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Polyanskiy

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2018-01-31
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2023-12-22
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un-security-council

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  1. That comes as no surprise, as the goal of turning Libya into a gas station to meet the energy needs of our Western colleagues was devised not yesterday but in 2011, when Libyan statehood was destroyed as a result of the aggression of NATO countries. It is clear that the United States Administration continues to view the political process in Libya solely through the prism of its own economic interests, including by preventing price hikes on the so-called black gold. Accordingly, Washington’s main efforts are aimed not at a genuine settlement of the Libyan crisis but rather at preserving the situation so that it does not deteriorate and undermine the supply of energy resources from that North African country to the European market. In the understanding of our American colleagues, that is the main task of the Libyan authorities.

    2022-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9192 (2022) · source

  2. The energy factor plays an important role in that connection. There is no mistaking the fact that Western capitals are paying increasingly greater attention to Libyan hydrocarbons and their extraction and transit. Moreover, Libya is known for its low-cost oil production, which is of high quality and located close to European markets. It is not a coincidence that in every statement by Western officials on Libya the importance of unimpeded access to Libyan natural resources is always mentioned in one way or another, or that the force majeure declared this summer on a number of Libyan oil fields resulted in a disproportionately negative reaction from those same officials.

    2022-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9192 (2022) · source

  3. We reaffirm our approach to eliminating the foreign military presence in Libya through a coordinated, balanced, gradual and step-by-step withdrawal of all non-Libyan armed groups and military units, without exception, with the aim of maintaining the balance of power and preventing the escalation that might be triggered by a sudden security vacuum. The international community should coordinate its assistance to Libyans, and in that regard, UNSMIL is one of the main mediators. Key players in Libya and its neighbours should not have a dual agenda. One of the main reasons for the protracted Libyan crisis has been the consistent policy of our Western colleagues, who pay lip service to their commitment to a political settlement but continue exploiting the turbulence in Libya for their own interests.

    2022-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9192 (2022) · source

  4. Meanwhile, under pressure from the diverging interests of external players, the situation again threatens to spiral out of control. We believe that the current situation in Libya demands the Security Council’s undiminished attention to the issue, which is why we insisted on convening today’s meeting. At this juncture, our priority is maintaining the ceasefire regime and facilitating the quest for compromise among the main political players in Libya. Given the recent troubling reports from Tripoli, that is particularly urgent. We underscore the unacceptability of creating obstacles to the Government’s work and urge Libyan leaders to show restraint and refrain from taking escalatory steps.

    2022-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9192 (2022) · source

  5. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We would like to thank Mr. Abdoulaye Bathily, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), for his briefing on the current situation in the country. I would like to take this opportunity to express our support for his mediation efforts. The situation in Libya remains extremely tense. Despite the relative calm on the ground, the current status quo is extremely unstable. Realistically, we do not yet see an end to the dual-power period, nor are there any prospects for the holding of inclusive, nationwide elections or for unifying the organs of Government. Progress on the Constitution track is also very modest.

    2022-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9192 (2022) · source

  6. It is clear that with such an approach there is no point in hoping for a meaningful discussion in the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013).

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

  7. That approach is in stark contrast to the policy of Rafael Grossi, the Director-General of another specialized international organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency Mr. Grossi has made shuttle diplomacy a hallmark of his work as Director-General. However busy his schedule is, he always finds time to brief the Council. Once he even did so when he was on an aeroplane. What is stopping Mr. Arias from doing the same? Is it because he is indifferent to his responsibilities, or because he is afraid of displeasing the Western delegations that are attempting to monopolize the platform at The Hague and bend the OPCW leadership entirely to their will? Does he understand the potential consequences for the organization he heads?

