YouSaid · the spoken record

Polyanskiy

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2,335
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2018-01-31
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2023-12-22
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300
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un-security-council

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  1. Our common priority is maintaining stability in Afghanistan, which we are convinced will benefit everyone — the Afghan people, the region and the world as a whole. It is clear, however, that in the absence of the necessary potential and resources, including financial resources, the new authorities will hardly be able to independently, rapidly and effectively deal with the accumulation of old problems and new challenges. Success here will depend, inter alia, on comprehensive international assistance to Afghanistan. On 22 December 2021, the Security Council adopted resolution 2615 (2021), aimed at providing humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan in the context of the 1988 sanctions regime.

    2022-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8954 (2022) · source

  2. Today it has been five months since the Taliban acceded to power in Afghanistan. As rightly noted by the Secretary-General and Ms. Lyons, the situation of the country is subject to a constant dynamic. We note that certain steps have been undertaken by the new authorities to tackle social, economic, humanitarian and human rights issues, and to mitigate challenges related to terrorism and drugs. We proceed from the understanding that those actions are only the beginning. We continue to expect the Taliban to take serious measures to ensure the real ethnic and political inclusivity of the Government, eliminating terrorist and drug threats and ensuring respect for basic human rights.

    2022-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8954 (2022) · source

  3. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We welcome your personal participation in this meeting, Mr. Prime Minister. I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. We also thank the Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Ms. Deborah Lyons, for her comments and her vision of the situation on the ground. We are grateful to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), Ambassador Tirumurti, for his analysis of the sanctions track. We also listened closely to the representative of civil society, Ms. Mahbouba Seraj. We are pleased that representatives of the countries of the region are able to participate in the discussion of issues that are so important to them.

    2022-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8954 (2022) · source

  4. We believe that it is crucial for the Secretary-General to present his proposals for candidates to this position as soon as possible. It is essential for the United Nations emissary to have a relevant mandate from the Security Council. Unfortunately, for now, there is no such individual. We will proceed from what I just said in negotiations on a draft Security Council resolution on the extension of the mandate of the Mission. We believe that it is important for the mandate to reflect the current goals of the Libyan settlement, which will change very quickly. In this regard, we suggest that our colleagues adopt a flexible approach regarding the term of the mandate renewal, and we will be ready to continue to engage in a constructive discussion.

    2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source

  5. At the same time, we welcome the fact that during its meeting in Geneva last October, the 5+5 Joint Military Committee agreed on a plan of action for a gradual, balanced and simultaneous withdrawal from Libya of all mercenaries, foreign fighters and other forces. We intend to continue to actively take part in international efforts to promote the political settlement in Libya, both through targeted engagement with the Libyan sides and in multilateral frameworks. We are concerned that starting in November 2021, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), which should be at the at the heart of these efforts, still has no one in charge, even though the head of the Mission should conduct good offices for Libyans to promote a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process.

    2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source

  6. Owing to the pause on the political track, activities in other areas have been slowed down as well. Work on unifying Government institutions, including financial institutions, has not been completed. Efforts are needed to normalize the socioeconomic situation in the country. There has also been no significant progress on the military track either. Of course, it is good that there have not been any active hostilities for over a year now. However, the opposing sides have not taken any further steps to prevent the possibility of an escalation of the ongoing standoff. This threatens to undermine the truce, with a new flare-up of violence triggered by an intentional provocation or an unplanned incident. We also believe that an important role in consolidating the armed forces should be played by the Libyan National Army.

    2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source

  7. The international community sent another very clear signal to the Libyan sides on the need to follow the road map of the political process. We are carefully following the discussions under way in Libya on rescheduling the presidential and parliamentary elections. This process should not be dragged out too much. We also believe that it is critically important that representatives of all the leading political forces be able to take part in elections. This will make it possible to achieve unity in Libyan society on the outcome of the future elections and avoid any new, dangerous escalation of the military and political conflict in the country. In this regard, we expect that the Libyans will, in the very near future, resolve all outstanding issues.

