YouSaid · the spoken record

Polyanskiy

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2,335
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2018-01-31
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2023-12-22
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300
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un-security-council

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  1. No matter how much they try to deny the facts and claim otherwise, we have not and are not conducting strikes that target civilians and civilian objects. If they do not believe us, they can look at eyewitness accounts and listen to the assessments of military experts. They will confirm, for example, that the apartment building in Kyiv that was mentioned today was not damaged by a Russian cruise missile but as a result of the two Ukrainian air defence systems downing their own anti-aircraft missiles above the building. The unwillingness on the part of some members of the Council to acknowledge that does not change the truth. In conclusion, I would like to once again emphasize that those who supply weapons to Ukraine are only prolonging the agony of the criminal Kyiv regime, which is ready to sacrifice its own population.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  2. Kyiv’s sole objective is to garner support in the form of money and weapons from members of the Council. At the same time, as we warned the Council from the very beginning, everyone should understand that such supplies were and remain military targets for us — as do the mercenaries from the same States. And the facilities where such weapons and mercenaries are stockpiled and stationed also become legitimate military targets — as do the hangars at the Kremenchuk road machinery plant. The Kyiv regime deliberately stores weapons in city centres, near residential areas, thereby endangering its people and turning them into human shields. Yet members of the Council try to ignore that, undermining the very values they seem to be trying to promote.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  3. And the houses next to the mall were not damaged either, even the glass in the windows was still intact. That would have been possible only if the rocket had exploded at a considerable distance. However, the detonation of ammunition from the Western weapons that were stored in the storage area caused a fire, which then spread to the shopping centre. I have gone into such detail today to describe the work of the Ukrainian propagandists in the hope that our Western colleagues in the Council will finally realize just how ridiculous and questionable it looks when they pick up and promote the latest products of Ukrainian agitprop. That includes not only the fakes and staged incidents I mentioned but also the claims that Russia is allegedly preventing the export of Ukrainian grain.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  4. We have not heard a single word today from our Western or Ukrainian colleagues about those strikes against civilians and civilian objects in Donbas, because they simply do not care, as they did not care all those eight years during which the Ukrainian armed forces methodically annihilated the inhabitants of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. Returning to Kremenchuk, the Amstor shopping mall, which is located some distance away for our target, was not affected by the strikes. That can be seen in the surveillance video. Nothing would have been left of the mall if a missile has hit it. The video posted by Ukrainian bloggers shows that the goods inside the mall were not damaged by the blast — they were still on their shelves and had not even been knocked down.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  5. The long-range artillery supplied by the West enables Ukraine’s armed forces to reach remote areas of Donbas far from the front lines and to strike civilians for no military purpose whatsoever except revenge and intimidation. On 15 June, Ukraine’s armed forces carried out such strikes using 155-millimeter Caesar Howitzers received from NATO countries, killing 6 and wounding more than 30 civilians. Every week, dozens more of the killed and wounded are added to that gruesome statistic. Yesterday the Ukrainian armed forces used the M142 high-mobility artillery rocket system they received from the United States for the first time in Perevalsk, in the Luhansk People’s Republic.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  6. That is apparently when the idea emerged to stage a new type of provocation — an alleged strike on a shopping mall in Kremenchuk. In reality, no such strike was launched. Russia’s armed forces used high-precision weapons to strike hangars containing Western-made weapons and ammunition from the United States and European countries near the Kremenchuk road machinery plant. Those weapons and ammunition had been dispersed throughout the storage area for further shipment to Ukrainian troops in Donbas — that is, for the purpose of shelling residential areas in Donetsk, Luhansk and other cities. The strikes carried out by Russia’s armed forces prevented that.