YouSaid · the spoken record

Polyanskiy

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2,335
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2018-01-31
most recent
2023-12-22
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300
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un-security-council

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  1. We would like to reiterate our firm position that there can be no alternative to inter-Yemeni negotiations that take into account the interests and concerns of all the parties involved in the conflict. That is a prerequisite for stabilizing the situation and restoring peace. It is vital that the representatives of the Presidential Leadership Council continue their direct dialogue with Ansar Allah. We will continue to use the diplomatic resources we have to cooperate actively with both the Presidential Leadership Council and the Houthi leadership, encouraging them to adopt a constructive approach and show their willingness to find a compromise solution aimed at normalizing the overall situation in the region.

    2022-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9063 (2022) · source

  2. We are confident that the parties’ compliance with all the terms of the truce and their rejection of unilateral provocations will allow the positive developments in the Yemeni crisis to be consolidated and to progress towards a full-fledged, comprehensive political settlement. A long-term cessation of hostilities would help create a favourable environment for launching serious political negotiations on the future of the country. However, things are not going as smoothly as we would like. The negotiations under way between the Presidential Leadership Council and the Houthis under the auspices of the United Nations to reopen the roads around Taiz have not produced the results we had hoped for. We hope the parties’ balanced and realistic approach to discussing this sensitive issue will help them find a common denominator.

    2022-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9063 (2022) · source

  3. Almost immediately, the tripartite Military Coordination Committee resumed its work to ensure respect for the United Nations-backed truce and the implementation of ceasefire provisions. We consider that the agreement reached within its framework to set up a working group for permanent operational communication on ceasefire violations is a very encouraging sign. It is important that negotiations do not become static. In particular, we would like to underscore the role of Special Envoy Grundberg, whose efforts greatly contributed to reaching the agreement and the implementation of the provisions of the truce agreement. Mr Grundberg can rest assured that our country will continue to provide him with the necessary support in his difficult work.

    2022-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9063 (2022) · source

  4. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in in Russian): We thank Special Envoy of the Secretary- General Hans Grundberg, Ms. Ghada Mudawi, Acting Director of Operations and Advocacy Division of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and Ms. Azal Al-Salafi for their briefings on the developments of the situation in Yemen. We continue to closely monitor the situation in Yemen, where we have recently seen increasingly positive trends in the long-standing military and political conflict. We welcome the agreement reached between the Presidential Leadership Council and the Ansar Allah movement to extend the truce for another two months. We understand how difficult it was for the Yemenis to reach that compromise, which makes it all the more valuable.

    2022-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9063 (2022) · source

  5. I think that we can all agree that the uncertain status in which the Secretary-General’s envoys have had to operate on the Libyan dossier has lasted far too long and has begun to have a negative impact. In that connection, we are in favour of the early appointment of a new Head of the Mission, and, in the process of selecting such a candidate, we deem it vital to secure the consent of the Libyan people themselves, regional players and the members of the Security Council.

    2022-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9047 (2022) · source

  6. Overall, we hope that the Libyan people will be able to independently overcome the difficulties facing them on the basis of an inclusive dialogue, without any heavy-handed external assistance. We are convinced that given the new realities in Libya, the role of the United Nations has become even more important. However, for a long time now, owing to the absence of an appointed Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) entrusted with a Security Council mandate, that role is not being fulfilled. After Jan Kubiš’s resignation, in November 2021, at a pivotal stage of the Libyan peace process, UNSMIL was left without de facto leadership. Now, as we see it, it is clear to everyone that the configuration of the United Nations presence in its current form does not meet the necessary requirements.

    2022-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9047 (2022) · source

  7. We note with satisfaction that the Libyans managed to overcome the recent impasse on the military aspect of the peace process, and the meeting of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission in Toledo, Spain is proof of that. We call on the Libyan people once again not to let that initiative slip through their fingers in that delicate area, as that could lead to an escalation of military conflict and a repeat of the sad scenario of 2019. On the issue of the evacuation of foreign forces from Libya, our approach remains unchanged. We continue to consistently advocate for the simultaneous, gradual and balanced withdrawal of all non-Libyan armed groups and military units. Failing that, we see serious risks of upending the fragile balance in Libya.