    2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source

  8. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo for her briefing on the situation in Libya. We are grateful to the Permanent Representative of India, Mr. Tirumurti, for his report (see S/2021/1058) on the activities of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011). We highly value the work of our Indian colleagues in that subsidiary body of the Council. We also listened carefully to Ms. Elham Saudi. The situation in Libya and the surrounding region continues to be stable overall. At the Paris International Conference for Libya on 12 November 2021, the participants adopted a detailed outcome document that follows in the footsteps of the decisions made at previous multilateral meetings on the Libyan peace process.

    2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source

  9. The imperative for any Government must remain the scrupulous implementation of obligations under the final peace agreement. Replacing the agreement with unilateral programmes that have not been agreed upon by all participants in the peace process could lead to backsliding and have negative long-term consequences. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia will continue to provide support to the Colombian peace process to make it sustainable and irreversible.

    2022-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8951 (2022) · source

  10. Preparations are well under way and form the backdrop to the entire report. We have taken note that some political players have included the issue of the implementation of the Final Agreement in their election manifestos. However, it is not enough. It is important that the United Nations convey to all election candidates and political forces the importance of strictly implementing this historic document. Colombians, independently and without external interference, must exercise their democratic right to choose the leaders of their society. However, we urge potential candidates for key State positions to recall that the global community will form its own opinion of them by assessing, first and foremost, the importance and feasibility of their peacebuilding programme. That is their primary responsibility to Colombian society.

    2022-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8951 (2022) · source

  11. The Colombian parties must begin to seek paths towards dialogue without preconditions and on the same basis as the previous negotiations process with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. This means that the talks must be initiated and conducted regardless of conflict’s modalities, as though there were no conflict at all. As usual, we recall that the normalization of relations with neighbouring Venezuela could also help to achieve sustainable peace and stability in Colombia. That, inter alia, is needed to combat the crime surge in border areas and could provide some insurance against possible incidents with dangerous consequences. In conclusion, I would like to address the upcoming elections in the country this year — parliamentary elections in March and presidential elections in May.

    2022-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8951 (2022) · source

  12. At the same time, we cannot but agree with the conclusions of the report of the Secretary-General in that the peacebuilding process in Colombia remains in jeopardy. One of the key problems identified by the Secretary-General is the deep-rooted factors causing divisions in Colombian society. Those must not be overlooked by Colombians in order to avoid a recurrence of internal conflicts. We cannot repeat enough that genuine peace cannot be achieved in the country without the inclusion of all major actors. In that context, the scant information in the report regarding the lack of negotiations between the Government and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional is unsatisfactory.

    2022-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8951 (2022) · source

  13. What we find rather worrisome is that according to the report, of the 13,000 defendants in the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, three quarters of them are former combatants of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, while only a quarter are from State security forces. We must acknowledge that the totality of those unresolved complex issues allows for only a cautious assessment of the results of the implementation of the Final Agreement on its fifth anniversary. At the same time, we note that some progress has indeed been achieved in a number of areas of the peacebuilding process. In that context, we express our full support for the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, as well as for the guarantor countries of the Final Agreement, namely Cuba and Norway.

    2022-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8951 (2022) · source

  14. That same conclusion clearly follows from the report of the Secretary-General. Traditionally, problematic issues include the security of the civilian population, including human rights defenders and participants in the peace process, and their economic, political and legal reintegration, as well as agrarian reform and crop substitution programmes. The most acute issues, of course, concern security. As a result of attacks by illegal armed groups, another 12,000 people were forced to leave their places of permanent residence during the reporting quarter. In the past year alone, there have been 56 massacres with 222 victims. Since the signing of the Final Agreement, 303 signatories to the peace process who had laid down their arms have been killed. Have those responsible for such terrible crimes been brought to justice?

