YouSaid · the spoken record

Polyanskiy

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2018-01-31
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2023-12-22
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un-security-council

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  1. Similarly, we notified the Secretary-General and the Head of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, who was directly responsible for its implementation. I see no point right now in going into the details of how António Guterres’ so-called Istanbul package, of which the Russia-United Nations memorandum of understanding was and still is an integral part, was actually implemented. We have already done that many times, including here in the Security Council Chamber. We renewed the Black Sea Grain Initiative more than once after receiving what turned out be repeated empty promises from the Secretariat. However, as the President of Russia has said, the grain deal has been a one-sided game for the entire past year.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  2. In that regard, we can only sympathize with the families and friends of the victims, who have been deliberately deprived of their right to the truth. And it is very telling that not a single Western colleague who spoke before me in the meeting reminded us today of the tragedy. They do not need the facts or the truth about it, because it has already served its purpose in the process of Russia’s defamation. Before I conclude, here is the last subject I would like to touch on today. Today, through the Russian Embassies in Ankara, Minsk and London, as well as the Consulate General in Istanbul, we circulated official notes on the decision of the Russian Government to terminate the Black Sea Grain Initiative as of 18 July.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  3. In the time that has passed since the disaster, the question of Kyiv’s responsibility for failing to close the airspace above the combat zone where the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s air defence equipment, including Buk surface-to-air missile systems, was deployed, has not been properly addressed. Some clarity could have been provided by the United States satellite images that were taken on the day of the crash. However, Washington categorically denied the judges’ requests to disclose that data or to at least allow us to familiarize ourselves with it under special conditions. Unfortunately, the approach of the Netherlands and its accomplices, based on promoting a political command that had already been decided on, has prevented the possibility of establishing the true perpetrators of the tragedy of Flight MH-17.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  4. In the case of Flight MH-17, Russia provided the investigation with a colossal amount of information that was vital to establishing the true causes of the crash. However, neither the investigation nor the District Court of The Hague took it into account. They considered the information of Ukraine’s intelligence services to be more reliable, information that consisted of data from dubious sources from social networks, photographs and video materials that had clearly been edited. Not a single question was asked of Ukraine, which refused to provide radar data or the recorded communications of ground-based flight-tracking services and has never been able to explain where the Ukrainian air-traffic controllers working that day, who could have shed light on the circumstances of the tragedy, disappeared to.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  5. Neither the technical investigation by the Dutch Safety Board nor the criminal investigation by the Joint Investigation Team met the criteria set out in resolution 2166 (2014). Their real purpose was not to establish the truth but to tailor the relevant evidence to fit the narrative of Russia’s involvement in the tragedy. Essentially, the MH-17 disaster became nothing less than a key element in a false and unsubstantiated anti-Russian campaign that was later supplemented by the poisonings of the Skripals and Navalny, as well as the provocation in Bucha that I mentioned earlier today. As we know, the more horrible the lie, the easier it is to believe it, and that principle has been our Western opponents’ top priority in all those cases.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  6. That event had a direct impact on the crisis within Ukraine, forcing the Donbas militias that held the military initiative to come to a halt in anticipation of what at the time was assumed would be Ukraine’s inevitable condemnation of an act of terrorism. It is well known that since that disaster, Russia has consistently advocated for a comprehensive, thorough, unbiased and depoliticized investigation into the causes of the disaster, based on facts and irrefutable evidence. We were among the initiators of resolution 2166 (2014), which expressed the importance of a full, thorough and independent international investigation. However, no such investigation has been conducted to date, and the circumstances of the incident have not been reliably established.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  7. No matter how hard they try to portray themselves as the defenders of poor, unfortunate Ukraine, their actions give them away. And the actions of the Kyiv regime, including against its own population and including the persecution of the followers of the canonical Orthodox Church, which everyone in the West is trying to ignore, leave no doubt that even when the regime starts grabbing all who disagree with the current Government’s destructive, anti-popular policy or shooting them on the spot, they will have no trouble turning a blind eye to it. But we will discuss that in more detail in the meeting we have requested for 26 July. In my statement, I would like to touch on two other issues that have to do with Ukraine. Exactly nine years ago, Malaysia Airlines Flight MH-17 was shot down in the skies above Donbas.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  8. We have yet to get to the bottom of the extent to which Western, and particularly British, intelligence services were involved in the preparation and execution of the terrorist attack. Far too much evidence points to the latter. All the facts that I have mentioned point to the fact that there is no crime that the West will not commit in order to preserve its hegemony in world affairs, and, as Mr. Borrell said, to preserve an idyllic garden at any price while everyone else can continue to live in the jungle. There is no principle that they are unwilling to trample on to achieve that end. The reason I am saying that is because their countries, or more precisely their Governments, should be under no illusion that their responsibility for what is happening in Ukraine is any less than that of the Zelenskyy regime and in fact may be more.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  9. In order to make civilians suffer even more, the West has decided to supply depleted uranium shells and cluster munitions to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as to ignore Ukraine’s continued shelling of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, destruction of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant and egregious terrorist attacks on Russian territory, which reflect the terrorist nature of power in Ukraine. Today we all learned of yet another terrorist attack by the Kyiv regime on the Crimean bridge, hundreds of kilometres from the combat zone. As a result, two innocent Russians were killed, and their 14-year-old daughter was seriously injured. I have not heard any of the Western sponsors of the Kyiv regime condemn that act of terrorism.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  10. For the sake of those unattainable goals, they condoned the formation of a genuinely totalitarian dictatorship in Kyiv, which unleashed a war on its own Russian-speaking citizens in the eastern part of the country. For eight years they failed to notice that Ukrainian shells were killing peaceful women, children and elderly persons. And today they are being killed by the long-range shells and missiles that the West has supplied, because Ukrainian shells are no longer capable of reaching peaceful Donetsk and other cities and their supplies are virtually gone.