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Nebenzia

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2017-08-02
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2023-12-30
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  1. We are also very concerned about the lack of clarity with regard to the future of the New START Treaty. The extension of the Treaty would be a reasonable step that would make it possible to prevent the further deterioration of the situation in the area of strategic stability; avoid a full collapse of the monitoring and restrictive mechanisms in the nuclear and missile spheres; and gain time to discuss approaches to controlling new weapons and military technologies. Appeals to Russia to extend the New START Treaty are misguided. President Putin has proposed that the United States extend the Treaty without any preconditions. We are waiting for an answer. At the time, the nuclear deal with Iran was a major success in the area of non-proliferation.

    2020-02-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8733 (2020) · source

  2. The starting point here can be considered Washington’s withdrawal in 2002 from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, one of the most important of those agreements. Last year, the United States, under a spurious pretext, tore up the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). Almost immediately thereafter, flight tests of previously banned United States systems began. Our proposals to impose a moratorium on the deployment of short- and medium-range ballistic missile systems, including the development of a mechanism for their verification, have not only been ignored by the United States and its allies, but even undermined. Such actions confirm that the real reasons for the collapse of the INF Treaty have nothing to do with Russia’s position and actions.

    2020-02-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8733 (2020) · source

  3. In the half-century of its existence, the NPT has established itself as one of the cornerstones of the international world order and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The indefinite extension of the NPT, achieved back in 1995, is evidence of its profound importance and the fact that the Treaty meets the interests of all States parties, nuclear and non-nuclear States alike. Recently, we have witnessed the breakdown of a number of internationally recognized mechanisms in the area of non-proliferation and arms control. The root cause, as we see it, are the attempts of one State to dominate the world and impose its rules on the world community, to the detriment of the interests of other States and international law. All multilateral agreements and mechanisms that prevent such domination are declared outdated and ineffective.

    2020-02-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8733 (2020) · source

  4. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Ms. Nakamitsu and Ambassador Zlauvinen for their briefings. The Charter of the United Nations begins with the words “We, the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. Just one and a half weeks after its signing came the first — and, we hope, the last — use of nuclear weapons, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That marked the beginning of the nuclear arms race, the consequences of which are still being felt. It took almost 25 years to address that challenge in the form of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), of which we will celebrate the fiftieth anniversary this year, in just a few days from now.

    2020-02-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8733 (2020) · source

  5. What we want is for the resolution to have a balanced text. However, the take-it-or- leave-it approach does not allow for compromise; we cannot agree to that kind of an approach.

    2020-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8732 (2020) · source

  6. Unfortunately, what has transpired today yet again attests to the non-constructive working methods of the sponsors of the draft, which should have been geared towards the adoption of a consensus-based document and have allowed all voices, not just ours, to have been heard. Again, we would stress that the penholdership mechanism requires meaningful reconsideration. The fact that our concerns are not heeded during work on the draft resolutions of the Security Council and are often simply disregarded ultimately puts the sponsors, and not us, in a difficult position. If there is a wish not to listen to us during consultations or to hear our concerns, that will impact our position on the vote, as was the case today. We certainly do not wish to achieve everything just for our own sake, contrary to what some may claim.

    2020-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8732 (2020) · source

  7. If a crisis were to occur, that would only complicate the efforts of both the Special Envoy, Mr. Martin Griffiths, and the United Nations. The Russian Federation fully support Mr. Griffiths’ efforts. We once again emphasize the need for the international community to work jointly to achieve overall stabilization in the region. We should not focus on isolation and pressure or seek to pin the blame on parties but, rather, meaningfully seek ways to resolve the crisis. The goal of the resolution was to extend the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts, not compete with the putting forward of approaches that go beyond the objectives of the resolution.

    2020-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8732 (2020) · source

  8. I emphasize also that there was no unity in sight during the discussions of the report of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014). However, any contentious issues were incorporated into the initial draft resolution, and many delegations did not have an opportunity to participate on equal footing in efforts to achieve a balanced text. Tell us, why does division have to be sown in the Security Council at a time when the situation in Yemen requires our concerted and collective efforts to help facilitate a settlement that would help to bring the conflict back onto a political track and ensure a comprehensive ceasefire and the delivery of aid to the Yemeni people? It is fortunate that, at least today, such division was able to be averted.

