growing concern, as are the escalating tensions in the south, including in Al-Suwayda governorate.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  25. Pedersen, during which special attention was paid to the task of re-establishing the effective work of the Constitutional Committee, among other things. In that context, we would like to welcome once again the outcome of the ministerial meeting of the contact group of the League of Arab States, held on 15 August in Cairo, during which there was an agreement reached to resume meetings of the Constitutional Committee and to conduct another round of the drafting committee at an agreed venue by the end of the year. Given the position of the Syrians themselves, both the Syrian Government and the opposition, we hope that Mr. Pedersen will focus specifically on convening a new session of the Constitutional Committee, without being distracted by other initiatives.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  26. To that end, on 22 September, on the margins of the high-level week of the seventy-eighth session of the General Assembly, another meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Russia, Iran and Türkiye was held, during which the leading role and approach of the Astana troika in pursuing consolidated efforts to facilitate a comprehensive settlement in Syria on the basis of strict adherence to the principle of respect for the country’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity were once again emphasized. In addition, there was a focus and an emphasis on the need to mobilize external assistance to Syria, including to ensure its post-conflict recovery, as well as to increase the pace of the return of Syrian refugees to their homeland. The trilateral meeting was followed by consultations between the Astana format representatives and Mr.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  27. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Special Envoy of the Secretary- General Geir Pedersen and Ms. Edem Wosornu, Director of Operations and Advocacy of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, for their briefings, and we listened attentively to the statement delivered by Ms. Jarbawi. We remain convinced that there is no alternative to advancing the Syrian-led and Syrian-implemented political settlement process in Syria with the assistance of the United Nations, in strict compliance with resolution 2254 (2015) and without external interference. On that basis, we will continue to consistently pursue our cooperation, both with the Syrians and the Special Envoy, as well as with all other stakeholders, first and foremost with our partners under the Astana format.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9426 (2023) · source

  28. We intend to assist in resuming as soon as possible work on all the pillars for normalization agreed to by the three leaders, including elaborating a peace agreement, unblocking transport communication, delimiting borders and building humanitarian contacts between the two neighbouring peoples.

    2023-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9422 (2023) · source

  29. We need to develop a gradual road map to integrate the population of Nagorno-Karabakh into the constitutional order of Azerbaijan, with clear guarantees for their rights and security. Those processes will be actively supported by Russian peacekeepers. The security and rights of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians are of key importance. Our position is that the set of trilateral declarations at the highest level made between 2020 and 2022 laid the legal groundwork for the process of Armenian-Azerbaijani normalization and that they are still the only real sustainable solution to the conflict in the South Caucasus. Nor is there any alternative to the Russian peacekeeping contingent.

    2023-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9422 (2023) · source

  30. The framework for the relevant parameters for the solution to the conflict were established by the authorities of Yerevan in October 2022 and May 2023 when, at summits held under the auspices of the European Union, they recognized that Karabakh was a part of Azerbaijan. At the same, in the concluding declarations of these summits, to which Yerevan agreed, the topic of the need to properly ensure the rights and security of the Armenian population of Karabakh was unfortunately simply omitted. We expect that contacts between Baku and Stepanakert/Khankendi will yield results and will make it possible to immediately launch measures to ease the humanitarian crisis in the region and ensure stability in the daily lives of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh. We will contribute to that in every way possible.

    2023-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9422 (2023) · source

  31. The Russian Federation continues to play a leading role in the process of contributing to the normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia and more than anyone else has been interested in resolving the crisis as soon as possible. The President of the Russian Federation held talks with the Prime Minister of Armenia, Mr. Nikol Pashinyan, and the President of Azerbaijan, Mr. Ilham Heydar oglu Aliyev. During those talks, the hope was expressed that efforts would be made to ensure the situation trends towards de-escalation and stabilization. We believe that the Armenian- Azerbaijani truce should be accompanied by reliable and clear guarantees of security and respect for the human rights of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh, based on universally accepted international principles.

    2023-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9422 (2023) · source

  32. People were given shelter in our peacekeepers’ camp, where they were protected from artillery and mortar fire. The wounded were given medical assistance, and temporary housing and hot food were provided. With the active mediation of the Russian peacekeeping contingent, on 20 September an agreement was reached on a full cessation of the fighting, to begin at 1 p.m. of the same day, and on the start on 21 September of negotiations between the representatives of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh and the central authorities of Azerbaijan. Today the negotiations are taking place in the city of Yevlakh with the participation and coordination of Russian peacekeepers. The absolute priority is to not allow a resumption of fighting and to direct the situation back to the political track and diplomacy.