    2022-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9047 (2022) · source

  8. In this context, we are extremely concerned about reports about recent armed clashes in Tripoli that coincided with the Prime Minister’s arrival. Once again, we would like to point out that the use of force to resolve disputes is unacceptable, especially in today’s complex situation. As far as we can tell, attempts to reset the political process have had mixed results. A number of initiative meetings have not led to any meaningful outcomes. Nevertheless, we welcome the positive steps during the meeting between the delegation of the House of Representatives and the High Council of State in Cairo at the end of May, during which it was possible to reach a preliminary compromise on a number of issues in relation to legislation that would form the basis for future elections.

    2022-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9047 (2022) · source

  9. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to the Under-Secretary- General, Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo, and the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011), Mr. T.S. Tirumurti, for their briefings. We are increasingly worried about the developments in Libya, especially in the light of recent events. With great regret, we note that the political process in the country is once again close to a dead end. In fact, what we are seeing in Libya is two competing Governments, in which the new Prime Minister Bashagha, who was elected by the parliament in February, formed a Government of a National Stability, which he has been fighting to have recognized as legitimate for two months.

    2022-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9047 (2022) · source

  10. 22, giving foreign private investors access to north-western and north-eastern Syria, effectively legalizing Washington’s plundering of Syrian grain east of the Euphrates. We are sorry to see that since then the United Nations leadership has been unable to find an opportunity to comment on this illegal activity of the United States in Syria, including yesterday, when we were discussing issues of food security around the world (see S/PV.9036). And yet ending a situation counter to international law such as this one would ease the lives not only of many ordinary Syrians but also their neighbours, who used to buy Syria’s surplus food products before the Americans intervened.

    2022-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9038 (2022) · source

  11. We also feel compelled to point out that the United Nations continues to try to circumvent the problem of the destructive consequences of the illegitimate unilateral sanctions of the European Union and the United States for Syria’s economy and the supply of international humanitarian assistance to it. It is ordinary Syrians who end up becoming hostages, deprived of access not just to their oil resources but to agricultural lands that once fed the entire region. In its lengthy occupation of these lands of Syria’s, Washington has essentially been deliberately creating famine in a country that was once agriculturally self-sufficient. On 12 May, the United States Treasury issued General License no.

    2022-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9038 (2022) · source

  12. We cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that the terrorists of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, who have been recognized as such by the international community, have usurped power and are manipulating humanitarian assistance that could easily be organized from Damascus if the will were there. But my colleagues have shown no such desire, leaving us with no reason to maintain the cross-border mechanism. And the Al-Nusra Front is openly saying that it will not let humanitarian cargo from Damascus go through to the detriment of the cross-border measures. As for the three zones of Turkish operations in northern Syria, internal deliveries to those areas have still not begun, despite the fact that Damascus promptly accommodates all United Nations requests.

    2022-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9038 (2022) · source

  13. As we are all well aware from our own life experience, nothing good generally comes of such spoiled children. And yet for some reason my colleagues are doing everything they can, despite the facts, in an obstinate attempt to portray their offspring as an excellent student. The choice of one of the briefers for today’s meeting was unfortunately a perfect example of that. We have frequently pointed out that in general the discussions on the situation in the Idlib terrorist enclave and the extremely one-sided attitude of some members to it have been rather protracted. They are trying to maintain a status quo that is exceedingly uncomfortable even for them, without proposing any solutions or trying to meet any of Damascus’s legitimate demands. We are not okay with that.

    2022-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9038 (2022) · source

  14. The main problem, which runs counter to the principles of the work of the United Nations, is that the implementation of early-recovery and reconstruction projects continues to be hedged about by donor countries’ political preconditions. It is deplorable that the United Nations finds it extremely difficult to resist that pressure. The Secretariat leadership’s shameful internal guidelines, “Parameters and principles of United Nations assistance in Syria”, which have never been abrogated, are an obvious example of that, including as they do political conditions. Frankly speaking, in their efforts to preserve the mechanism at any cost, my colleagues on the Council increasingly resemble the parents of a lazy, sloppy student who is threatened with expulsion from school, pleading for keeping him in school for one more year.