    2020-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8732 (2020) · source

  9. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation was not in a position to support resolution 2511 (2020), penned by the United Kingdom, which renews the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, because not all of our concerns were taken into account. During the consultations, we clearly and explicitly presented our principled and duly justified position. We made clear our objections to a host of the provisions contained in the British draft. A number of our remarks were taken into account only today, when yet another contrived crisis was already in the works in the Security Council. This all could have been agreed to calmly, without any drama or haste.

    2020-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8732 (2020) · source

  10. Some of them keep a low profile and stay in refugee camps; others spread out all over the region. We express our extreme concern about such developments. On our part, we will continue efforts to normalize the situation in Syria. We believe that it is important to restore normal relations among the various population groups of the Syrian Arab Republic, which have been hurt tremendously by attempts to tear the country apart. Achieving stability in Syria is possible only by respecting its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. To our German colleague, who asked a direct question: we will not stop supporting the legitimate Government of Syria, which is conducting a legitimate fight against international terrorists.

    2020-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8727 (2020) · source

  11. If some of our colleagues are indeed so worried about protecting oil fields from terrorist fighters, they could recommend that these fighters reach an agreement with Damascus. Otherwise their presence in Syria is illegal, as it is in other areas, like in Al-Tanf, where the situation with the Rukban camp has not yet been resolved, or in the area beyond the Euphrates, where refugees still suffer in the Al-Hol camp. This includes visits by officials to territories that are not under control of the Syrian Government. How can they visit those territories if terrorists are operating in those regions? I would also like to note that on the eastern side of the Euphrates River there is a growing danger of fighters, including foreign terrorist fighters, who have fled prisons.

    2020-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8727 (2020) · source

  12. The Syrian side responded to the United Nations request for an alternate itinerary one day after it received the request — I say this in response to those who say that Damascus does not respond quickly — and it covered routes both through Iraq and through Syria, according to a specific note dated 29 January. Today is 19 February, and the convoy has not yet been sent, either from Iraq or from Damascus. United Nations colleagues have simply remained silent for three weeks now. What happened to the urgency? Maybe because it was no longer in the headlines, so the needs of Al-Hasakah were no longer important. We hope that this will be reflected in OCHA’s report on alternate itineraries through Al-Yarubiyah. If the oil fields were returned to Government control, it would also significantly improve the humanitarian situation in Syria.

    2020-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8727 (2020) · source

  13. We know these techniques very well. In order to undestand how they work, let us recall the same sensation from last month — the cross-border assistance mechanism (see S/PV.8707). Council members will remember how everyone criticized us for the closure of the Al-Yarubiyah border crossing. We were asked to work with the Syrian side to find alternative ways of delivering humanitarian assistance as soon as possible. We were told that the situation was extremely urgent and that supplies of medicine in Al-Hasakah were going to run out. For some reason, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) did not inform the Council or the public at large about the subsequent developments on the issue. We will tell Council members now.

    2020-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8727 (2020) · source

  14. Like other members of the Council, the Russian Federation expresses its concern with regard to the situation of tens of thousands of internally displaced persons who found themselves locked outside of camps. Resolving their problems should be the top priority of the humanitarian community, especially given the winter period and the high number of vulnerable individuals among that group of people. As far as we understand, humanitarian agencies have the resources to do so, as donors have so far spared no effort in providing financing to regions that are not under Government control. Furthermore, we cannot but note that these kinds of problems have to be aniticpated and provided for in order to make sure that people do not find themselves without shelter in winter. Once again, people are trying to hype this.

