YouSaid · the spoken record

Nebenzia

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2017-08-02
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2023-12-30
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un-security-council

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  1. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic and Türkiye to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Geir Pedersen, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria; and Ms. Lisa Doughten, Director, Humanitarian Financing and Resource Mobilization Division, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I give the floor to Mr. Pedersen.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9313 (2023) · source

  2. Let the spirit prevail. The question is, what spirit? As I announced, I drew a line. There are no more speakers on my list. I am sorry to anybody who wanted to request the floor, but we really have run out of time. The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  3. We cannot continue into the night. We have other plans in the Security Council in the very near future. The representative of Albania has asked for the floor to make a further statement. As this is starting to resemble an open debate, I will draw the line here on representatives asking for the floor and will end the meeting after he speaks.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  4. We note the position of the United States. We already stated how we see the matter and how things developed and are developing in the course of discussion of that issue. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Serbia has asked for the floor to make a further statement. I now give him the floor.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  5. But we all witnessed today that she masters English more than decently, and we did not object, as the representative of Albania claimed today, but consulted with the Member States through the political coordinators network. The result of these consultations was the communication of one State member of the Council to the Secretariat of the decision — I emphasize, decision — by Ms. Gërvalla- Schwarz to address the Council in English. The same message was communicated to the Russian presidency. In the message to the Secretariat, that same Council member underlined that if the request to speak Albanian reaches the Secretariat before the communication that Ms. Gërvalla-Schwarz had decided to speak English, the formal request should be disregarded. We therefore reject any attempts to accuse the presidency of non-impartiality.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  6. At 99 per cent of the meetings of the Security Council, briefers and speakers are invited under rule 39, and none of them insist on speaking his or her own language if different from one of the six official languages of the United Nations. We thought it should not be otherwise at this meeting, and this has nothing to do with discrimination against the Albanian language. I have already referred to precedents where there were statements under rule 39 in native languages, but these exceptions were made for those speakers who did not speak any of the six official United Nations languages. Had that been the case with Ms. Gërvalla-Schwarz, we would have treated the situation in the same way: she would have been granted an opportunity to speak Albanian.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  7. Council members — actually, two Council members — addressed the presidency with the request to allow Ms. Gërvalla- Schwarz to speak in Albanian. Today the representative of Albania invoked rule 44 of the Security Council’s provisional rules of procedure. I will quote the rule for the Council: “Any representative may make a speech in a language other than the languages of the Security Council. In this case, he shall himself provide for interpretation into one of those languages. Interpretation into the other languages of the Security Council by the interpreters of the Secretariat may be based on the interpretation given in the first such language.” Ms. Gërvalla-Schwarz does not fall under the category of representative. She speaks under rule 39, not under rule 37, in contrast to Serbia.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  8. We view this as the last chance for restoring justice, albeit 25 years after the inhuman atrocities that were committed. We hope that these criminals will be punished, as they deserve, and the Court in the Hague will not repeat the disastrous mistakes of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. (spoke in English) I understand that Albania has already spoken the issue that was raised at the beginning of the meeting. As President I would like to make a comment on what has been said today since the way the representative of Albania raised this issue directly or indirectly implicates the presidency and basically accusing it of being partial, that is, of abusing its prerogatives as the presidency. I would like to clarify this issue.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  9. The environment suffered catastrophic damage, as noted in the report on the environmental impact of the war in Yugoslavia on South-East Europe, which was adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in January 2001. The fact is that NATO has never been too concerned about the “collateral damage”, as former United States Secretary of State Albright termed it, and that remains the case, as demonstrated by Britain’s deliveries of depleted uranium weapons to the Ukrainian regime. In the light of the 1999 events I just mentioned, we should like to draw attention to the trial of one of the leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army, Hashim Thaçi, and his accomplices, which began at a special court in The Hague in April.