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

  8. It is clear that, in principle, there can be no question of any objective investigation in such a case. But the leadership of the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat does not seem to need that. Speaking to the Council in June last year, Mr. Arias did not answer any of the questions that we raised about irregularities in the work of the Technical Secretariat, and, in fact, he refused to take any action to rectify them. Moreover, he openly bragged that he had violated the methodology required by the CWC for preserving evidence, which was allegedly obsolete. I would like to hear how he is able to support that position, which is diametrically opposed to his mandate. It is also telling that Mr. Arias has never visited Syria or seen with his own eyes the sites about whose inspections he reports on to the Security Council every month.

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

  9. The report is full of fantastic details, such as helicopters flying at low altitude at night with their lights on, which, in principle, is unacceptable when carrying out combat missions, and a cylinder that somehow became corroded in less than 12 hours after hitting the ground. No national court in the world would accept such crude disinformation as evidence. But the OPCW Technical Secretariat does not hesitate to bring it to the attention of States Members of the United Nations and the OPCW, and it even announces new IIT products. In principle, we are very concerned about the Technical Secretariat’s practice of retrospective investigations. What eyewitness accounts can be found five years after the incident, particularly given the military and political instability in the country? What material evidence?

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

  10. Given the fact that it itself is illegitimate, that is, its establishment was pushed through by Western countries in violation of the CWC, it is not surprising that all its products are an example of the lowest grade of politically ordered pseudoanalysis. Let us take last year’s report on the incident in Saraqib in February 2018. It shows that the IIT never went to the scene of the incident. All the physical evidence was collected by representatives of the infamous White Helmets non-governmental organization. At the same time, half of the witnesses interviewed were White Helmets themselves, and their testimony was examined by anonymous so-called authoritative experts and scientific institutions.

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

  11. We see how the OPCW inspection teams readily seize on any, even the weakest and most inconclusive, material from the infamous White Helmets, while evidence of the involvement of the opposition in the organization of provocations using chemical weapons provided by professionals — the Syrian authorities and the Russian military — is blatantly ignored, as well as the numerous confirmations of local eyewitnesses, that is, living eyewitnesses, of the staged nature of those incidents. The Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), so cherished by our former Western partners, is, as they say, as crooked as a corkscrew.

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

  12. What factors have contributed to the fact that the Technical Secretariat now allows itself to openly violate its own declared principles and does not hesitate to admit it in its reports? Who, if not the Director-General, should deal with this unacceptable situation? Another related issue is the double standards of the Technical Secretariat in selecting sources of evidence.

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

  13. Thirdly, we remain thoroughly dissatisfied with the working methods of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, which in its investigations relies on information from biased sources opposed to the Syrian Government, collects their statements remotely and draws “highly likely” conclusions based on them, claiming all that fiction as irrefutable evidence. In addition to being unconvincing, such methods are in direct violation of the CWC, which has a chain-of-custody requirement to ensure that evidence is preserved. At the very least, all that is a dramatic, inexplicable and unjustified change in the basis of the organization’s work. Moreover, a former OPCW spokesman, Mr. Luhan, said in 2013 that the organization would never examine samples that had not been collected by its inspectors in the field.

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

  14. The Director-General and his representatives never provided us with a reasonable explanation for that unacceptable and outrageous situation. Secondly, there is Syria’s initial declaration under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). We asked for an explanation of the differences in approach on that issue between Damascus and, for example, Libya and other countries that experienced similar problems but were not subjected to the same barrage of criticism as Syria. Why are the reports of the Technical Secretariat on the issue invariably one-sided and do not take into account any positive developments? In addition, it was not limited to criticism, and unprecedented restrictive measures were imposed on Syria for no reason.

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

  15. Neither have we received any response from the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the presence of whose representative, according to Mr. Arias’s strange logic, allegedly relieves him of the need to address the Security Council in person. Let me recall the main points that remain unclear. First, of course, is the infamous report of the Fact- Finding Mission related to the incident in Douma in April 2018. As confirmed by various sources, including former inspectors of the OPCW itself who were directly involved in the investigation of that case, its final version was radically edited as compared to the original one under pressure from some delegations. In fact, that was a forgery. Attempts by the inspectors to get the OPCW leadership to investigate what had happened came to nothing. Moreover, they were harassed for their pursuit of the truth.

