YouSaid · the spoken record

Nebenzia

lines on the record: 5,044
first: 2017-08-02
most recent: 2023-12-30
sittings or episodes: 461
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“We know perfectly well who is actually planning, preparing and authorizing sabotage on this scale. It is deeply puzzling that the Secretariat repeatedly refuses to condemn the Kyiv’s regime’s attacks by citing a lack of information, as, for example, with regard to the shelling of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant by the Armed Forces of Ukraine despite its obvious source. At the same time, the Secretariat’s leadership does not hesitate to reiterate politicized conclusions that all such crimes are allegedly the result of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. That is an unacceptable deviation from the principle of objectivity and impartiality by which the Secretariat leadership should be guided, according to Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations.”
2023-06-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9340 (2023) · source
“That is explicitly prohibited by Article 51 of the same Protocol Additional. The use of terrorist methods has already become an official tactic of the Kyiv regime, which openly brags about it. It has bombed the Crimean Bridge, assassinated Daria Dugina and Vladlen Tatarskiyand and attempted to assassinate Zakhar Prilepin. The Chief of Military Intelligence of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Kirill Budanov, has publicly announced plans for the further terrorist extermination of Russians. And Western delegations have not uttered a word condemning those actions. The Kyiv regime has good teachers, who, are inter alia, responsible for the Nord Stream pipeline explosion and targeted strikes on the Al-Tabqa dam in Syria. The West is used to having others do its dirty work. But in this case, hiding behind Kyiv’s dysfunctional regime will not work.”
2023-06-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9340 (2023) · source
“We are also not ruling out an implicit attempt at provocations involving the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. At the same time, the Kyiv authorities have significantly increased the release of water from the Dnepropetrovsk hydroelectric power plant, which is leading to even more flooding in the territories and indicates that the sabotage was premeditated in order to inflict the most severe consequences on the population of the region. In our view, the criminal Kyiv regime and its Western sponsors that are persistently stoking it with weapons bear full responsibility for the unfolding tragedy. This act can be seen as a continuation of the systematic tactic that the Kyiv regime has used since 2014, which consists of striking purely civilian targets for the sole purpose of intimidating the civilian population.”
2023-06-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9340 (2023) · source
“The second goal of today’s attack is to inflict maximum humanitarian damage on the population of vast territories, which inevitably results from the destruction of a major water and energy infrastructure facility. The authorities of the Kherson region of the Russian Federation are currently evacuating the population from flood-prone areas. The explosion at the hydroelectric plant has already led to an environmental disaster. Dozens of settlements located downstream of the Dnipro River have been flooded. The water level in the Kakhovka reservoir and the North Crimean Canal, which supplies water to the Crimean peninsula, is dropping. In other words, Kyiv has once again set out to take revenge on the Crimean people for choosing Russia by depriving them of water.”
2023-06-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9340 (2023) · source
“Attacks on installations containing dangerous forces are expressly prohibited under international humanitarian law, with the specific mention of dams in article 56 of Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions of 1977. Kyiv’s sabotage has two obvious goals. The first is to draw maximum attention to itself in order to create favourable opportunities to regroup the units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and continue the much-publicized and so-called counteroffensive, which is clearly becoming bogged down and failing to achieve Kyiv’s set goals. According to information obtained by our Ministry of Defence, Kyiv has begun building up defensive positions on the right bank of the Dnipro River, which indicates that the Ukrainian forces intend to change to a defensive posture.”
2023-06-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9340 (2023) · source
“We are already seeing a coordinated information — or rather, disinformation — campaign. We are hearing statements from the West and, of course, Kyiv. And we are sure to hear today in this Chamber that the Kakhovka hydroelectric dam was brought down by Russia. Such statements follow the same flawed logic that attribute to Russia the shelling of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant and the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines. Drawing such “conclusions” reeks of schizophrenia, perhaps not even latent schizophrenia. Kyiv’s deliberate act of sabotage against this critical piece of infrastructure is extremely dangerous and can, in fact, be classified as a war crime or terrorism.”
