YouSaid · the spoken record

Polyanskiy

lines on the record: 2,335
first: 2018-01-31
most recent: 2023-12-22
sittings or episodes: 300
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Overcoming this difficult legacy is also the responsibility of the Truth Commission, which published its comprehensive report on 28 June, an event we can only applaud. It is yet another example of Colombian society’s desire for genuine reconciliation and confirms the viability of the peace agreement, which has remained relevant despite the attempts that have been made over the past four years to torpedo its implementation. We agree with the conclusions of the Secretary- General’s report (S/2022/513) that the election of Gustavo Petro Urrego as President and Francia Márquez as Vice-President, the first Afro-Colombian to hold that position, allows us to hope for a new impetus in the Government’s implementation of its commitments under the Final Agreement.”
2022-07-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9094 (2022) · source
“The traditional challenges are still there in the form of issues such as agrarian reform, crop substitution, the safety of the civilian population and the economic, political and legal reintegration of participants into the peace process. We hope that the leaders of the country will at last begin to relate to ex-combatants as participants in the peace process, not former enemies. Between the previous report and this one the members of the Security Council are now reading that Colombian society must overcome its entrenched stigmatization and contradictions and learn to look towards a common future, and we believe that such a change in the relations among the partners in the peace process is long overdue.”
2022-07-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9094 (2022) · source
“Colombia’s recent elections demonstrated that the existential need for a lasting peace process is supported by millions of Colombians from various political camps. It was affirmed by the election victory for the forces calling for an end to the many years of conflict, which have left the country with countless victims and tragedies. We will never tire of repeating that the agreement has not only brought about a long-awaited end to a half-century of internal armed conflict, but it has also provided the peace process with the support of the international community as represented by the Security Council. There is no question that there is a great deal of work facing the Government in implementing its obligations.”
2022-07-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9094 (2022) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We welcome the personal participation of Ms. Marta Lucía Ramírez, Foreign Minister of Colombia, and Francisco José de Roux Rengifo in today’s meeting, as well as the briefing by Ms. Jineth Casso Piamba. We thank Carlos Ruiz Massieu, Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, for his briefing on the situation in the country. At our last meeting (see S/PV.9015), the mood was one of anxiety as we considered the outcomes of the five years that had elapsed since the signing of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace. Today we have definite reasons for taking a more positive view of the prospects for seeing that historic document implemented.”
2022-07-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9094 (2022) · source
“Nothing can enhance the image of peacekeepers like the effective discharge of their mandate, including with regard to the protection of civilians.”
2022-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9090 (2022) · source
“Attempts to instrumentalize the topic of the safety of peacekeepers in order to achieve narrow political goals that have nothing to do with the protection of Blue Helmets and the stabilization of countries in conflict are dangerous. We urge the United Nations not to neglect cooperation with the law enforcement agencies of host countries because, under international law, they bear the primary responsibility for the safety of peacekeepers. Any threats to the life and health of Blue Helmets, let alone any attacks on them, should be investigated in accordance with national legislation. As for critical publications or even protests, as we said earlier, it is vital to have painstaking explanations of each mandate in order for the local population to have realistic expectations.”
2022-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9090 (2022) · source
“There is censorship of the information space by online platforms, primarily the information technology giants that have a monopoly on social networks and video hosting platforms. It is important that both the United Nations Headquarters and missions themselves be fully aware of these processes. After all, it is most dangerous when unreliable information is used to achieve military and political advantages on the ground. It is vital to have early detection and prevention of disinformation campaigns in order to neutralize and minimize their ramifications. Even here in the Council, blurry photographs from social networks and media publications have been presented as irrefutable evidence of unlawful acts. Even today, we were unable to dodge politicized propaganda from some colleagues.”