    2022-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9038 (2022) · source

  15. Despite the vital need for early-recovery projects outlined in resolution 2585 (2021) in order to establish normal conditions for Syrians’ lives and livelihoods, at this stage we can only welcome the intention of the United Nations to expand those efforts. Martin Griffiths repeatedly spoke in support of stepping up efforts in that area. The fact is that the cumulative effect of restoring basic infrastructure to increase Syrian society’s resilience post-conflict could represent considerable savings for donors. We fully support Mr. Griffiths in that regard, and it is unfortunate that the fundamental logic of ensuring humanitarian recovery in Syria has not elicited the same response from donors, who include countries that signed on to resolution 2585 (2021).

    2022-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9038 (2022) · source

  16. We tried to see things from our colleagues’ perspective and agreed to extend the mechanism for six months, as a serious down payment, so to speak. And what do we have now? In principle, we are back to square one. In terms of establishing sustained humanitarian deliveries from Damascus, especially to Idlib, four cross-line convoys in a year can hardly be called a success. Stories of a lack of security in the region essential to the convoys’ passage come up solely in the context of the cross-line deliveries, while nothing seems to prevent the constant transport of goods across the Bab Al-Hawa checkpoint. And even if the total will be six or seven convoys by the time the mechanism is terminated, that will not change the picture. We see no systematic efforts happening here.

    2022-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9038 (2022) · source

  17. Nonetheless, a year ago we allowed our colleagues to persuade us of the need to temporarily retain the mechanism until deliveries across the line of contact were fully operational. Resolution 2585 (2021) was adopted as a result and included a number of other elements, including support for early-recovery projects. However, from the very beginning, the resolution’s implementation was stymied, and the reason for that immediately became clear. Quite simply, no Council member wanted to be responsible for working with the terrorists in Idlib to ensure that they stopped sabotaging the cross-line convoys. In fact it was only in January, facing the six-month extension, that they suddenly recollected the problem and began trying to persuade us that there were positive trends on the ground that needed support.

    2022-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9038 (2022) · source

  18. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. Martin Griffiths for sharing his insights. It would not be overstating things to say that in the context of the issue under discussion today, we are all concerned first and foremost about the question of the future of the cross-border mechanism for delivering humanitarian assistance to Syria, which will expire in July. Today we heard and will probably continue to hear opinions about the importance of this mechanism for Syrian refugees and the need for its extension or even expansion. The Council members are aware that we have a different take on this issue and that we cannot ignore the fact that if we call a spade a spade, the cross- border mechanism violates Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

    2022-05-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9038 (2022) · source

  19. The Centre does important work in terms of coordinating counter-terrorism measures in the region. For our part, we intend to continue to assist in building the capacity of Iraq’s security forces, first and foremost by promoting bilateral military and technical cooperation, particularly since Moscow and Baghdad have long cooperated closely in fighting ISIL and other terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq.

    2022-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9034 (2022) · source

  20. According to the most recent report of the Secretary- General (see S/2022/368), in various provinces of the country, attacks by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) fighters, including suicide bombers, are continuing. They destabilize the already turbulent atmosphere in the area of regional security. Once again, we would underscore that that challenge can be effectively tackled through the broadest possible coordination of counter-terrorism efforts. We believe it necessary to ensure that all parties involved in the fight against terrorism in Iraq respect its State sovereignty and coordinate their efforts with those of the country’s official authorities. In that context, we note the activities of the Baghdad Quadripartite Information Centre, with the participation of representatives of Russia, Iraq, Iran and Syria.

    2022-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9034 (2022) · source

  21. We welcome the resumption in April of the dialogue between the federal authorities in Baghdad and the Kurdish autonomous region on addressing existing areas of disagreement, first and foremost in the oil and gas sphere. We are convinced that further addressing this issue will also help address existing ethnic and sectarian problems and allow the economic potential to be more effectively leveraged for the benefit of the Iraqi people as a whole. Despite Baghdad’s achievements on the counter- terrorism front, the security situation in the country remains volatile, including as a result of the recent increased activity of clandestine terrorist groups.

    2022-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9034 (2022) · source

  22. We deem it unacceptable that the country be turned into an arena for settling scores and for regional confrontation. Despite the fact that the results of the early elections to Iraq’s Council of Representatives were endorsed in December last year and that the presidency of the Council was re-elected in January, we note with regret that members of Parliament still have not managed to finish forming the highest bodies of State authority. We hope that the parties in Parliament will soon be able to agree on the appointment of a president and the makeup of a new Government, one that enjoys the support of all major political, ethnic and sectarian groups in the country.

