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Polyanskiy

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2,335
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2018-01-31
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2023-12-22
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un-security-council

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  1. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation abstained in the voting on resolution 2616 (2021), on combating illicit arms trafficking. To put it bluntly, for the entire time the resolution was being discussed, we did not really understand why it was introduced in the first place. The penholders’ concept changed several times. However, in our view, it was the starting point that was incorrect: an attempt to introduce a one-size-fits-all, universal approach to all arms embargo regimes and peacekeeping missions. That runs counter to the very nature of such regimes and missions, which are approved by separate decisions of the Council when considering country-specific situations with their own particularities.

    2021-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8942 (2021) · source

  2. We would also like to take this opportunity to thank the delegations of the Niger, Viet Nam, Tunisia, Estonia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines for their close engagement in the Security Council during their two-year tenures, including on the issue under consideration today.

    2021-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8940 (2021) · source

  3. At an international conference held in Brussels on 16 November in support of the Agency, Russia announced its intention to continue its funding, which involves annual voluntary contributions to the Agency’s budget over the next five years. We believe that it is crucial that UNRWA continue its comprehensive work to provide humanitarian assistance to the millions of Palestinian refugees in the Middle East without hindrance. In conclusion, given that this is the last official meeting of the Security Council this year, we would like to thank you, Mr. President, and all the delegation of the Niger for your high-level presidency of the Council in December.

    2021-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8940 (2021) · source

  4. We intend to continue working actively with our Quartet partners, whose most recent teleconference took place on 10 December. Our initiatives to improve the effectiveness of that mediation mechanism are well known and remain on the table. We believe that it is important to provide comprehensive humanitarian assistance to those in need in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as to Palestinian refugees in neighbouring Arab countries. Following the escalation in violence in May, maintaining the ceasefire and providing humanitarian assistance to affected Palestinians, especially in the Gaza Strip, are of the utmost importance. In that regard, we support the efforts of the relevant international organizations, including the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

    2021-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8940 (2021) · source

  5. For our part, we maintain our intention to hold the next joint meeting in Moscow as soon as leading Palestinian political forces and movements are ready to agree on common approaches and formalize them in the relevant document. We are counting on the assistance of other interested parties, particularly our friends in Egypt. We continue to work with the Palestinians and the Israelis and with the international and regional actors concerned, including within the Middle East Quartet. A month after Prime Minister Bennett’s visit to Russia, President Putin met with President Abbas in Sochi on 23 November. In principle, we support the initiative of the Palestinian President to hold an international conference on the Palestinian question.

    2021-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8940 (2021) · source

  6. We are particularly concerned about the Israeli leadership’s plans, announced in mid-October, to resume, after a brief pause, building illegal settlements in the West Bank, as well as to double the number of the settlers in the Jordan Valley by 2026. We call on the parties to resume the peace process on a universally recognized international legal basis that includes the two-State solution. That requires renouncing provocations and unilateral steps that create irreversible facts on the ground. Overcoming the intra-Palestinian division within the Palestine Liberation Organization remains an important condition for emerging from the crisis.

    2021-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8940 (2021) · source

  7. We view with concern the recurring outbursts of confrontation in the Old City of Jerusalem, which have resulted in injuries and casualties. We call on the parties to show restraint and refrain from taking drastic steps. The situation is complicated by unilateral actions — the appropriation and destruction of Palestinian property, the construction of settlements, arbitrary arrests, violation of the status of holy sites and incitement to violence. The most recent report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2334 (2016) provides some very disheartening statistics in that regard.

    2021-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8940 (2021) · source

  8. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Tor Wennesland for his comprehensivebriefingonthesituationinthe Middle East. It will not be possible to achieve an overall improvement in the situation in the Middle East region without resolving the Palestinian question. As demonstrated by the voting in the General Assembly this past November and December on the annual thematic resolutions, the vast majority of the international community is united in its commitment to a just solution to the Palestinian question. With no prospect of an imminent relaunch of the peace process, that focal point of repeated tensions will continue to generate sporadic violence. The escalation in May in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and predominantly Arab areas of Israel are clear examples of that.

