YouSaid · the spoken record

Polyanskiy

lines on the record
2,335
first
2018-01-31
most recent
2023-12-22
sittings or episodes
300
sources
un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

  1. The lack of a fully functioning Government complicates all aspects of life, from ensuring security to meeting normal business and humanitarian needs. We welcome the emergence of various initiatives to promote direct public dialogue in order to overcome the crisis. Our consistent position has been that sustainable peace, in any country, can be guaranteed only through a frank and inclusive discussion on resolving critical problems and overcoming differences by taking the views of all parties into account, and Haiti is of course no exception. In that context, the mission’s efforts to assist Haitians in establishing dialogue are very important. We believe that this should remain a top priority for the United Nations.

    2020-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8729 (2020) · source

  2. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Ms. Helen La Lime, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti, for her briefing on the situation in the country and the work of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH). We agree with the assessment of the situation in Haiti contained in the first report on the work of the special political mission (see S/2020/123) during an extremely important period for the country. The withdrawal of the United Nations peacekeeping mission coincided with an uptick in political activity. Disagreements between the branches of State power prevented the appointment of a Government and Parliament and it was not possible to hold timely elections.

    2020-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8729 (2020) · source

  3. I would just urge Mr. Heusgen to act responsibly. He is promoting some very good initiatives, which we support — children in armed conflict and women, peace and security. Each statement in which he abets the Ukrainians’ unwillingness to engage in dialogue with their own people does not theoretically promote those initiatives that he supports but has a concrete impact on the women and children in Donbas who are dying due to the bullets of Ukrainian soldiers. He should think about that next time he makes a statement.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8714 (2020) · source

  4. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are always impressed by the institutional memory of Mr. Heusgen, who took part in the negotiations on drafting the Minsk agreements, although his memory has recently started to significantly fail him. Regarding the aggression against Ukraine, in recent history there is only one example of such aggression, namely, on 22 June 1941. We will not mention the country that carried out that aggression, particularly since the nationalistic forces in Ukraine are trying to forget about it and, in fact, echo Mr. Heusgen’s words about the supposed Russian aggression. I will not return to the issue of Flight MH-17. Our position is well known. There is no convincing evidence. Russia has not been involved in the investigation. I do not think that this is a topic for our discussion today.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8714 (2020) · source

  5. That is why we are interested in strengthening the role and authority of the OSCE and in expanding its cooperation with the United Nations, as that relationship has tremendous potential. We look forward to seeing the Albanian chairmanship-in-office contribute to that endeavour.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8714 (2020) · source

  6. The Kyiv authorities must do the very opposite and try once again to win the trust of people whose interests and vital beliefs were desecrated by the authors of the anti-constitutional Maidan coup d’état. The goal of the OSCE is to assist way that process in every possible, which is critical to the future of Ukraine, rather than abet the short-sighted and noxious nationalistic relapses still prevalent in Ukrainian society. We believe that the OSCE can and should play a significant role in the establishment of multilateralism as a systematic basis for international relations based on international law, contributing in every way to the construction of a system of equal, comprehensive system and indivisible security.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8714 (2020) · source

  7. Guided by that principle, we call on the opposing sides of conflicts everywhere to engage in direct communication — from Afghanistan to Syria and Yemen, from Cyprus to Colombia and Venezuela. Only the population of Donbas is being denied that obvious right. We would like to believe that the OSCE understands the absurdity of the situation and that it is a non-starter. We hope that the new Ukrainian leadership will realize how damaging it is to promote confrontational initiatives that only divide society and restrict the linguistic, educational, religious and cultural rights of the Russian- speaking population and other national minorities.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8714 (2020) · source

  8. Crimea is completely open for any kind of visits that are conducted in accordance with Russian law. That can be confirmed by tourists, of whom there were some 7 million last year. I would therefore ask Ms. Pierce to stop inventing things. I invite her to come and visit Crimea to see how people live. Despite the contradictory signals from the Zelenskyy team, we would like to believe that, with the arrival of the new administration in Kyiv, they will finally understand what is obvious — any resolution of the situation in the east of the country will be impossible without the direct participation of the people of those regions. Here in the United Nations, that is known as inclusivity.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8714 (2020) · source