2022-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9090 (2022) · source
“Recently, the coronavirus pandemic and natural disasters have become a significant problem for the Blue Helmets. These are the main enemies of peacekeepers and must be addressed as a matter of priority. As for the spread of false information and disinformation, there is no doubt that this phenomenon, unfortunately, is gathering momentum around the world and should be denounced. Regrettably, the ubiquitous fundamental norms and principles of ensuring the freedom of expression and access to information and protecting the rights of journalists have been eroded at an unprecedented scale. We are facing a deliberate infodemic that has captured the leading global media, serving the interests of a narrow group of countries.”
2022-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9090 (2022) · source
“In that regard, we would like to emphasize that this issue has always been a priority for the Russian Federation. Recently, we, like many other troop-contributing countries to United Nations peacekeeping operations, lost a peacekeeper in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We therefore take this topic very seriously and call for a comprehensive and substantive discussion on the matter. It is no secret, and it has been confirmed by the reports of the Secretary-General, including for the General Assembly Special Committee — peacekeepers primarily suffer from asymmetric attacks, the actions of armed groups, improvised explosive devices, the overstretching of peacekeeping forces and a lack of necessary equipment and evacuation means.”
2022-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9090 (2022) · source
“But in most cases, quick-impact projects have proven helpful as they are not very costly, make it possible to establish contacts and bring practical benefits to vulnerable segments of the population. This approach was highly valued in Haiti, where it was, incidentally, actively promoted by the delegation of Brazil, as well as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In our age of new technologies, clearly social networks and other methods of social outreach play a significant role, but we must not forget that actions speak louder than words. We urge the Secretariat, which will prepare the relevant report, to pay special attention to this. The concept note prepared by the Brazilian delegation (see S/2022/539, annex) and negotiations on the presidential statement focused significant attention to the safety of peacekeepers.”
2022-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9090 (2022) · source
“We are confident that sooner or later we will have to revive the discussion about what exactly impartiality, lack of bias and objectivity of the United Nations means in the context of changing circumstances — and to do so in a way that cannot imply inaction. The third issue we would like to address in today’s debate is the operationalization of steps to improve strategic communication. In fact, the issue of criticism of peacekeeping operations is not new. We saw this many years ago in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti, and now in South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Mali. Some missions have been more successful in meeting these challenges by explaining their mandate, working with the local population through radio and television and implementing various local projects — others less so.”
2022-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9090 (2022) · source
“Secondly, and perhaps an even more important part of strategic communication, is building constructive cooperation with the host country and cultivating reliable contacts, primarily with the Government and the local population. Peacekeeping missions should be perceived as partners — not through their words, but through their actions — in achieving the common goals of the State and its people and as impartial assistance for solving the problems of the most vulnerable countries. It is unacceptable for missions to serve as political controllers overseeing sovereign Governments or introducing imperatives formulated across oceans to new ground. It is of the utmost importance that all components of the operation act coherently, only within the framework of the mandate, and do not contradict each other.”
2022-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9090 (2022) · source
“Their tasks range from purely military, in some cases even offensive, to bordering on replacing certain State functions, such as protecting human rights and strengthening the rule of law, as well as working with children and young people. In some cases, when a mission has been in a country for years and sometimes decades, it integrates into the domestic political process. Whether that is good or bad is a rhetorical question, but it is important to understand that in such circumstances it is impossible to imagine a situation in which a mission cannot be subject to criticism. We are confident that all those functions, which the Security Council entrusts to operations, should be clear and serve one goal — to achieve a political settlement, establish peace and stabilize host countries. Mission leadership plays a key role in that regard.”
2022-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9090 (2022) · source
“The Blue Helmets carry out their noble duty in extremely difficult and dangerous conditions, risking their lives every day. We would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to all peacekeepers who honourably carry out their service, as well as to express our condolences to the States and families of those who lost their lives in the line of duty. Strategic communications are designed to facilitate the fulfilment of the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping missions, contribute to the protection of the Blue Helmets themselves from malicious information and provocation and increase the level of trust in their activities among the warring parties and the local population. Undoubtedly, the key task is to establish effective work within the missions themselves. Modern peacekeeping operations are complex and multifaceted.”
