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Polyanskiy

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2,335
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2018-01-31
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2023-12-22
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un-security-council

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  1. In that context, we consider any unilateral initiatives, including those aimed at creating formats to facilitate a settlement without the participation of all influential international and regional players and the Libyans themselves, to be counterproductive. Operational coordination with members of the Security Council has also taken on a special role at this decisive stage. We stress once again that our country stands ready to work constructively with all interested parties. At this critical juncture for Libya, the main task of the international community is to continue to encourage the country’s leaders to maintain and build on the positive trends of recent months. We cannot allow Libya to become a stage for confrontation between external forces working to perpetuate divisions within the country and exacerbate instability and chaos.

    2023-06-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9351 (2023) · source

  2. One of the key areas in that regard is the eventual withdrawal of the foreign military presence in Libya. We advocate a synchronized, balanced, gradual and phased withdrawal of all non-Libyan armed groups and military units. We believe that reinvigorating the political process requires the conscious desire on the part of the key Libyan stakeholders to come to a reasonable compromise under the auspices of the United Nations and UNSMIL, its most important instrument in Libya, with the consolidated support of the international community. We take this opportunity to reaffirm our support for Mr. Bathily in his efforts to find ways to overcome the internal political impasse and give impetus to political dialogue.

    2023-06-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9351 (2023) · source

  3. It is also necessary to limit external interference and allow Libyans themselves to play the leading role in determining the future of their long-suffering country. An important positive element of the situation on the ground is that there have been no active hostilities in Libya for over two years. However, the threat of a resumption of large-scale military confrontation has not been completely eliminated. We continue to see sporadic clashes between local armed groups. In that context, it is important to ensure the general maintenance of the ceasefire regime in the country to eliminate the threat to civilians and ensure uninterrupted transportation connections. We welcome the ongoing activities of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, but further progress towards a comprehensive settlement of the conflict requires active work.

    2023-06-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9351 (2023) · source

  4. We hope that those efforts will continue and that conditions will be met for the simultaneous holding the presidential and parliamentary elections in the near future. The focus of international mediation efforts should be on providing Libyans with all possible support to enable them to swiftly move on to the next stages of the political process. We believe that the electoral process should be transparent, truly inclusive and include, on a non-discriminatory basis, the entire spectrum of the leading political forces of the former Jamahiriya, including representatives of the former Government. That will ensure that Libyan society accept the results of the elections and will preclude the possibility of a new military and political deterioration of the situation.

    2023-06-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9351 (2023) · source

  5. We firmly believe that this is in keeping with achieving lasting peace and stability throughout the entire North African region, which is still suffering the consequences of the tragic events of 2011. The way out of the current stalemate is the holding of national elections. It is essential for Libya to agree on the modalities for organizing the electoral process as soon as possible. Active efforts in the joint 6+6 committee format have paved the way for holding those elections. We welcome the progress made during the inter-Libyan talks in Bouznika, Morocco, where a compromise on key aspects of the legal framework for the upcoming elections was almost reached. Libyans are literally one step away from the breakthrough that is needed.

    2023-06-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9351 (2023) · source

  6. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Mr. Abdoulaye Bathily, and the Permanent Representative of Japan, Mr. Kimihiro Ishikane, for their statements. We also listened closely to Ms. Abeir Imneina. The developments in Libya do not give us much cause for optimism. The country continues to have two competing Governments. The prospects for overcoming the protracted internal crisis unfortunately continue to appear dim. We call on the Libyan leaders to put aside any possible differences and work together to ensure comprehensive security and a definitive normalization of the situation.

    2023-06-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9351 (2023) · source

  7. We are convinced that, regardless of the Western outrage in The Hague, the Security Council should not be turned into a platform for promoting the anti-Syrian narrative of the United States and its allies. Repeatedly discussing the carbon -copy reports of the Director-General every month, especially in his absence, is pointless. We are taking the floor today only because there was no meeting on this topic in April, and we abstained from taking the floor in March (see S/PV.9275). Once again, we call for a reasonable schedule for discussions on this subject in the Council — one meeting per quarter on the Syrian chemical weapons dossier would be more than enough.

    2023-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9317 (2023) · source

  8. Against the backdrop of the trends and circumstances we have described, we harbour little hope that, during one of the organization’s major events — the fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention — to be held from 15 to 19 May in The Hague, the discussions will not be politicized. It is unlikely that the collective West, confident in its impunity, will eschew further violations of the basic principles of the work of the organization and the provisions of the Convention itself. The truth is that the OPCW is rapidly losing its authority, owing to the efforts of Washington and its satellites, and its role has been reduced to that of an obedient tool in the hands of the West in its crusade against Russia and its allies.