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  7. Thousands of soldiers have ended up in the new pocket in the Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk area, against the backdrop of the upcoming NATO Summit, at which the question of new weapons deliveries to Ukraine will be discussed again. Such weapons may not only be used but may also be sold on the side, under Ukrainian officials’ well-known scheme of attributing everything to military losses. It became obvious that, in order to regain the fading attention of the global community, which was fatigued with regard to Ukraine, a new Bucha-style provocation was needed. The problem was that the Russian army had not retreated from anywhere for a long time, while it only made sense for corpses to be planted or civilians to be shot in the territories that were back under the control of the Kyiv regime.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  8. There were also the military failures caused by the inept actions and betrayal of the Ukrainian command, leaving lightly armed soldiers, including new recruits, to their fates and not allowing them to surrender and save their lives. Instead, they were prevented from surrendering or retreating by detachments of nationalists who shot their own soldiers in the back. There have been too many such videos from the Ukrainian military lately — and there have been hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers, if not thousands, willing to surrender. It has become increasingly difficult to hide all of that from the Ukrainian and global public.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  9. Our Western colleagues then willingly used those descriptions, including in this Chamber. After being fired, she was forced to admit that she had lied deliberately so that Ukraine would continue to receive weapons. It turned out that there was no evidence for Denisova’s lies. Ukraine and Western countries had no evidence. On top of all that is the video and evidence concerning the liberated and heavily shelled cities of Donbas, as well as the liberated cities where people openly said that if there was anyone that they did fear and blame for what was going on it was the Ukrainian army and Western countries that gave it long-range weapons, allowing it to strike where Ukrainian artillery could not reach before.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  10. There were also reports of looting, torture, rape, deliberate shelling of residential areas, placing heavy weapons in residential areas and using civilians as human shields. There were not just dozens of such testimonies, but hundreds and thousands spreading across social networks. That is how, for example, the myths about the shelling of the maternity hospital and the drama theatre in Mariupol fell apart. In addition, more than 2,500 nationalists from the Azov Battalion, who had already been turned into martyrs and heroes, not only had to surrender outright but also had to release hundreds of civilian hostages, who told the truth about what had been done to them. Ukrainian Ombudswoman Denisova also let everyone down by going too far in recounting and relishing the details of rapes allegedly committed by Russian soldiers.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  11. Today his followers have adapted and modified that ridiculous tale to the point that our soldiers now allegedly loot electric kettles but forget to take the bases for them because they do not know how to use them. A similar logic underpins the lie about the theft of Ukrainian grain, which we also heard today. Many in the West believed that. They pitied the poor Ukrainians and hated the Russians implacably, yet they were in no hurry to check the facts while they regularly supplied Kyiv with coveted weapons. But at a certain point everything started to go wrong for the Ukrainian propagandists. Reports accusing Ukrainian soldiers and nationalists of cruelty and war crimes began to multiply on social media.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  12. However, it was done so clumsily and unconvincingly that they now prefer not to recall it at all because the involvement of the armed forces of Ukraine in that crime is so obvious. Then, in the best tradition of Goebbels, the image of the barbaric Russian soldier rapist and marauder began to be implanted in Western minds, exactly as the Nazis did during the final stage of the Second World War. At that point, our soldiers, according to Ukrainian propagandists, began to loot, rape and sow fear with unprecedented cruelty. We all remember how the representative of the Kyiv regime sitting with us today talked with a straight face about how our soldiers steal washing machines and even toilets because they never had such miraculous appliances back home.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  13. Bucha became a turning point in the supply of Western weapons, which was precisely the goal of the Ukrainian authorities. They themselves openly admitted that. As Ukrainian Minister for Foreign Affairs Kuleba said in an interview with the BBC on 4 April, “the Bucha massacre should remove any kind of hesitation and reluctance in the West to provide Ukraine with all necessary weapons”. Having acquired the taste, the Kyiv successors of the White Helmets then tried to implement something no less ambitious, which is when the shelling of the Kramatorsk railway station occurred. That was designed to cement the global community’s belief in the atrocities of the Russian army.