    2020-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8727 (2020) · source

  15. We therefore ask for pressure to be put on the terrorists in Idlib to stop using civilians as human shields and allow them to leave through humanitarian corridors, and to stop executing and torturing those who demonstrate or protest against the invasion of terrorists. By the way, for those who doubt that humanitarian corridors are functioning, on 18 February alone 177 people crossed the Bjarez checkpoint, 171 in Maaret al-Numan and 35 in Habit. Thirdly, it is also important to begin work right now on the post-conflict reconstruction of the country. Our colleagues who are holding the Arria Formula meetings are simply strengthening the sanctions regime, which, on 17 February, was expanded to target Syrian companies taking part in post-conflict reconstruction. How is that related to their concern for Syrians?

    2020-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8727 (2020) · source

  16. They were attacked by an armed group, which simply confirms the need to fight armed groups and restore Government control over the entire territory of the country. We appeal to all those who have influence on the factions in Idlib to work to stop the shelling of the civilian population, drone attacks on the Russian Khmeimim air base, and provocations against the Syrian forces. For the information of Council members, over the past day there were 29 such attacks, in Latakia, Idlib, Hama and Aleppo. It will be impossible to achieve a sustainable ceasefire if we do not stop this. As was recently pointed out to us, humanitarian law applies to all types of conflicts.

    2020-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8727 (2020) · source

  17. Last time we spoke in detail about the efforts of our military to protect civilians and to respect international humanitarian law. Maybe our British colleague missed this, but I just wanted to remind her of something else that we discussed. It is not good to boast of destruction, but objectively speaking, the level of destruction of civilian targets as a result of anti-terrorist activity by Syrian forces in Idlib is many, many times less than what we saw during the actions of the so-called international coalition in Raqqa and other cities, which were the targets of merciless bombing as part of the fight against terrorists at that time. We deplore the deaths of Oxfam personnel in the south of Syria in Dar’a governorate, which we heard about today.

    2020-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8727 (2020) · source

  18. Yet we have already learned that some of our colleagues make a strict distinction between the right Syrians and those who support the legitimate authorities. We have already heard all today’s rhetoric more than once also this month. Some are playing the card of civilian suffering and long-term truce every time the terrorists they cherish are in danger. How can we respond to their accusations about exterminating civilians? Whatever we say in attempt to persuade them, they do not listen and stubbornly keep speaking about the deliberate bombings of schools, hospitals and refugee camps. Of course, anyone who is human and who has a heart will of course react to such statements. It is a ploy that is 100 per cent guaranteed. Who is going to try to understand whether it is true or not?

    2020-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8727 (2020) · source

  19. To provide political cover to terrorists by portraying them as revolutionaries and to force the Syrian Government to engage in negotiations with them will not be possible. The Ministry of Defence of Russia reports that there are samples of modern Western munitions in weapons depots captured from the terrorists, many of which were organized in schools and hospitals converted into combat positions. It is important to stop supplying terrorist fighters with weapons. By the way, when armed regiments were marching on Damascus, with the approval of some Western States, I do not recall that the Security Council meetings were held so often at that time to discuss this matter, although the casualties among civilians and in the Syrian army were enormous.

    2020-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8727 (2020) · source

  20. Of course, we would all like to see progress on the political track, but to push through or impose ready- made solutions would violate the principle on which we all agreed: that the future of Syria should be decided on by the Syrian people. We will also seek to encourage all Syrians to work constructively. Russia has been given advice on what to do and how to do it. We too can make a few recommendations. First, what needs to stop is the protection of fighters, including those from organizations by the Security Council, such as Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham. Recently we once again heard a statement from James Jeffrey that it might be possible to reach an agreement with Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham.

    2020-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8727 (2020) · source

  21. But today we would like to focus on the discussion that was planned for today, on the political track. We are trying to promote the peace settlement process. With a key role played by Russia, together with Turkey and Iran, the Constitutional Committee was established, and there is simply no other mechanism for a political dialogue. There have been two sessions of that Committee to date. Now the Special Envoy and his team are working on convening a third meeting and are in constant contact with the Syrian sides. To that end, the Special Envoy and then his Deputy recently visited Damascus. We believe that this approach is the right one — the parties should first agree on an agenda for a meeting so as to ensure that discussions take place on concrete issues.