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

  16. It has already become clear that he is terrified of publicly holding the OPCW Technical Secretariat, headed by him, accountable for flagrant violations in its work. That is very unfortunate because, without the requisite work on mistakes, the decline in the OPCW’s international credibility will be irreversible. On the two occasions that Mr. Arias finally dared to address the Security Council in person, we asked him a number of specific questions about the irregularities in the work of the Technical Secretariat (see S/2020/1202 and S/PV.8785). In December 2020, they were transmitted to the Director-General in writing, as well as being distributed among the members of the Council. For the past almost two years, we have not received any substantive response.

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

  17. It seems that today we are holding a meeting for the sake of a meeting and are convening only so that some Western capitals can tick a box and report that we are maintaining the same frequency of meetings on the Syrian chemical weapons issue as before. Such an approach devalues the discussion on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) and undermines the authority of the Council, which could have discussed far more urgent and fast-moving situations instead of wasting time. But since we are all gathered today anyway, I will touch on a topic that is becoming increasingly outrageous. We are grateful to the Ghanaian presidency for inviting OPCW Director-General Fernando Arias to brief the Security Council. His latest refusal was predictable.

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

  18. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The previous meeting on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) (see S/PV.9164) was held on 25 October, that is, less than two weeks ago. There are no subjects within the Security Council’s mandate-reporting cycle that have been considered with such frequency. Given that, in the case of the Syrian chemical file, there has been no development of the situation at all on the ground, this is simply absurd. The latest report of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (see S/2022/828, annex) differs from the previous one (see S/2022/727, annex) in exactly two sentences. What is the point of convening a separate meeting of the Security Council for the sake of discussing them?

    2022-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9184 (2022) · source

  19. We will continue to further act within the framework of the BWC and make the efforts needed to establish all of the facts having to do with the violations by the United States and Ukraine of their obligations under the Convention in the context of the activities of biological laboratories on the territory of Ukraine. Sooner or later, all the violators will be held accountable by the international community for such illegal activities. In order to ensure national, regional and global biosecurity, Russia will unfailingly work on further strengthening the regime of the Convention. We will make such efforts during the ninth Review Conference of the BWC, slated to take place in Geneva from 28 November to 16 December 2022.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9180 (2022) · source

  20. In the course of our work on the draft resolution, Western countries demonstrated in every way that the law does not apply to them and that they have no intention of abiding by the provision I just quoted, and for this so they are ready to trample on any norm or to flout any rule. This is the usual colonialist mentality to which we are accustomed, and we are not surprised by it now. Regardless of the outcome of the vote today, we retain our questions for the United States and Ukraine to answer, and the evidence that accompanied our complaint still requires clarification.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9180 (2022) · source

  21. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are extremely disappointed by the fact that the Security Council today did not manage to activate the mechanism provided for under Article VI of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC). Let me recall that, according to section 2 of Article VI, “[e]ach State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council...”.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9180 (2022) · source

  22. Whenever we voice any kind of concern with supporting documentation, we are immediately accused of spreading propaganda. Generally speaking, Western countries remember the United Nations Charter and international law only when they need to. The idea that such norms could be or should be applied to them as well sparks categorical rejection among our Western colleagues. Work on the draft resolution was a very eloquent illustration of that fact. We expect that respect for the standards of international law, including the BWC, will prevail in the Council today. Those delegations that are committed to upholding those standards and which are not afraid of taking an independent stance that could anger Washington and its satellites will support our draft.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9180 (2022) · source