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  10. In violation of resolution 1244 (1999), its members are contributing to the gradual establishment of a virtual Kosovar army by increasing the supply of weapons and military equipment. Washington has essentially privatized the Bondsteel military base, which was created exclusively for peacekeeping purposes. And Washington is doing that shamelessly, as if everyone had forgotten about the so-called Reçak/Račak massacre, which was staged to justify NATO’s invasion of Yugoslavia and resulted in the mass bombing of the country with depleted uranium weapons, mass civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian infrastructure.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  11. We must once and for all end the recurrence of Pristina’s arbitrary treatment of Mission personnel, such as in the case of the Russian citizen Mr. Antonov, who was declared persona non grata in December 2021 by an unlawful decision of the regional authorities. It is obvious that the main goal of the West is to subdue the Balkans by all means possible and draw the countries of the region into one of its military-political blocs. Under such conditions, it is pointless to talk about the sincerity of statements by members of the Quint concerning the stabilization of the region. If it served their interests, they would have no scruples in setting the region on fire. The increasing activity of NATO attests to that.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  12. The way that was organized and the manner in which votes were cast in favour of it by certain countries shows better than words can their attitude towards the United Nations and Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1244 (1999) providing the framework for the settlement of the Kosovo issue. UNMIK is also under pressure from the Kosovo Albanians — which our Western colleagues would never allow to happen in the context of other peacekeeping operations. We believe that UNMIK must be able to fully carry out its functions and be provided with the necessary human and financial resources to that end. We call for accelerating the investigation into the circumstances of the May 2019 detention of UNMIK staff member Mr. Krasnoshchekov by members of the Kosovo Albanian police and the severe injuries that he suffered as a result.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  13. The United States and the European Union have condoned the Kosovars’ de facto usurpation of authority in the north of the province and seek to deprive the Serbs of their voice in the face of the terror unleashed against them. In that way, Western countries continue to fuel the conflict between Belgrade and Pristina and continuously exert pressure on the Serbs on all fronts. For example, at the height of the confrontation in December 2022, the Czech presidency of the Council of the European Union accepted Kosovo’s application for European candidate status. On 18 April, the European Parliament approved visa liberalization with Kosovo for its citizens, which will enter into force no later than 1 January 2024. The same applies to the immediate review of Kosovo’s membership in the Council of Europe, which was conducted on April 24.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  14. Despite the refusal of the Serbian majority to propose any candidates, the elections were held nevertheless under pressure from the United States and the European Union. As we know, the Serbs unanimously refused to participate in such a mockery of democratic procedure. However, the paltry 3.5 per cent turnout and the lack of needed resources for holding the elections did not stop Pristina from declaring successful the completely illegitimate elections and announcing the winners — four Kosovar Albanians who represent a tiny fraction of the local population, 96.5 per cent of whom ignored the farce. The normal electoral process was provocatively replaced by an artificial election process, which was immediately approved by Pristina’s Western sponsors.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  15. We believe that the optimism expressed in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2023/247) on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) with regard to the prospects for their implementation is greatly exaggerated. We recall that, as made clear by the many frank statements of the Serbian leadership, Belgrade agreed to continue the dialogue with Pristina on the basis of that understanding and on the condition that its red lines be respected — namely, its non-agreement with the unilateral declaration of independence and Kosovo’s membership in the United Nations and the swift establishment of the community of Serb municipalities in Kosovo in accordance with the Brussels Agreement. On 23 April, Pristina decided to escalate tensions once again by holding so-called municipal elections in northern Kosovo.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  16. Throughout the entire period, the Kosovo Albanians have attempted to substitute what was agreed for the establishment of something akin to a non-governmental organization, which must be rejected. Only a full-fledged community will ensure the basic rights and security of the province’s Serbs and the socioeconomic development of the areas they inhabit and preserve their cultural identity. Finally, it would be a prerequisite for achieving lasting and not merely temporary progress towards the settlement of the issue. In our opinion, it is with an understanding of the true goals of Mr. Kurti’s policy that we should approach the 18 March verbal agreements reached between Belgrade and Pristina in Ohrid on two documents — the Agreement on the path to normalization between Kosovo and Serbia and its Implementation Annex.