    2020-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8727 (2020) · source

  22. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to Special Envoy Geir Pedersen for his briefing. We also listened carefully to the briefing of Under-Secretary-General Mark Lowcock. The actions of the Security Council’s penholders, who asked to invite Mark Lowcock at the last minute, surprised us, but for us the motivations are clear, as we have talked about this more than once. This month we have already discussed humanitarian issues in some way twice, and the programme of work of the the Security Council also includes a monthly briefing on the humanitarian aspects of the situation in Syria on 27 February. Maybe next time we can invite Ms. Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and discuss all the various aspects of the Syrian crisis that are considered by the Security Council.

    2020-02-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8727 (2020) · source

  23. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I say to Mr. Kyslytsya not to try to drive a wedge between me and Spokesperson Peskov. I saw his statement this morning. The information I referred to was not written at Sixty-seventh Street — where the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations is located — it is information we received today after the situation had been clarified. The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  24. For that reason, the Normandy format is meaningful only if it is geared towards the implementation of the Minsk package of measures, which need to be implemented without any preconditions.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  25. We have repeatedly said that the investigation is shockingly closed and opaque. That information, which needs to be verified and corroborated, of course, only serves as proof. Lastly, I would like once again to recall the fact that it is important for us to understand that there are two sides, not three, in this conflict — and not two, Ukraine and Russia, in the view of our Ukrainian colleagues — namely, it is Donbas and Kyiv. As long as there is no direct dialogue between Kyiv and Donbas, there can be no settlement in Ukraine, just as there can be no settlement without direct dialog between the parties to the conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria, Cyprus, Colombia or anywhere else in the world. Only an inclusive dialogue can generate opportunities and guarantees for lasting peace.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  26. I continue to be surprised at where he gets his information about “unfortunate people who have been coping with that tremendous oppression in Russian-occupied Crimea”. I have called on him many times to go to Crimea and have a look for himself how the “unfortunate Crimeans” are suffering there. Two speakers today mentioned the Malaysian Airlines Flight MH-17 disaster. Of course, that is not the subject of today’s meeting. I do not think they should present that information pretending to be a prosecutor. And I myself am not a prosecutor. Moreover, I want to share with the Council some surprising information published by Western media outlets today, namely, that Dutch military intelligence and security services did not detect a single Buk anti-aircraft missile system in the area where the aircraft was downed.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  27. Kyiv committed 3,737 ceasefire violations, as opposed to 2,809 coming from Donbas territory — and that is just the cases in which the violator could be identified. The overall number of violations stands at 45,244 explosions on one side and 12,114 on the other side. There are 304 pieces of equipment west of the line of demarcation — a violation — as opposed to none on the east side. During the same period, Ukrainian security forces targeted three residential areas in Donbas, while there was not a single attack against territory under Kyiv’s control. Unfortunately, he does not want to see what could not be clearer. I do not know what type of eyeglasses could help him see that.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  28. I asked him, the next time he visited the Security Council, to please bring photographs of civilians who had died as a result of the actions of Ukrainian security forces in Donbas. Many such photographs could be provided. I will do so myself the next time, because most likely I will not wait for the Ukrainian side to do it. This is an ongoing tragedy. And this tragedy must end. The way to end it is by implementing the Minsk agreements. Mr. Heusgen also told us today about violations at the line of contact. In that regard, let me turn to statistics from the Special Monitoring Mission. Ukrainian forces were responsible for 60 per cent of firing incidents between 9 December 2019 and 12 February 2020.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  29. That offensive strike was carried out using medium-calibre mortars and large-calibre artillery in vicinity of Holubivske, Sokilnyky, Donetskyi and Smeloye. Ukrainian military forces fired more than 50 mortar shells into the territory of the Luhansk People’s Republic. Mr. Kyslytsya showed us a photograph of an unfortunate 22-year-old young man, Maksim Khitailov, who died today, apparently in the same area. He was a grenade-launcher operator with the 72nd Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian armed forces. That is a tragic event, but why are they deploying young men to die there? We remember how Mr. Kyslytsya’s former Minister, Mr. Klimkin, seating in that very chair, showed us a photograph of an unfortunate girl who had died on their line of contact.