2022-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9090 (2022) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We welcome your personal participation, Mr. Minister, in today’s meeting. We highly appreciate your country’s contribution to United Nations peacekeeping efforts. We are grateful that such an important issue as strategic communications in peacekeeping has been brought before the Security Council for discussion. We supported the initiative to prepare a relevant document. We appreciate the work done by your country’s delegation. We also associate ourselves with the statement to be made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Group of Friends on the Safety and Security of United Nations Peacekeepers. We thank the Secretary-General and the other briefers for their briefings.”
2022-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9090 (2022) · source
“We all now need to work on many important areas, including increasing cross-line deliveries in all regions of Syria. We call also upon the Secretary-General to pay special attention to the need to lift unilateral sanctions in the context of the consequences of the coronavirus disease pandemic, which has not yet been overcome. We must work actively to ensure that that issue is resolved in Syria, which will increase opportunities for donors to fund early-recovery projects in that Arab country. We will closely monitor the achievement of all those goals as well and expect that by January 2023 the Secretary-General will have provided the Council with exhaustive information on the work done.”
2022-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9089 (2022) · source
“By finding the optimal way of extending the cross-border mechanism, we gave a second chance to the good-faith implementation of all aspects of the resolution for the upcoming six months. Through the opportunities offered by the informal interactive dialogues within the Security Council, we will continue to monitor progress in implementing the resolution that we adopted today so as to decide on the ultimate fate of the cross-border mechanism. We are convinced that only through candid and substantive dialogue on the issues in the Syrian humanitarian track while involving all interested parties will we be able, in six months’ time, to come up with a well-considered decision. The special reports of the Secretary-General, unfortunately, as shown by experience, are not sufficient for that purpose.”
2022-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9089 (2022) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): My delegation supported the adoption of resolution 2642 (2022), which was put forward by the informal penholders of the Syrian humanitarian dossier in the Security Council, namely, the delegations of Norway and Ireland. It allows the Syrian cross-border mechanism to continue working until January 2023. We note that some dissatisfaction has been expressed by some of our colleagues concerning the fact that their vision of the extension of the mechanism did not pass. Well, the world is not limited by the Western countries or the so-called first Golden Billion, as was imagined in Washington, London and Paris. It is time for them to get used to respecting the interests of other States, first and foremost States that are impacted directly by Security Council decisions.”
2022-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9089 (2022) · source
“At the same time, the current highly sensitive situation is hardly conducive to a readjustment of the Mission’s tasks. A calmer time can be found for that. In conclusion, we would like to note that the situation in Yemen directly affects the region of the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. In the interests of regional de-escalation, we call on the international community to engage constructively in the interests of promoting peace and stability throughout the Middle East region, including on the basis of resolution 598 (1987). The Russian concept of collective security in the Persian Gulf, which advocates an inclusive and collective approach to resolving problems, remains relevant.”
2022-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9088 (2022) · source
“We reiterate that, in order to achieve those goals, there is no alternative other than a comprehensive, inclusive intra-Yemeni dialogue. The extremely difficult socioeconomic situation in Yemen remains a matter of particular concern. The deteriorating situation in the country has been described as the greatest humanitarian catastrophe. We reiterate the urgent need to remove all restrictions on the delivery of essential goods to Yemen. Food, medicines and other items needed by the Yemenis should be available to them on a non-discriminatory basis. The mandate of the United Nations Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement expires this month. We support its technical extension. We consider the work of the Mission to be extremely important in the context of international efforts for a settlement in Yemen.”
2022-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9088 (2022) · source
“We welcome the ongoing work of the Military Coordination Committee in Amman on upholding the terms of the ceasefire, with the participation of representatives of all parties to the conflict. We support the efforts of Mr. Grundberg, who, even in the current circumstances, has not abandoned attempts to help the parties to reach an agreement and find the beginnings of a positive spirit. We call on all parties to actively engage in the Special Envoy’s mediation efforts. As we have repeatedly said, Mr. Grundberg can count on our help. We continue to provide the maximum possible assistance to the United Nations mediation in Yemen, including through contacts with all political forces in the country and the parties concerned. We actively encourage them to be constructive and willing to compromise in addressing their differences.”