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  11. The cost of that fateful decision for Ukraine has been hundreds of thousands of young Ukrainians killed and maimed, while even today the Kyiv regime continues to throw them into the meat grinder on the eastern and southern fronts in its vain attempt to prove to its Western sponsors Ukraine’s ability to win. Since then, the country has already lost several battalions and for all practical purposes all of its own weaponry. Since there are a number of Western Ministers among us today, I would like to take this opportunity to underscore the responsibility of their Governments for the ongoing tragedy inflicted on the people of Ukraine. By systematically pushing Ukraine towards war with Russia rather than implementing the Minsk agreements, they were guided solely by their own geopolitical interest in weakening Russia.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  12. But we all remember how in April of last year the United Kingdom presidency of the Security Council used unscrupulous procedural manoeuvres to prevent the holding of a special meeting of the Council that we had requested in connection with the provocation, behaving in a manner unbecoming to the presidency of the Security Council and one of its permanent members while making it clear that it was an accomplice of the Kyiv regime. The provocation in Bucha was the smokescreen needed to give the Ukrainian leadership cover in choosing a path of armed confrontation with Russia rather than peace. At the same time, instead of making diplomatic overtures, the Western countries redoubled their efforts to provide Ukraine with aid and Western weapons.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  13. That was when the hot stage of NATO’s proxy war on Russia, waged to the last Ukrainian standing, began in earnest, in which Ukraine was essentially transformed into a private military company hired by Washington, London and Brussels. In order to ensure that there was no way the Ukrainian authorities could back out after Russia’s troops had withdrawn from Kyiv as a gesture of goodwill against the signing of the draft peace agreements in Istanbul, a disgusting and clumsily executed provocation took place in the Kyiv suburb of Bucha, which many experts believe British intelligence played a direct role in organizing. We definitely intend to carry out an objective investigation to ascertain whether that was the case.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  14. For anyone capable of unbiased analysis, it is quite obvious that we had no choice of any kind and that the time bomb that went off on 24 February 2022 had been set by the West at least as long ago as 2014 but in reality even earlier. As we all know, in April 2022 — that is, a little more than a month after the start of the special military operation — Ukraine rejected a peace plan to resolve the crisis that its negotiators had already signed off on and that it was understood included international security guarantees for Ukraine. As we are now all well aware, that was done with the direct involvement of the United Kingdom, whose leadership at the time convinced the leader of the Kyiv regime that Ukraine would be able to defeat Russia with Western support.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  15. We were compelled to come to the defence of the women, children and elderly who were being annihilated by Kyiv before the eyes of the so-called civilized Western world after Ukraine and its Western patrons refused once and for all to comply with the Minsk agreements, which were endorsed by the Security Council. And as we now know very well, for all those years that document was a mere smokescreen behind which the Western States were preparing Ukraine for war with Russia. That is why all our Western colleagues’ lamentations about Russia’s so-called unprovoked aggression and war of choice persuade no one anymore.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  16. Despite the aspirations of a majority of Ukrainians, and in order to satisfy the West’s fixation on confrontation with our country, they abandoned peace and good-neighbourliness with Russia and non-discriminatory treatment of all the nationalities represented by those living in Ukraine, and began the wholesale promotion of nationalism and whitewashing of Nazi war criminals at a breakneck pace. In unleashing a bloody war on the Russian-speaking residents of Donbas nine years ago, the Kyiv regime deliberately and intentionally escalated the Ukrainian crisis into a military confrontation with Russia.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  17. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Since in addition to you, Mr. President, there are many other high-ranking accomplices of the terrorist regime in Kyiv in this Chamber today who bear full responsibility for its crimes, I would first of all like to consider where their actions in the context of the Ukrainian crisis have led us all. A tragedy is deepening before our eyes, a tragedy whose underlying cause is the 2014 anti-constitutional coup d’état in Kyiv, instigated by the United States of America and its Western allies in fine colonial tradition. The motives of the people who have led the Kyiv regime since then have nothing to do with the interests of Ukraine.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  18. Regrettably, it appears that this elementary task is beyond the capacity of Britain’s diplomats for the second year in a row.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  19. It has learned no lessons even from its own mistakes as President of the Council, of which we have already seen quite a few in the first half of July alone. This is also a good moment to remind everyone that in February we encountered attempts by an EU member, then President of the Council, to turn a Council meeting on Ukraine into a political spectacle performed to coincide with the visit of European ministers to New York (see S/PV.9269). The same thing is happening today. We feel obliged to point out that London has shown complete disregard time and again for the procedures and practices of the Security Council, putting its national position and the interests of NATO above the duties of the President of the Security Council, who is supposed to be the guardian of its procedures with a balanced and impartial approach.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  20. It is clear that today’s participants, in accordance with their NATO membership, will add no value to the discussion and will merely drag out today’s meeting, turning it into a debate, which is not something that the United Kingdom agreed on with Council members ahead of the meeting. That behaviour speaks not only to a lack of integrity on the part of the presidency but also to an attempt to put pressure on the members of the Security Council. There can be no plausible explanation for turning a Council meeting into a get-together for representatives of NATO States. However, the British presidency does not seem to care about its own reputation or about the rules and traditions of the Security Council.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  21. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Before you proceed with the meeting, Mr. President, I would like to express our principled disagreement with the presidency’s approach to inviting delegations to participate in this meeting under rule 37. In violation of existing practice, the British presidency has unilaterally decided to give the representatives of eight member States of the European Union (EU) and NATO and their closest allies the opportunity to speak at today’s meeting, as well as the representative of the EU itself, despite the fact that it is the regular practice of the Council to invite no more than three delegations to take part in the meetings on Ukraine under rule 37.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  22. Russia, for its part, as a permanent member of the Security Council, will continue to take an active part in international efforts to support the Colombian peace process, including by extending support to the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, with Mr. Carlos Ruiz Massieu at the helm.