  23. It became obvious that Western countries are simply fearful of establishing the kind of commission that would consider the materials presented by Russia and will investigate them, as provided for in the BWC. In particular, they are not satisfied with the fact that this commission will consist of all members of Security Council because they are trying to unilaterally make decisions on behalf of the entire international community. Indeed, they are also not satisfied with other forms of international cooperation because they do not fit in with the concept they are promoting: the so-called rules-based order where the rules are to be set by themselves. The accusations against us by Western countries and Ukraine without providing any evidence whatsoever are immediately presented as the absolute truth.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9180 (2022) · source

  24. After that meeting, we conducted two rounds of expert consultations on the draft resolution contained in document S/2022/821, but what we heard from our former Western partners — only the old talking points about so-called Russian propaganda and their statements that the evidence we provided is not sufficiently convincing and that it does not merit further consideration — were conclusions that they arrived at unilaterally, prejudging any outcomes that could issue from the Security Council, and in essence they replaced the decisions about to be taken by the key body of the United Nations responsible for maintaining international peace and security with their own biased national assessments. We regret the fact that our Western colleagues essentially derailed the negotiations on the draft resolution.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9180 (2022) · source

  25. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The upcoming vote is a considerable milestone for the Security Council. We will have to decide whether the Council shows readiness to act in line with international law, in this specific case, with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC). We explained our positions in this regard in detail at the Security Council meeting held on 27 October (see S/PV.9171). I am not going to repeat them.

    2022-11-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9180 (2022) · source

  26. It is otherwise difficult to explain the presence of five additional participants from the European Union at today’s meeting and none at all at the debate of 28 October on the situation in the Middle East (see S/PV.9174). We believe firmly that international civil aviation and the International Civil Aviation Organization should not become an instrument for applying political pressure. It would be extremely regrettable if it were allowed to slide down the same slippery slope as that of the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which is being rapidly politicized and losing all sense of independence. Such a scenario would cause irreparable damage to international cooperation in the area of civil aviation.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9175 (2022) · source

  27. We see an ever-increasing number of situations in which ICAO acts in the interest of a small group of countries. As we can see, the inability to properly respond to civil aviation issues leads to those topics being addressed in a non-specialized forum — the Security Council. Instead of addressing issues pertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council must again spend its time on the schemes concocted by our former Western partners against countries they dislike, although that bears no relation to the mandate of the Security Council. Judging by the number of representatives of European States inscribed on the list of speakers, those schemes are of greater concern to them than the real issues facing the States Members of the United Nations.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9175 (2022) · source

  28. In October, the biased report that had been redrafted to meet the pre-cooked accusations was endorsed by a resolution adopted at the forty-first session of the ICAO Assembly, which characterizes the legitimate acts of the Belarusian Government as a blatant violation of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. We consider that decision to be not only unfounded, but also overtly politicized. We sincerely regret that, contrary to ICAO’s long-standing reputation as a technical body, its Assembly was used as a platform to promote the political interests of some countries. Overall, the recent developments in ICAO have demonstrated that the organization is rapidly losing its ability to deliver in an impartial and professional way on its mandate, namely, to contribute to the safe and progressive development of international civil aviation.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9175 (2022) · source

  29. As far as they were concerned, ICAO had only one goal — to confirm the conclusions and claims of the Western capitals, which ICAO did the second time around to the detriment of its reputation. As a result, we now have serious doubts about the impartiality of ICAO because no objective and transparent investigation into the incident involving that Ryanair flight was conducted. Let us recall similar air incidents. What would be the reaction of the international community to an investigation into, for example, the forced landing of the aircraft of the President of Bolivia in Vienna in 2013, the landing of a Belavia flight in Kyiv in 2016 or the emergency landing in Berlin in May 2021 of a Ryanair flight en route from Dublin to Krakow upon receiving information about an explosive device onboard?