  9. Overall, as we have heard from the statements of our Western colleagues, none of them has ever read the Minsk agreements or even intends to read them. It would seem more advantageous to continue to stubbornly present Russia as a party to the conflict — which defies all facts and common sense — thereby contributing to the efforts of the Kyiv authorities to shirk responsibility. They are basically giving Kyiv carte blanche for any discriminatory action that it may take against its own Russian-speaking citizens. By the way, from the statements of some of our colleagues here, who make up fantasies about human rights violations in Crimea, some people might get the impression that the region, which has rejoined Russia, is somehow closed off to foreign visitors and that no one is allowed to go in. That is obviously just a fantasy.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8714 (2020) · source

  10. It would be interesting to hear the views of our French and German colleagues on how such a statement aligns with their vision of the future of the Ukrainian peace process. When will they stop denying the obvious? Over the past five years, Kyiv has not fulfilled a single political commitment, has used every possible excuse to refrain from holding a dialogue with its own citizens and has continued to claim a non-existent Russian aggression without offering any evidence thereof. Unfortunately, we can deduce from the words of our colleagues, including the Permanent Representative of Germany, that they remain prepared to support such claims, despite the fact that they have been refuted by the former Chief Monitor of the Special Monitoring Mission, Mr. Ertuğrul Apakan, in this very Chamber.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8714 (2020) · source

  11. In that context, we call for an impartial response to the regular statements from Kyiv about its desire to revise the Minsk agreements. By the way, 12 February will mark five years since the agreements were signed. The Security Council expressed its full support for the agreements in resolution 2202 (2015) and confirmed that support in presidential statement S/PRST/2018/12 of 6 June 2018. There are many examples of Kyiv’s revisionist approach. One need only quote the representative of Kyiv at the Trilateral Contact Group, Mr. Oleksii Reznikov, who, in an interview on 23 January, said that the position of President Zelenskyy remained unchanged and could be summarized by the fact that the Minsk agreements should be at least partially revised.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8714 (2020) · source

  12. That fundamental document, endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 2202 (2015), calls for direct dialogue among Kyiv, Donetsk and Lugansk, for which the Trilateral Contact Group was formed. The Special Monitoring Mission (SMM), whose work we support, plays a key role in OSCE assistance. The Mission should report as fully and objectively as possible on the situation, including on civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian infrastructure, and have direct contact with local authorities in Donbas. We call on the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office to ensure that the SMM publishes thematic reports on civilian victims of the conflict in Donbas and the destruction of civilian infrastructure over the entire course of the conflict. Unfortunately, despite significant diplomatic efforts, the crisis in Ukraine is still far from being resolved.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8714 (2020) · source

  13. As co-Chair of the Minsk Group, we are actively supporting the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and working to bring the sides closer together in the Transnistrian settlement process. We welcome the cooperation between the United Nations and the OSCE in the Balkans, as well as the fact that the two bodies will co-chair the Geneva discussions on stability in the Caucasus. Naturally, when speaking about country situations on the OSCE agenda, it is impossible not to mention the internal crisis in Ukraine. The OSCE has been playing a very positive role in its settlement and the package of measures under the Minsk agreement is the only path to that end.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8714 (2020) · source

  14. Priority should be given to ensuring that negotiations on international information security continue, under the auspices of the United Nations, with a view to developing universal agreements on rules of responsible conduct in cyberspace. Such rules should enshrine equal status for all States in their participation in and governance of the Internet. In an era of an ongoing global trend of deteriorating mutual trust, regional organizations, including the OSCE, have a special mission to restore an atmosphere of mutual understanding in order to resolve crisis situations in their regions. The main criterion for effectiveness in that regard is, of course, contributing to conflict resolution. For our part, we are striving to provide every possible assistance to efforts within the framework of the OSCE.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8714 (2020) · source

  15. We believe that in order to promote non-consensus initiatives, such as the concept of countering violent extremism, which some members of the OSCE are trying to do, is to move in the wrong direction. We support the plan of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism and the OSCE to organize a conference on the issue of the return of foreign terrorist fighters, on 11 and 12 February in Vienna, and look forward to its success. The time has come to significantly enhance the OSCE’s work on combating the drug threat. We welcome the plans of the Chairperson-in-Office to organize an anti-drug conference. Over the past year, the OSCE’s work on security in the context of the use of information and communication technologies has gained new momentum. We hope it will maintain a constructive attitude when considering that issue.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8714 (2020) · source