    2023-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9374 (2023) · source

  23. We are looking forward to the execution of the decisions of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, and representatives of the United Nations Mission will be following that as well. We are concerned about the ongoing high levels of violence against ex-combatants. Just a few days ago we saw a number of high-profile cases of killings and attacks on former members of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, including owing to their political activities. Without security guarantees for ex- combatants, it will be impossible to reintegrate them into society and the economy. We hope the situation will improve markedly in the run-up to regional and local elections in October.

    2023-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9374 (2023) · source

  24. The shift in focus to new negotiation formats should not detract from the key objective that it is the job of the Security Council to monitor, that is, the implementation of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace. We believe that the comprehensive implementation of the Agreement’s provisions is the only way to build trust among the new participants in the peace process. We acknowledge Bogotá’s conscientious efforts on that front, especially the progress made on agrarian reform. However, it is clear that more needs to be done to ensure the physical safety of former combatants, social leaders and the most vulnerable sectors of society, as well as to implement crop substitution programmes and strengthen State authority on the ground.

    2023-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9374 (2023) · source

  25. We believe that we can accommodate the request from the heads of the delegations of the Government and the ELN that the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia be expanded so that it can verify and monitor the parties’ implementation of the bilateral ceasefire agreement. We are willing to consider the possibility that the Mission could verify agreements with other groups once such agreements are reached. In that context, we welcome the efforts of the Colombian authorities to engage in dialogue with the Estado Mayor Central Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. We note that the parties issued a joint statement saying that they are ready to come to the negotiation table.