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  14. Ukrainians and their Western handlers quickly understood that whatever was happening on the ground was not important at all in our digital age. What was important was what the Western media was showing. Taking advantage of the voluntary withdrawal of Russian troops from the Kyiv and Chernihiv regions, Kyiv and Western propagandists brought the world the provocation in Bucha, which was monstrous in its scale and equally monstrous in execution. Despite the glaring inconsistencies, many in the West continue to believe in it, as we heard today. Kyiv authorities use the place where the provocation was carried out as a mandatory stopping point on the itinerary for foreign visitors since it is located close to Kyiv. It is a kind of ominous marketing, which is very convenient for squeezing more arms supplies from sponsors.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  15. As for the famous ace pilot, the Ghost of Kyiv, who allegedly terrorized the Russian air force and shot down dozens of aircraft, it does not matter that his exploits were illustrated with fragments from computer games or old Internet videos. Later on, however, even Western journalists had to reluctantly admit that story was made up. Yet some Ukrainian propagandists continue to exploit that myth to this day. Internet videos are a separate issue altogether. At the initial stages of the special military operations, even the BBC was horrified by the number of Ukrainian video fakes. But then, like other Western media outlets, it began to take a more relaxed approach, and even to publish its own, passing off homes in Donetsk that had been destroyed by Ukrainian shelling as buildings in Kyiv.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  16. If someone were to try to count all the false Ukrainian information that has been disseminated to date, there would easily be enough for a weighty tome or even a collection of them. Just take the beautiful but absolutely false myth about the Russian ship to which the brave defenders of Snake Island allegedly refused to surrender and for which they paid with their lives. They were posthumously awarded the title of Heroes of Ukraine by President Zelenskyy. Of course, it later turned out that the entire Ukrainian garrison of the island was alive and well and had safely surrendered to the Russian army. But the myth was not revised, and Ukraine still proudly issues stamps illustrating that patriotic story.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  17. The Council should not apply double standards in order to serve the Ukrainian party and its Western backers, discriminating in the process against African States. There should not be any exceptions for anyone. From the very beginning of the special military operation in Ukraine to end the eight-year war of the Kyiv regime against the civilian population of eastern Ukraine, we were faced with the fact that the true situation on the front line was not the main concern of Ukrainian authorities. They were much more concerned about another front, the information front, to which they zealously applied themselves along with their Western public relations propaganda collaborators.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  18. We have repeatedly reiterated our understanding that representatives of States who wish to speak in the Council must be physically present in the Chamber. The Security Council should not be turned into a platform for a remote public relations campaign by President Zelenskyy to obtain more weapons from participants in the NATO Summit. That undermines the authority of the Council as the body responsible for collective decisions on the maintenance of international peace and security. The Ukrainian party, at the instigation of our Western colleagues, is attempting to undermine that authority and turn the members of the Council into a theatre audience. I wish to draw attention to the fact that, just one week ago, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central African Republic was refused an opportunity to speak to the Council.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  19. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Before I begin my statement, I would like to say that we are greatly concerned by the position of the Albanian presidency on the participation of President Zelenskyy in today’s meeting. No consultations were held with the members of the Council on this matter. Delegations were essentially presented with a fait accompli at the last possible moment. That violates the current working practices and traditions of the Security Council. An opportunity was provided to President Zelenskyy to address the Council once before, on an exceptional basis (see S/PV.9011). The United Kingdom presidency assured us at that time that no precedent would thereby be created. We do not see any reason to keep multiplying such exceptions.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source