    2022-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9034 (2022) · source

  23. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert for her briefing on the situation in Iraq. We also listened very carefully to Ms. Hanaa Edwar. We remain concerned over the internal political situation in Iraq, which is compounded by the difficult socioeconomic situation. We cannot fail to notice that the attempts by certain external actors seeking to derive benefit from Iraq’s domestic disputes are preventing a lasting normalization in Iraq. In that context, we call on the international community to support Baghdad’s efforts to stabilize the situation in the country, including through ensuring the rule of law and working towards social, financial and humanitarian sector recovery in the country.

    2022-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9034 (2022) · source

  24. In our statement, we already said that the United States had not provided any information or clarifications about the nature and the real aims of its biological activities in Ukraine, including within the Preparatory Committee of the ninth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva, which is a specialized forum. The United States tries to pretend that nothing serious is happening, but, unfortunately, it is. We want clarifications from the United States. We mentioned the mechanisms that we may utilize. We will not leave this subject. The United States attempts to turn our specific objections and questions into empty talk by talking about Russian propaganda will not work. The United States will have to provide specific clarifications about the criminal activity in which it is involved in Ukraine.

    2022-05-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9033 (2022) · source

  25. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): There are once again attempts to divert the discussion, move the focus away from the topic that we initially put forward and mix together chemical and biological weapons. Those are different things. You, Mr. President, talked about both, but we are talking about specific facts that we have uncovered about specific documents that indicate that the United States is carrying out military biological programmes at biological laboratories in Ukraine. We have distributed several hundred documents. There are specific data, cases, companies and people in them. If it is thought to be insufficient evidence, then what is sufficient evidence? Our questions are not answered, not only within the Security Council.

    2022-05-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9033 (2022) · source

  26. There is no doubt that your presidency, Madam, will be studied in the textbooks of diplomacy as a counterexample of how a President of the Council should behave, notwithstanding personal convictions or the interests his or her capital wants to pursue. Madam, you managed in a month’s time to considerably undermine or even destroy both written and unwritten rules on which the trust and cooperation in the Council is based. Indeed, regardless of the geopolitical circumstances, the consequences of your actions will be felt for a long time I do wish every success to the upcoming United States presidency of the Council. Against the background of your presidency, Madam, I believe it will be simple for our American colleagues to succeed. We will explain the details of that during the wrap- up today.

    2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source

  27. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Because this is the last meeting under this month’s United Kingdom presidency, I had to take this opportunity to say that we are very happy that the month is drawing to a close. As we all know from popular movies and books, British diplomats and other officials are extremely considerate, polite, concerned about traditions and that they keep their word in any and all situations. However, during this month, Madam President, you managed to seriously undermine, if not completely destroy, that stereotype in your leadership as President of the Security Council.

    2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source

  28. We will make a clear distinction between such tactical pseudo-peacekeeping calls and a genuine intent to help Ukraine to the only correct and long-overdue course of action. The sooner that is done by the Ukrainians, contrary to the inclinations of those that are egging them on — those who wish to profit from the tragedy that has been unfolding since 2014, including the European Union’s leadership, which has taken off its mask — the better it will be for that country, because in one way or another, the objective of the special military operation to liberate Donbas, which is aimed at demilitarizing and de-Nazifying Ukraine and eradicating the threats emanating from the area against the Russian Federation, will certainly be achieved.

    2022-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9018 (2022) · source

  29. The OSCE leadership was aware of that issue but preferred to sweep that fact under the rug until the last moment. Those disclosures undermine trust in any international organizations whose officials include predominantly representatives of Western countries. I will not conceal the fact that under these circumstances calls for peace and a ceasefire sound mendacious and insincere, and in practice they merely point to an aspiration to provide Kyiv nationalists and radicals with breathing room to regroup and obtain more drones, anti-tank guided missiles and man-portable air defence system , and in the meantime stage additional inhumane provocations and disseminate more fake information about the alleged actions of Russian soldiers.