2023-06-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9340 (2023) · source
“This time, with its sense of total impunity and the encouragement of its Western backers, the Kyiv regime decided to carry out its terrorist plan. It is becoming increasingly difficult to convince anyone that the Ukrainian conflict is supposedly the result of Russia’s so-called unprovoked aggression. Only the United States and its closest allies today continue to deny the fact that Ukraine’s Western sponsors have long and purposefully prepared Ukraine for war with Russia since the unconstitutional Maidan coup, while egregiously ignoring the nine-year war of the Maidan Government with its Russian-speaking populations in the east and south-east of the country, which killed thousands of civilians and ending which was the primary purpose of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine.”
2023-06-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9340 (2023) · source
“‘The Ukrainians’, he said, ‘even conducted a test strike with HIMARS launchers on one of the floodgates at the Nova Kakhovka dam, making three holes in the metal to see if the Dnipro’s water could be raised enough to stymie Russian crossings but not flood nearby villages. ‘The test was a success’, Kovalchuk said. But the step remained a last resort. He held off.” We have warned the international community and the United Nations leadership about that threat. At the end of October 2022, we circulated, as an official document of the Security Council, a note from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation on the Kyiv regime’s plans to destroy the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant. We regret that our appeals to the Secretary-General to do everything possible to prevent this horrendous crime were not duly taken into account.”
2023-06-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9340 (2023) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): On the night of 6 June, the Kyiv regime committed the unthinkable crime of breaching the dam of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant, which resulted in the uncontrolled release of water downstream on the Dnipro River. Settlements have been flooded. Thousands of people are in need of evacuation, which has already begun. Agriculture in the region and the ecosystem of the Dnipro estuary have suffered enormous damage. I would like to underscore that the leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine had openly declared its readiness to destroy the dam to gain a military advantage as early as last year. A 29 December 2022 article from The Washington Post — listen closely — states, “Major General Kovalchuk considered flooding the river.”
2023-06-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9340 (2023) · source
“Grossi’s statement, the IAEA secretariat, for its part, will also display the Agency’s impartiality and impartiality and openly condemn the actions of Ukraine, which has already repeatedly brought the world to the brink of a nuclear incident that would affect not only the territory around the plant but lands far beyond its borders, including in Europe. That would be a nuclear disaster.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“In the light of the nuclear safety and security principles outlined by the Director General, we will continue to protect the plant to ensure that there is no chance that Kyiv and the collective West can grossly and irresponsibly violate them. Russia will respond with extreme measures to any attacks by Ukraine on the plant or its critical infrastructure, including its power supply lines, or on Enerhodar, the town where the plant’s personnel and their families live. We hope that in taking into account Mr.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“Grossi’s proposals for ensuring its safety correspond to the measures that we have long been implementing in our national capacity in accordance with decisions taken at the national level. In that regard, no attacks have been launched from the plant’s site and no heavy weapons or ammunition have been deployed there. There are no military personnel stationed at the plant who could be used to launch an attack from the site. We have taken concrete steps to protect the plant’s most sensitive structures, systems and components from attacks or sabotage. In the current circumstances, Russia intends to take every possible measure to strengthen the plant’s nuclear safety and security in accordance with its national legislation and obligations under the relevant international legal instruments to which our country is party.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“The Director General’s initiative establishing a nuclear safety and security protection zone at the Zaporizhzhya plant, announced following his visit there on 1 September 2022, included a number of important elements whose implementation would have helped to prevent Ukraine’s attacks on the plant and any emergency situations or human-made disasters with unpredictable consequences. The Director General and the Agency’s secretariat worked very hard on that, but thanks to Kyiv’s reluctance to reach an agreement and its unwillingness to accept its obligation to refrain from shelling the plant, the initiative did not succeed. We share the Director General’s apprehension about the continuing threats to the safety of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. Ukraine’s shelling of the plant is absolutely unacceptable. Mr.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for his briefing. Ensuring the nuclear and physical safety of nuclear facilities has always been and always will be an unequivocal priority for our country. From the very beginning, with the support of the Agency’s leadership, Russia has made every possible effort to prevent the threats to the security of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant created by the Zelenskyy regime and its Western backers.