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  17. Ziadeh already evoked several noteworthy dates today: 19 April marks the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Brussels First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations of 2013, the main provision of which was the establishment of a community of Serb municipalities in Kosovo. But during all the time that has elapsed since then, the Kosovo authorities have avoided its implementation with impunity. The remaining substantive problems remain unresolved because Pristina — we must be frank— is not interested either in the normalization of relations or the fulfilment of its obligations. That is why Albin Kurti unreasonably demands that the community of Serb municipalities comply with the provincial Constitution and be multi-ethnic without conferring executive powers.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  18. Former Serbian members of the Kosovo police are being prosecuted on spurious charges. Orthodox shrines and tombs are being desecrated. Physical attacks against Serbs and their property have increased. Since Albin Kurti came to power in February 2020, more than 300 violent acts against Serbs have been recorded in Kosovo. The perpetrators are generally not prosecuted. Those are the realities on the ground. But we all understand that without a negotiation process, agreements or adequate mechanisms to ensure the protection of Serbs in the north and the few who remain south of the Ibar River, resolving the current problems will be impossible. In that regard, we must revisit recent history. Ms.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  19. Pristina, with the support of Western capitals, has not abandoned its attempts to take control of Serb- populated areas. It seems that despite the international community’s obsession with human rights, almost no one cares about their observance with respect to the Serbs. As Minister Dačić mentioned earlier, the systematic policy of physically displacing Serbs and transforming the province into an ethnically pure Albanian space continues. I would add that 209,000 of the 372,000 non-Albanians who lived in the province until June 1999 were forced to leave. There are regular incursions by the special forces of the Kosovo police into the northern part of the province. They are building security-agency strongholds on plots of land that were confiscated from non-Albanian locals.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  20. Gërvalla-Schwarz has once again attempted to pass off the plan of interministerial consultations signed by the Russian and Serbian Foreign Ministers as Serbia surrendering its sovereignty and putting foreign policy decision-making in Russia’s hands. I would say to Ms. Gërvalla-Schwarz that that is ridiculous and simply unprofessional. Russia’s position on the issue of Kosovo remains unchanged. We are in favour of reaching a sustainable, mutually acceptable international legal solution for Belgrade and Pristina, based on resolution 1244 (1999). The solution must be in the interests of Belgrade and the Serbian people, and it must be endorsed by the Security Council. The situation in Kosovo is increasingly alarming. Over the past few months, the situation in the province has repeatedly been on the verge of a renewed heated conflict.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  21. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation. We thank Ms. Caroline Ziadeh, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, for her briefing on the situation in the province and for the views she has presented. We welcome the participation in this meeting of the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Serbia, Mr. Ivica Dačić. We also listened to the views of Ms. Donika Gërvalla- Schwarz, although she devoted more of her statement to the ties and bilateral relations between Russia and Serbia — which have nothing to do with Pristina — than to Pristina’s own legitimate claims, which have been expressed here, and its policies. I already mentioned this at our previous meeting (see S/PV.9155), but today Ms.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  22. While I thank Ms. Gërvalla-Schwarz for her statement in my capacity as President of the Security Council, I reject her assertion that the presidency did not allow her to deliver her statement in Albanian. The presidency was informed that she was prepared to speak in English, as her predecessor did previously. If Ms. Gërvalla- Schwarz had unequivocally insisted on speaking in Albanian — for which there is certainly precedent, although I would like to draw Ms. Gërvalla-Schwarz’s attention to the fact that those speakers did not speak any of the official United Nations languages — we would have enabled her to do that. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  23. I thank Ms. Ziadeh for her briefing. I now give the floor to the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  24. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2023/247, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. I now give the floor to Ms. Ziadeh.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  25. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Serbia to participate in this meeting. On behalf of the Council, I welcome His Excellency Mr. Ivica Dačić, First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Ms. Caroline Ziadeh, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Ms. Donika Gërvalla-Schwarz to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9312 (2023) · source