  16. We hope that the current Albanian Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE will clearly follow his organization’s mandate, play the role of honest broker in achieving consensus and promoting the collective interests and priorities of OSCE member States, and maintain a neutral approach. Cooperation between the two organizations is, in practice, fairly broad in scope, although there remains room for its further strengthening. For example, the OSCE still has considerable potential to combat transnational threats, in particular those posed by foreign terrorist fighters, the financing of terrorism and the spread of extremist ideology. On counter- terrorism, it is important to adhere strictly to the guidelines on international cooperation developed by the Security Council.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8714 (2020) · source

  17. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Prime Minister and Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania, Mr. Edi Rama, for his briefing on the work of the Organization and the issues on its agenda. The Russian Federation has consistently advocated strengthening cooperation between the United Nations and the OSCE on the basis of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and the 2006 declaration of the OSCE Permanent Council. We believe that this regional organization should complement global efforts on the European continent.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8714 (2020) · source

  18. In conclusion, I note that the Russian Federation shares the concerns of the international community with regard to the uncontrolled proliferation of SALWs and advocates the further consolidation of international efforts to counter them under the auspices of the United Nations. We agree that those issues require a comprehensive approach. We intend to continue to work closely on these issues with all stakeholders during this year’s biennial review conference on the Programme of Action.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  19. In practice, that would significantly curtail the ability of States under sanctions not only to exercise the right of self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, but also to simply conduct law enforcement activities. In addition, we find the references to the international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) questionable. The Treaty, which is far from universal, still does not fully allow for the implementation of its own provisions. For example, the ATT does not explicitly prohibit the unlicenced production of weapons or their transfer to non-State actors or include provisions governing the re-export of weapons. There are serious questions about the application of the Treaty in practice. Some parties to it continue to directly or indirectly supply arms to areas of internal armed conflict.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  20. In particular, we draw attention to the idea it raises of expanding the remit of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms to include an eighth category of SALWs. It should be taken into consideration that the existing seven categories already include all major conventional weapons whose delivery, in certain circumstances, can be destabilizing. Furthermore, when taking decisions on an eighth category, we should bear in mind the negative precedent of the use of the Register for unintended purposes, namely, to define the scope of arms embargoes, as was the case with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Iran.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  21. Finally, greater national control over all stages of the life cycle of weapons, from their manufacture to their use, would also help to significantly lower the risk of the uncontrolled proliferation of SALW. Such measures could be based on the relevant best practices of States, including those of Russia, which has well- developed legislation in that area. We stand ready to advise States interested in studying Russian best practices in SALW control. As part of its annual reporting, our country always presents its report on the implementation of the Programme of Action. It is a stand-alone, structured document that provides a holistic view of the effective implementation of the Programme of Action at the national level. However, we must point out that the report of the Secretary-General also contains a number of controversial points.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  22. We believe that the implementation of the Programme of Action would be more effectively facilitated by introducing a universal ban on the transfer of all types of SALW to entities that are not authorized by the Governments of recipient States; ensuring that States impose strict regulations and exercise direct control over brokering activities related to arms exports within the territory under their jurisdiction and limiting, to the extent possible, the number of brokers themselves; imposing a ban on the re-export of imported SALW without the consent of the initial exporting State; and banning the manufacture of SALW with expired licenses or without licenses from the countries owning the production technology.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  23. Despite progress in some areas, significant improvement has yet to be made in countering the illicit trade in SALW throughout the world. The pace of the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects remains inadequate. There has also been a loss of traction in the implementation of the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  24. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu, for introducing the report of the Secretary General on small arms and light weapons (SALW) (S/2019/1011). We are also grateful to Mr. Damien Spleeters for his valuable briefing on the work of the non-governmental organization Conflict Armament Research. Russia has consistently advocated enhancing the role played by the United Nations in coordinating the international community’s efforts to resolve the problem of the illegal trade in SALW. The illegal traffic in such weapons remains the main source of financing for terrorist and extremist groups and a major factor in the spread and exacerbation of local conflicts and armed violence.

    2020-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8713 (2020) · source

  25. Sanctions are one of the many important tools in the Council’s toolkit to stimulate the peace process and political dialogue, and they should be used with the full measure of responsibility and caution in order to avoid causing harm. Moreover, any Security Council restriction must evolve and adapt in line with the changing dynamics on the ground. We wish to assure the Council that Russia will continue to provide assistance to the Central African Republic, both in its process of national reconciliation and in the context of strengthening its security forces, with a view to normalizing the situation in the country and reaching a sustainable settlement to the protracted armed conflict.