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“In addition, it is high time for the issue of the return of Syrian refugees to now be dealt with in a practical manner. On the subject of refugees, another so-called donor conference for Syria is scheduled to take place in Brussels in June. Once again, representatives of the Syrian authorities have not been invited. In fact, the West continues to criminally freeze the Syrian refugee crisis in neighbouring countries, condemning people to live in tents, even in winter. Helping to resolve the country’s internal issues, building reserves for independent development and restoring at least the basic infrastructure are what is really expected from the donors. Efforts to respond to Syria’s humanitarian needs must be based, without preconditions, on the interests of the Syrian people.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9333 (2023) · source
“At the same time, more than 1,700 trucks have entered from Türkiye through three checkpoints between February and April, while the United Nations has sent more than 100 inter-agency missions to the enclave. The United Nations emergency humanitarian appeal for the north-west of Syria, which is not under Damascus’ control, has raised a whopping $400 million for 5 million people and is already fully funded. The United Nations mandate for the use of the cross-border mechanism for humanitarian assistance, as I have already mentioned, expires on 10 July. We see no reason at all to extend it. The United Nations has already proven that, with contact and coordination with the national Government, it can work without a Council resolution, which should finally cease to exist.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9333 (2023) · source
“Since July 2021, only 10 convoys have been able to cross the contact lines into Idlib, the most recent being in early January — therefore, none since the devastating earthquake. A total of just 152 trucks have been dispatched. It is extremely worrisome that this is happening despite the acute needs of the population in the affected areas. The United Nations leadership has also failed to react. At the same time, in statements in support of the cross-border mechanism, we have repeatedly heard from the Secretary-General and his Under- Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs about a moral imperative that we must follow in preserving the cross-border mechanism. That is a rather strange moral imperative, given that it applies only to the terrorists in Idlib. As for the rest of the country, that moral imperative is nowhere to be seen.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9333 (2023) · source
“Adam Abdelmoula, to report without delay on the impact of the unilateral restrictions on the humanitarian situation in the country. That is all the more pertinent given that Mr. Abdelmoula’s predecessor reiterated that commitment during the April round of the informal interactive dialogue on Syria. The Syrian Government’s unprecedented decision to open two border crossings with Türkiye at Bab Al-Salam and Al-Rai and then to extend them by three months until 13 August, in addition to the Bab Al-Hawa crossing point, in accordance with resolution 2672 (2023), has unfortunately not received due credit. On the contrary, it appears as though that decision has undermined the prospects for humanitarian supplies to the insurgent north-west from Damascus.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9333 (2023) · source
“They have argued for the need for the long-term planning of United Nations humanitarian operations, but how can humanitarians make any plans for Government- controlled territories when the humanitarian plan for Damascus is so catastrophically underfunded? Their arguments are therefore flagrant blackmail, a violation of all humanitarian principles and another blatant display of double standards. Moreover, the problems caused by the plundering of Syrian grain and oil resources by the United States, as well as the illegal unilateral sanctions by the Western bloc of States suffocating the country’s economy, are not going anywhere. We therefore once again appeal to the United Nations leadership as a whole and to the new Resident Coordinator in Syria, Mr.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9333 (2023) · source
“The existing needs of 15 million people, in addition to the fuel and water crises and the cholera outbreak, have been compounded by widespread destruction and a new wave of internally displaced persons. Meanwhile, the United Nations is woefully short of funds for even the most basic operations. Only 9 per cent of the annual humanitarian response plan for Syria for Damascus- controlled territories has been funded for the five months of 2023. For that reason, inter alia, the World Food Programme will be forced to reduce its food aid coverage by 70 per cent. Here we would like to address the advocates of the obsolete cross-border mechanism, who have been fervently advocating for its extension by one year.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9333 (2023) · source
“On the political track, we continue to support the mediation efforts of Special Envoy Pedersen to advance the process of a Syrian settlement in strict compliance with resolution 2254 (2015) and without any external interference. In that connection, we consider it important that the Special Envoy adhere strictly to his mandate, which is based on facilitating intra-Syrian dialogue — the optimal format for which we believe is the Constitutional Committee. At the same time, we believe that decisions in principle on the parameters for future rounds of intra-Syrian consultations should be made by the Syrians themselves. We share the alarming assessment that the humanitarian situation in Syria, exacerbated by the earthquake in February, continues to deteriorate.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9333 (2023) · source