    2021-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8940 (2021) · source

  9. Time will tell as to whether the humanitarian exemptions are effective; we will closely watch this situation. We call upon the Secretary-General not to divert attention from this and to report about the situation in his regular reports. In conclusion, I wish to emphasize that, on the basis of our assessment, both the United Nations and individual members of the Security Council can and should do more to ensure implementation of resolution 2585 (2021). Without this, the efforts we undertook in July to establish constructive cooperation on the Syrian humanitarian track will not bring us the desired results.

    2021-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8937 (2021) · source

  10. The stepping up of comprehensive humanitarian assistance to Syrians is especially important given the coronavirus disease pandemic. This would be facilitated by addressing the problem of unilateral sanctions. In our view, a step in the right direction was the publication of a special explanation by the United States Department of the Treasury stating that restrictions do not apply to early-recovery projects. Their implementation, including for critical civilian infrastructure facilities, will help to meet not only the urgent needs of Syrian people, but will also help to improve living conditions and assist in preventing the collapse of water- and electricity-provision systems. Rebuilding schools, hospitals and homes will also help to ensure that conditions are ripe for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

    2021-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8937 (2021) · source

  11. Can my colleagues imagine individuals living in demolished homes or even tents, not wanting to have access to normal accommodation; that they would not want to provide their children with access to education; or that they would not want access to medical assistance in a properly functioning hospital and running water? Their voices need to be heard first and foremost. Very little is being done for now in the area. We call upon donors to reconsider their approaches to humanitarian assistance in Syria for the benefit of ordinary civilians, including those returning to their homes. I wish to take this opportunity to thank those countries that proactively joined financing plans and have helped to finance these relevant projects. We expect that the United Nations will develop the relevant comprehensive plans and programmes.

    2021-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8937 (2021) · source

  12. From July to October this year in north-east Syria, 425 trucks made cross-line transfers in addition to seven convoys received through the World Health Organization. This number cannot even be compared to the 109 trucks that crossed through Al-Yarubiyah in the six years that the operations have run in the area. My third point concerns early recovery projects. The report of the Secretary-General contained in document S/2021/1029 provided exhaustive argumentation about the importance of stepping up these efforts. We hear from our colleagues in various formats about the importance of accounting for the views of those in need in carrying out humanitarian needs assessments and developing humanitarian response plans. This allegedly enhances the accountability for assistance being provided.

    2021-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8937 (2021) · source

  13. The calm and even positive assessments of the situation, which are essentially tantamount to being satisfied with seemingly noble one-off gestures of terrorists is something which we cannot countenance. We call upon everyone to contribute to unblocking the provision of humanitarian assistance from Damascus to Afrin, Al-Bab, and Tel Abyad. We believe that this is possible. Two years have elapsed since the closure of Al-Yarubiyah. The report of the Secretary- General (S/2021/1029) notes that land and air assistance delivery routes from Damascus have been ironed out and made available, and that the United Nations presence has been expanded and access has been improved for those in need, with the exception of such areas as the Al-Hol internally displaced persons camp.

    2021-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8937 (2021) · source

  14. On 27 October, we heard about clear plan of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to step up cross-line operations into north-west Syria (see S/PV.8888). According to the plan, the area should have had five convoys reach it to date. In fact, there was only one convoy, which did not include the late August United Nations World Food Programme convoy to Sarmada. And yet the plan describes the areas insufficiently covered by cross-border assistance, and individuals who are not receiving assistance that they need. Pragmatic and concrete proposals of humanitarian representatives are rejected by those who are in a position to unblock cross-line assistance and make it sustained. Thus, one of the key provisions of resolution 2585 (2021) is therefore simply being torpedoed.

    2021-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8937 (2021) · source

  15. This shows that Idlib fighters are obstructing implementation of resolution 2585 (2021), not the fact that the cross-border mechanism has no alternatives. The potential for cross-line deliveries and the interest in it on the ground is indeed considerable, but incentives for Idlib terrorists to allow assistance to cross through that mechanism are not yet significant. The Council needs to continue to work to see to the implementation of its resolutions. While a number of those in this Chamber criticize the Syrian authorities, the Syrian authorities are fully carrying out their obligations on time, which has already been confirmed by a number of reports of the Secretary-General.