2022-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9088 (2022) · source
“Unfortunately, the issue regarding the opening of transport links with the city of Taiz is still at an impasse. In that regard, we would like to note that the lack of flexibility on the part of the parties may result in another round of mutual accusations. On the other hand, any additional concessions, however small, would demonstrate their desire for a long-term political settlement. However, it is encouraging that the inter-Yemeni dialogue is continuing and that the parties have refrained from engaging in hostilities. There has not yet been sliding into a new confrontation. However, the balance is extremely fragile. One wrong move could undo all the progress made and roll the country back to the chaos of war.”
2022-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9088 (2022) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Special Envoy of the Secretary- General for Yemen, Hans Grundberg and Assistant Secretary-General Joyce Msuya for their briefings on the developments in the political and humanitarian situation in Yemen. We have to note that the political situation in the country is now in a period of stagnation. The pace of the Yemeni settlement, as we have recently witnessed, is slowing down. It has been a month since the June extension of the truce between the Presidential Leadership Council and the Ansar Allah movement, but there has been no significant progress since then. Previous experience has clearly shown that, in principle, the parties are capable of reaching an agreement. We hope that they will overcome their differences and strengthen their mutual trust in each other.”
2022-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9088 (2022) · source
“I do not think anyone in Syria will suffer from that, whatever they may be saying. As for the terrorists entrenched in Idlib, those Security Council members already have their own opportunities to provide for them. Everyone had a choice, and everyone made their choice, and now this page of history has been turned once and for all. For our part, we will keep providing assistance to the brotherly people of Syria, with full respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
2022-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9087 (2022) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I will not speak at length, because the vote we just cast on draft resolution S/2022/541 was more eloquent than any words — especially the empty, deceptive words we heard from our Western colleagues today. Those who did not support the draft resolution demonstrated their real attitude towards the needs and aspirations of ordinary Syrians. They had the opportunity to extend Syria’s cross-border mechanism for one year, in two stages, on the condition that the assistance mechanism for the entire country would improve. The words frequently spoken by certain colleagues in support of improving the cross-border mechanism turned out to be false and hypocritical — they clearly proved that today by killing the cross-border mechanism for good.”
2022-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9087 (2022) · source
“I hope that everyone will vote in favour of the draft resolution we submitted, because the alternative is the final and irrevocable closure of the cross-border mechanism. We therefore encourage everyone who cares about the fate of the cross-border mechanism to support draft resolution S/2022/541, instead of playing suspect geopolitical games.”
2022-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9087 (2022) · source
“It provides for a six-month extension; in addition, once the required parameters of the work we agreed on last year have finally been achieved, it provides for a further six-month extension. My American colleague’s statement was particularly deceptive, sly and hypocritical in that regard and could give the impression that the draft resolution proposed by Russia does not envisage an extension of the cross- border mechanism at all. However, everything that the Permanent Representative of the United States just outlined in her statement is included in the draft resolution we proposed. Everyone can see that for themselves. Her words are a blatant expression of political cynicism and an attempt to mislead world public opinion. We will now have another vote.”
2022-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9087 (2022) · source
“First and foremost, draft resolution S/2022/538, which was just put to the vote, ignored the interests of Damascus, which is supposed be its main beneficiary. It also ignores the fact that, over the past year, in our estimation the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole have not been able to fulfil the objectives that we had unanimously agreed to work on, including establishing deliveries through north-west Syria via domestic routes, increasing the transparency of reporting on United Nations project activities in Syria and providing a significant increase in donor assistance for early-recovery projects. We tried to correct those shortcomings in draft resolution S/2022/541, which we submitted to the Council today and on which members will have the opportunity to vote.”