“It is deeply regrettable that there has been no reaction whatsoever from the leadership of the United Nations. At the same time, arbitrary special mechanisms continue to be churned out to investigate incidents and protect human rights in Syria, with a structure for missing persons next in line. Such entities, the non-consensual creation of which is being pushed by a group of States in the General Assembly and Human Rights Council, have no added value. Gathering compromising materials on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic at the behest of Washington and Brussels with a view to future judicial proceedings only pushes the prospects of a political settlement in Syria further away.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9333 (2023) · source
“According to our information, Washington has started to establish a so-called Free Syrian Army around Raqqa, with the participation of local Arab tribes and militants from Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and other terrorist organizations. The aim is clear: to use those fighters against the legitimate authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic to destabilize the country. We note with concern the intensification of Israeli air strikes against Syrian territory, including by violating the airspace of neighbouring countries. In April alone, there were approximately 10 random strikes, which not only destroyed civilian infrastructure — including the Aleppo airport and Latakia port — but also killed and injured civilians. We condemn such violent acts, which violate the sovereignty of Syria and its Arab neighbours.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9333 (2023) · source
“Unfortunately, instead of supporting the efforts of regional actors, who have clearly demonstrated their ability to single-handedly resolve issues within the Arab family, our Western colleagues continue to exert pressure, including by force, on the Syrian authorities and the countries of the region, dissuading them from engaging in dialogue with Damascus. In that context, we should like once again point to the destructive policy of the United States, which is apparently no longer satisfied with merely pumping weapons into the illegal armed formations they have created in the trans-Euphrates and Al-Tanf regions.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9333 (2023) · source
“There has also been positive momentum in the normalization process between Syria and Türkiye. On 10 May, a quadrilateral Astana format meeting was held in Moscow between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Russia, Iran, Syria and Türkiye, during which participants reaffirmed their commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria and to fighting terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and underscored the need for increased international assistance to Damascus, including for the voluntary, safe and dignified return of Syrians to their homeland and for post-conflict recovery.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9333 (2023) · source
“That long-awaited step was a logical outcome of the process of Syria’s reintegration into the Arab family — a scenario for which Russia has always consistently advocated. We have worked for many years with regional players, encouraging them to restore full-fledged relations with Damascus. The decision of the Council of the League of Arab States demonstrated the desire of the countries of the Arab world to strengthen the coordination of actions to resolve current regional and international issues, reaffirming their willingness to pursue an independent policy on the world stage based on their own fundamental interests. In that context, we hope that the Arab countries will step up their support to the Syrian Arab Republic in its post-conflict reconstruction endeavours.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9333 (2023) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Special Envoy Geir Pedersen, Deputy Director Ghada Mudawi and Ms. Morgane Aveline for their briefings. The increasing restoration of Damascus’s ties with its regional environment is of key importance to the political settlement process in Syria. We welcome the decision taken on 7 May by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the League of Arab States at its extraordinary session in Cairo to restore the participation of the Syrian Arab Republic in meetings of the Council of the Arab League and in all of the structures of the League — and we welcome in particular the participation of President Bashar Al-Assad in the League’s summit, given that Syria is one of its founding States.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9333 (2023) · source
“Moreover, they are compounded by unlawful and unilateral restrictive measures that run counter to all the principles of international law, further aggravate the socioeconomic situations of the countries involved and undermine efforts — including those of the Council — to build peace. That is why our delegation took the initiative of including a passage in the draft resolution recognizing the negative impact of such unilateral measures on post-conflict reconstruction work and calling for countries to refrain from applying them to countries that are subject to Security Council sanctions. We regret that our constructive language, despite receiving strong support from China and the three African members of the Security Council, was rejected by the United States as the penholder.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9332 (2023) · source