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9175 (2022) · source

  30. However, instead of adopting measures to rectify that egregious situation, Western States continue to blame the Belarusian side. In our view, what is important is that Belarus itself maintained absolute transparency in the investigation, with no other agenda. The Belarusian aviation authorities interacted closely with ICAO and provided all the information requested. However, that responsible approach was not welcome, as it did not fit into the predetermined plans of Western countries, which did not wait for the outcome of the international investigation. Before the report was even released, they decided to suspend flights through Belarusian air space, ban EU-bound flights of Belarusian air companies and impose illegitimate restrictions on Minsk.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9175 (2022) · source

  31. Suffice it to say that the revised report cites as one of its sources an anonymous individual, who allegedly used to be an air traffic controller and is now outside Belarus, and uses unverified audio recordings while ignoring the information shared by the Belarusian authorities. Many appear to forget that the Team’s task was not to find ways to accuse the Republic of Belarus but to determine the facts and identify gaps with a view to maintaining the safety and security of international air transport. I will provide just one example. The report states that some European States read the communications about a threat of an explosion onboard the aircraft 24 or more hours after those messages had been sent. Is that the proper level of flight security? Is that acceptable to European airline passengers?

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9175 (2022) · source

  32. I recall that Western sponsors were not satisfied with the OPCW’s initial report, which confirmed the lack of proof of the use of chemical weapons, and as a result the already finalized report was further doctored and tailored to satisfy their predetermined conclusions about Syria’s involvement in the provocation staged by the notorious White Helmets. Western States and the OPCW Director-General, Mr. Arias, do their utmost to turn a blind eye to the obvious facts that confirm manipulation and fraud, which dramatically undermines trust in the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the organization as a whole. Similarly, the revised ICAO report on the landing of the Ryanair flight in Minsk, which is completely at odds with the initial report, carries little credibility in terms of its objectiveness.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9175 (2022) · source

  33. They took advantage of their majority in the ICAO Council and forced the Team to continue the investigation. As a result, the final report was not final at all. Upon considering the revised report, the ICAO Council reached a completely different decision, which condemned the acts of the Belarusian authorities and found that its officials were allegedly complicit in providing Ryanair Flight FR-4978 with false information about the threat of an explosion. Thus, essentially, the ICAO Council repeated the allegations made by Western countries in May 2021. This situation is painfully reminiscent to the investigation by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) into the incident that occurred in Douma, Syria, on 7 April 2018.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9175 (2022) · source

  34. There are many questions that can be posed about that document — questions about which some States prefer to remain silent. Let us examine the facts. On 31 January, the ICAO Council hosted a discussion about what it said was the final report on the incident involving Ryanair Flight FR-4978. The Team had concluded that a Belarusian MIG-29 had not intercepted or escorted the Ryanair flight and that the decision to land in Minsk had been made independently by the crew of the aircraft and the alleged guilt of the Belarusian side was not established. Could such conclusions satisfy Western countries? Clearly not, as they needed the report to be political in nature so that they could use it to justify their illegitimate restrictive measures against the Belarusian air industry.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9175 (2022) · source

  35. We take note of the briefing by the President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Mr. Salvatore Sciacchitano, on the event involving the landing of Ryanair Flight FR-4978 at Minsk National Airport on 23 May 2021. However, the picture painted of that event and its allegedly objective investigation by the ICAO team does not resemble what actually happened. We have every reason to believe that the so-called “fact-finding process” was nothing more than the widely practiced settling of scores by Western countries with countries they dislike. Let me explain. Let us start with the report submitted by the ICAO Fact-Finding Investigation Team, which was the basis of the recent ICAO Assembly resolution condemning Belarus.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9175 (2022) · source

  36. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Before I address the topic of today’s discussion, let me express our surprise and great disappointment at the decision of the President to allow representatives of several European Union (EU) States to participate in today’s meeting. They have no connection with today’s agenda item. That sets a bad example and demonstrates a lack of integrity. It also plays into the hands of Western countries, which as we just heard very clearly, planned an anti-Belarusian show — and for that matter anti-Russian show — for the Security Council today. We can explain the President’s clear neglect of the Council’s rules of procedure and duties by inexperience and the overall strain that comes at the end of a Security Council presidency, which was on the whole successful.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9175 (2022) · source

  37. In conclusion, I would like to underscore that our position with respect to the voting is due solely to our disagreement with the wording of the resolution, which I mentioned earlier, and rather reflects the assessment of the work of the penholder. Nevertheless, we reiterate our consistent support for the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara and its Head, Mr. Alexander Ivanko. The Mission plays a key stabilizing role in terms of creating favourable conditions on the ground for the resumption of dialogue between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO in order to advance the peace process.