    2021-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8937 (2021) · source

  16. The terrorists having gained access to assistance provided by the United Nations in Aleppo, eastern Ghouta and Rukban clearly attest to this. Still, we emphasize the pressing need for a United Nations international presence to be established in the enclave. This will help to enhance confidence in the distribution mechanism. Secondly, with respect to the modest — to put it mildly — progress in humanitarian deliveries across the line of contact, essentially what we cautioned against actually transpired. In six months, only two humanitarian convoys reached Idlib — only 28 trucks — while, in the period from July to November this year, through Bab Al-Hawa, 48,498 trucks reached the de-escalation area.

    2021-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8937 (2021) · source

  17. It is no secret that it is indeed the fault of the fighters that the food that reached Sarmada from Aleppo back in August was distributed as late as 16 December. I cannot but voice regret at the fact that over all that time my colleagues did not utter even a single word of condemnation, all the while patiently waiting to get the approval of terrorists for the food aid to reach areas not covered by the cross-border mechanism. What about the people for whom this assistance is critical? Are my colleagues indifferent in the face of their suffering? Against this backdrop, the proposal for some kind of effective remote oversight by a United Nations monitoring mechanism in the Idlib enclave is completely unpersuasive.

    2021-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8937 (2021) · source

  18. In that connection, I would like to make various observations. First, I would like to comment on transparency in the ongoing humanitarian operations, primarily in Idlib. I repeat, once again, that, on the whole, we do not doubt that the United Nations monitoring mission, which oversees the delivery of humanitarian convoys exclusively to the border with Syria, is carrying out its work well. Our concerns, rather, are related to what is taking place directly in Idlib, which is rife with terrorists who have seized control of all areas of life, including freedom of movement. Under such circumstances, how can the provision of assistance be considered in any way impartial and independent?

    2021-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8937 (2021) · source

  19. Another critical component in that connection has already been mentioned — the special report of Secretary-General António Guterres (S/2021/1030). I now wish to comment on the Secretary-General’s report. At the outset, I would like to pay special tribute to the United Nations humanitarian agencies, and to Mr. Martin Griffiths in particular, for their extensive efforts to steer the humanitarian situation in Syria towards a constructive solution. Mr. Griffiths personal contribution to this process has been invaluable. On the whole, the report lies within the framework of resolution 2585 (2021). We have already mentioned that we fully grasp the difficulties that all parties have grappled with in the implementation of the provisions of that resolution and generally recognize the progress made as the beginning of a long journey.

    2021-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8937 (2021) · source

  20. We call for further steps to ensure the full return of Damascus to the Arab family. I now turn to the humanitarian situation in Syria, which remains tense. Difficulties persist in areas not controlled by Damascus — in Idlib, beyond the Euphrates River and where Turkish operations are conducted in the north of the country. We believe that the achievement of long-term peace and security in Syria is possible only through the full restoration of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, including Government control of its national borders and natural resources, with ongoing efforts to combat terrorism. Given the current circumstances, there is a pressing need to alleviate the humanitarian and socioeconomic situation. The full and conscientious implementation of consensus resolution 2585 (2021) should play a key role in that regard.

    2021-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8937 (2021) · source

  21. We intend to hold the next meeting of the representatives of Russia, Iran and Turkey, with the participation of interested parties, on 21 and 22 December in Nur-Sultan. One important area of the work of the Astana representatives is the issue of detainees. On 16 December, in the framework of a special working group of the Astana format, a sixth exchange of such individuals took place. That initiative was carried out successfully thanks to the coordination of the Russian Defence Ministry and Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as well as the relevant Turkish agencies, the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The general improvement in the situation in and around Syria is also facilitated by the resumption of natural ties between that country and its Arab neighbours, including in the economic arena.