    2022-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8951 (2022) · source

  15. We will never tire of repeating that the agreement not only brought a long-awaited end to half a century of internal armed conflict, but also ensured that the peace process enjoyed the support of the international community, including the United Nations Secretary-General and the Security Council. For the long-suffering Colombian people, there was a good chance for gradual post-conflict recovery. Secretary-General Guterres’ visit to Colombia last year further reaffirmed international support for the Final Agreement. As a polite guest, during his trip the Secretary-General focused primarily on what had been achieved in the five years since the agreement was signed. However, it is no secret to members of the Security Council that the bulk of the Government’s work in implementing its commitments still lies ahead.

    2022-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8951 (2022) · source

  16. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We welcome the first participation of Ms. Luz Marina Giraldo, a peace process participant and a signatory to the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, as well as that of Mr. Emilio José Archila, Presidential Adviser for Stabilization and Consolidation, in this meeting. We thank the Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, Mr. Carlos Ruiz Massieu, for presenting the report of the Secretary- General on the situation in the country (S/2021/1090) and for his assessments. The reporting period covered a landmark occasion, namely, the fifth anniversary of the signing of the historic Final Agreement.

    2022-01-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8951 (2022) · source

  17. In conclusion, I wish to note that we have growing concerns about plans that have been unveiled vis-à-vis the expansion of Israel settlement activities in the occupied Golan Heights. I refer not merely to the ongoing cutting of red tape for Ramat Trump settlement, which was announced in 2020, but also to the creation of two new settlements, Asif and Matar, with 12,000 housing units. The stated goal of the Israeli leadership is to double the number of Israelis residing in the Golan Heights, which flies in the face of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. For our part, we emphasize Russia’s position, which remains unchanged — we do not recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which are an integral part of Syria.

    2022-01-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8950 (2022) · source

  18. We intend to continue to make assiduous efforts with our Quartet partners aimed at boosting the effectiveness of this mediation mechanism by determining and identifying possible collective measures to implement what has been endorsed in United Nations resolutions, namely, the two-State solution. We reaffirm the importance of convening a Quartet meeting at the Ministerial level and of establishing full-fledged cooperation under this mechanism with the Palestinians, Israelis and other key regional stakeholders. I also wish to emphasize that progress in the peace process is impossible absent Palestinian reunification through the Palestine Liberation Organization. We stand ready alongside other interested parties, first and foremost, our Egyptian friends to provide the necessary assistance to that end.

    2022-01-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8950 (2022) · source

  19. In this context, we welcome the results of the Ministerial meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee in Oslo last November. We note Norway’s contribution in organizing this event, which attests to the fact that the international community remains focused on a Middle East settlement. The focus of today’s debate under Norway’s presidency of the Security Council is setting the stage for the expeditious relaunch of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. We fully believe that a settlement is possible only through the launch of direct talks between the parties. At the same time, we believe there is an urgent need to step up multilateral efforts to create a propitious atmosphere for talks, first and foremost, in the format of the Middle East Quartet of international mediators.

    2022-01-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8950 (2022) · source

  20. We call upon them to rekindle a peaceful settlement process on a universally recognized international legal basis. We attach great significance to the comprehensive international assistance being provided to those in need on the West Bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip, as well as to Palestinian refugees in neighbouring Arab countries. We support the efforts of key international organizations, among which we emphasize those of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). We believe that the need to provide financial assistance to UNWRA remains ongoing and important, so that it may continue to deliver humanitarian assistance to millions of Palestinian refugees in the Middle East without hindrance. Russia will continue to make annual voluntary contributions to UNRWA’s budget.

    2022-01-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8950 (2022) · source

  21. The situation as described today by the Special Coordinator is further exacerbated by Israel’s unilateral, unlawful acts, breaches of the status of the holy sites, expansion of settlement activities, the confiscation of Palestinian lands, expulsion of Palestinians, arbitrary arrests and violence targeting civilians. It is with concern that we have been learning about sporadic outbreaks of violence in Jerusalem as a result of which there have been casualties. Specifically, we are very troubled by yesterday’s action by the Israeli police in Sheikh Jarrar, as a result of which a Palestinian family was evicted from its home. We call upon the parties to exercise restraint and to abandon and reject radical measures that create irreversible facts on the ground.