  26. There are no more speakers on my list. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at noon.

    2023-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9302 (2023) · source

  27. I should point out that our discussion has taken on an interactive aspect. The representative of Mali has asked for the floor to make a further statement. I now give him the floor.

    2023-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9302 (2023) · source

  28. We are working on ways to provide additional assistance to Mali in the food and energy sectors. We believe that effective assistance to the Malian Government for ensuring security and overcoming the crisis will foster lasting peace and stability in the entire Sahelo-Saharan region. We believe that a leading role in stabilizing the Sahelo-Saharan region should be played by the peoples of the region themselves in according to the principle of “African solutions to African problems”. I now resume my functions as the President of the Council. I give the floor to the representative of Mali.

    2023-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9302 (2023) · source

  29. We believe that, under these circumstances, we should effectively assist Malian authorities in overcoming urgent problems instead of telling them how to behave, as certain countries tend to do. We call on Bamako’s international partners to refrain from politicizing donor assistance, which has led to the suspension of financing of Malian development-assistance programmes. These decisions could lead to a further exacerbation of an already dire humanitarian situation, especially in the light of the chronic underfunding of the humanitarian plan for this country. Russia intends to provide further support the normalization of the situation in Mali, using the Security Council as a platform, and by providing comprehensive assistance to Bamako on a bilateral basis.

    2023-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9302 (2023) · source

  30. On the contrary, the Malians’ views are of no interest to them and never have been. Everyone knows that the need for stabilization of the Sahel — and Mali in particular — is the result of Western countries’ irresponsible military actions in Libya. No tangible results have emerged from the many years of presence of Western countries in this part of Africa. In that regard, we call on our colleagues in the Council to acknowledge their mistakes and renounce their neocolonial habits. This region does not belong to them. Let the Malians and people of neighbouring countries in the region take the wheel and resolve their own problems, with help from partners that they themselves have chosen. We have received no complaints from our African partners with regard to the parameters of our cooperation with them.

    2023-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9302 (2023) · source

  31. Russia is providing the Malian army with comprehensive assistance, including with regard to increasing its combat readiness and training soldiers and law enforcement agents. Our bilateral cooperation is taking place at the request of Bamako, in strict accordance with applicable norms of international law. Thanks in part to Russian support, the Malian armed forces have been able to significantly increase their capacity to counter terrorism and convert the potential into real results on the ground. We have once again heard a negative reaction from Western colleagues to the growing Russian-Malian cooperation. We find it unfortunate that they cannot set aside their geopolitical rivalry. In essence, their claims have nothing to do with concern for Mali’s well- being.

    2023-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9302 (2023) · source

  32. At the same time, it is important to focus on implementing key elements of the Mission mandate, especially the protection of civilians and supporting the Malian security and defence forces to this end. MINUSMA should also strictly adhere to its mandate when it comes to human rights, especially with regard to support for the Malian Government in carrying out investigations. It is unfortunate that a number of troop- contributing countries have decided to end or suspend their participation in MINUSMA. In terms of options for reconfiguring the peacekeeping presence, we believe that any option for revising the modalities of the Mission’s work should be aligned with the main challenges the country is facing, be agreed upon in advance with Bamako and be based on the host country’s in-depth views.

    2023-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9302 (2023) · source

  33. We believe that the Malian Government is focused on doing all it can to overcome the challenges currently facing the country, especially when it comes to ensuring security and political stability. We support the work of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in assisting Bamako and the country’s population in resolving their current problems. We note the efforts of the Mission in facilitating stabilization in Mali. We understand the dangers that peacekeepers face when serving in this country, and we pay tribute to those peacekeepers who have laid down their lives for peace and stability in Mali. The key to achieving the Mission’s goals is close coordination with the host country and respecting Mali’s sovereignty.

    2023-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9302 (2023) · source

  34. It is important for signatories of the peace agreement to be flexible and willing to compromise for the sake of peace and unity in Mali. Without normalization in Mali, stability in the Sahel region is not possible. On a large swath of the Malian territory, terrorist groups affiliated with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Al-Qaida continue to be active, and they engage regularly in raids on the civilian population as well as units of the Malian army and United Nations peacekeepers. Despite these real difficulties, however, the Malian armed forces have shown that they are capable of effectively combating terrorists. We welcome the launch of the national strategy for stabilization in the centre of Mali.