    2023-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9317 (2023) · source

  9. The only thing worth mentioning today is the Arria Formula meeting that we held on 24 March, in which we heard new convincing evidence of the methodology used by both the Fact-Finding Mission and the IIT in direct violation of the CWC’s principles of investigation, especially in terms of the principle of the chain of custody. Of course, our Western colleagues are deaf and blind when it suits them and contend that such evidence is Russian and Syrian propaganda. After all, their only goal is to cover up the Technical Secretariat’s fabrications and its manipulation of the report on the staged incident in Douma in 2018. That, of course, is also part of today’s performance.

    2023-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9317 (2023) · source

  10. Given the fact that we have nevertheless met to play our role in this pointless spectacle, which is diverting the resources of the Security Council, we would like to reiterate that we do not acknowledge the legitimacy of the punitive decision of the Conference of the States Parties — which was brazenly pushed through by Western delegations in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the principle of consensus — or the work or outcomes of the illegitimate Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), established in violation of the principle of consensus and article XV of the CWC.

    2023-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9317 (2023) · source

  11. The Technical Secretariat continues to find an increasing number of reasons to delay the consultations so that Western countries can continue to present the situation as evidence of the Syrian authorities’ supposed unwillingness to cooperate, all of which is nothing other than a scene from the West’s monthly staged performance in this Chamber. The understudy in this play is none other than Fernando Arias, Director-General of the OPCW, who has not only never visited Syria, but also stated his unwillingness to do so under the contrived and legally unsubstantiated grounds that Syria’s rights within the organization have been suspended. In other words, Mr. Arias simply is unwilling to discharge his duty, while opting to toe the line of the Western countries.

    2023-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9317 (2023) · source

  12. They do not shy away from saying that, despite its biased approach, even the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) acknowledges, including in its recent report (see S/2023/297), that Damascus continues to cooperate with the organization. We note that the twenty-fifth round of consultations between Damascus and the Declaration Assessment Team since the initial declaration has yet to take place because the Technical Secretariat is not interested in such a scenario.

    2023-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9317 (2023) · source

  13. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): As in previous meetings to discuss the Syrian chemical dossier in past reporting periods, we are compelled to note that there has been no significant progress on the ground that would require the attention of the Security Council. We are meeting today only to enable a number of Western delegations to repeat the same hackneyed anti-Syrian talking points, which are clearly intended for domestic consumption. It goes without saying that this entire performance seriously undermines the Council’s effectiveness and credibility. We are likely to hear once again from our Western colleagues the unfounded allegations that there has been no progress on closing the Syrian chemical weapons dossier, ostensibly owing to Damascus’ lack of cooperation.

    2023-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9317 (2023) · source

  14. We are convinced that the key to the success of the work of the 1540 Committee should also be its attitude of respect for all States Members of the United Nations and the consideration of their interests and needs as much as possible.

    2023-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9293 (2023) · source

  15. The Russian Federation remains committed to the aims and objectives of resolution 1540 (2004), which remains the only universal international instrument in the field of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that requires States to establish effective national control systems in order to prevent WMDs and their means of delivery from being acquired by non-State actors. We highly value the spirit of global cooperation in the document, as well as the ongoing recognition of the importance of the document for the international community, consistently shored up by practical steps by Member States to implement the resolution.

    2023-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9293 (2023) · source

  16. In that regard, we note the unanimous adoption last year of resolution 2663 (2022), on the extension of the mandate for 10 years, which confirmed its key elements and outlined a range of issues facing the Committee. We emphasize among them the coordination of efforts to provide countries, upon request, with technical assistance in the processes of implementing resolution 1540 (2004) at the national level in order to facilitate the resolution’s full and successful implementation by all countries.

    2023-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9293 (2023) · source

  17. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I would like to thank the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), Mr. Hernán Pérez Loose, for his substantial briefing on the work of this subsidiary body of the Security Council and on the Committee’s plans for the future. In that regard, we are pleased to note the adoption of its programme of work up until January 2024. We trust that, under the chairmanship of Ecuador, the Committee will manage to successfully achieve its goals in the allotted time. We are convinced that, for that purpose, it is necessary to continue to maintain a constructive atmosphere of cooperation in that subsidiary body and to improve its work in order to achieve concrete results within the framework of the implementation of the 1540 Committee’s mandate.