  20. It is also necessary, not only to ensure consensus on the choice of a Special Representative of the Secretary- General in the Security Council, but also to take into account the views of internal Libyan stakeholders and regional players and not to succumb to the dictates of the West, which views Libya as its backyard.

    2022-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9078 (2022) · source

  21. In that regard, we see evidence of the fact that our Western colleagues, in the spirit of neocolonialist thinking, wish to impose on Libya their script of what the future of the country should look like and who should be in charge there. We believe that approach to be cynical and unacceptable. The United Nations envoy should have a relevant Security Council-authorized mandate. We will proceed from these considerations during negotiations on a Security Council draft resolution on the renewal of UNSMIL’s mandate in July. The egotism of Western States, the self-appointed arbiters of Libya’s fate, must be put to an end. That is long overdue. At the same time, we note the Secretary-General’s determination to resolve this matter. We call on him to approach the issue in a balanced and careful manner.

    2022-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9078 (2022) · source

  22. We therefore underscore once again that there is no alternative to a resolution of the Libyan dossier in a manner that reflects Libyan realities and under the auspices of the United Nations. UNSMIL has an important role to play as a key mediator in such a configuration. However, the Mission has remained decapitated for quite some time. Without a leader, UNSMIL cannot deliver on its crucial mandated functions of facilitating national dialogue. We note the effective stewardship of Stephanie Williams at the helm of UNSMIL as a Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, who is not accountable to the Security Council. We believe that her leadership of the Mission is being dragged out artificially despite repetitive assurances that this is a temporary measure.

    2022-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9078 (2022) · source

  23. We regret that, even at this critical juncture, our British colleagues were overcome by banal jealousy over their penholdership, which prompted them to advance patently unacceptable revisions that prevented the Council’s adoption of the statement. At the same time, the day before, a standalone statement from a number of Western Security Council members was circulated. That statement largely duplicated the content of our proposed draft. That left us no doubt that, behind our Western colleagues lofty rhetoric about the importance of a Council speaking with one voice, there is nothing more than barefaced double standards, which have caused so much suffering in Libya. Due to the persistent intra-Libyan differences and the egotism of our Western colleagues, the situation in Libya risks spiralling out of control.

    2022-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9078 (2022) · source

  24. Libya must not be an arena for competition or for the advancement of one-sided parochial agendas. It is therefore regrettable that those who destroyed Libya in 2011 apparently have completely different plans. Maintaining the unity of the Security Council on the Libyan dossier is but a smokescreen for them. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the very unconstructive position of our Western colleagues, first and foremost the British penholder on the Libyan dossier, regarding the Security Council draft presidential statement proposed by Russia, which sets out the general position of the Council in support of stability and resilience for the political transition in Libya.

    2022-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9078 (2022) · source

  25. We can only hope that the upcoming meeting between Aguila Saleh and Khaled Al-Mishri in Geneva at the end of the month will help resolve the remaining disagreements. It is reassuring that the ceasefire is still holding and that the 5+5 Joint Military Commission is continuing its work. The issue of evacuating foreign forces from Libya remains pressing. We have consistently advocated for a synchronized, well-balanced, gradual and phased withdrawal of all non-Libyan armed groups and military units, in line with the agreements reached by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission in Geneva last year. That is the only approach that can prevent the deterioration of the security situation. More than ever, international efforts on the Libyan track need to be consolidated.

    2022-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9078 (2022) · source

  26. We call on the parties to refrain from reckless acts that could further exacerbate the rift. We believe that all international stakeholders that can bring influence to bear on Libyan actors should prompt them to engage in constructive cooperation with the aim of seeking compromise solutions to the accumulated problems solely through political and diplomatic means. The alternative to that — an escalation of armed hostilities — must certainly be avoided. We welcome the progress made on the political settlement track, including a third round of talks held in Cairo, where members of the House of Representatives and the High State Council negotiated a draft constitution. The talks yielded significant results, but unfortunately no final agreement has yet been reached.

    2022-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9078 (2022) · source

  27. In that connection, we note the commitment of the representative of Prime Minister Fathi Bashagha, elected by the House of Representatives, and his Office to pursue efforts for the welfare of the country, and we welcome the steps taken in that regard. Most important, that enthusiasm was constructive. There is still much to be done to establish consolidated governance bodies, unify State mechanisms and financial and economic institutions and create united security forces. However, the most important challenge facing the Libyan people is overcoming the burden of mutual mistrust — the consequence of the protracted conflict. We strongly condemn the increasingly frequent outbreaks of armed violence among armed groups in Tripoli and other parts of the country, as well as road closures along the coastline.

    2022-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9078 (2022) · source

  28. That was a benchmark document designed to determine the direction for the ongoing political settlement process, including a qualitative transition on matters regarding unifying the administrative and security structures of the former Libyan Arab Jamahiriya so as to bolster the economy and social sector. Unfortunately, a number of the tasks set out therein, including completing the work on the country’s constitution and the conduct of nationwide elections, were not fulfilled on time. Nevertheless, the spirit of the road map and its principles remain relevant for Libya’s future. The fact that the document expired is no reason to throw caution to the wind.