2022-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9087 (2022) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Our delegation voted against draft resolution S/2022/538, which would have extended the cross- border mechanism in Syria for one year. We regret that the determination of the delegations of Ireland and Norway, co-penholders on the Syrian humanitarian file at the Security Council, failed to find the best way to resolve the issue. Our position on the proposals for a one-year extension of the cross-border mechanism for humanitarian assistance to Syria has been well known from the very start. We did not mislead anyone in that regard, and we remained flexible on other issues. However, our Norwegian, Irish and other Western colleagues clearly lacked the diplomatic skills and commitment needed to reach an agreement.”
2022-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9087 (2022) · source
“At the same time, it does not make those revisions pertinent for us. Overall, we positively assess the work of the Irish team, which is something that we have already stated. We regret the fact that at the last juncture there were certain misunderstandings. Had everything been done correctly, perhaps Ms. Byrne Nason would not have had to justify the way her report was prepared. I do hope that things will go more smoothly in future. I thank her again for her delegation’s work.”
2022-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9085 (2022) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I am somewhat surprised at the discussion that has unfolded. It seems to me that if one of us Security Council members were to speak before the Council with the authority to perform certain Council actions, then those statements should, at the very least, not run counter to the understanding of other Council members or raise questions for them. Furthermore, Ireland is not the first State to be carrying out the facilitator role, and, to my memory, its predecessors approached this matter with greater care and attention. So, with respect to the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, as we have noted the trend of a new generation of British diplomats to revise the gentlemen’s agreements that exist in the Council, we are not surprised.”
2022-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9085 (2022) · source
“We see no insurmountable issues in the way of reviving the JCPOA, but now we are at an exceedingly important, delicate and crucial stage. Attempts to step up pressure on Iran and through an unwarranted fuelling of tensions around the JCPOA could fully invalidate prospects for reviving the deal. We would urge the parties to demonstrate strategic restraint, adopt a pragmatic posture and focus on compromise. We are confident that in this case solutions acceptable to all will be found.”
2022-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9085 (2022) · source
“The Council has not received any compelling evidence to the contrary. We deplore the fact that a number of States continue to make unjustified allegations vis-à-vis Tehran’s nuclear programme, using the same logic that we have repeatedly repudiated. To conclude, I wish to stress that there is still no alternative to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Our duty is to safeguard and revive it. The Russian Federation wholeheartedly supports negotiations to resume implementation of the JCPOA through the initially agreed-upon frameworks. From the very beginning, we said that the path back to the JCPOA would not be easy. It is always much easier to destroy something than it is to rebuild it. But we are heartened by the fact that work on a recovery package is already at an advanced stage.”
2022-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9085 (2022) · source
“Its mandate in the context of resolution 2231 (2015) is exclusively administrative and technical in nature, as set out in the note dated 16 January 2016 from the President of the Security Council contained in document S/2016/44. The authority to send any requests to Member States to provide information or to react to such requests, not to mention any inspections on the ground, is not vested in the Secretariat. The 2231 cell is not a sanctions committee; it does not have the relevant expertise. We do not believe that a report of the Secretary-General should contain any conclusions based on conjectures of Secretariat staff or information from unidentified or uncorroborated sources. We have repeatedly noted that Iran has been scrupulously complying with the missile-related provisions of resolution 2231 (2015).”
2022-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9085 (2022) · source
“The Russian Federation, like a number of other countries, voted against the Board of Governors resolution that was initiated by a group of Western States in early June. We believe that that initiative is highly inopportune, blatantly politicized and at variance with the efforts being made on the negotiations track to restore the JCPOA. The issues addressed are retrospective in nature and pose no proliferation-related risks. Let us recall that, since 2015, Iran has been the State that has been most frequently verified among IAEA parties. We continue to be very much troubled by the illegitimate practice of the Secretariat in carrying out certain investigations under resolution 2231 (2015). We categorically object to that kind of activity by the Secretariat.”