    2023-03-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9293 (2023) · source

  18. In conclusion, I would like to stress once again the need for the continued comprehensive support for Palestinians in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and neighbouring countries that is provided by international humanitarian agencies, led by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, whose activities have not just humanitarian, but also political dimensions with an important stabilizing effect on the countries in the Middle East.

    2023-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9290 (2023) · source

  19. Recently, it has become clear that among the factors preventing a just peace for the Palestinians are the actions of the United States, which seeks to monopolize the peace process and reformat it as it sees fit in order to impose an economic peace on the Palestinians rather than meet their legitimate aspirations to establish their own independent State. That confirms once again the harm of the back-room schemes that Washington is advancing, in circumvention of the Security Council and without regard for internationally recognized solutions, and then imposing them on the parties to the conflict.

    2023-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9290 (2023) · source

  20. In that context, we would like to reaffirm our position of principle that the establishment of Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967 constitutes a violation of international law and is one of the main obstacles to the resumption of direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, to which there is simply no alternative. We also attach key importance to overcoming the division among the Palestinians, which is among the key reasons that the peace process continues to stall.

    2023-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9290 (2023) · source

  21. The ongoing violence in the occupied Palestinian territories and the erosion of the international legal basis for settlements as a result of Israeli unilateral actions are a reminder of the danger of a continued vacuum in the negotiation process. We must acknowledge that the situation will remain volatile until the parties reach mutually acceptable agreements on all final status issues, based on the universally recognized international legal basis of the Middle East peace process and the two-State formula, which we have consistently supported.

    2023-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9290 (2023) · source

  22. In the context, we call on the parties to refrain from using provocative and hateful rhetoric, which can only make the situation more difficult. In particular, we consider the recent remarks made in Paris by Israel’s Minister of Finance, Bezalel Smotrich, to be extremely dangerous and irresponsible, as well as insulting to the Palestinian people. We cannot help but be concerned also by the Knesset’s adoption of laws that deprive Israeli Arabs of citizenship, leading to their subsequent deportation to the occupied Palestinian territories for alleged terrorist activities, and that deny medicine and medical care to Palestinian prisoners.

    2023-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9290 (2023) · source

  23. Since the beginning of the year, we have witnessed violent raids by the Israel Defense Forces in Jenin, Jericho, Nablus and Huwwara, resulting in the killing of more than 150 Palestinians, including 18 minors. Against that backdrop, there has been a sharp increase in attacks by settlers and cases of the disproportionate use of force, which is resulting in deaths and injuries among civilians on both sides. Mass arbitrary detentions are being reported on a daily basis. The situation in the Old City around Jerusalem’s holy sites continues to be extremely tense, particularly now for Muslims in the context of the holy month of Ramadan. At the same time, we also reaffirm Israel’s right to ensure its security.

    2023-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9290 (2023) · source

  24. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. Tor Wennesland, Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, for his briefing on the implementation of resolution 2334 (2016), on Israeli settlement activity in the occupied Palestinian territory. We listened with concern to Mr. Wennesland’s assessments regarding the continued stagnation of the Middle East peace process as Israel intensifies its unilateral steps to create irreversible facts on the ground, expanding illegal settlement building while continuing to forcibly evict Palestinians, destroy their homes and expropriate their property, alongside the decisions by the Israeli leadership to legalize outposts in the occupied territory.

    2023-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9290 (2023) · source

  25. Its work should result in progress towards much-needed regional détente and create the conditions necessary for further de-escalation. In conclusion, I would like to underscore that the difficult socioeconomic situation in Yemen unfortunately persists, despite the many efforts of international and regional donors. We have consistently called for a lifting of all restrictions on the delivery of food, medicine and other essential goods to all areas of Yemen, without exception. We call on all stakeholders in the Yemeni settlement to continue their cooperation in that area with international financial organizations and to support the work of specialized United Nations agencies. We reiterate our support for the work of the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen.

    2023-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9282 (2023) · source

  26. We would like to recall that sanctions are one of the Security Council’s most powerful instruments, and they are intended to restore peace and security, not punish anyone. They should be applied in a targeted and flexible manner and regularly reviewed until they are completely lifted, which also ultimately holds true in the context of Yemen. Accordingly, the work of the 2140 Committee should be carried out in a strictly neutral and depoliticized manner. The main task of its Chairs is to facilitate the search for consensus solutions in the face of what are sometimes the irreconcilable positions of its members. Their work must be as objective and impartial as possible. Care must also be taken to ensure that the Panel of Experts adheres to its mandate in its work.