    2022-01-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8950 (2022) · source

  22. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Madam President, we welcome you as you preside over the Security Council today. We also wish to note the participation in today’s meeting of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ghana, Ms. Shirley Ayorkor Botchwey, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Palestine, Mr. Riad Al-Malki. We thank Mr. Tor Wennesland for his comprehensive briefing on the situation in the Middle East region in the context of finding a settlement. We listened closely to Mr. Gidon Bromberg and Ms. Nada Majdalani. With regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the degree of violence continues unabated and is claiming casualties on both sides.

    2022-01-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8950 (2022) · source

  23. It is our view that creating preferential processes for the protection of certain categories of participants in conflict resolution is not only counterproductive but also dangerous, as it may foment additional social tensions, set off new waves of conflict and exacerbate existing conflicts. It is evident that creating safe conditions for women’s participation in conflict resolution requires that the safety and security of all participants in the process be established. That is the only way to ensure meaningful, robust and sustained peace. In conclusion, I would like to reaffirm our focus on constructive cooperation with all States on issues relating to the equal participation of men and women in addressing security issues and conflict resolution in key forums, in line with relevant mandates.

    2022-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8949 (2022) · source

  24. We deem it to be unacceptable for those crimes to be swept under the rug, or for them to be justified as inevitable and the results of so-called collateral damage. Such crimes must be investigated, and the perpetrators must be held accountable. That should not apply only to crimes against women peacebuilders. We believe that the goal of every State is to ensure the safety and security of every citizen, without special emphasis on any particular category. It is clear that violence against women is unacceptable, not only in the area of peacekeeping but in all contexts. Such violence is unacceptable against anyone, irrespective of gender, race, language or belief.

    2022-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8949 (2022) · source

  25. We must protect the institution of the family. At the same time, the participation of women in all aspects and stages of peacekeeping should not become an end in itself or merely a quota to be met. It should be carried out in a manner that reflects the unique context of each situation. At the same time, we should prioritize the professionalism of women, as well as their personal interests and other challenges — for example, in the area of peacekeeping. Regrettably, despite the multitude of efforts under way, women continue to fall victim to many different forms of violence. We are deeply concerned about instances of the maiming and murder of women, including as a consequence of the indiscriminate or excessive use of force.

    2022-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8949 (2022) · source

  26. Without a doubt, such engagement is of vital importance as it helps to build trust and trust-based relations with local populations, to prevent violations against women and children, to ensure that violations are investigated and to ensure sustained recovery and rehabilitation of the victims of such violence. We believe that more meaningful participation by women in peacekeeping is possible if the right conditions are put in place. In that regard, an important area on which efforts should be focused is to ensure women’s access to resources and technologies, including the banking sector. There should also be a greater focus on the specific development issues faced by women, including poverty eradication and access for women to education in conflict-affected countries. The family is particularly important.

    2022-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8949 (2022) · source

  27. Properly implementing and leveraging resolution 1325 (2000) to ensure its effectiveness requires stringent compliance with its mandate and a consideration of women’s issues in the context of the maintenance of international peace and security, with a special emphasis on the situations on the Council’s agenda. Russia welcomes the steady increase in the participation of women in peace processes, including in negotiations and peacekeeping. We welcome the increase in the contribution of women in addressing key issues of security, conflict resolution and post-conflict recovery.

    2022-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8949 (2022) · source

  28. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are pleased to see you, Madam President, presiding over today’s meeting of the Security Council. We would like to thank the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms. Michelle Bachelet, Ms. Zarqa Yaftali and Ms. Kaavya Asoka for their briefings. The issue of women and peace and security has become an integral part of the overall process of peaceful conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding. We believe that the benchmark that provides a unique road map for advancing the role of women in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict recovery, as well as for protecting women in conflict, is resolution 1325 (2000). The world currently faces many crises. However, they are not all a threat to international peace and security.