    2020-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8712 (2020) · source

  26. Meanwhile, the saboteurs of the peace process among the armed groups remain unhindered in replenishing their stockpiles of weapons through smuggling. Simplifying procedures for the Central African Republic to obtain certain categories of armed vehicles for its own needs, as provided for by the present resolution, is another small step in supporting the Central African Republic. However, we must not forget that the legitimate Central African authorities have urged the Council to fully lift the arms embargo, and in our view they have every reason to do so. We are therefore determined to further review the Security Council’s restrictive sanctions in July with a view to their easing and, ultimately, their full lifting.

    2020-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8712 (2020) · source

  27. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Russia was unable to support today’s resolution 2507 (2020). We sincerely appreciate the penholder’s efforts; however, not all of our arguments were taken into account in the drafting the text of the resolution. We advocated for a greater easing of the arms embargo. Unfortunately, neither Bangui’s official appeal nor our position were duly considered. The arms embargo on the Central African Republic may have played a positive role in the early stages, but now it is effectively an obstacle to the rearming of the national army and security forces — the very institutions that bear the primary responsibility for upholding the peace and security of their own citizens.

    2020-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8712 (2020) · source

  28. The problem of the return of the Rohingya refugees should be resolved through bilateral consultations between the parties involved. We welcome the mediating role played by ASEAN and China in resolving the situation in Myanmar. We note the fact that ASEAN recently conducted an assessment mission on the needs of refugees. We believe that the people of a region always have all of the information they need about the state of affairs on the ground and are best aware of the regional specifics. In January, Hanoi became the President of ASEAN. We share Viet Nam’s priorities in the Association, including the focus on increasing its contribution to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. We are convinced that our partners and ASEAN have all the necessary experience, the tools they need and the requisite goodwill.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8711 (2020) · source

  29. In connection with the ideas that have being expressed here about the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, I would like to underscore that our view is that any territorial disputes in that region must be resolved between the States in question on a bilateral basis, in the context of the subject of today’s meeting, which is aimed at building cooperation and advancing a unifying agenda in the region. It is unacceptable to impose a particular vision of the resolution and settlement of disputes and of thorny issues on the basis of narrow national interests, especially if this is being done by States that are located many thousands of kilometres from the region. We also do not see any added value in raising the subject of Myanmar here in the Security Council.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8711 (2020) · source

  30. Based on the positive experience of cooperation between the United Nations and the SCO, including the third high-level meeting on the terrorism and organized crime nexus, held in New York in November 2019, we propose that we embark on a process of reflection on expanding the format of such events to include ASEAN. It would also be useful for ASEAN and the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure to exchange experiences on a well-developed legal and treaty basis and effective mechanisms for inter-State cooperation.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8711 (2020) · source

  31. These efforts have laid the foundation for the creation in Eurasia of an innovative centre free from barriers and based on the principles of international law and the norms of the World Trade Organization, as well as respect for different development models and the rights of peoples to themselves determine which path they want to take forward. That philosophy lies at the heart of the Greater Eurasian Partnership initiative, which was advanced by Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin at the ASEAN-Russia Summit. We deem it important to build dialogue and practical partnership between the SCO and ASEAN given that both organizations work to resolve the same security and sustainable development issues in Asia.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8711 (2020) · source

  32. Such dubious novelties in no way promote regional cooperation or a unifying agenda. Alongside other dialogue partners of ASEAN, Russia is helping the organization to build its capacities in addressing new threats and challenges, such as terrorism, transnational crime and illegal drug trafficking. We are especially focused on the consistent implementation of the Statement of ASEAN and the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Field of Security of and in the Use of Information and Communication Technologies, which was adopted at the 2018 ASEAN-Russia Summit held in Singapore. We are taking steps aimed at harmonizing the various integration associations and undertakings with the involvement of the East Asia Economic Caucus, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and ASEAN.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8711 (2020) · source

  33. Recently, however, including at today’s meeting, we have heard much about a rules-based order that, as far as we can judge, is based on a selective approach to international law and the concept of so-called Indo- Pacific region — a concept that has emerged seemingly out of nowhere. When we look at geographical maps and ask the authors of that concept what the difference is between the Indo-Pacific strategies and cooperation within the Asia-Pacific region, they say that Indo-Pacific strategies are ostensibly more open and democratic. At the same time, they do not include East Africa or the Persian Gulf as part of the Indo-Pacific region. Naturally, China does not fall within that region either. That raises the question of what the added value is of a format that divides rather than unites.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8711 (2020) · source