    2023-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9374 (2023) · source

  26. Our country has consistently promoted dialogue with the group, even when the former Colombian Administration completely ignored such calls and countries guaranteeing the peace process were subjected to unprecedented pressure. We note the important role that Havana has played in discharging its duties as guarantor in good faith and establishing contact between the parties. It is very telling that its principled and consistent mediation efforts were precisely the reason that the United States added Cuba to its list of State sponsors of terrorism. As the saying goes, no further comment is necessary.

    2023-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9374 (2023) · source

  27. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We welcome the participation of Álvaro Leyva Durán, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia, in today’s meeting. We thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Colombia and Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia for his assessments. We also listened to the civil society briefer, Diana Salcedo López. Russia welcomes the agreement reached in Cuba on a six-month ceasefire between the Government of Colombia and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which is an extremely important step towards comprehensive peace in Colombia.

    2023-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9374 (2023) · source

  28. We are therefore trusting in and counting on the United States representative’s support so that our experts can join that ongoing investigation, and we have much more reason to do that now. I have one more comment. I noticed that today’s statements, which many of our Western colleagues devoted almost entirely to the Ukrainian crisis, have enabled us to clearly follow the cause-and-effect connections that guided those who committed these crimes and those who have covered it up and continue to do so. I thank them for that, because it alone made today’s meeting worth it. I am convinced that this is excellent material for a Russian and international investigation in future, and I am sure that the record of today’s meeting fully deserves to be one of its key documents, at least in the initial stages. The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9373 (2023) · source

  29. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Because we spoke at the very beginning, I will allow myself a few comments. First of all, I would like to ask the representative of the United States to clarify something. If I remember correctly, he said that the States affected have a right to participate in this investigation and should do so. Does he consider the Russian Federation — the State to which the pipeline actually belonged — to be among the States affected, or does he believe that they include only the States in the coastal area around the site? I would hope that the Russian Federation is indeed included among the States affected. Anything else would simply be illogical.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9373 (2023) · source

  30. We would not be surprised if today, for example, the United Kingdom presidency, as it has done at previous meetings on the Syrian chemical dossier, continued its disinformation campaign and once again for no good reason brought up its claims about Russia’s alleged use of chemical weapons. As always, we will not respond to such fabrications. In conclusion, I want to emphasize once again that the reckless policies of the countries of the collective West, based on their hatred for the legitimate Syrian Government, will have extremely negative consequences for international security by undermining the efforts of Member States in the work of ensuring the non-proliferation and destruction of chemical weapons. Our Western colleagues bear full responsibility for that, regardless of their attempts to prove otherwise.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source

  31. In other words, if Washington and the other Western capitals so decide, any party to the CWC can be punished. Moreover, in the current anti-Syrian frenzy, genuinely important and burning issues, such as the possibility of chemical weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, are deliberately ignored because they undermine the presumption of Damascus’s guilt. As a result, instead of issues concerning the cooperation between the United Nations and the OPCW being discussed in the General Assembly or the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) being discussed in the Security Council, all we hear are the same old unsubstantiated accusations of Damascus. Moreover, the Western countries have not limited themselves to Syria.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source

  32. The desire to transform the Technical Secretariat from an impartial and authoritative body into a mere convenient tool for putting pressure on States that Washington finds undesirable has already led to its decline. The same Investigation and Identification Team was established in flagrant disregard for the practice of decision-making by consensus and was endowed with certain attributive functions in violation of the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) itself, and we emphasize once again that no product of the Team can be considered legitimate. That tame entity’s conclusions have already been used to justify the punitive decision by the OPCW Conference of States Parties to suspend the rights of Syria, a sovereign State that has conscientiously complied with the Convention.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source

  33. At the same time, they will deliberately overlook the fact that OPCW Director-General Arias himself spoke about the above-mentioned method of analysis — if it can even be considered a method — in this Chamber in February (see S/PV.9255). We recall that, at the time, Mr. Arias was trying to somehow justify the conclusions that the illegitimate Investigation and Identification Team had come to about the incident in Douma. It is a pity that today the Council members will once again be unable to ask him questions, of which we have many, about the work of the entity he heads, which makes this discussion all the more meaningless. It is also futile to expect Western delegations to acknowledge the consequences of their short-sighted policies on the OPCW.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source