    2022-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8949 (2022) · source

  29. In that context, we believe that maintaining Security Council sanctions against Guinea-Bissau under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, which provides for such sanctions only where there is a threat to international peace and security, makes no sense whatsoever. We call for those sanctions to be removed.

    2022-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8944 (2022) · source

  30. The effectiveness of the Office will depend directly on how well it cooperates with other regional organizations, such as the African Union, ECOWAS, the Group of Five for the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin Commission. UNOWAS cooperation with the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa is required on certain issues, including combating piracy, the Lake Chad basin and the demarcation of the Cameroonian-Nigerian border. After the closure of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau in 2020, the monitoring of events in that country fell under the purview of UNOWAS.

    2022-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8944 (2022) · source

  31. We agree that, without the return of State control to many parts of the country, it will be difficult to consider the results of the elections as credible. That would lead directly to further political destabilization, as happened in Mali after last year’s elections. Returning to the subject of UNOWAS, we are convinced that the Office faces a range of extensive and complex tasks: helping resolve regional crises, participating in political mediation, providing assistance in strengthening State institutions, implementing the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel and carrying out coordination functions with other United Nations entities on the ground.

    2022-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8944 (2022) · source

  32. Let us give the respect due our Malian colleagues and support their understandable efforts to establish order within their own country and rely on the partners they deem most appropriate to that end. Any double standard used to evaluate the situation or attempt to act on unverified information — of which, unfortunately, we heard today — is completely unacceptable and unworthy of any self-respecting State. The obligations of the transitional authorities in Mali to restore constitutional order must be fulfilled while keeping the realities on the ground in mind. Of course, we would like to see the elections held on time. We understand, however, the difficulties faced by the Malian authorities in preparing for the elections.

    2022-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8944 (2022) · source

  33. We express our support for all those people who are engaged in the difficult fight against terrorism in the region. The humanitarian situation remains extremely challenging. The number of internally displaced persons and people in need of food aid has grown dramatically. Many schools and medical facilities have been closed. All of that calls for the countries of the region, especially in the Sahel, to redouble their efforts to restore effective State control and governance. With regard to the situation in Mali, we believe that the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation, the eradication of terrorism and the improvement of the socioeconomic situation depend on internal political stability. Further political upheavals could lead the country into a dead end.

    2022-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8944 (2022) · source

  34. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. Mahamat Annadif, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) for his briefing. Russia welcomes his efforts to help the countries of West Africa, the Sahel and the Lake Chad basin overcome current difficulties. There is no question that the results of UNOWAS work are highly commendable. We share the concerns about the dangerous challenges facing many countries in West Africa, especially those in the Sahel. Terrorist activities, interethnic and intercommunal conflicts, organized crime and drug trafficking continue unabated in the region. Throughout the second half of 2021, we received tragic reports of the loss of life in deadly terrorist attacks and clashes with militants.

    2022-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8944 (2022) · source

  35. Today, it is no more than simply another lever that Western colleagues may use to criticize the country and try to prove what cannot be proven, even in disregard of the laws of physics, chemistry and basic logic. This is the situation that my colleagues in the Council will have to work with in the near future. Of course, we must be ready to hear the most rabid accusations against Russia for allegedly undermining the authority of the OPCW. We would like to think that this topic, which has become a pain in everyone’s neck, will take a turn in an objective and fact-based direction by the end of your term in the Council, Madam President. If Norway, together with us and other clear- minded delegations, can contribute to bringing that about, then rank-and-file Syrians and their neighbours will only be the more grateful for it.