    2021-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8937 (2021) · source

  22. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the briefers for the information provided. With respect to the political situation, we wish to emphasize that we advocate the pursuit of intra-Syrian consultations in Geneva in the framework of the Constitutional Committee. We believe that there is no alternative to the advancement of the Syrian-led and -owned settlement process, with the support of the United Nations and without external interference or the imposition of artificial deadlines. That also applies to all new ideas and proposals to that end. On that basis, we will continue to interact with the Syrians, the Special Envoy and other stakeholders, first and foremost our Astana partners.

    2021-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8937 (2021) · source

  23. We all know very well that agreeing on even a single sentence, not to mention complex, multilayered agreements, might take several days or more; this is something that is completely normal. Let us not try to spur the process forward or put pressure on its participants from outside. I have no doubt that if the parties demonstrate a pragmatic and constructive approach aimed at seeking a balance of interests outcomes that satisfy everyone will be found.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source

  24. The entity established to facilitate resolution 2231 (2015) is not a sanctions committee. It has no right to collect or analyse information and even less to conduct investigations. Nor does it have any authority to send requests to Member States for information, and particularly the kind of information mentioned in paragraphs 9 and 11 of the Secretary- General’s report. We will expect that any sections of the report related to these illegitimate investigations will not see any further elaboration in the Secretary- General’s next report. In conclusion, I would like to once again return to Vienna. What is most important is that there is a normal diplomatic process under way there. All of us in this Chamber are professional diplomats.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source

  25. We do not share the approach of the authors of the report, who equate the lifting of illegal unilateral sanctions by the United States and introducing exemptions from those sanctions. By that, they legitimize the practice of unilateral restrictions in contravention to resolution 2231 (2015) and the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter. We continue to be seriously concerned about the illegitimate practice of the United Nations Secretariat to conduct so-called investigations within the framework of resolution 2231 (2015), bearing in mind the total lack of a mandate to investigate and the expertise necessary to do so. The United Nations Secretariat’s mandate in this area is of a purely administrative and technical character. It is enshrined in the Note by the President of the Security Council dated 16 January of 2016 (S/2016/44).

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source

  26. We join the appeal of the Secretary-General to States Members of the United Nations to increase commercial and economic cooperation with Iran, including by using the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges mechanism. Unfortunately, a number of our traditional criticisms about the biennial reports of the Secretary General on implementing resolution 2231 (2015) continue not to be taken into account, just as in the past. The current report does not single out with sufficient clarity the reasons for the current situation with respect to the JCPOA. The unwillingness of United Nations leadership to call a spade a spade looks like silent acquiescence in the current situation. And yet, contraventions by the United States of resolution 2231 (2015), including the JCPOA, cannot be considered the norm and should be rectified.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source

  27. In and of itself, the deal is first and foremost the most significant confidence-building measure on the international level. There will be no trust without it, and no confidence. Those who believe in a world without the JCPOA must clearly realize that the world without the agreement would be a completely different, much more unpredictable and dangerous place than it is with the agreement. The Secretary-General’s support of the negotiations in Vienna is of fundamental importance. We have noted that this idea is reflected in the current report. We also believe that the United Nations leadership’s position sends an important message that issues that have no relationship to the JCPOA should be dealt with outside of efforts to restore the deal. We would like to echo words of gratitude to the IAEA.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source

  28. The deal contains a carefully negotiated balance of interests and must be implemented exactly in the form in which it was approved by the Security Council in 2015 (resolution 2231 (2015)), without any deletions or additions. In addition, we cannot agree with certain opinions that the deal is supposedly no longer relevant owing to the fact that the Vienna process is not moving fast enough. Currently, there is no alternative to the JCPOA. Thanks to the mechanism of thorough verification envisioned in the deal, Iran today is the most thoroughly verified State in the world. No less important is the fact that, from a political point of view, the JCPOA has become a symbol of the possibility to strike a deal despite differences in approaches to a very complex and sensitive set of issues.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source