    2023-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9422 (2023) · source

  33. We took note of the readiness of the Azerbaijani side to immediately conduct a thorough investigation of the tragedy and to bring those responsible to justice. Despite the complex situation, the Russian peacekeeping contingent continues to conscientiously carry out its mission and to do everything possible to protect the civilian population. From the moment the fighting resumed, the command of the Russian peacekeeping contingent has been in contact with representatives of Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijani authorities and is actively taking steps to immediately put an end to the bloodshed and the fighting as well as to ensure adherence to humanitarian law for peaceful civilians. Some 5,000 civilians, including more than 1,000 children, were evacuated from the most dangerous regions.

    2023-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9422 (2023) · source

  34. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. Miroslav Jenča, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for his briefing on the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh. We note the participation in the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan. On 19 September, there was a sharp escalation of the military confrontation in Nagorno-Karabakh. The humanitarian situation has worsened. There have been risks of a steep increase in the number of refugees. Fighting has led to civilian deaths. Unfortunately, Russian peacekeepers once again bore the brunt of the attack in carrying out their mission. As a result of the shelling, they sustained several casualties.

    2023-09-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9422 (2023) · source

  35. I would like to assure the Council that as one of its permanent members, Russia bears a special responsibility for the prevention and settlement of armed conflicts and is focused on strengthening our global Organization’s capacity for peacekeeping and countering crises.

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9413 (2023) · source

  36. As we know from the latest report of the Secretary-General on the performance of United Nations peacekeeping operations, the Secretariat has established a peacekeeping intelligence academy. However, Member States did not directly instruct it to establish such an academy, and it is not acceptable for the Secretariat to ignore or arbitrarily interpret the conclusions of the C-34 when taking administrative decisions. We expect to see a similar approach with regard to agreement on the Secretary-General’s initiative for a New Agenda for Peace. It will be important for the full range of views of Member States to be taken into account in developing that initiative.

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9413 (2023) · source

  37. In that regard we should all remember that one of the basic principles of peacekeeping is the consent of the parties. Without it the work of peacekeeping is impossible. In conclusion, we want to emphasize that the main platform for discussing major developments in United Nations peacekeeping activities should remain the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations of the General Assembly (C-34). Its decisions draw their legitimacy from the universal composition of its membership, which includes all active participants in peace processes, and from the consensus nature of its work. The Secretariat should follow the course of discussions within the C-34 closely and take their outcomes into account in its work. That is especially true for an issue as sensitive as peacekeeping intelligence-gathering and information analysis.

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9413 (2023) · source

  38. We should never forget that resolving a country’s internal crisis is a complex, painstaking and often lengthy process that must be national in nature and take into account the interests of every sector of the population. There is no universal formula. What is needed is a unique approach based on the social, historical, cultural and civilizational specificities of each society. Only the Government of the State itself can ensure that stable social contract. We consider the situation in the Central African Republic a positive example of the establishment of cooperation with the authorities of the host State. The Special Representative of the Secretary- General, Ms. Valentine Rugwabiza, has succeeded in establishing a close dialogue with Bangui.

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9413 (2023) · source

  39. An overall assessment by the countries of the region of existing threats and ways to deal with them, a willingness to take on the risks of doing that and the creation of a coherent and effective command- and-control system based on trust and cooperation are the keys to the success of regional efforts. In addition, an undeniable advantage of regional efforts compared to United Nations peacekeeping operations is the ability to respond rapidly to emerging challenges and threats. Constructive cooperation with host States is a key prerequisite for the effective implementation of peacekeeping operations. After all, it is they that bear the chief responsibility for the protection of civilians, the elimination of the causes of the crisis and the achievement of post-conflict recovery.

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9413 (2023) · source

  40. United Nations cooperation with regional and subregional organizations is an integral element of the current international agenda in general and the Security Council in particular. We have consistently advocated for developing such cooperation on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations, especially its Chapter VIII. We believe firmly that regional integration associations, first and foremost the African Union, which have a first-hand acquaintance with the problems of their members, can play a constructive role in supporting the aspirations of States to ensure the security and welfare of their citizens.

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9413 (2023) · source

  41. Unfortunately, we are seeing situations in which opinions on those issues differ significantly between the warring parties, the main regional players and outside stakeholders, as well as in the Security Council. Without political solutions it is impossible to agree on clear and realistic mandates, gain the trust of host States and ensure effective support for regional efforts. One of the consequences of such disagreements in a number of regions around the world is that the lack of results produced by the United Nations presence leads countries to pursue regional or other bilateral options. We believe that in situations where peace is lacking and terrorist threats are elevated, involving regional players at the host State’s request is an effective way to establish peace and security.