    2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source

  36. These facts fall within the purview of paragraphs 18 and 19 of resolution 2118 (2013) and are subject to the resolution’s paragraph 12, which stipulates that such information should be shared with Member States. Nevertheless, no information on this has been provided either today or earlier. This is very important evidence that clearly points to the fact that chemical weapons could be spreading among terrorists and used by them at any moment to make chemical provocations. In sum, the so-called Syrian chemical dossier has lately lost even the appearance of impartiality and the objective establishment of facts that could confirm the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

    2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source

  37. There is one more very important aspect to mention in order to understand the evolution of the chemical dossier. By peddling the so-called violations by the Syrian authorities, the United Nations Secretariat and the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW are, in essence, turning a blind eye to the topic of the use of chemical weapons by terrorists in Syria and neighbouring States. I just want to mention the November report of United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, which contains a wealth of evidence of the use by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) of chemical weapons in Iraq in 2014 and 2016. Specifically, ISIL used the laboratory of the University of Mosul to conduct chemical research and development.

    2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source

  38. He attempted to cover up the discrepancies in the aforementioned report on Douma by any possible means, on the one hand, and to justify the use of remote methods of work employed by the Technical Secretariat when gathering evidence, on the other hand. In addition to that, he tried with a straight face to distort the content of the note verbale sent by the Permanent Representation of the Russian Federation to the OPCW in connection to that report. Nevertheless, we deem it important to continue to demand from Mr. Arias clear and logical explanations of the current situation, which risks destroying the OPCW. We only insist that Mr. Arias thoroughly execute the provisions of the OPCW. We also intend to do this again in the Security Council, by inviting Director General back to one of our meetings.

    2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source

  39. Furthermore, preparatory work is continuing on meetings between Mr. Mekdad, Syria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, and Mr. Arias, Director-General. Mr. Arias has been invited to visit Damascus because it would be very important for him to get a first-hand impression of the situation on the ground. Would the Syrian authorities try to do this if they wanted nothing to do with the OPCW or had something to hide? And why is Mr. Arias himself refusing to visit Syria? I have to say, generally speaking, that there are more and more questions for Mr. Arias. His last appearance before the Security Council (see S/PV.8785) left us with an unpleasant aftertaste.

    2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source

  40. However, as we have been told, this round has once again been postponed by the leadership of the Technical Secretariat on artificial and politicized grounds, namely, that, supposedly, the entire mission cannot visit the country because one of its members was not granted a visa. The pretext chosen by the Technical Secretariat last time was no less absurd: that supposedly in the summer it was impossible to visit Syria because of the heat. It is crucial to understand that the dialogue with the DAT is part of the voluntary, bilateral obligations that Syria undertook. I stress the word “voluntary”. The very nature of the DAT mandate does not provide for any kind of investigative functions. Its role is simply to help the Syrians prepare their initial declaration. It has no authority to conduct retrospective investigations.

    2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source

  41. Also worth mentioning is the campaign launched by our Western colleagues on Syria’s initial declaration. As a result, under a bogus pretext and in a gross violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Syria was stripped of a number of rights and privileges at the OPCW. Nevertheless, even after that, the Syrian Government, showing significant restraint, continues to be ready to engage in dialogue with the OPCW. However, in reality, this cooperation is being held up by the Technical Secretariat itself despite its efforts to shift blame to Damascus in relation to the work of the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT). Syria has clearly stated its readiness to receive the DAT on its territory and to conduct the twenty-fifth round of consultations.

    2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source

  42. Bearing in mind that we know in detail about the under-handed dealings I have just mentioned, it is impossible to call what happened anything other than a carefully planned political provocation. By the way, our American colleague just said that the facts collected by the Fact-finding Mission in November 2021 demonstrate the criminal nature of the Al-Assad regime, but where do they get such information and facts? These have not yet been circulated. Unless they have written them themselves, that is. To give the Council a full picture, it is important to mention the illegitimate activity of the Investigation and Identification Team, which is working remotely to rubber-stamp the unconvincing anti-Syrian reports based on videos and information from anti-Syrian groups.