2022-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9085 (2022) · source
“At the same time, we should point out that the report fails to mention the important role of the Joint Commission of the JCPOA, whose decisions are designed not only to ensure the implementation of negotiated measures but to monitor that implementation. We also need clarification of the Secretary-General’s assertion that a lack of progress in relaunching the JCPOA will undermine confidence in ability in the Plan’s ability to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. I would like to recall that the key role in this context is played by Iran’s implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The JCPOA has ensured notable transparency vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear activity.”
2022-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9085 (2022) · source
“We welcome the fact that the Secretary-General’s report confirms the role of the JCPOA as the most effective tool for strengthening the non-proliferation regime and regional security, and we fully agree that the path to lasting peace and security is through diplomacy. The report states that during the Vienna talks, the United States and the current parties to the JCPOA, including Iran, demonstrated their collective commitment to resolving all political and technical differences. We trust that that trend will continue. We support the Secretary- General’s call to all sides to remain flexible in the interests of reaching a compromise.”
2022-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9085 (2022) · source
“It is therefore completely logical to assume that any steps taken by the United States to resume full compliance with the relevant JCPOA obligations could encourage Iran to move forward with some of the obligations that were previously put on hold. We regret that the Secretary-General’s report (S/2022/490) fails to clearly articulate that cause-and-effect nexus, and not for the first time. Furthermore, the report gives equal weight to calls for the United States to lift restrictions to take a decision on exemptions. When the revival of the JCPOA is in question, what is important is not exemptions but the full, consistent and verifiable lifting of the illegitimate discriminatory measures that the United States imposed on Iran in violation of resolution 2231 (2015).”
2022-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9085 (2022) · source
“Regrettably, that crucial balance was disrupted in 2018 following the United States’ unilateral withdrawal and subsequent multiple steps that not only shattered the JCPOA but also prevented the other parties to it from properly fulfilling it. Those steps include above all the illegitimate unilateral sanctions, both direct and indirect, imposed by the United States. I would like to underscore that the policy of maximum pressure on Iran, which the United States continues to embrace to this day, is the root cause of all the issues currently plaguing the JCPOA. All of Iran’s subsequent steps have been a reaction to the United States’ destructive position rather than Tehran’s arbitrary deviation from its obligations.”
2022-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9085 (2022) · source
“Regrettably, that has somewhat affected the overall positive impression of Ireland’s work as Facilitator. We hope that in future the facilitators of the resolution 2231 (2015) format will return to the practice of having their statements adopted by consensus by all Council members. In the past, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was endorsed thanks to professional diplomacy, which among other things envisages a willingness to take into account the interests of others and demonstrate reasonable flexibility in order to reach a compromise. It marked a key achievement in modern multilateral diplomacy. The importance of the deal for the region and the world as a whole can hardly be overestimated. It signified that despite fundamental differences in positions, the sides were still able to reach an agreement.”
2022-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9085 (2022) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, Head of the Delegation of the European Union Ambassador Skoog and the Facilitator on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and Permanent Representative of Ireland Ambassador Byrne Nason for their briefings. We note Ireland’s efforts in ensuring the successful coordination of the resolution 2231 (2015) format and the Irish team’s high level of professionalism, confirmed by the adoption by consensus of the six-month report of the Facilitator (see S/2022/510). However, we should point out that unlike the report, today’s briefing by the Facilitator was not agreed by consensus, in line with the resolution 2231 (2015) format. We have questions on some of its points.”
2022-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9085 (2022) · source
“We note the successful operation that led to the simultaneous release of detainees on 13 June as part of the special working group established with the assistance of the Astana format. That operation proved the willingness of the parties to expand cooperation under the auspices of the working group. It is a unique mechanism that has proven its worth and effectiveness in building trust among the Syrian parties.”