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  30. According to the information available to us, on 18 February a division from the Ukrainian armed forces attempted to destabilize the situation along the line of contact in Donbas. At approximately 6 a.m., a 10-person sabotage group from the armed forces of Ukraine moved towards the positions of the Luhansk forces near Holubivske. That operation by the Ukrainian armed forces was revealed at an early stage. As they approached the contact line, the group tripped a landmine, which killed at least two people and injured three more. In order to evacuate the dead and wounded from the area, the armed forces of Ukraine carried out a large-scale artillery attack targeting residential areas in the Luhansk People’s Republic.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  31. Was he referring to the anniversary of the adoption of resolution 2202 (2015), which endorsed the Minsk package of measures? Does it mean that for him the day of the adoption of that resolution is a tragic day? He referred to how Vladislav Surkov deftly persuaded the representatives of Donbas to sign on to the Minsk agreements. Mr. Heusgen perhaps should know that the Donbas representatives who signed the Minsk agreements in 2015 saw it as an enormous concession and defeat. Today the Ukrainian authorities do not even want to engage in dialogue with them, labelling them not just separatists but terrorists. There was much said about today’s hostilities in the area of Holubivske.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  32. Kyslytsya a question: does the fact that United States citizen Natalie Jaresko was once Finance Minister of Ukraine, that Lithuanian citizen Aivaras Abromavičius was Economy Minister and that United States citizen Ulana Suprun was Minister of Health — incidentally, she is from Chicago, which is 8,000 kilometres from Kyiv, greater than the distance from Kyiv to Irkutsk — lead us to think that the United States and Lithuania are direct parties to the conflict in Ukraine? I will not even mention the example of United States Army Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman, who found himself entangled in the impeachment affair and who claimed that he was three times offered to be made Minister of Defence of Ukraine — something he himself acknowledged was a joke. Mr. Heusgen noted that today was a sad day for international law and for Ukraine.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  33. We can ask them where they saw Russian troops in Donbas. We are told that with a wave of the hand Moscow can end this conflict as soon as we tell the Donbas representatives. I have a question. My question is this: are they really that naive to think that the Kremlin is puppet master to those individuals in Donbas? Do they actually think those individuals do not have their own opinions, that they are nothing more than puppets of the Kremlin? I do not believe they are so naive as to think so. My friend Ambassador Heusgen never ceases to amaze me. His country is one of the authors of the Minsk agreements. I personally do not know Mr. Pashkov, who was the Vice-Governor of the Irkutsk region. But I want to ask Mr. Heusgen and Mr.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  34. It is impossible to respond to all of it and, in fact, that is not the task before me. Unfortunately, we have not heard anything new. Everything is as before — the same old tune. The representative of Ukraine calls on Moscow to comply with the Minsk agreements but, for some reason, he does not appeal to Kyiv. There is the same tinkering with the Minsk agreements and the issues of cause and effect. It seems that it was Russia that started the war in Ukraine, not Kyiv that came to Donbas. We again heard that Russia must withdraw its troops. But last year, we asked Mr. Apakan and Mr. Sajdik to tell us about the presence of Russian troops in Donbas (see S/PV.8461). They were unable to say anything precise or satisfactory to those who posed the question. Perhaps Ms. Grau and Mr. Çevik have more information.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  35. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I would like to say to the Ukrainian representative that I am glad he is interested in Russian poetry. But that is not surprising — we all come from the same country and were probably taught the same lessons at school. I want to correct him. “O, do the Russians long for war? Ask of the stillness evermore Ask of the soldiers who now lie Beneath the birch trees ...” He missed one line. I do not know whose portraits will be carried on 9 May. I do not think that it will be those of Stalin. I doubt that. However, I wonder what portraits will be carried in Kyiv on 9 May and whether there will even be a parade in Kyiv commemorating our — by the way — shared victory in the Great Patriotic War. Today we heard many things.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  36. Yet it is precisely dialogue between belligerent parties that we all call for in all other conflicts, be it in Syria, Yemen or Libya. Only Donbas is denied that right. We therefore hope to hear our colleagues’ commitment to the Council’s unanimous adoption of resolution 2202 (2015) and presidential statement S/PRST/2018/12 of 6 June 2018 in support of the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements. That document is part of international law and should be implemented unconditionally.