    2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source

  43. How can a chain of events be established four years after they occur, especially given the evolving military situation in Syria? What kind of eye witnesses can be found? What details can they remember? This is especially regrettable bearing in mind the colossal efforts made, together with the Syrians, to drag the obstinate FFM inspectors to the site of the alleged incident in Douma in 2018. Our Western colleagues, on the other hand, did not need an investigation at all. Not only did they immediately blame the Al-Assad Government despite the fact that, on the eve of the alleged incident, we had warned of the impending provocation by Syrian insurgents, but they actually conducted a missile strike against Government targets supposedly connected to the use of chemical weapons.

    2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source

  44. Unfortunately, instead of admitting obvious mistakes and correcting them, the Director-General continues to openly violate, year after year, the provisions of the CWC, the integrity of which he must defend. I would even say that he is flaunting the use of a flawed methodology that is violating the provisions of the Convention and is based on data collected remotely from politically engaged sources. As a result, the situation is only getting worse, with the appearance of increasingly dubious innovations. For example, in today’s report (see S/2021/1103), the Director-General indicates that, in November and December 2021, the FFM collected information and conducted interviews about incidents in a number of towns in Syria that took place in 2017. Common sense dictates that such investigations post facto are, by definition, improper.

    2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source

  45. Unfortunately, hopes of that occurring are dwindling, as they are deeply mired in the scandal surrounding the report of the Fact-Finding Mission on the incident in Douma in April 2018, the final version of which was revised, due to pressure on behalf of some delegations, to make it more anti-Syrian. This is fraud, plain and simple. That continues to be confirmed by various sources, including former inspectors of the OPCW who were directly involved in the investigation. Attempts by said inspectors to get the OPCW leadership to investigate what happened only led to them being persecuted for their search for the truth. All attempts to set the record straight, or at least to discuss the situation, including by engaging the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board, have been rejected by the Technical Secretariat.

    2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source

  46. True experts cannot in good faith consider as evidence the demonstrably staged videos provided by politically engaged non-governmental organizations created specifically to fight the Syrian Government — such as the notorious White Helmets — videos in which people without chemical protection equipment are working with toxic substances and the alleged victims’ symptoms are completely inconsistent with the use of chemical weapons. It would seem that the OPCW Director-General, Mr. Arias, and the Technical Secretariat would have the final say in that regard.

    2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source

  47. The most paradoxical thing is that the Syrian chemical dossier has no connection to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. That has been the case for a long time. Its non-proliferation aspects have been resolved. By joining the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Damascus has fulfilled in good faith all the obligations it assumed in that regard, as the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council in June 2014 (see S/PV.7212). The elimination of Syria’s military-chemical potential was confirmed in 2016 by the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Conference of the States Parties. No real, scientifically corroborated evidence to the contrary has been presented to the Council in all these years.

    2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source

  48. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): First of all, I would like to congratulate you, Madam President, on the start of your presidency of the Council. You and your team can count on our support. I would also like to welcome our colleagues from Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates to the first briefing of the Security Council this year. We look forward to constructive cooperation. Our newcomers are very lucky today. On their very first day, they have the opportunity to plunge headlong into one of the most controversial and politicized files on the Security Council’s agenda — the Syrian chemical dossier. It is unique because no other plot is so disconnected from reality, resembling instead a fairy tale concocted by some science fiction writer. I will explain what I mean.

    2022-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8943 (2022) · source

  49. This situation undermines the credibility of the Council and prevents it from fully carrying out its mandate as the organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Russia intends to continue defending that precise approach when evaluating the Council’s output.

    2021-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8942 (2021) · source

  50. As a result, the meaning of the document presented today is simply drowned in a huge number of provisos, the essence of which boils down to the fact that all the proposed measures should be implemented in the context of the Security Council’s consideration of country-specific situations. It is not clear to us where the added value of the resolution lies. As the results of the vote have shown, there was no consensus on the document in the Council either. Unfortunately, this situation vividly illustrates the negative trend that has emerged recently, namely, the adoption of resolutions for resolutions’ sake on fashionable or hastily invented topics, according to the principle that, if there is a presidency, there must be a resolution. As a result, the quality and significance of Security Council products become secondary.

    2021-12-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8942 (2021) · source