  34. In practice, the technical experts have already admitted that their basis is an established political position into which they fit whatever information they get, independently of its plausibility. The inevitable inconsistencies that arise are simply ignored. When the Western countries need to blame the Syrian armed forces, the Technical Secretariat boldly draws the appropriate conclusions. In the remaining cases, the experts “throw up their hands” and refuse to acknowledge the facts about terrorists and militants’ use of chemical weapons, claiming a so- called lack of evidence. Today the Western delegations in the Security Council will say whatever it takes, true or not, to “defend the honour” of the OPCW leadership, while portraying our entirely justified concerns about its activities as mere “Russian propaganda”.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source

  35. And when the available information ran counter to the goal of vilifying the Syrian authorities, they would go as far as to literally edit the prepared documents, as in the case of the infamous report of the Fact- Finding Mission on the staged incident in Douma in 2018. Even the OPCW’s own experts talked about such an egregious violation of its principles. But instead of putting things right in its subsidiary body and restoring the reputation of the Technical Secretariat, the leadership, shielded by Western countries, has gone even further. It is now openly defending the method of substantiating various conclusions not with facts but based on so-called “reasons to believe”.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source

  36. Of course, if the Technical Secretariat’s activities had adhered strictly to the provisions of the Convention and the fundamental principles of the conduct of an investigation, particularly the collection and chain of custody of evidence, no questions would have been raised. However, the Technical Secretariat’s reputation had already been disastrously undermined by its unscrupulous violations of those principles during the analysis of other incidents, when experts did not hesitate to use open-source data or information obtained after the fact from third parties, including some known to be biased. That did not prevent the OPCW experts from drawing conclusions about Damascus’s culpability.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source

  37. That is reflected in the recent report of the Fact-Finding Mission, on incidents in Kharbit Masasnah on 4 July and 7 August 2017, which was prepared upon Syria’s request. I would note that the related documentation was circulated in the Security Council only yesterday, in flagrant violation of the timelines for Council members to study such voluminous documents, consult with their capitals and establish their position. According to the report, the experts were allegedly unable to reach a conclusion on the use of toxic chemicals against the Syrian armed forces, citing a lack of evidence.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source

  38. However, as we can see from the repeated statements made at every meeting by Western States, they have long forgotten about the purpose of this resolution and ignore all the actions taken by Damascus. After all, their only goal is to use every opportunity to try to discredit the Syrian authorities in the Security Council. We have consistently rejected such an approach, which does palpable damage to the authority of the Security Council. It is obvious that the reputation of the international Organization is of little concern to the United States and its allies. A clear example of that is the current worrisome situation with the OPCW, whose Technical Secretariat, under the influence of Western countries, more or less openly states that it is promoting Western interests.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source

  39. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We regret that today the members of the Security Council must once again waste their time discussing the Syrian chemical dossier, although there have been no new developments over the past two months requiring the attention of the Security Council. Damascus, despite all the difficulties, continues to cooperate with the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Recent reports by the Director-General confirm that fact, but otherwise they are no different from the formulaic and biased documents signed by Mr. Arias. We have stated many times that it would suffice to discuss this topic in the Council once per quarter. That would allow us to assess the situation on the ground and progress in the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013).

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source

  40. We do not entirely understand why, given that political dialogue is stalled in the country, that there is a legitimacy crisis and a lack of control of weapons trafficking, and that the humanitarian plan is underfinanced, some circles consider that the panacea for all Haitian issues would be to send a multinational armed force to the island. The history of foreign interventions in Haiti proves that templates imposed from outside do not take root in Haitian society, that they bring more harm than good and that they are only used as a cover under which to promote the interests of other States. It is therefore not a coincidence that, even now, despite all of the problems, there are voices in Haiti against any kind of foreign interference, and it is our duty to heed these voices and not try to play them down or ignore them.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9368 (2023) · source

  41. We advocate a responsible and well-founded selection of candidates for the inclusion in the sanctions list established by the 2653 Sanctions Committee, with the understanding that this is the kind of work that needs to be conducted in the interest of stabilizing the situation in the country and not so as to situationally clean up the political landscape in Haiti in the interest of some actors. We have outlined a number of areas where the international community can and should already today focus as it extends assistance to the long-suffering people of Haiti.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9368 (2023) · source