“We believe that rather than keeping African countries under sanctions for decades, what they need is help in overcoming their continuing security issues, which is impossible without effective, well-trained and -equipped national security entities. And their benchmarks were not intended to become an iron curtain against the lifting of sanctions. In general, it is our view that the Council’s frequently archaic sanctions regimes on the African continent are in need of extensive review and restructuring. We are particularly concerned about the fact that in many African States, including in South Sudan, sanctions regimes are used by Western countries to pressure them and even interfere in their internal affairs.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9332 (2023) · source
“It cannot be ignored that at this point South Sudan is particularly in need of strengthening its developing armed forces, which can become an effective tool for tackling the problem of intercommunal violence and can ensure the success of the elections scheduled for December 2024. South Sudan has made significant progress in the past year in implementing the benchmarks of resolution 2577 (2021), as the Secretary- General recognized in his report on the findings of the United Nations assessment team (S/2023/300). In our view, using the alarming situation in its neighbour the Sudan as a pretext for not making meaningful progress on South Sudan’s sanctions file is unfair.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9332 (2023) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation abstained in the voting on resolution 2683 (2023), prepared by the United States, on the extension of the sanctions regime against South Sudan. We believe that the easing of the sanctions that it provides for is insufficient. We regret that the United States penholders were so fixated on the ill-suited sanctions paradigm that they were unwilling not only to meet this young State halfway regarding reviewing the arms embargo but even to hold a constructive discussion during the negotiations on the key provisions of the draft and the specific proposals made for their revision. They once again ignored the agreed positions of the countries of the continent as well as the approaches of a number of other members of the Security Council, including Russia.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9332 (2023) · source
“We appreciate the willingness of regional players, as reaffirmed at the summit, to self-finance 25 per cent of the continent’s total expenditure on peace and security activities, including peacekeeping operations. This step affirms — not in words, but in deed — the principle of African solutions to African problems. We are studying the lessons learned in the report of the Secretary-General from United Nations and African Union interactions and possible future planning and joint decision-making on peacekeeping missions on the continent, including the most viable financing modalities, while maintaining rigorous transparency and accountability measures on the use of funds. We stand ready to engage in substantive discussions as part of the forthcoming negotiations process on a future Security Council draft resolution on the matter.”
2023-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9329 (2023) · source
“The need for an in-depth discussion on predictable and sustainable financing is objectively dictated by the ever-increasing number of crises and armed conflicts in Africa, which organizations and States in the region are quick to engage in resolving. The lack of access to the resources necessary to resolve those crises inevitably results in the ineffectiveness of such efforts and the further spread of instability. Our African colleagues are capable of taking responsible decisions to ensure peace and security in their region. That was demonstrated at the recent African Union summit, at which it was agreed to use the Peace Fund and its crisis reserve facility to support the East African Community’s operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to address the financing issues faced by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia.”
2023-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9329 (2023) · source
“Recent examples include the logistical support provided by the United Nations Support Office in Somalia to African peacekeepers in the country; the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur; and the assistance of Blue Helmets in Mali to the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. The advantages of African peacekeeping as compared to United Nations peacekeeping operations include the ability to respond quickly to emerging challenges and threats, as well as a willingness to use force in order to restore peace. That is particularly relevant in the context of the growing terrorist threat on the continent and the unsustainability — or indeed, absence — of peace agreements.”
2023-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9329 (2023) · source
“The African Union Peace and Security Council is functioning effectively and is supported by the African Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early-Warning System and the African Standby Force. The Peace Fund is also being replenished, and the African Union’s flagship initiative to end armed conflict which has been extended until 2030 is being implemented. Significant progress has been made on ensuring human rights, transparency and accountability in African military contingents. The United Nations, on numerous occasions, has extended material and financial assistance to African efforts in the field of international peace and security, including through assessed contributions from United Nations Member States.”