    2023-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9282 (2023) · source

  27. Our ultimate collective goal must be reaching a lasting and comprehensive solution to the many problems faced by Yemen and that greatly affect its neighbours. We believe that the emerging positive trends affecting Yemen’s neighbours at the regional level could also contribute to that end. For our part, we continue to encourage the official Yemeni authorities, represented by the Presidential Leadership Council, and the Houthis to adopt a constructive approach to resolving their differences. We are convinced that, in the current situation, we must focus on launching direct inter-Yemeni dialogue with the participation of all parties involved in the conflict, including the Houthis. Such a format could be the prelude to returning the situation in Yemen to the path leading towards a peaceful political process.

    2023-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9282 (2023) · source

  28. We are convinced, however, that restoring the ceasefire in Yemen and consolidating its results through United Nations mediation and other important channels and mechanisms requires the harmonization of external approaches. We support the efforts of the Special Envoy to consolidate international assistance to the Yemeni parties. The logical consequences of Hans Grundberg’s efforts should be the development of a comprehensive and sustainable plan for a political settlement under United Nations auspices. That is not an easy job — it will require a constructive approach, flexibility and willingness to comprise. Besides, the international legal framework for a Yemeni settlement will need to be updated to reflect the realities on the ground.

    2023-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9282 (2023) · source

  29. We hope that the calm in Yemen will continue and not be broken by a new round of tensions and that key Yemeni players will continue to adopt a constructive stance to allow for the resumption of the ceasefire and pave the way for a full- fledged political process. Under such circumstances, it is important to exercise restraint and avoid provocative actions. At the same time, as we continue to work towards de-escalation, we must not forget that, without broad dialogue on all political issues, achieving long- term stability will remain impossible. We welcome all efforts to move the settlement of the Yemeni issue forward and reduce tensions in the Middle East, as a whole.

    2023-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9282 (2023) · source

  30. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, Mr. Hans Grundberg, and the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Ms. Joyce Msuya, for their briefings. We also thank the Deputy Permanent Representative of Albania, Ms. Albana Dautllari in her capacity as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014), for her briefing. The situation on the ground in Yemen can be characterized as relatively stable. The return to a large-scale military confrontation has been avoided even in the absence of an official ceasefire.

    2023-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9282 (2023) · source

  31. Persistentattemptstomaintainthe Sudanesesanctions regime, attempts to sabotage previous decisions of the Security Council regarding benchmarks and ignoring the positions of almost half the members of the Security Council, in particular its African members — none of that surprised us. It only strengthened our view that all this is being done to further the narrow national interests of Western countries, which are focused on further pressuring the Sudan.

    2023-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9278 (2023) · source

  32. At the same time, the only concession made by the authors of the resolution was to make the sanctions regime limited in time — and not even for one year, as is customary in the Security Council, but by 18 months, namely, 12 September 2024. In addition, as a basis for the revision sanctions measures, they included benchmarks 2 and 3 from the report (S/2021/696) of the Secretary- General published on 31 July 2021, on which there was and still is no consensus in the Security Council. We also regret that, despite the appeal of seven members of Council to continue consultations on the draft resolution, the United States delegation decided to force a vote on the document.

    2023-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9278 (2023) · source

  33. Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation abstained in the voting on the resolution prepared by the United States on the sanctions regime in relation to the Sudan (resolution 2676 (2023)). We continue to believe that the Sudan sanctions regime no longer reflects the actual situation in Darfur. Moreover, it hinders the Sudanese Government’s implementation of State-building plans and the region’s socioeconomic development. In principle, we favour Security Council sanctions being perfectly justified, regularly reviewed and modified until they are fully lifted. It is unacceptable to use them as a punitive measure. The League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Group of African States have all spoken out in favour of lifting the sanctions on the Sudan.

    2023-03-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9278 (2023) · source

  34. In that regard, we would like to once again note the relevance of Mr. Pedersen’s efforts to depoliticize the Geneva platform and resume the sessions of the Constitutional Committee, as well as to maintain regular contact with the Syrians. It is important to focus on those tasks and to not get distracted by other initiatives, the added value of which remains unclear to us.