    2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9168 (2022) · source

  38. In that context, and as a permanent member of the Security Council and a member of the Group of Friends of Western Sahara, we continue to maintain active contact with all interested parties. We are working with Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO, Algeria and Mauritania. We call on all parties to refrain from unilateral actions that could complicate the resumption of a substantive political dialogue. The formula for a final settlement should be based on mutually acceptable outcomes that will contribute to a fair political resolution of the situation in Western Sahara for both Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO. It should also provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the framework of procedures that are consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

    2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9168 (2022) · source

  39. We question the vague language used to define the direct participants in the conflict and the Western Sahara peace process. We also consider the numerous references to the round-table format, which is irrelevant and limits the mediation activities of the Personal Envoy, to be misplaced. At the same time, the text of the resolution does not reflect the continuing issue of access by United Nations entities to the territory of Western Sahara in order to provide humanitarian assistance to the civilian population there. In that regard, we would like to reaffirm our consistent position on the settlement of the Western Sahara issue. We advocate for a balanced and impartial approach, and we support the efforts of the Personal Envoy to organize direct negotiations between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO.

    2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9168 (2022) · source

  40. In the past few years, the resolutions on the renewal of MINURSO’s mandate have included amendments that in our view harm the unbiased and impartial approach needed to resolve the issue of Western Sahara. We disagreed with that iteration of the resolution in the past, and we could not vote in favour of it today. The resolution adopted today does not reflect the real situation on the ground with regard to the settlement of the Western Sahara issue and is unlikely to facilitate the efforts of the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, to resume the direct negotiation process between Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) in order to reach a mutually acceptable solution.

    2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9168 (2022) · source

  41. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Russia abstained in the voting on resolution 2654 (2022), submitted by the United States, on renewing the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). The process of preparing and agreeing on the document was not fully consultative. None of our principled and well-grounded comments, including compromises, which we repeatedly communicated to the United States, were taken into consideration. A number of useful proposals by other Council members also went unheeded. As a result, the resolution is not balanced. That situation raises doubts, once again, with regard to the impartiality of the informal penholders of country- specific topics in the Security Council.

    2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9168 (2022) · source

  42. Through the efforts of representatives of the Department for Rescue Archaeology of the Institute for the History of Material Culture of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Syria’s Directorate-General for Antiquities and Museums, the first stage of restoring the Arch of Triumph at Palmyra has been completed. As part of that project, Russian and Syrian experts are successfully carrying out a set of activities in order to provide a post-traumatic response, conduct comprehensive archaeological research on the territory of the arch and work on its restoration.

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9163 (2022) · source

  43. In the past month alone, 11 new farming cooperatives were established in the provinces of Aleppo, Latakia, Tartus, Dara’a and As-Suwayda, in support of farmers. Concessional lending programmes were launched in the country, and the main irrigation station was put into operation in the province of Deir ez-Zor, enabling the use of about 7,500 hectares of agricultural land. In addition, in the provinces of Damascus, Deir ez-Zor and Homs, the construction of 921 residential properties is being completed. Those housing units are to be donated to refugees and internally displaced persons. In addition, we are working to preserve the cultural and historical heritage of Syria.