2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9083 (2022) · source
“That decision by the Syrian leadership, in addition to the January amnesty for objectors, creates a favourable environment for Syrian citizens who wish to return home. Damascus has also demonstrated its willingness to take concrete steps to foster civil reconciliation and work on issues related to detainees and missing persons. In other words, the Government of Syria is working to implement resolution 2254 (2015). Russia has also made a considerable contribution to the overall settlement. Along with our partners in the Astana format — Iran and Türkiye — we held the eighteenth international meeting on Syria in Nur-Sultan, which culminated in the adoption of a joint statement that was circulated as a Security Council document.”
2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9083 (2022) · source
“The host countries — Lebanon, Jordan and Türkiye — do not hide the fact that they have reached their limits with regard to further accommodating the refugees Meanwhile, Western countries stubbornly refuse to help Syrians return home. They prefer to pay for refugees to stay in the host countries. For our part, we deem it to be necessary to ensure the fundamental right of refugees to return home, pursuant to resolution 2254 (2015), provided that such efforts are carried out strictly in coordination with Damascus. In that regard, we would like to highlight the decree of the President of Syria, Bashar Al-Assad, establishing an amnesty for Syrian citizens convicted of terrorist activity and crimes committed prior to 30 April 2022, except for crimes that resulted in a loss of life.”
2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9083 (2022) · source
“At the same time, there is currently a serious deterioration of the economic and humanitarian situation. According to United Nations estimates, the number of those in need has reached a record 14.6 million people. That is evidently the direct result of the suffocating unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union. That situation persists almost one year after the unanimous adoption by the Council of resolution 2585 (2021), which was intended to alleviate the humanitarian suffering and needs of the Syrians, inter alia, by conducting early recovery projects. The acute problem of the return of refugees remains.”
2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9083 (2022) · source
“In that context, we are convinced that the way to resolve the Syrian crisis is by ending the illegal foreign military presence, which violates the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, and by the unconditional cessation of regular air strikes by the Israeli Air Force. The most recent strike, on 10 June, targeted the Damascus International Airport. The airport sustained serious material damage, namely, the runway was damaged, which led to the grounding of all flights, including United Nations humanitarian service flights. We regret that, due to the politicized and biased positions of Western delegations, the draft Security Council press statement that we proposed was rejected. Time and again, we see the extent to which the politicized stances of Council members reflected on their principles.”
2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9083 (2022) · source
“We believe that progress on the Syrian political settlement track is urgently needed now, as the situation on the ground remains tense. The main security threats to Syria and the region as a whole are posed by groups the persistent large-scale presence of terrorists who have found refuge in areas not under the control of Damascus, such as Idlib, areas across the Euphrates River and Al-Tanf. However, we believe the root causes of the explosive situation lie in the current policy followed by the countries of the West of flirting with terrorist elements in an attempt to use them for their own geopolitical purposes.”
2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9083 (2022) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank you, Mr. President, for the practical demonstration of how an irresponsible choice of briefers representing civil society can turn a serious discussion into a low-grade talk show and farce. We would like to thank the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Geir Pedersen, for the overview of the political situation in Syria. We believe that the ninth session of the small drafting body of the Constitutional Committee, which is scheduled to be held at the end of next month, will be a very important event. We are convinced of the need to continue to direct intra-Syrian dialogue with the assistance of the United Nations, in line with the resolution 2254 (2015).”
2022-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9083 (2022) · source
“Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I, too, will be brief and not take up too much of your time, Mr. President. I just wanted to note that such statements sound very convincing coming from the representative of a country that brought the world such provocations as the Skripal and Litvinenko cases, as well as many other incidents that will go down in history as glaring provocations and false-flag operations. They should keep that in mind next time they try to teach us lessons.”
2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source
“The sooner they realize that, the sooner the Ukrainian leadership will sit down at the negotiating table with a realistic position instead of citing slogans and phantom pains. We launched a special military operation in order to stop the shelling of Donbas by Ukraine and the threat to both Russia and the residents of southern and south- eastern Ukraine from the territory of the country that was turned against Russia at the behest of a number of Western countries and from its nationalist leadership. And until those goals are achieved, our operation will continue.”
2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9080 (2022) · source