    2023-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9272 (2023) · source

  35. Together with our partners, we will continue to scrupulously facilitate the achievement of sustainable and long-term normalization in Syria and the region. We consistently call for advancing the Syrian- led and -owned political settlement process, with the support of the United Nations, without external interference and on the basis of respect for the principles of the sovereignty, independence and integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic. As part of that approach, we had a thorough exchange of views with the Special Envoy in Moscow on 27 February. During those consultations, we confirmed the need for the implementation of resolution 2254 (2015), which stipulates the promotion of intra-Syrian dialogue, including within the framework of the work of the Constitutional Committee.

    2023-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9272 (2023) · source

  36. We believe that continuing such a mistaken practice is absolutely unacceptable, especially in conditions in which many countries of the world, including Russia, are actively helping the Syrians to overcome the consequences of the devastating earthquake and sending their rescue workers, medics and humanitarian supplies to the country. We once again recall that in order to achieve lasting stabilization and security, both in Syria and beyond, there must be a full restoration of the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as Damascus’ control over the entire national territory. Those principles underpin the agreements of the Astana format — Russia, Iran and Türkiye — on Idlib and the area beyond the Euphrates.

    2023-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9272 (2023) · source

  37. As a result, five people were killed and an additional 15 were wounded. And one of the fragments of the Israeli missile intercepted by the Syrian air defences landed just 300 metres from the building of the Russian Embassy in Damascus. We firmly condemn Israel’s use of force in these cases, which is in flagrant violation of the norms of international law. We urge the Israeli side to stop its armed provocations against Syria and to refrain from steps that could have dangerous consequences for the entire region.

    2023-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9272 (2023) · source

  38. With regard to the military-political track of the Syrian settlement, we are forced to acknowledge that the existing problems on the ground, such as the illegal foreign military presence and the remaining hotbeds of terrorism, have been supplemented by new ones in the form of a threat of a possible military operation in the north of the Republic, as well as the activation of various armed groups, including because of the release of prisoners from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Against that backdrop, Israel’s regular arbitrary military actions continue. On 19 February, the Israeli air force launched further attacks on the territory of Syria. Several targets in and around Damascus were attacked. One of the missiles hit a residential building in a dense urban area.

    2023-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9272 (2023) · source

  39. Separately, we demand that the Secretary-General personally withdraw his scandalous methodology “Parameters and principles of United Nations assistance in Syria”, which serves as an umbrella for Western donors and de facto legitimizes their political assertions about the inexpediency of financing infrastructure projects in territories controlled by the legitimate Syrian authorities.

    2023-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9272 (2023) · source

  40. Given that Syria faces an impending hunger crisis and its agricultural lands are occupied by the United States, we expect that if Washington is really committed to humanitarian values, it will take the necessary steps to allow the United Nations to carry out this humanitarian operation. For the time being, unfortunately, nothing of the sort is happening. We once again urge the United Nations Secretariat to address the problems of the negative consequences of sanctions against Syria and, in particular, to ensure that this shipment of our fertilizers is dispatched to the country.

    2023-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9272 (2023) · source

  41. The United Nations Secretariat has repeatedly said that problems in the work of humanitarian workers on the ground due to the so-called “overcompliance effect” are not going away. Because of the American Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, even the efforts of the United Nations to deliver a humanitarian supply of Russian fertilizers impounded in European Union ports to Damascus were blocked. We emphasize that we do not have access to those fertilizers, but in the framework of the anti-Syrian sanctions regime, fertilizers are considered a dual-use product, which minimizes the chances of them being dispatched.

    2023-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9272 (2023) · source

  42. Humanitarian exemptions do not deserve special praise, but are instead are the bare minimum of what the authorities of the United States and European countries can and must do in the current conditions. And, of course, the question of the full lifting of unilateral sanctions is not only not going anywhere, but, on the contrary, is becoming increasingly relevant. The subject of sanctions, in particular, was reflected in the context of the consequences of the February earthquake in the thematic review of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. We also look forward to the report, promised in January, of the United Nations country team in Syria on the impact of sanctions.

    2023-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9272 (2023) · source

  43. In general, our colleagues’ attempts to expose us as freeloaders when it comes to early recovery projects are beneath self-respecting international players. Moreover, the Syrian people themselves know perfectly well who is helping them and how much they are helping. What our Western colleagues can indeed boast of is their efforts to preserve Syrian refugees in camps in neighbouring countries for political reasons. They can also boast of their suffocating sanctions, which place a heavy burden on the shoulders of ordinary Syrians. We urge Council members to be wary of assessments of exemptions from the sanctions regimes. The introduction of such exemptions is not an act of magnanimity or a panacea for the many ills that Western sanctions continue to bring to the Syrian people.