  29. Let me repeat: the steps taken by Iran are a reaction to the destructive line that the United States of America has taken. By the way, these steps were postponed for a long time; they were not some unilateral withdrawal by Tehran from its obligations. That is precisely the context in which we should consider the reporting by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), without trying to present the situation as evidence of some malicious intent by Tehran, as our Western colleagues are doing. We believe that it is dangerous and irresponsible to make statements that the JCPOA is outdated or that it needs to be renewed, expanded and so forth.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source

  30. So let us be objective and not forget that the source of today’s problems is the policy of the United States, not Iran. Now our American colleagues speak of their readiness to return to the implementation of the JCPOA, but those are just words that must be confirmed by action. It is regrettable that, despite the complexity of the Vienna talks, the United States is pursuing its policy of maximum pressure on Iran. In response, the Iranian side has continued to freeze some of its obligations under the JCPOA. Thus far, it has not been possible to break this vicious cycle. We believe that progress in terms of the United States returning to the full implementation of the deal will create the conditions for a positive reaction from Iran, including the unfreezing of certain obligations that had been suspended.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source

  31. As we understand it, that position is evolving and being developed. That is why any blanket conclusions, especially those pronounced here today in New York, are wholly inappropriate. We must bear in mind that the Vienna talks are objectively not a quick or simple process. There is an apt Russian proverb to describe this: “It is easier to tear down than to build up.” As many have said today, it was the United States that tore everything down in 2018, when it withdrew from the JCPOA and did a great deal of damage, including by blocking other parties from implementing the agreement. The world then waited six months for the Biden Administration to finally determine its policy towards the JCPOA. Though not often mentioned, that is one of the main reasons why the return to the JCPOA is so difficult today.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source

  32. The world’s attention is now focused on the negotiations in Vienna. Our colleagues there have a very challenging task ahead — to return the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to the initially agreed framework. We must help them, and we can only do so by demonstrating strategic restraint and not fuelling tensions. That applies to all parties to the JCPOA, Security Council members and Iran’s neighbours in the region. In the context of resolution 2231 (2015), what is urgently needed now is professional diplomacy. We need to give it a chance to succeed. Its success is in our shared interests. Against that backdrop, I must frank say that I am rather puzzled that some of our Western colleagues today rushed to comment not only on the negotiation process, but also on Iran’s position at the talks.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source

  33. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I would like to thank Under-Secretary- General Rosemary DiCarlo; Mr. Olof Skoog, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations; and Geraldine Byrne Nason, Permanent Representative of Ireland and Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), for their briefings. We also welcome the participation of our Iranian colleagues in today’s meeting. We approve the adoption of the twelfth report of the Facilitator (see S/2021/1019) and welcome Ireland’s efforts to agree on the text, in which our colleagues demonstrated a truly professional and results-oriented approach. We still have a number of criticisms with regard to the text but, given the importance of maintaining Council unity on this issue, we decided to join the consensus.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source

  34. Once again, we reiterate that Security Council sanctions should be used only to push the political process in Yemen forward. Sanctions should not seek to increase pressure on any one party to the conflict. A source of grave concern is the serious humanitarian situation in Yemen. As we heard from Mr. Rajasingham, the situation, which is worsening on a daily basis, increasingly resembles a full-scale humanitarian disaster. We are seriously concerned by attacks on civilian facilities. We strongly urge the warring parties to strictly comply with the provisions of international humanitarian law and to swiftly and fully refrain from hostilities, which are destroying non-military infrastructure and causing civilian casualties.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8929 (2021) · source

  35. We would urge the members of Security Council to think about a much-needed solution to this long- standing problem — a solution that would turn the conflict into a peaceful political situation and provide necessary assistance to millions of Yemen inhabitants who desperately need humanitarian help. However, we see that our ultimate aim is to reach a comprehensive and long-term settlement of the numerous problems facing Yemen, which are also felt to a significant extent by Yemen’s neighbours. Unfortunately, we have to note that, time after time, our Western colleagues prove how quick they are to sacrifice the unity of the Council on Yemen, guided purely by their own selfish interests. They use the language of sanctions, thus rejecting the possibility of finding any other kind of solution.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8929 (2021) · source