2023-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9329 (2023) · source
“Russia supports the position of African countries on the need to adopt effective measures to enhance predictability, reliability and flexibility on that issue. We consider it abnormal that peace and security in Africa depend on the irregular assistance of individual States and organizations. We are convinced that Africans themselves know better than anyone the nature and root causes of instability in their region. They have come a long way in shaping the regional peace and security architecture and today have the necessary mechanisms in place that take into account local specificities and harmoniously complement the efforts of the United Nations within its area of responsibility and mandate.”
2023-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9329 (2023) · source
“I would also like to highlight the contribution of African countries to United Nations peacekeeping, both on their own continent and beyond. Let us pay tribute to all those who have sacrificed their lives for that noble cause. It is also most symbolic that we are discussing the topic of African peacekeeping today, We thank Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo, African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security Bankole Adeoye and Ms. Bitania Tadesse for their briefings. We carefully studied the report of the Secretary- General on the implementation of resolutions 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017), which contains specific considerations on addressing the issue of financing of African Union peace support operations on the continent under the auspices of the Security Council (S/2023/303).”
2023-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9329 (2023) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): At the outset, I would like to wish all of our African colleagues a happy Africa Day. On this day, exactly 60 years ago in Addis Ababa, the first conference of independent African States was held and laid the foundations for the creation of the Organization of African Unity, the work of which the African Union is now successfully continuing. That also constituted the culmination of the first phase of decolonizing the African continent. Today, thanks to the joint efforts of African countries, it has become possible to establish mechanisms for collective responses to local crisis situations and to launch regional integration processes in various formats, undoubtedly contributing to Africa’s socioeconomic development and enhancing its role in international affairs.”
2023-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9329 (2023) · source
“Only a genuine resumption of the peace process, with a two-State solution at its core, will contribute to reducing violence and radicalization and to restoring mutual trust in the Middle East.”
2023-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9328 (2023) · source
“We believe that Syria’s resumption of its participation in the work of the Arab League, of which it is a founding member, will help to improve the atmosphere in the Middle East, including with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The League’s decision demonstrates the Arab world’s desire to strengthen the coordination of efforts to resolve the region’s outstanding problems through negotiations. We believe that the international community must continue to advocate the necessity of relaunching direct negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis on a universally recognized international legal basis on all final status issues — that is, borders, refugees, water resources and Jerusalem.”
2023-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9328 (2023) · source
“Having blocked the work of the Middle East Quartet of international mediators, the United States is stubbornly promoting Arab-Israeli normalization while bypassing a just settlement of the Palestinian question. The real paradox here is that Washington, which aspires to the role of sole sponsor of the Middle East peace process, long ago and definitively lost the neutrality and impartiality essential to an honest broker. The previous Administration’s decisions to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights effectively erased the United States’ commitment to the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. Against that worrisome backdrop, we can only welcome the long-awaited decision of the League of Arab States to restore Syria’s membership.”
2023-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9328 (2023) · source
“Meanwhile, 700 housing units in the settlement of Givat Hamatos in East Jerusalem were approved for construction in April of this year. In the circumstances, Palestinians are increasingly opting for resistance and stepping up efforts to defend their legitimate rights before international bodies such as the International Court of Justice, the Security Council and the General Assembly. The Israeli- Palestinian conflict has clearly exposed the double standards of our colleagues from the United States, which has continued its unilateral attempts to reverse the deteriorating situation on the ground by substituting an economic truce for a genuinely political peace.”
2023-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9328 (2023) · source
“Above all, that is a result of the record rate of Israeli settlement construction activity, with 7,157 housing units approved this year, which is double the numbers for 2021 and 2022, along with the retrospective legalization of outposts, with corresponding expropriations of land and demolitions of Palestinian homes. In addition, the number of arbitrary arrests of Palestinians has increased, with more than 2,000 people, including minors, detained since the beginning of the year. Incidents involving the disproportionate use of force and the heightened use of socioeconomic pressure measures are also on the rise. It is noteworthy that neither the meetings in Aqaba and Sharm El-Sheikh nor the Security Council presidential statement condemning those unilateral Israeli actions (S/PRST/2023/1) have had any tangible effect.”