    2023-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9272 (2023) · source

  44. To be honest, we are struck by the cynicism of some members of the Security Council, who are trying to reproach us for allegedly not doing anything to help to restore Syria, since we are not acting through the United Nations mechanisms. We have already provided our colleagues with statistics on what we have done and are continuing to do bilaterally in this area. However, they are deliberately ignoring the fact that the volume of assistance we are providing is many times greater than what they are allocating. We do not wish to act through the United Nations mechanisms, primarily because, despite all of our requests, they remain opaque, and we cannot get basic information on the projects being implemented.

    2023-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9272 (2023) · source

  45. If entirely legitimate deliveries from Damascus are artificially hobbled, we see no sense in maintaining such deliveries under the cross- border mechanism, which violates the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Syria. In parallel with the provision of urgent assistance to the population of Syria, urgent attention must be paid to the reconstruction of destroyed areas — residential, social and communal infrastructure. That will require impartial support from the entire international community. Back in 2017, the United Nations assessed the amount of funding required for the restoration of this Arab country at $250 billion. Given the pace of funding of the humanitarian plan for Syria over the past few years, we can confidently assert that the donor community either cannot or does not want to carry out this task.

    2023-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9272 (2023) · source

  46. Our Western colleagues are essentially trying to force all of us to cover up the corruption scheme from which United Nations-listed terrorists profit. And since the fighters have access to none of the cross-line supplies controlled by the Syrian Government — or at least fewer than the cross-border supplies — they are not interested in them. Subsequently, Western capitals are also showing only half-hearted interest in such supplies. My colleagues who act in such a fashion are not only coming across in an extremely unfavourable light, but are also undermining the future of the cross- border mechanism as a whole, which makes sense only as an element that temporarily supplements intra-Syrian deliveries.

    2023-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9272 (2023) · source

  47. We are talking about the very same militants who have taken root in Idlib, receiving humanitarian aid in some cases and blocking it in others. Unfortunately, they are, essentially, being indulged by a number of delegations in the Council who only weakly express concern about what is happening, thus preventing the Council from giving an honest assessment of the actions of terrorists. If we add to that the copious evidence that Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham militants are openly appropriating humanitarian aid entering the enclave through the cross-border mechanism in order to then resell it to the local population, establishing control over volunteer humanitarian centres in the Idlib de-escalation zone and seizing the money they receive, then the picture before the Council is quite unpleasant.

    2023-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9272 (2023) · source

  48. That measure opens up vast opportunities for the coordination of humanitarian deliveries along internal Syrian routes, which fully complies with resolution 2672 (2023), as well as with the position shared by all members of the Council that it is essential to deliver aid to those in need by all possible means. However, the message of the Syrian leadership has still not been properly acknowledged. In the two weeks since the tragedy, due to outright sabotage by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham terrorists, not a single humanitarian convoy has been dispatched across the contact line. Despite the situation on the ground and the lack of logistical capacities and transport infrastructure, humanitarian deliveries to the north-west of the country from Damascus are urgently needed. That situation is puzzling, to say the least.

    2023-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9272 (2023) · source

  49. The agreement reached between Syria and the United Nations is fully consistent with the guiding principles for humanitarian assistance enshrined in General Assembly resolution 46/182, and therefore requires no further action through a Council decision. Thanks to that agreement, since 9 February, the United Nations has enjoyed full and unhindered access via not only the Bab Al-Hawa crossing point, as provided for in resolution 2672 (2023), but also the newly reopened crossing points of Bab Al-Salam and Al-Rai. In addition, within the first few hours after the tragedy, the Syrian authorities provided humanitarian workers with blanket approvals to work across the country. The same applies to the sending of humanitarian convoys to areas not under Damascus’ control in the north-west.

    2023-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9272 (2023) · source

  50. Comprehensive support for Syrians is also being provided through the Russian Centre for the Reconciliation of the Warring Parties. Security Council members concur in their assessment that the consequences of the disaster, which has struck several provinces in Syria, have virtually wiped out the humanitarian gains made in previous years. In view of the unprecedented scale of the catastrophe and guided by a humanitarian imperative, Damascus responded immediately and unconditionally to the request of the United Nations humanitarian wing by agreeing to open two additional crossing points on the border with Türkiye for the delivery of humanitarian aid by global Organization. We welcome such an approach by the Syrian Government.

    2023-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9272 (2023) · source