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  37. We therefore wish to warn Council members in advance that every time they say that Russia is failing to comply with the Minsk agreements, they should remember that they are deliberately misleading their own people and the international community. Every time that they refuse to acknowledge Kyiv’s responsibility and urge Kyiv to comply with its obligations towards its own people and instead wait for someone else to step in and do it, they prolong the suffering of the residents of Donbas, who, unlike them, know the truth and defend it at the cost of their own blood. The longer they play along with Kyiv, the less the opportunity for a mutually respectful dialogue between Ukrainian citizens on both sides of the demarcation line.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  38. That position must be respected, since no settlement is possible without taking the views of the residents of Donetsk and Luhansk into account. I believe that it is time to finally understand that elections in Donbas can take place only in a climate of public trust in the electoral process. That requires specific conditions in which Kyiv cannot oppress politically those who enjoy genuine popular support — those whom all Ukrainian politicians call separatists and whose punishment they call for and those whom the residents of Donbas, in turn, consider to be their protectors, who uphold their right to life and their identity. We need guarantees of a truly inclusive political process. We know the points that some representatives are about to make.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  39. Many of those present have themselves spoken of the devastating plight of the residents of Donbas yet have refused to acknowledge the responsibility of Kyiv, which, in waging war against its own population, has imposed a transport, food and economic blockade against Donbas. Every day for the past five years, people have died as a result of the shelling. Are they shooting themselves? Were they the ones who started the war and marched on Kyiv? A scenario whereby in Kyiv they propose first allowing Ukrainian soldiers into Donbas, which former civilian militias have been protecting for all these years, risking their lives every day, and then giving the Ukrainian armed forces control over the border is absolutely unacceptable to eastern Ukraine.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  40. Before our meeting, we circulated the text of the package of measures as an official document of the Security Council so that all those here present could have an opportunity to refresh their memory as to the fact that not only is Russia not mentioned there, but also that the 13 points contained therein set out a clear sequence for implementation: ceasefire, amnesty, constitutional reform, with the provision of special status to Donbas and the right to linguistic self-determination, then the holding of elections and only after that the restoration of Government control throughout the conflict zone. Unfortunately, of the 13 points to date perhaps only two have been implemented, that is, those on the proceedings of the Contact Group in Minsk and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  41. There is no progress on the issues of disengagement of forces and equipment, interaction on demining, permanent introduction of the Steinmeyer formula in the Ukrainian legislation; there is no willingness to agree on the disengagement of forces in new areas, and no readiness for direct dialogue with the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  42. Therefore, we deem it important to reiterate that the efforts made under this format will be effective only if they are rooted in unconditional implementation of the package of measures and agreements reached under the Normandy format. This specific approach was endorsed in the agreed conclusions of the quartet summit held in Paris on 9 December. It is the implementation of this approach by all parties, primarily Ukraine, that will become for us a decisive factor for us in assessing the viability of a new meeting in the Normandy format. So far as we can see, hostilities are ongoing, including today in the area near Luhansk.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  43. We proposed today’s meeting specifically because for millions of residents in eastern Ukraine, whom Kyiv and its partners in this Chamber prefer not to remember, the Minsk agreements are neither a ploy nor a parallel reality but the sole real hope for peace. Only after their implementation will Ukraine have an opportunity to rebuild the eroded trust of the people of Donbas, whom the Ukrainian authorities have demoted in an instant to second-class citizens, labelling them separatists and aliens in their own land. We cannot but be troubled by the attempts to deliberately or unwittingly supplant the Minsk basis for a settlement with other formats, for example, the Normandy format, which, let us recall, was created specifically to support the implementation of the Minsk agreements.