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9163 (2022) · source

  44. The ships of the Mediterranean group of the Russian navy took part in the rescue operation. Such refugee tragedies are yet another grim wake-up call. For our part, we are doing everything we can — in close cooperation with Damascus — to rectify the humanitarian situation on the ground. Thanks to those efforts, more than 2 million Syrian citizens have returned to their homes to date. Of those, more than 1,375,000 are internally displaced persons and more than 1 million are refugees from abroad. Since 2018, we have repaired and put into operation more than 22,000 socially significant and industrial facilities in various regions of the country, and construction work is under way at more than 4,100 additional facilities.

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9163 (2022) · source

  45. For neighbouring Lebanon, continuing to host Syrians on its territory has already become an unbearable burden. The country’s authorities openly declare that, but none of our Western partners is interested in a fundamental solution to the problem, just as no alternatives are being proposed to return people to normal life. Humanitarian workers are passively looking on, fearful of provoking anger in the West with actions and initiatives that run counter to the political stances of well-known Western capitals. The refugee problem requires an urgent solution. At the end of September, a boat that left Tripoli capsized and sank. According to different sources, 120 to 150 Syrian refugees headed to Europe were on board. One hundred people died, and the survivors are being cared for.

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9163 (2022) · source

  46. According to estimates of Syria’s Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, the country’s energy-sector losses as a result of the actions of the United States and the Kurdish Administration amounted to more than $107 billion, due, among other things, to the activities of American companies such as Delta Crescent Energy, as well as the consequences of the so-called Caesar Act. In that regard, we attach great importance to the regular review of international humanitarian activity in Syria as part of informal interactive dialogue designed to ensure the implementation of resolution 2642 (2022). That is important not only to ensure a conscious and informed decision regarding its extension in January 2023, but also for creating the basic conditions needed, inter alia, for the return of Syrian refugees.

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9163 (2022) · source

  47. The main reason for that is not — in any way — the actions of the Syrian authorities, but rather the consequences of United States and European Union sanctions, combined with new challenges, such as the pandemic, a food crisis and a growing number of cholera cases. The specialized agencies of the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross are chronically short of funds to extend urgent assistance to all those in need. The humanitarian plan is only 25 per cent funded. Western donors, led by the United States, only declare their generosity, but in reality they are plundering Syrian natural resources.

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9163 (2022) · source

  48. This situation looks especially cynical in the light of the fact that Damascus regularly issues the necessary permits. It is worth noting that both the Secretariat and those who allege that there is insufficient security in the region are actively and demonstrably clamouring for cross-line access in other country contexts, where the intensity of hostilities makes such operations much riskier for the security of humanitarian workers. We see this as yet another display of double standards. Overall, the socioeconomic and humanitarian situation in Syria continues to deteriorate, primarily in Government territories, where 67 per cent of the population lives. In fact, many of those living there are forced to fight for their survival.

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9163 (2022) · source

  49. The Syrians have repeatedly launched appeals in that regard to the Secretary-General and the Security Council, citing the numerous violations of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international humanitarian law. We consider it unacceptable to leave those letters unanswered, all the more so because on other topics the Secretary- General expresses his views and assessments much more actively, sometimes without even waiting for the States Members of the United Nations to express their positions. Returning to the topic of Idlib, we certainly welcome the recent dispatch of another cross-line humanitarian convoy to Sarmada. However, let us be frank — this is only the eighth convoy, and there is no real enthusiasm to increase humanitarian assistance to Syria’s rebel- held areas, in cooperation with the Government.

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9163 (2022) · source

  50. The American command, demonstrating its impotence in providing security guarantees in the territory it controls, continues to block the arrival of a joint mission of Russia’s Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides and Refugee Migration Monitoring in the Syrian Arab Republic and international humanitarian organizations to conduct a real assessment of the situation in the camp and evacuate the remaining refugees. The United States, as the occupying party, bears full responsibility for the civilians therein. Another destabilizing factor in Syria is Israeli attacks, with their systematic violation of the airspace above Syria and neighbouring Arab countries, in the course of which strikes are being carried out against civilian targets.

    2022-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9163 (2022) · source