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9413 (2023) · source

  42. All of that can help to establish a constructive relationship with the local population and reliable contacts, and thereby strengthen the authority of the United Nations. Another serious problem is the discrepancies between the tasks that peacekeepers are assigned and the resources available to them for doing them, which creates inflated expectations among the population. We believe that peacekeepers’ main focus should continue to be on achieving reconciliation through dialogue and creating favourable conditions to political processes. The quest for political solutions should be based on reaching agreement on the reasons for the emergence of the conflict. Without defining the goal it is difficult to identify the proper resources.

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9413 (2023) · source

  43. It requires a complex approach, since negative responses to United Nations missions are certainly not always attempts to tarnish the Organization’s reputation, and countering disinformation should not be used as a pretext for censoring fair criticism of Blue Helmets. Where peacekeepers are doing a good job of performing their functions, no one listens to slander. But the fact is that critical assessments are often evidence of the disappointment of host States’ populations with missions’ work. That is why major attention should be paid to the concerns and priorities of the host country and the local population. United Nations peacekeeping missions should explain their mandates, work more actively with the population through radio, television and social networks and implement a variety of local quick-impact projects.

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9413 (2023) · source

  44. In many country situations, we see a patronizing approach and an arbitrary interpretation of such concepts as the imperative of unconditional respect for the sovereignty of host States and strict adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the basic principles of peacekeeping — ensuring the consent of the parties and impartiality and refraining from the use of force, except in self-defence and to defend the mandate. Unfortunately, that approach has done nothing except worsen relations. The issue of increasing disinformation and misinformation about the United Nations, which has recently been the subject of such active discussion in various forums within the Organization, is closely related to that.

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9413 (2023) · source

  45. It is not unheard of for different units within the same mission to differ in their understanding of their roles. United Nations peacekeeping operations have been present for many years in a number of regions, becoming part and parcel of the domestic political context and the conflict-management process rather than a tool for resolving that conflict. As a result — and we have seen it increasingly often of late — there is growing public dissatisfaction with the way in which peacekeepers are carrying out their mandate.

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9413 (2023) · source

  46. The drawdown of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, and the demands from Kinshasa for the withdrawal of the United Nations presence from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to begin by the end of the year, have compelled us to think about the real reasons for the dissatisfaction among States that had originally consented to the deployment of peacekeepers on their territory. Those reasons include insufficient consideration of the wishes of host States and some mistaken priorities, with a shift in focus to secondary issues such as human rights, gender and climate. An additional factor is the so-called multidimensional nature of modern peacekeeping operations, which often distracts them from their core tasks and results in diminished internal coordination.

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9413 (2023) · source

  47. During that time, United Nations peacekeeping operations have come a long way, from compact observation missions that still exist to this day to complex multidisciplinary presences numbering tens of thousands of military, police and civilian professionals. It is that readiness to adapt to changing circumstances that has always distinguished peacekeeping and enabled it to fulfil its mandates effectively and with dignity. At the same time, the challenges facing United Nations peacekeeping efforts today are a source of serious concern about the future of peacekeeping operations.

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9413 (2023) · source

  48. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to Under-Secretary-General Lacroix for his thorough briefing. We would like to take this opportunity to thank the military, police and civilian personnel of United Nations peacekeeping missions for their unwavering commitment to fulfilling their noble duty in extremely difficult and dangerous circumstances, risking their lives on a daily basis. We also offer our condolences to the States and families of those killed in action. United Nations peacekeeping is an important tool for strengthening international peace and security. For 75 years, thanks to the Blue Helmets, we have succeeded in creating the conditions necessary for establishing and maintaining lasting peace in many countries.

    2023-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9413 (2023) · source

  49. Of course, those countries could also effectively help the Malian authorities themselves rather than doing everything to discredit their efforts to ensure security and combat terrorism. Unfortunately, these countries do not know how to cooperate with the countries of the Global South on an equal and respectful footing. We should therefore pay no heed to their colonial phantom pains. Russia, for its part, will continue to provide Mali and other interested African partners with comprehensive assistance on a bilateral, equal and mutually respectful basis.

    2023-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9407 (2023) · source

  50. With regard to the question of the modalities for the transfer of MINUSMA’s powers, in the context of the Algiers Accord, to any United Nations entities, such as the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, we believe that any decision in that regard requires securing the consent of the Malians themselves, first and foremost. We continue to see how Russian-Malian bilateral cooperation, carried out at the request of Bamako and in strict accordance with applicable norms of international law, as well as Mali’s sovereign choice of international security partners, are keeping a number of our former Western partners up at night. They are suffering from a clear relapse of neocolonial approaches and are unable to put away their double standards.

    2023-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9407 (2023) · source