    2023-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9302 (2023) · source

  35. On 10 March, the Government of Mali announced a postponement of the constitutional referendum, apparently for valid reasons: it had to ensure that a maximum number of Malian citizens could cast their votes freely and safely. Currently, the absolute priority is ensuring security in the country, especially given the entire withdrawal of the French Barkhane force and the European Union Takuba Task Force. The Malian Government has also affirmed its commitment to the Algiers peace agreement, which remains the basis for attaining lasting peace and national harmony in the country. As part of the work of the Agreement Monitoring Committee, steps are planned to accelerate development in the northern territories to restore the institutions and integrate former combatants into the national armed forces. The negotiation process is complicated.

    2023-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9302 (2023) · source

  36. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation. I thank the Special Representative of the Secretary- General, Mr. El-Ghassim Wane, for his briefing and welcome the Permanent Representative of Mali, Mr. Issa Konfourou, to today’s meeting. The Malian Government is undertaking systematic efforts to normalize the situation and to lay the groundwork for holding elections at all levels within the agreed time frame. It is implementing the road map for the transitional period and taking measures, such as drafting electoral laws, conducting territorial-organization reforms and discussing a new draft constitution on a national level.

    2023-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9302 (2023) · source

  37. I thank Mr. Wane for his briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements.

    2023-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9302 (2023) · source

  38. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Mali to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. El-Ghassim Wane, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2023/236, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali. I now give the floor to Mr. Wane.

    2023-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9302 (2023) · source

  39. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation. Before adopting today’s agenda, I would like to remind colleagues that today, 12 April, is International Day of Human Space Flight, which commemorates the day that Yuri Gagarin became the first person in the world to carry out a crewed flight into outer space. We hope that space will remain an area for cooperation, non-confrontation and peaceful exploration, and not for an arms race. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in Mali Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/2023/236)

    2023-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9302 (2023) · source

  40. Then, on 1 February 2019 President Trump announced the start of the United States withdrawal proceedings from the Treaty. Secondly, I have a question for my American colleague: can he confirm or deny that United States nuclear weapons are not only on United States national territory but also on European territory? Maybe he will dare to answer that question in the Chamber.

    2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source

  41. I just want to refer to a statement from 23 January 2019, when Russia’s Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs invited foreign military attachés and journalists to a briefing, at which a number of tactical and technical characteristics of the land-based 9M729 cruise missile and its launcher and launch vehicles were demonstrated for the first time. The representatives of the United States and the militaries of a large number of other NATO and European Union member States ignored that invitation. An official representative of the United States Embassy in Moscow told Russia’s Interfax news agency that the United States and the majority of its NATO allies declined to attend the briefing, which we all saw as just another attempt to cover up violations and create an appearance of transparency.

    2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source

  42. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We do not intend to transform today’s meeting into a dialogue between Russia and the United States, but I would like to say a few things. First of all, I want to thank the representative of the United States for acknowledging just now — contrary to what he said in his official statement — that it was precisely the United States that withdrew from Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019. Since what we just heard from him is a confirmed fact, we will be sending a letter to the members of the Security Council to describe the sequence of steps that took place at the time, specifying who did what — who the initiator was — and the basis and grounds on which each step was taken.

    2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source

  43. Western countries are simply trying to impose their own self-serving rules on the rest of the world and then demand that other countries strictly comply with them. They themselves do not of course consider themselves bound by any obligations. Such inherently neocolonial attitudes, which are aimed at ensuring the prosperity of the so-called “golden billion” at all costs, cannot mislead us or our colleagues from developing countries, not anymore. They are as disingenuous and unconvincing as the attempts to shift the blame for undermining strategic stability onto Russia. The sooner the collective West understands that and embarks on a serious dialogue — on equal principles of indivisible global and European security — the better the chances will be of avoiding new urgent problems and crises.