  34. The 2016 Russia-ASEAN Summit, held in Sochi, was the first high-level meeting to be convened in Russia in the history of our relations. The Summit resulted in the adoption of the Sochi Declaration and the 2016-2020 Comprehensive Plan of Action to Promote Cooperation between ASEAN and the Russian Federation. Russia and ASEAN are like-minded on issues such as establishing an open and balanced security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region, based on the principles of the rule of international law, non-interference in internal affairs, the non-use or threat of use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes. We are united in our aspirations to prevent the emergence in the region of new dividing lines, as well as the undermining of equality and consensus in the work of inter-State associations built around ASEAN.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8711 (2020) · source

  35. We commend their contribution to the work of United Nations peacekeeping operations. This year marks the twenty-fourth anniversary of the ASEAN-Russian Federation Dialogue Partnership. Within that period, we have achieved impressive progress in every area of our cooperation. A robust treaty and legal basis for cooperation has been established, which can now be described as a strategic partnership. We have launched effective joint mechanisms and our trade, economic and humanitarian ties are steadily developing. We have laid the foundation for closer coordination of steps at key multilateral platforms, foremost among which is the United Nations. We have had meaningful dialogue in the area of policy and security, focused on establishing an equal, balanced and transparent system of inter-State relations in the Asia-Pacific region.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8711 (2020) · source

  36. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Secretary-General António Guterres and the Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Dato Lim Jock Hoi, for their informative briefings on cooperation between ASEAN and the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security. We also appreciate the initiative of our colleagues from Viet Nam to convene this thematic meeting of the Security Council on the subject of cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, in this case ASEAN. We consider ASEAN to be one of the most successful integrative associations. It plays an important role in ensuring peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. We have consistently called for the strengthening of the central role of its 10 member States in regional affairs.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8711 (2020) · source

  37. In conclusion, we would like to convey our gratitude to Special Representative of the Secretary-General Annadif for his effective leadership of MINUSMA.

    2020-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8703 (2020) · source

  38. The principle of African solutions to African problems is the cornerstone for the nation-building of sovereign States on the continent. We continue to provide bilateral support to the Sahara- Sahel countries. We would like to highlight in particular the role of the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali in facilitating the settlement process. We firmly believe that the Mission needs comprehensive support, especially in an environment where it essentially has to implement its mandate on two fronts at the same time, in central and northern Mali. At the present time, we are not prepared to consider options for a significant adjustment in the scope of its operations or a drawdown.

    2020-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8703 (2020) · source

  39. The so-called Liptako-Gourma triangle, located on the borders of Mali, the Niger and Burkina Faso, where we see the juncture of the greatest challenges facing the region, has become all too familiar. We also regret to note that the “malignant tumour” of terrorism extends to other West African countries. In that regard, we support the concrete steps taken by the States of the Group of Five for the Sahel to establish the Joint Force in order to combat terrorism and organized crime, as well as the counter-terrorism operations that they are conducting. We would particularly like to note the commitment of the countries of the Economic Community of West African States to investing significant resources in overcoming the increasing security challenges.

    2020-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8703 (2020) · source

  40. We note that factors such as the high levels of inter-ethnic tensions, persistent attacks by terrorists and extremists and delays in the restoration of State governance institutions in the central and northern parts of the country could significantly slow or even undermine the positive changes that have been observed. We are very concerned about the humanitarian situation. The victims of violence remain the most vulnerable groups — women, children and the elderly. We welcome the steps taken by the authorities and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to resolve intercommunal disputes and to disarm the local self- defence forces. The Libyan dimension continues to have a very negative impact on the situation in Mali and in the region as a whole.

    2020-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8703 (2020) · source

  41. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process for former combatants is yielding positive results. We trust that units of the Operational Coordination Mechanism will be deployed as expeditiously as possible to the north of the country. We call on the Malian authorities to consistently strengthen the capacities of the regular armed forces and to reclaim the positions lost in Ménaka and Gao. We view the inclusive national dialogue launched in the fall as a unifying platform for determining the future of the country. However, within the framework of the obligations that have been undertaken by the parties to the Algiers peace agreement, the inclusive participation of all stakeholders is of paramount importance.