  42. In this regard, we support the proposal to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) to help assist and train the national police. At the same time, the objectives of the mission should be commensurate with its capacity, and priority needs to be given to looking for political solutions. Sustainable models for a political settlement need to be accompanied by what we have in resolution 2653 (2022), namely, studying the sources and routes of smuggling firearms, including through the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, as well as cutting off the channels of funding and supplies to local criminal gangs. So far, we have not seen practical steps taken in this area on the part of those States from which most of the illegal weapons, drugs and money flow into Haiti.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9368 (2023) · source

  43. We call on the national authorities and all States that can exert influence in this regard to ensure that this crime is investigated in a transparent manner and that the outcome of the investigation is shared with the international community so as to make sure that all real perpetrators are brought to justice. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia has traditionally advocated establishing responsible international assistance for Haiti, with emphasis on a political settlement based on the objective internal needs of the Haitians themselves and finding solutions that are acceptable to the parties in conflict. We note the appeal by Port-au-Prince for providing assistance to respond to the range of security challenges faced by the country.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9368 (2023) · source

  44. The nefarious practice of imposing political models that are removed from local realities on the Haitians does not take into account their national interests, undermines the fragile foundations of Haitian Statehood and exposes the political elite’s loss of a culture of conducting a dialogue. We are concerned by the fact that the killing of President Moïse, which was committed with foreign interference, remains uninvestigated. Tomorrow will be the second anniversary of that crime, which has unquestionably become the starting point for a spiral of lawlessness and violence and the creation of a power vacuum in the country.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9368 (2023) · source

  45. We can see that there is still a lot that remains to be done in that regard. We welcome the mediation efforts by CARICOM as well as the efforts by regional actors to bring the positions of the Government and the opposition closer together. It is important to make sure that the Haitian crisis does not become a challenge to the stability and security of the Caribbean as a whole. The systemic crisis in Haiti has been, to a large degree, fuelled by many years of destructive external interference in the form of direct interventions and manipulations in the form of political engineering.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9368 (2023) · source

  46. We note with concern that progress in implementing the National Consensus for an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Election, signed 21 December 2022, has de facto been limited to creating a High Transitional Council and then sponsoring a political forum on the key issues the country is facing. The main opposition parties did not participate in this forum. We are convinced that finding lasting solutions to the political crisis in Haiti is only possible on the basis of a genuine and truly broad national consensus. Including the word “consensus” in the title of a document, forcing those who disagree with the consensus to agree it and then believing that consensus has been achieved is far from being the best strategy. We expect that the Special Representative will continue her efforts to broaden a genuine political dialogue.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9368 (2023) · source

  47. The statistics presented in the Secretary- General’s report (S/2023/492) demonstrate a worrisome trend towards growing numbers of abductions, murders, sexual violence and other crimes this year. Direct clashes between gangs and peaceful civilians continue, and these peaceful civilians who, when they lost all hope of receiving assistance from the Government, are organizing themselves to protect their lives. Armed to the teeth and well-organized armed gangs feel at ease in the areas of the capital that they control, at a time where the understaffed and unmotivated police is afraid even to enter. The national institutions of governance show that they have almost completely lost their capacity to act, and this is compounded by the long-standing crisis of legitimacy of the elective bodies.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9368 (2023) · source

  48. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We welcome the participation in today’s meeting of the Prime Minister of Jamaica, Mr. Andrew Holness, who spoke on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Haiti, Mr. Jean Victor Généus, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic, Roberto Álvarez Gil. We also thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ms. María Isabel Salvador, for her briefing, and the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022), the Permanent Representative of Gabon, Mr. Michel Xavier Biang. We listened very carefully to the briefing by Ms. Gilles. The situation in Haiti continues to deteriorate across the board.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9368 (2023) · source

  49. We look forward to more effective inspection efforts off the coast of Libya, which must be carried out in strict compliance with international law.

    2023-06-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9351 (2023) · source

  50. Against that background, the double agenda of our Western colleagues is obvious. Their goal is the same as it was before: not a long-term solution, but rather to provide resources for their own economic needs at the expense of Libya’s hydrocarbon resources. The stable functioning of Libya’s oil sector is important for post-war reconstruction, with the understanding that the country’s natural resources belong first and foremost to its citizens. Order must also be restored in its economic and financial sectors, based on the principle of Libyan ownership of financial assets, including those in frozen accounts. In conclusion, we remain concerned about the problem of illegal migration and the proliferation of weapons in Libya, which have an impact on security both within the country itself and in the Sahelo-Saharan region as a whole.

    2023-06-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9351 (2023) · source