    2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source

  44. The pinnacle of their hypocrisy was their attempt to present themselves as champions of peace, while flooding the Kyiv regime with weapons, and the statements from Washington and European capitals that it was unacceptable to pursue a ceasefire in Ukraine. I would remind members that all that was in response to recent international initiatives to resolve the situation, which Russia, on the contrary, welcomes. I am not talking about the so-called peace plan presented by Zelenskyy, though. The collective West is unprincipled and inconsistent towards the situation in Ukraine and other international problems. That clearly illustrates the essence of the so- called “rules-based order”, which has nothing to do with international law.

    2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source

  45. This assertion will be more accurate. However, we have long known that the Kyiv authorities have shelled civilians in the Donbas for years, continue to use Western weapons against their own civilians and are misanthropic and servile towards the West. Their indifference to their own population and their European neighbours was fully demonstrated in the situation around the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, which the Armed Forces of Ukraine have repeatedly shelled, despite the risk of a full-scale disaster at the largest nuclear power plant in Europe. Western countries have also known about that for a long time too, but they have been hypocritically silent about it.

    2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source

  46. Russian tanks would not be in Ukraine and Ukrainian soldiers would not be dying for foreign political interests if the United States and its allies had not conducted an anti-constitutional coup d’état in Kyiv in 2014; if they had not brought Russophobes, nationalists and Nazis to power in Ukraine; if the United States and its allies had not armed that group and prepared them for war against Russia, under the cover of the Minsk agreements; and if they had not covered up their crimes against Russian speakers in eastern and southern Ukraine. Ukraine would have known peace long ago if the United States and its allies were not pumping the Kyiv regime with weapons and forcing it to send thousands of conscripts into this senseless slaughter. That is the sole objective, and the West uses it to justify the allocation of funds to Ukraine.

    2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source

  47. Such an impact was fully felt by victims of the invasion of Yugoslavia and Iraq by Western States, and the consequences of the use of such munitions are still being felt. It would seem that the Kyiv regime, which allegedly cares about ordinary Ukrainians, itself should have resolutely refused such a gift in order not to endanger the civilian population and avoid future contamination of the land. The representative of the United States used the chain of reasoning that Russian tanks would not be coming into contact with depleted uranium shells if Russia had not committed, as he said, aggression against Ukraine. I would like to elaborte on that assertion.

    2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source

  48. As we have repeatedly noted, the establishment of that bloc generally provokes tensions, undermines efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and sets the stage for the start of a new arms race. However, the Americans and their allies, as we know, have never been deterred by such considerations. They are only concerned about maintaining their own geopolitical superiority. However, such duplicity no longer surprises us. The Ukrainian crisis has clearly demonstrated it, and the interests of the Ukrainians themselves have never been taken into account by Western countries. A recent egregious example is London’s decision to supply Kyiv with armour-piercing shells containing depleted uranium. We all know for certain the dire impact of using such toxic munitions on areas where they were used.

    2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source

  49. That is precisely the direction of the measures announced by the President of Russia, which so frightened the Zelenskyy regime and its Western supporters. Or did they seriously expect that we would not properly respond to their provocative and aggressive actions? The concern about global stability on the part of Western countries looks extremely hypocritical even against the background of their provocative activities outside Europe. The establishment of the so-called United States-United Kingdom-Australia security partnership and the declared plans to build nuclear submarines in that context raises many questions, not only for us, but also for other States.

    2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source

  50. The respective storage facilities are located on the territory of other States, for example Greece. In recent years, there have been calls to expand the network of American nuclear weapons storage sites in Europe towards the borders of the Union State of Russia and Belarus. We recall that, as recently as last October, the leadership of Poland publicly announced that it was negotiating that country’s participation in “joint nuclear missions”. Against the background of NATO’s openly declared desire to inflict a “strategic defeat” on Russia, it is obvious that such actions require us to take all necessary reciprocal steps, including in the military sphere, to ensure the security of the Union State of Russia and Belarus.

    2023-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9300 (2023) · source