    2022-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9018 (2022) · source

  30. I am referring to the use by the Ukrainian armed forces of OSCE Mission armoured vehicles. According to media outlets, in late February Azov Battalion fighters turned up at the Office of the Special Monitoring Mission in Mariupol demanding that the keys to the vehicles be handed over. When rejected, they threatened the staff with guns, and, ultimately, obtained eight OSCE vehicles, including armoured ones. One of those vehicles was eventually found 5 kilometres from the Special Monitoring Mission’s offices, in the Kirov market in Mariupol. It had clearly been used in hostilities. Not a single one of those vehicles was ever returned to the OSCE. Similar threats were made against the Mission’s staff in Sievierodonetsk in late February and early March.

    2022-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9018 (2022) · source

  31. However, we are carrying out the special military operation not to find understanding or support from them. It would be naïve to trust in their support in the geopolitical game that they have initated, in which they use Ukraine as a mere pawn. We became aware of the dirty tricks that they are prepared to utilize to forge a so-called rules-based world order when we saw that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Ukraine, instead of monitoring and reporting on violations of the ceasefire, simply engaged in spying for Kyiv’s benefit, handing over to the Ukrainian army’s information from surveillance cameras so that they could adjust their firing positions and targets. The collection of evidence about that very inconvenient fact is ongoing. However, another issue warrants specific attention.

    2022-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9018 (2022) · source

  32. One month into the siege of Azovstal plant, those same radicals and neo-Nazis suddenly declared that allegedly, there had been civilians inside the plant all that time, even though until yesterday, they had never uttered a word about it. They never mentioned any civilians; in fact, even hundreds of military personnel, once surrounded, moved to surrender. In that way they have once again disclosed the truth. The civilians in that facility were there only to be used as human shields. There is a multitude of such evidence that we will without fail share with the Council. But will members wish to hear about this? For eight years they have studiously ignored the deaths of civilians — women, children and the elderly — in Donbas, and therefore we have our doubts in that respect.

    2022-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9018 (2022) · source

  33. It is not possible to sweep the truth about that under the rug, and the fact that the Ukrainian military has been using prohibited cluster munitions in the shelling of residential infrastructure cannot be swept under the rug either. For example, this morning, cluster munitions targeted Golovchino, in Belgorod oblast of the Russian Federation, where there are no military facilities. This was put on record, and all relevant evidence has been registered. However, for some reason, we do not see any willingness on the part of our Western colleagues to condemn that heinous crime and the radicals’ breach of the norms of international humanitarian law.

    2022-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9018 (2022) · source

  34. However, that is felt more and more by ordinary Ukrainians, who from the beginning of the special military operation have not been encountering terrorism or shelling by the Russian army, contrary to what Ukrainian or Western propagandists say, but ruthless hostility and indifference to the country’s own population on the part of Ukrainian neo-Nazis and radicals, who have been seeking to save their own skins at all costs. With each passing day there is more and more evidence of civilians being used as human shields, indiscriminate shelling of residential areas in their own cities in order to pin the blame on Russian military personnel, egregious, Goebbels-inspired provocations in Bucha and Kramatorsk and at the maternity hospital and theatre in Mariupol.

    2022-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9018 (2022) · source

  35. So what if American liquefied natural gas is considerably more expensive than Russia’s? Yet these are “molecules of freedom”, as a United States official put it, that the Europeans, not the Americans, will pay for. The Russian economy, as is well known, is doing fine under these circumstances of sanctions pressure, finding in these new circumstances fresh areas of development and new, reliable partners. The only country that is losing in all respects as a result of the situation is Ukraine, and yet it seems that the Kyiv authorities have not noticed that, or perhaps they prefer not to notice it.

    2022-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9018 (2022) · source

  36. That is clearly to the liking of the Eastern European members of NATO, which have long been thinking about how to rid themselves of obsolete Soviet weapons. Now, promising to supply modern NATO weaponry, they have been gladly offloading vehicles that no longer work to Ukraine, as they know that the Russian army will grind and crush those non-functional items and they will no longer have to think about its disposal. In addition, our pragmatic United States colleagues, without one iota of conscience, are now attempting to reap maximum economic profits. By prompting Europeans to impose increasingly stringent economic sanctions, Washington, which will suffer the least in that scenario, intends to have other States gradually become addicted to their gas products.