    2020-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8703 (2020) · source

  42. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under- Secretary-General for Peace Operations, for his briefing. Russia is deeply concerned about the deteriorating security situation in many parts of Mali in recent months. Tragic reports of deaths of military personnel and civilians at the hands of jihadists demonstrate the magnitude and severity of the threats facing the country and its vulnerability to the destabilizing forces of terrorists, organized crime and extremist ideology. A central factor to normalize the situation in Mali remains the implementation of the 2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. We note that progress has been achieved in implementing some of its provisions.

    2020-01-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8703 (2020) · source

  43. The international community, the United Nations, the Security Council and, most important, the Colombians themselves expect the strict implementation of obligations under the final peace agreement. Absent that, the consequences of half a century of internal armed conflict will be insurmountable. We trust that the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia will continue to play a significant role in the peace process.

    2020-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8702 (2020) · source

  44. It has been our consistent belief that the situation can be stabilized only through peaceful means, with the greatest possible level of public dialogue. That approach is enshrined in core resolution 2282 (2016), on peacebuilding, which states that national responsibility for preserving peace presupposes that the Government concerned take into account the views of every segments of society. In that regard, we hope that the initiatives announced by the President and society to establish a broad national dialogue will yield results. The most important thing is to prevent duplication of work. We welcome the declared commitment of the Colombian leadership to the peace process, but we cannot stop there.

    2020-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8702 (2020) · source

  45. We share the position of Havana that members of that group cannot be extradited, because Colombia cannot ensure their immunity, as demanded by the guarantees established under the protocols signed by the parties governing the actions of participants in the event that the dialogue breaks down. Like all those who have read the report, we are alarmed by the wave of protests in the country. We are convinced that only the effective implementation of the final agreement can reassure society and prevent another return to arms. That document and its core element, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, have made it possible for the Secretary-General and the Security Council to support the peace process.

    2020-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8702 (2020) · source

  46. Regardless of the origin of those threats, we see them as an attempt to pressure the justice system. That practice must stop immediately; prominent cases need to be investigated, and those responsible must be brought to justice. I also note the report’s observation that communities and civil society organizations affected by the actions of the Ejército de Liberación Nacional are insisting on the need for dialogue with the latter. We agree with the view that achieving genuinely lasting peace in Colombia is hard to imagine without taking into account the full spectrum of opinions. We trust that Bogotá will find a way to resolve disagreements with Cuba over negotiations with the Ejército de Liberación Nacional.

    2020-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8702 (2020) · source

  47. There is public demand for increasing the effectiveness of socioeconomic reintegration. The report notes the widespread dissatisfaction in society with regard to insufficient progress in the implementation of agrarian reforms, including reintegration and crop substitution programmes. In terms of legal reintegration, it is worth noting that, during the reporting period, State programmes did not accredit a single new participant, although they had received applications to that effect. The Security Council regularly insists on the need to preserve the independence of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace. In that regard, we cannot but be concerned about information in the report that lawyers representing former combatants in court have been subject to threats.

    2020-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8702 (2020) · source

  48. While the October elections were more peaceful than previous ones, the Secretary-General notes increasing mistrust among various sectors of society. There are various reasons for that situation. One of the main ones is the lack of solutions to security-related issues. The year 2019 saw the highest number of victims since the final peace agreement was signed. We believe that every murder must be investigated and that those responsible must be appropriately punished. The report also notes gaps in the area of political reintegration. In particular, one seat in Parliament remains temporarily blocked, although under the final agreement it was supposed to be allotted to the Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común (FARC) party, not to a specific representative.

    2020-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8702 (2020) · source

  49. That is why the Security Council, which is entrusted with monitoring the Colombian peace process, is closely following developments and hopes that the success achieved by the signing of the Final Agreement will not only be maintained but also built upon. The role of the Verification Mission is very important. However, the primary responsibility for the peace process clearly lies with the Colombians themselves. As the report points out, despite some progress most of the work to consolidate peace still lies ahead. Since the signing of the Final Agreement, it has become clear that, in addition to the emergence of new challenges in the Colombian peace process, there remain basic issues that need to be urgently addressed.

    2020-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8702 (2020) · source

  50. Based on that document, the Security Council and the Secretary-General agree that the success of the peace process depends entirely on the ability of Colombians to fully meet their obligations under the historic Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace. Colombia has entered a crucial phase that will determine the sustainability of the peace that the Colombians achieved at such a high price. As the Secretary-General rightly notes in his report, the Final Agreement stipulates a long period of post-conflict recovery but the solid foundations for peace must be laid now.

    2020-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8702 (2020) · source