2023-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9328 (2023) · source
“The Israeli Air Force continues to launch indiscriminate strikes against Syria, including on Aleppo airport, which is being used to transport humanitarian aid to victims of the devastating earthquake. There has been an alarming increase in incidents along the Blue Line with Lebanon, culminating in the most intense exchange of rocket fire since 2006. There can be no question that the triggers of the deteriorating situation on the ground continue to include unilateral steps aimed at establishing irreversible facts on the ground and the lack of prospects for reviving the peace process.”
2023-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9328 (2023) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. Tor Wennesland, the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, for his substantive briefing on the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories. We also listened to the remarks by Ms. Tania Hary. The unprecedented escalation of violence in the Arab-Israeli conflict zone remains a focus of international attention. As a result of Israeli military raids in the West Bank in Jenin, Jericho, Nablus and Huwwara, clashes in the context of violations of the status quo in Jerusalem’s holy sites, especially the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, and the escalation of violence in the Gaza Strip, more than 100 Palestinians have died and thousands more have been injured since the beginning of this year. The number of Israeli casualties is also growing.”
2023-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9328 (2023) · source
“For our part, despite the dirty games being played with the agreements, we intend to continue to be guided by the importance of contributing to ensuring international food security, especially for developing countries, and by overcoming the artificial barriers erected by the West. Everything that our grain and fertilizer exporters have achieved is the result of their own efforts, and neither the United Nations nor the West’s so-called exemptions have anything to do with it. As in the past, our country continues to be one of the world’s key suppliers of agricultural products. We have earned our reputation as a reliable and predictable partner, and we intend to continue to be one in the future.”
2023-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9327 (2023) · source
“Almost a year after the Black Sea Initiative was agreed, the supply of ammonia available on world markets is down by 70 per cent because cargoes have not shipped. As for the Russia-United Nations memorandum of understanding on the export of Russian foodstuffs, its implementation has barely started. While hypocritically claiming that there are no sanctions on exports of foodstuffs and fertilizer, the EU and the United States have refused to unblock SWIFT access to the Russian Agricultural Bank or to resolve the other logistical problems created by the sanctions that we have discussed repeatedly, including for shipping, insurance and agricultural equipment. That is how Kyiv and its Western mentors are blocking exports of foodstuffs and fertilizer while blaming others for it.”
2023-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9327 (2023) · source
“Over the 10 months of its operation out of Ukrainian ports within the framework of the World Food Programme’s humanitarian operations, that amounts to only 600,000 tons of foodstuffs, out of a total volume shipped of more than 30 million tons, an overwhelming percentage of which went to developed countries. We would like to draw particular attention to the ammonia supplies stipulated in the Istanbul agreements, which could ensure the shipment of 2.5 million tons of raw material, enough to produce 7 million tons of fertilizer. That amount of fertilizer would have the potential to produce food for 200 million people. Those shipments should have begun at the same time as the export of the Ukrainian products, but that has not been happening.”
2023-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9327 (2023) · source
“We believe that hunger continues to be a method of the economic warfare that the West is waging all over the world. It arbitrarily strangles the possibilities for trading in foodstuffs. The situation surrounding the Black Sea Grain Initiative is a clear example of that tactic. We expressed our view of it at the 15 May Security Council meeting on the humanitarian situation in Ukraine (see S/PV.9321), and we will continue to draw attention to the real situation going forward. To cite some numbers, the least-developed countries have received less than 3 per cent of all the shipments made within the framework of the Black Sea Initiative.”
2023-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9327 (2023) · source
“We urge the Secretary-General to continue to monitor that alarming situation closely and do more to bring it to international attention. The grave humanitarian situation in Syria is due in large part to the fact that the United States and the European Union (EU) continue to impose illegal unilateral sanctions on the Syrians, with disastrous consequences for the civilian population. As the Secretary-General’s report indicates, the sanctions continue to have a negative impact on the provision of humanitarian assistance, which people’s lives in conflict areas often depend on. And that does not affect Syria alone. We call on the Secretary-General to continue investigating the issue. We note that the country-specific report on the situation in Syria, which we were promised by January, has not yet been issued.”
2023-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9327 (2023) · source