    2022-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9078 (2022) · source

  29. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo for her comprehensive briefing on the situation in Libya in the context of the activities of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). We also listened carefully to Ms. Bushra Alhodiri. As of today, the situation in and around Libya continues to become destabilized. The country is unable to cope with the fallout from the Western aggression in 2011, which caused Libyan statehood to collapse and triggered a political crisis that continues to this day. The Libyan Political Dialogue Forum road map expired last week.

    2022-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9078 (2022) · source

  30. In that regard, we support Egypt’s initiatives and Algeria’s plans to host the next round of talks between the representatives of Fatah and Hamas. Our proposal to use the Moscow platform also remains on the table. Under the current circumstances, it is essential to continue to provide comprehensive humanitarian assistance to Palestinians in need, both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and in neighbouring Arab countries. In that regard, we support the efforts of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as the main international entity for the provision of assistance to Palestinians in the areas of education, health care, social services and improving infrastructure and living conditions in the refugee camps.

    2022-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9077 (2022) · source

  31. In return, our colleagues in the Council seek to impose economic peace on the Palestinians without allowing them to create their own independent State or satisfy their legitimate aspirations. The fact that the international community is essentially ignoring the systematic violations of Palestinian rights is a clear reflection of Western countries’ double standards regarding the provisions of international humanitarian law and the protection of human rights, which we are also experiencing with respect to the situation in Ukraine. We believe that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict can be resolved only on the basis of the universally recognized two-State formula. In addition, a sustainable long-term solution will not be possible without achieving inter-Palestinian unity.

    2022-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9077 (2022) · source

  32. We note the conclusions of the representatives of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, following their analysis of that tragic incident, that the responsibility for the killing of the journalist lies with the Israeli army. On 10 June, the Israeli Air Force once again launched strikes against Syria, targeting Damascus International Airport. The airfield sustained serious damage and the runway was damaged, resulting in the suspension of all flights, including humanitarian flights. Israel seems to have been given carte blanche to take unilateral unlawful actions in the region, with the tacit consent of Washington, which has effectively blocked any chance of reviving the peace process.

    2022-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9077 (2022) · source

  33. In that regard, we reiterate Russia’s unwavering position that it does not recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which is an integral part of Syria. We regret to note that the level of violence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem continue to increase steadily, including through the harassment of Christians and Muslims and the imposition of restrictions on their access to the holy sites. At the same time, arbitrary arrests of Palestinians and the disproportionate use of force by the Israeli armed forces continued during so-called operations that often targeted women and children. The killing of Al-Jazeera correspondent Shireen Abu Akleh on 11 May, while she was covering the Israeli army’s operation in Jenin, is also revealing.

    2022-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9077 (2022) · source

  34. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Tor Wennesland, for his report on Israel’s settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territories. We are concerned about the continuation, and even the escalation, of unilateral measures leading to irreversible steps in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the past year, Israel approved the construction of more than 12,000 housing units and more than 1,000 Palestinian homes were demolished. The Israeli authorities’ plans to double by 2026 the number of Israelis living in the West Bank and the occupied Golan Heights directly contradict the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention.

    2022-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9077 (2022) · source

  35. In conclusion, we would like to request that the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) provide more detailed information about the so-called Action Plan for Dignified Shelter and Living Conditions in North-west Syria. Which specific regions does the programme cover and what progress has been made in its funding? We would also welcome more details from OCHA on early-recovery projects that have already been funded by donors. We believe that such efforts should be expanded, including in the Government-controlled areas, in order to ensure that refugees returning to Syria have roofs over their heads.

    2022-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9068 (2022) · source

  36. There is no denying that marginal terrorist elements are blocking United Nations efforts and undermining trust in humanitarian workers in general. It seems that the tail is wagging the dog, and our Western colleagues — who had a whole year to prove the opposite — find that situation perfectly acceptable. Yet they do not seem particularly eager to deal with this issue as they are to care for Idlib-based or other terrorists. In addition, some our colleagues are politicizing the dialogue on humanitarian assistance to Syria. As a result, the Council has not been able to adopt even modest documents that are nevertheless important and could lay the groundwork for a constructive discussion on the cross-border mechanism. We simply cannot ignore that extremely unfavourable context.