    2022-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9018 (2022) · source

  37. I also cannot but note that the concerns of our Western colleagues about Ukraine and the Ukrainians are extremely short-sighted and selfish. They need Ukraine and the Ukrainians today only as cannon fodder in their indirect war with Russia “to the last Ukrainian”. At the same time, they are keeping their own interests front and centre. For example, weapons manufacturers in Western countries are eagerly rubbing their hands together, calculating their profits from increased defence orders. After the first week of hostilities in Ukraine, the stock value of the leading British arms producer, BAE Systems, rose by 24 per cent and the stock value of Thales Air Defence Limited, a producer of anti-tank and anti-air systems, rose by 42 per cent. We have seen the same trends with the United States war industry.

    2022-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9018 (2022) · source

  38. Today they are trying to not only rewrite modern history with an anti-Russian lens, but also to encourage the insane speculations of some of our Eastern European neighbours about the role of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the liberation of Europe, and the world as a whole, from fascism. Apparently, it is easier for them to ignore the egregious manifestations of neo-Nazism in Ukraine, whose de-Nazification is one of the goals of our military operation. That is necessary in order to ensure that there will never again be a threat — not only to the people of the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic, but also to Russia and to the Ukrainians themselves, who are held hostage by those authorities — from the territory of this State.

    2022-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9018 (2022) · source

  39. Moreover, by baselessly portraying what happened on 24 February as an “unprovoked and unprecedented Russian aggression” or a “war of choice”, they hypocritically pretend that nothing more horrific has happened in the world since the end of the Second World War, sweeping under the rug the hundreds of thousands of victims of the military adventurism of Western States since the Cold War — in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yugoslavia and Libya. As recently as yesterday, our Syrian colleagues circulated a letter in the Security Council about the horrific consequences of the American razing of the city of Raqqa to the ground in 2017. That operation has become synonymous with inhumane action, which resulted in the city being practically wiped off the face of the Earth, along with its inhabitants.

    2022-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9018 (2022) · source

  40. None of our Western colleagues have commented on that disgraceful phenomenon. In painting their picture of the world, they are striving to present Ukraine as a pure and innocent white lamb. That picture does not include the Kyiv regime’s eight-year war on civilians in the east of its country or its many years of sabotaging the Minsk agreements. They simply try to forget about it and prompt others to do the same under threat of sanctions and direct political and economic blackmail.

    2022-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9018 (2022) · source

  41. Today our Western colleagues prefer to overlook not only the growing rate of emigration from Ukraine in recent years, as I mentioned, but also the staggering corruption, the skyrocketing political murders, most of which have remained unpunished, the unprecedented repression of opposition leaders and the mass closure of opposition media outlets, to name but a few. Those who reproach us for human rights violations fail to recall the unprecedented persecution of the Russian language and those who speak it in that country. Understandably, when praising Ukraine, it is embarrassing to talk about the Mirotvorets website, which remains operational and posts publicly the personal data of inconvenient Ukrainians and foreigners who criticize the Maidan regime. Some of those whose lives are thus endangered are minors.

    2022-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9018 (2022) · source

  42. At the same time, according to the Ptoukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, in 2021 there were even fewer Ukrainians — 38 million people. It is noteworthy that — according to the same Institute — 3 million Ukrainians left for seasonal work. I am not providing those figures to downplay the scale of the migration challenges Ukraine and its neighbours are facing today. I merely wish to disagree with attempts to erase the history of post- Soviet Ukraine, turn a blind eye to all its problems and start counting issues only from the beginning of the Russian special military operation.

    2022-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9018 (2022) · source

  43. According to official reports, since 2014 alone, at least 1.7 million people have applied for Russian citizenship, refugee status or temporary asylum in our country. After the intensified shelling of Donbas by the Ukrainian side on the eve of the start of Russia’s special military operation, that flow increased dramatically, reaching 863,000 people. In other words, at least 2.5 million Ukrainians have sought refuge in Russia since the Maidan coup. By the way, the mass exodus of Ukrainians from their country is nothing new for that State. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance, between 1990 and 2021 the country’s population decreased by a quarter — from 54 to 41 million people.