  36. The resolution, adopted in 2015, has nothing whatsoever to do with the situation on the ground in the Yemeni theatre of hostilities. The new reality is that the political landscape and the balance of powers in the country have undergone significant changes, which resolution 2216 (2015) quite simply does not reflect. In this regard, we see a real need for Council members to review the bases for political settlement while maintaining the central role of United Nations mediation efforts and the constructive contribution of States of the region. Only in this way can we help Mr. Grundberg, not just in words but in deeds, develop a new road map for settlement that would reconcile the numerous competing interests of the various players in the Yemeni domestic political conflict.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8929 (2021) · source

  37. After that, piecing the mosaic of the Yemeni State back together will simply not be possible. Given this, the international community should recognize that the reality is that the parties have dug their heels in and are not prepared to relaunch direct negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations. In this context, the mediation efforts of the Special Envoy aimed at bringing the parties to the Yemeni conflict to the negotiating table are and will remain unsuccessful. We heard Mr. Grundberg’s views, especially with regard to his future plans, and we are prepared to support his efforts. However, it is becoming clear that making progress within the existing framework for a Yemeni settlement — and by that, I mean resolution 2216 (2015) — is no longer possible.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8929 (2021) · source

  38. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We would like to thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Mr. Hans Grundberg, and the Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Ramesh Rajasingham, for their substantive briefings. We are closely following developments in the situation in the Republic of Yemen. For more than seven years now, there has been an ongoing bloody conflict with no end in sight. The political process remains stalled under the Stockholm and Riyadh Agreements. This is coupled with a widespread uptick in violence and increased hostilities on all fronts, including Ma’rib and Shabwah provinces. Stagnation in the political process is nearing the point of no return.

    2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8929 (2021) · source

  39. We deem it extremely important that resolution 1540 (2004) remain an instrument of cooperation in the area of non-proliferation. Given the gradual return in the United Nations to working in person, we trust that there will be a significant uptick in the Committee’s work in this area, and in particular with respect to soon carrying out the comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), which was due to take place in 2020.

    2021-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8915 (2021) · source

  40. We are also grateful to the Mexican chairmanship of the 1540 Committee. We are pleased with the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), which remains the only universal international instrument in the area of non-proliferation. Resolution 1540 (2004) obliges all countries to create effective national control systems to prevent weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and associated material from falling into the hands of non-State entities. Achieving that and implementing the resolution fully by all States is our shared aim. The 1540 Committee should play the role of coordinator of global efforts in that area. A priority of its work continues to be to provide technical assistance to countries in implementing the provisions of the resolution when dealing with the relevant requests.

    2021-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8915 (2021) · source

  41. It would be good in future to avoid frequent postponements of meetings and documents being sent for approval by members of the Committee at the last minute. A good example in terms of organization was the joint special meeting of the CTC and the ISIL and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee on terrorism financing that took place on 18 November. We note the high-quality expert support to the Committee provided by CTED, which continues to play a significant role in tackling varied challenges facing the Committee and the entire Security Council in countering terrorism. It is important that CTED maintain its status as a political mission and its exclusive remit to assess efforts of States to combat terrorism. I would like to thank Ms. Michèle Coninsx for her fruitful work as the Executive Director.

    2021-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8915 (2021) · source

  42. We understand how difficult that was during the coronavirus disease pandemic. The Committee successfully adapted and continued to carry out its important role of assessing the implementation by States of the relevant Security Council resolutions. We thank the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) for preparing the global surveys on the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005). In the light of the pandemic-related restrictions, temporary procedures are in place for conducting hybrid visits. That means that some meetings are conducted virtually. We trust that there will be a gradual return to the Committee’s normal way of working. We welcome the resumption of CTC in-person meetings. We hope there will be more active involvement by CTED in addressing organizational matters.