    2022-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9068 (2022) · source

  37. We regret that we are not seeing similar responses with regard to other Syrian matters, including early- recovery projects and cross-line humanitarian deliveries. The resuts of the United Nations engagement in that area are disappointing, especially the fact that there have been only five cross-line humanitarian convoys this year. Was this what we had in mind when we adopted resolution 2585 (2021) a year ago? We are convinced that it is possible to organize humanitarian deliveries in coordination with Damascus to every region of Syria, and the Syrian Government is seeking to facilitate that process. That became evident after the Al-Yarubiyah crossing point at the border with Iraq was shut down. Similarly, closing the Bab Al-Hawa crossing could enable a significant increase in cross-line deliveries to Syria’s north-west.

    2022-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9068 (2022) · source

  38. In summary, the terrorists in Idlib are doing just fine. The black market for arms that has recently been surging in Europe has become a real treasure trove, both for terrorists in Syria and radical Islamists throughout the Middle East. Predictably, many have spoken today about the need to renew the cross-border mechanism in July. We have also heard about the many shortcomings on the Syrian humanitarian track, all of which are apparently beyond the control of the United Nations. That point is highly debatable, and it is hard not to conclude that there are double standards with regard to the settlement of the situation in Syria. One example demonstrating that was the recent joint statement to the Council by high-ranking United Nations officials on the issue of the cross-border mechanism.

    2022-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9068 (2022) · source

  39. For several years in a row, the experts of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, have repeatedly confirmed that Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham has been profiting from humanitarian assistance to Idlib and that it constitutes one of their main sources of income. It appears that, in order resupply its fighters, all that Washington needs is to ensure the renewal of the cross-border mechanism. We also note the recent discussions in United States political circles in favour of exonerating those terrorists. According to reports, Idlib is seeing an increase in flows of Western weapons sold by corrupt Ukrainian officials.

    2022-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9068 (2022) · source

  40. For our Western colleagues, when it comes to the delivery humanitarian aid, there are apparently two different categories of Syrians: those in Government- controlled areas and those in non-Government- controlled areas. In that context, there have been reports that the United States has found ways to sponsor the Maghawir Al-Thawra-affiliated militants in the Rukban camp. If true, that is absolutely deplorable, especially against the backdrop of the anti-Syrian sanctions. Our American colleagues are also quick to show similar concern for internationally listed terrorist groups, such as Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham.

    2022-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9068 (2022) · source

  41. Of particular significance in that context is the series of air strikes launched on 10 June by the Israeli air force on the suburbs of Damascus, which damaged the Damascus International Airport runway and building and caused it to be shut down. As a result, all Damascus-bound flights were put on hold, including those of the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service, a key humanitarian channel that provides life-saving support to more than 2 million people. Such acts are unacceptable, as they cause serious implications for the people of Syria and create risks of escalation for the entire region. We are astonished by the lack of reaction in that regard from of all those who are so keen to support the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria.

    2022-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9068 (2022) · source

  42. Humanitarian workers on the ground in Syria have themselves denounced the Western sanctions. As we have said on many occasions, their difficulties include obstacles to financial operations and logistics, as well as humanitarian exemptions that do not work. The claims by Washington and a number of other capitals that by imposing unilateral sanctions they are supposedly fulfilling their international obligations, as well as claims that such sanctions are targeted and well balanced, are not only false and unconvincing but also demonstrate their inhumane treatment of Syria’s civilian population. The deteriorating humanitarian situation continues to worsen owing to tragic incidents that undermine security.