    2022-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9018 (2022) · source

  44. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We take note of the views voiced by Ms. Kelly Clements, United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, and Mr. António Vitorino, Director General of the International Organization for Migration. We heard many alarming conclusions and terrifying figures in their statements. In that context, we must recall that the Russian Federation faced the consequences of the deteriorating situation in Ukraine immediately after the anti-constitutional coup there in February 2014. As soon as the nationalist authorities showed their true face by unleashing a war against the Russian language and then undertaking the physical destruction of their eastern residents, Russia was flooded with refugees fleeing the Maidan lawlessness.

    2022-04-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9018 (2022) · source

  45. Another negative aspect is the expedited energy transition that Western countries are implementing with the main goal of protecting and promoting their technologies. All of this had caused spikes of prices on food and energy before 2022 even started. The main factor driving instability and the source of the problem today is not the Russian special military operation in Ukraine, but the sanctions imposed on our country, seeking to undermine the logistical chains and financial patterns used to make payments for any incoming deliveries from Russia, except for energy products that the West is interested in. For that reason, if Council members really want to save the world from a food crisis, they should lift the sanctions of choice that they themselves have imposed and poor countries will immediately feel the difference.

    2022-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9017 (2022) · source

  46. Lastly, I would like to say that we are not surprised that today we heard renewed allegations on the part of a number of countries that the looming global food crisis is caused solely by the actions of Russia in Ukraine. We understand that it is more convenient for our Western partners to make such accusations than to actually recognize their own responsibility for the volatility and pessimism in the food, energy and financial markets. The situation did not arise overnight and took years to evolve. Indeed, it is the result of the excessive subsidizing of Western economies, trade wars, protectionism and unilateral illegal sanctions that affect two-thirds of the planet’s population to varying degrees.

    2022-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9017 (2022) · source

  47. We would like to stress once again, however, the need to completely lift restrictions on the supply of medicines and basic necessities to all parts of the country without discrimination. In that context, we underscore the efforts of regional States that are prepared to continue to provide financial, humanitarian and mediation assistance to resolve the political and military crisis in Yemen. We also note the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding between the Ansar Allah movement and United Nations agencies to resolve the situation involving the FSO SAFER oil tanker. We again recall resolution 598 (1987) and other initiatives aimed at subregional stabilization, including the renewed Russian collective security concept.

    2022-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9017 (2022) · source

  48. In that connection, we welcome the first visit of the Special Envoy to Sana’a since he assumed his post and the resumption of direct dialogue with the movement’s leadership. We also welcome Mr. Grundberg’s willingness to cooperate with the Ambassadors of the five permanent members of the Security Council in Yemen. For our part, we will further actively encourage the new Yemeni authorities and the Houthis to engage in dialogue. We call on all parties to the internal conflict in Yemen to return to the negotiating table in order to establish a lasting comprehensive political settlement, under the auspices of the United Nations, which is key to normalizing the humanitarian situation in Yemen, which remains a source of major concern. We note the renewed access to the Al-Hudaydah ports and the unloading of food and fuel from tankers.

    2022-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9017 (2022) · source

  49. In that context, we note the establishment in Yemen of a new collegial authority, the Presidential Leadership Council, consisting of representatives of several political and social forces in the country. The Council is tasked with governing the State in the political, economic and military spheres during the transition period, as well addressing the security situation. That important event for the Yemeni people was also the result of the political and diplomatic efforts of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council. We trust that the members of the Presidential Leadership Council will do their utmost to stabilize the situation in Yemen and restore peace in the country. We are convinced that such a goal can be achieved only through constructive dialogue with the Ansar Allah movement, which controls the north of the country.

    2022-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9017 (2022) · source

  50. In that regard, we pay particular tribute to the role of Special Envoy Grundberg, whose efforts greatly facilitated the negotiation and implementation of the ceasefire. We hope that the ceasefire can be extended and expanded beyond its stipulated timeframe. We believe that such positive steps will contribute to restoring mutual trust. We strongly urge all parties to the Yemeni conflict to strictly comply with the agreements reached and to reject unilateral, provocative acts. We continue to believe that the long-awaited peace in Yemen can be restored only through widespread national dialogue by taking into account the interests and concerns of all leading political forces and religious and regional groups in the country.

    2022-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9017 (2022) · source