    2021-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8915 (2021) · source

  43. We support the effective work of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. Its reports are an important part of the work of the Committee. We urge Member States to cooperate closely with its experts. We trust that the reports of the Monitoring Team will be as objective as possible and that they will rely solely on credible sources of information. Country visits by the Monitoring Group constitute another important aspect. We therefore expect that priority will be given to countries in a state of armed confrontation against international terrorism, as well as countries that are severely impacted by the phenomenon of terrorism. We would also like to express our gratitude to the Tunisian chairmanship of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) for their effective leadership of that body.

    2021-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8915 (2021) · source

  44. We deem it of primary importance to effectively implement the Security Council resolutions related to the counter-terrorism sanctions regime concerning ISIL and Al-Qaida. The Afghan wing of ISIL is one of the main factors destabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. An additional danger is posed by their expanding ideological propaganda and recruitment activity with the smart use of information and communication technologies. We view the ongoing presence in the country of the group as a threat to States of Central Asia. The increase in the number of terrorist attacks using suicide bombs indicates that the group has the manpower available. We underscore that we need to keep the focus on the problem of foreign terrorist fighters who have been added to anti-terrorist sanctions lists so that to prevent and curb their criminal activity.

    2021-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8915 (2021) · source

  45. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We welcome the briefings on the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities; the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), concerning counter-terrorism; and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). We thank the Ambassador of Norway, Chair of the 1267 Committee, for her able leadership and readiness to approach issues constructively. We commend the work of the Committee. We believe it is one of the most effective Security Council mechanisms in the area of counter-terrorism.

    2021-12-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8915 (2021) · source

  46. The leadership of UNRWA is making efforts to improve efficiency and reduce costs, which must be commended. Russia will continue to support the Agency, and we call on the entire international community to do likewise.

    2021-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8913 (2021) · source

  47. The ongoing construction of settlements and plans to double the number of Israelis living in the Jordan River Valley by 2026 can be viewed as a de facto annexation of most of the occupied Palestinian territory. We attach great importance to the provision of comprehensive humanitarian assistance to those in need in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as to Palestinian refugees in neighbouring Arab countries. Against that backdrop, the continuing precarious financial situation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is extremely worrisome. The Agency’s activities have not only a humanitarian but also a political dimension, with an important stabilizing impact on the Palestinian territories and countries of the Middle East.

    2021-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8913 (2021) · source

  48. On 23 November, President Putin and President Abbas met in Sochi. At that meeting, Russia reaffirmed its principled position on the Middle East settlement in favour of a two-State solution within the framework of the established international parameters. The Palestinian side also reaffirmed its willingness to engage in dialogue on a universally recognized basis. Unfortunately, against that backdrop, illegal unilateral actions, such as the seizure and demolition of Palestinian property, the construction of settlements, arbitrary arrests and detentions and the violation of the status of the holy sites, continue to have dangerous consequences. Israel’s announcement of plans to expand settlement activity in the West Bank and in the Givat Hamatos neighbourhood of East Jerusalem was deeply disturbing.

    2021-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8913 (2021) · source

  49. On the margins of the Committee, the first in-person meeting in several years of Middle East Quartet members was held. The Quartet remains the sole internationally recognized mechanism to facilitate a Palestinian-Israeli settlement. At the end of the meeting, a statement was adopted in support of efforts to promote a settlement in the Middle East. We intend to continue our efforts to step up the work of the Quartet and call on our Quartet colleagues to examine our well- known initiatives, including through the holding of a ministerial meeting and consultations in an extended format with the participation of the States of the region. We also count on the support of the international community for those initiatives. For our part, we continue to engage with all parties and international and regional stakeholders.

    2021-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8913 (2021) · source

  50. In that context, the international community faces the urgent tasks of achieving stabilization, providing humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people and creating conditions for the resumption of the Palestinian-Israeli settlement process on a universally recognized international legal basis. We believe it is important to continue efforts to build international consensus and coordinate joint actions to promote a fair solution to the Palestinian problem. In that context, we welcome the outcome of the ministerial meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for the Coordination of the International Assistance to Palestinians, held in Oslo. We note Norway’s contribution in preparing for the event, which shows that the international community has not turned its attention away from resolving this problem.

    2021-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8913 (2021) · source