    2022-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9068 (2022) · source

  43. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We would like to thank the Secretary- General and Mr. Martin Griffiths for sharing their views. We also took note of Mr. Iyad Agha’s briefing. We would like to raise a number of points concerning the Secretary-General’s report (S/2022/492). We are increasingly concerned about the reports of a food and fuel crisis in Syria. Regrettably, the report again fails to point out that the United States, as a result of both its unilateral sanctions on Syria and its ongoing occupation of the north-east of the country, is responsible for causing the crisis. The population, including children, is starving, and the work of civil and medical facilities is being stalled. The fuel shortage is also affecting the operations of water stations and power plants, as well as Syrian agriculture.

    2022-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9068 (2022) · source

  44. For our part, we will continue our efforts to achieve results through the work of the Security Council and the United Nations mission, which should be centred round a Haitian-led and exclusively Haitian-owned settlement process.

    2022-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9066 (2022) · source

  45. Haitians must come up with a viable solution for emerging from their political nosedive on their own. Externally imposed solutions are not capable of dealing with the unique and complex nature of the underlying causes of Haiti’s crisis. We firmly believe that one of those causes is the years of external interference and the imposition of democratizing models that fail to consider the country’s specificities. That crude, bull-in-a-china-shop approach has become the primary cause of countless crises all over the world. Any international assistance, including that provided by the United Nations, must be responsible and based on broad national discussion.

    2022-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9066 (2022) · source

  46. We have carefully studied the Secretary-General’s conclusions about the independent review of the work of the special political mission prepared in accordance with resolution 2600 (2021). We have noted his most detailed recommendations were about helping to strengthen the capacity of the Haitian National Police, and we are ready to give due consideration to the relevant recommendations as part of the work on the next draft resolution. However, we would like to see more details on the mission’s mandate to provide assistance to Haitians in establishing an internal dialogue. Without progress on the political track, tackling the country’s security problems may be merely tilting at windmills, because it is the chaos in the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the Government that is creating fertile ground for the rise in crime.

    2022-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9066 (2022) · source

  47. All that demands that Haiti consolidate and enhance the effectiveness of its system of law enforcement, which is on the front lines of the country’s challenges. Nor should we forget the likely impact of the global food crisis caused by the irresponsible actions of Western States, for which they try to blame Russia, to no avail. We understand the Secretary-General’s logic when he concludes in his report (S/2022/481) that the current domestic political and security situation means that we cannot count seeing the long-overdue elections held before the end of the year. However, we believe that only a political settlement of the country’s internal contradictions can lead to a genuinely sustainable settlement.

    2022-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9066 (2022) · source

  48. While we can see that Prime Minister Ariel Henry is trying to establish a dialogue with some forces, we have to admit that considering everything, it is premature to talk about concrete results. Unfortunately, BINUH’s assistance in organizing informal discussions between various groups is not having any perceptible effects either. We hope to see some fresh ideas in the discussions in the tripartite committee of representatives from academia, religious organizations and the business community. The security situation is being exacerbated by the armed groups that are fighting one another as well as the Government. In the first five months of the year, the number of kidnappings has increased by a third, murders went up, the number of internally displaced persons once again reached 17,000 and sex-related crimes were off the charts.

    2022-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9066 (2022) · source

  49. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We welcome the participation in this meeting of Mr. Jean Victor Généus, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Religion of Haiti. We listened carefully to the remarks made by Mr. Arnoux Descardes. And we thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General Helen La Lime for her briefing on the situation in the country and the work of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH). We are increasingly concerned by the developing situation in Haiti. The recent four-month reporting period was again characterized by continuing deterioration on all key issues — from political settlement to the security and humanitarian situation. Key stakeholders in the Government, civil society and the business sector still fundamentally disagree on how to overcome the political deadlock.

    2022-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9066 (2022) · source

  50. We are concerned about the serious socioeconomic situation in Yemen, which the United Nations has called the biggest humanitarian disaster in the world. It will be crucial to lift the restrictions on the delivery of food, medicine and other essential goods to all areas of Yemen without discrimination, regardless of who controls the territory. In that regard, we note the mediation efforts of the stakeholders in the region who are helping Yemenis on the financial and humanitarian fronts. In conclusion, we would once again like to remind the Council of resolution 598 (1987) and other initiatives aimed at the stabilization of the subregion, including Russia’s updated collective security concept.

    2022-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9063 (2022) · source