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  44. Zagorodniuk, objected to disengagement along the entire line of contact because, allegedly, “this runs counter to the very essence of the Minsk agreements”. Yet this is actually the very essence of the first paragraph of the Minsk package of measures. The representative of Ukraine to the subgroup on political issues of the Trilateral Contact Group, Mr. Resnikov, said that Minsk agreements are at the very minimum subject to partial revision. Just yesterday, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, Mr. Avakov, said, “We are considering a step-by-step approach; on one day we will take up one area, and the next day, another one”. At the same time, the Ukrainian security forces persist in their attempts to take up the positions of militiamen in the so-called grey zones, where there should be no military personnel at all.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  45. Yelchenko, expressed his gratitude to the presidency of the Security Council for the opportunity to participate in a meeting on “an issue of the utmost concern to us”. Many eminent Ukrainian politicians have also joined the campaign to sabotage the Minsk agreements. They are blatantly contradicting the political will that was announced by President Zelenskyy in Paris towards a settlement. Will alone indeed is insufficient; what is necessary are concrete measures. Only in recent days we have heard from Mr. Kryvonos, Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, that the Ukrainian forces “need to stand ready to use force to liberate the territory of Donbas”. The Defence Minister, Mr.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  46. We deeply regret the fact that for five years, our Western partners, which at the time supported the anti-constitutional Maidan coup d’état, with its rabid Russophobia and nationalism, did not deign to absorb the fact that the parties to the Minsk agreements are not Russia and Ukraine but, rather, Ukraine and the Republic of Donbas. What is even more alarming is the fact that Kyiv has of late egregiously ratcheted up its rhetoric, which casts doubt on the Minsk agreements. For example, our initiative to convene today’s Security Council meeting has been called by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry a ploy on the part of Russian diplomacy aimed at generating a parallel political reality. Let us recall that just a year ago, on 12 February, during a similar Security Council meeting (see S/PV.8461), the permanent representative of Ukraine, Mr.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  47. Thus, during a Security Council meeting on cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that took place on 6 February (see S/PV.8715), it came to light that members of the Council with significant influence on the settlement process in Ukraine, including the parties to the Normandy Format, prefer not to recall what has been explicitly set out both in the resolution and the package of measures. They have attempted to conceal their forgetfulness by resorting to the mantra, so to speak, that the Russian Federation is failing to comply with its obligations.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  48. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful for the support for our initiative to convene today’s meeting on an issue that is highly relevant to European security, and we thank the briefers for their assessments. We welcome to today’s meeting the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Mr. Kyslytsya. As far as we understand, we will soon be meeting here in New York more frequently, and we look forward to constructive cooperation with him. Yesterday marked exactly five years since the adoption of resolution 2202 (2015), approving a set of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements. The document has therefore become a mandatory component of international law. Unfortunately, few remember that.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  49. The way to genuinely contribute to ensuring the accountability of foreign terrorist fighters, including those active in Syria, would be to repatriate them and try them in courts of national jurisdiction, in accordance with counter-terrorism conventions, in keeping with the obligation, under those conventions, to extradite or prosecute them. Of course, that would be based on the principle of the inevitability of punishment and its proportionality to the crime committed. We are convinced that the issues of transitional justice in the work of the Security Council should not be reduced to the search for a universal formula, but rather should reflect country-specific realities and the mandates of peacekeeping and political missions. The United Nations should not dictate but should encourage and complement national initiatives.

    2020-02-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8723 (2020) · source

  50. At the same time, mechanisms of transitional justice should not be used to consolidate the victory of one party to a conflict over the other or to settle political accounts, neither should they be used to elicit foreign interference in the internal affairs of a State weakened by conflict. In addition, transitional justice must be distinguished from direct political manipulation in the guise of fighting impunity, a practice that, unfortunately, is taking root in our Organization. A sad example is the illegitimate International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011.

    2020-02-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8723 (2020) · source