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Nebenzia

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2017-08-02
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2023-12-30
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  1. In this process, the United Nations must be an actor that provides examples of good practices and proposes solutions rather than creating problems. In this connection, it is not always acceptable for unconditional demands to be made by the United Nations, such as the unacceptability of amnesty or the primary role of an international component in mixed judiciary and investigative bodies. It is important to openly discuss cases of the abuse of transitional justice. In United Nations documents, it is common for such mechanisms to be written about only in the most superlative terms. The only criticism we hear relates to the lack of political support, the lack of financing or the fact that the victims of crime do not have an appropriately active role.

    2020-02-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8723 (2020) · source

  2. By the mid- 2000s, it had become clear that the most effective forms of transitional justice were those based on national dialogue in conflict-affected countries, complemented by United Nations efforts. Establishing a post-conflict reality is impossible without focusing on local traditions and specific features. In some places, for purposes of reconciliation truth and reconciliation commissions are needed, but in others traditional mechanisms are required, such as the Gacaca trials in Rwanda. Since sound national reconciliation is the determining factor in the successful resolution of a conflict and preventing its resumption, we believe the United Nations must focus its efforts on providing the most appropriate forms of technical assistance to restore a national justice system and law-enforcement bodies destroyed by conflict.

    2020-02-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8723 (2020) · source

  3. However, the further activities of the Court showed that the idea of complementarity remained a dead letter, while the general trend towards the politicization of the work of international judicial bodies manifested itself in its ugliest forms. To date, the most important international achievement in combating crimes against peace and humanity is the Nuremberg tribunal. It was created on the basis of the unity of all allies in the anti-Hitler coalition based on the principle of fair judicial procedure. That tribunal did not need any kind of completion strategy or any special and costly measures to preserve its legacy. The authority of the decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal are indisputable, in spite of all the time that has elapsed. Let us come back to today’s world.

    2020-02-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8723 (2020) · source

  4. In spite of various political statements by and positions of States, the true assessment by all parties of the work of those bodies was almost identical. The Council, first, agreed to their costly reform, known as the completion strategy, and then opted not to replicate such mechanisms. The attention of the international community then shifted to the International Criminal Court, a body that seemed very attractive to many because, unlike the Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it was based on the principle of complementarity. It was supposed not to replace but rather complement national justice.

    2020-02-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8723 (2020) · source

  5. That is a multidimensional phenomenon that includes not only legal but political mechanisms, and national and international efforts are essential to establish peace in specific States. We are not convinced that the 2010 guidance note of the Secretary-General on the United Nations approach to transitional justice, which was drawn up without the participation of Member States, is right in all its aspects concerning this framework. The United Nations has been through various phases in the use of transitional justice instruments. In the early 1990s, great hopes were pinned on the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, created by the Council. However, by the early 2000s, it had already become clear that this mechanism was not effective.

    2020-02-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8723 (2020) · source

  6. Internal armed conflicts are the main instance of the use of military force in today’s world, and there is a dangerous tendency towards their proliferation against the backdrop or as the result of the overthrow or destabilization of legitimate Governments through external interference. Conflicts do not arise by themselves, therefore in resolving each one of them we must take an approach that bears their causes in mind. Transitional justice is not always the key to establishing peace. What is important is not to get carried away and prescribe the same medicine to all patients, independently of the diagnosis or the symptoms of the disease. However, that does not mean that the extensive instruments of transitional justice available should not be used where they are necessary.

    2020-02-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8723 (2020) · source

  7. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Belgium has proposed a debate on a very important topic, and we are grateful to it. We welcome the presence of Ministers here, and we also welcome Ms. Bachelet and other keynote speakers and thank them for their contribution to this discussion on the role of transitional justice in efforts towards peacebuilding and sustaining peace in conflict and post-conflict situations. We believe that the approach formulated regarding the topic of our discussion is the right one. It is important to determine the role and the most useful forms of transitional justice in the achievement of its main goal, the establishment of a lasting peace and the prevention of the resumption of conflict.

    2020-02-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8723 (2020) · source

  8. If members do not recall what that was, let me remind them. A Security Council resolution was blatantly violated in 2011, after which the country, which had been thriving, was destroyed — we know by which countries — and Libyan statehood basically ceased to exist. As a result, Libya became what it became, and we still cannot put it back together again. Furthermore, Libya has become a haven for all types of foreign terrorist fighters from all sorts of countries. I also recall that Russia wanted to include a reference to those terrorists in the resolution. The country that was most against doing so was the United States. Rhetorically, I wonder why.

    2020-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8722 (2020) · source

  9. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I am not going to repeat what I said before about why we have doubts about whether resolution 2510 (2020) can be implemented. That is what led us to abstain in the voting. We will see; events will show us who was right. If the resolution has a positive impact on resolving the conflict, I will be the first to acknowledge that I was wrong. However, in the form in which it was drafted, we have serious doubts that the resolution will contribute to any kind of resolution, at least in the way that we would like to see. I would like to add that we are accustomed to the United States being obsessed with trying to find a Russian fingerprint in every situation. Instead of trying to find those who are guilty and attaching labels, let us instead remember what led to the current situation in Libya.

    2020-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8722 (2020) · source

  10. In conclusion, yesterday and today we have adopted two resolutions on Libya on which there is no consensus. That is a result of the actions of some of our colleagues, about which we cannot express anything but deep disappointment and regret.

    2020-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8722 (2020) · source

  11. We have a number of other criticisms regarding the text of the resolution, the details of which I will not elaborate on, as we voiced all of our concerns during consultations. Unfortunately, they were rejected by the co-penholders. I would like to mention one more thing. Yesterday we adopted another resolution on Libya (resolution 2509 (2020)) (see S/PV.8719), a so-called sanctions resolution. We could not help but notice the liberal approach taken by some of our colleagues in reflecting the realities on the ground in the texts of resolutions. In one case, despite a particular event being a one-off, it was persistently inserted into documents and, in another, when an abundance of information and facts from a variety of sources was available, they were disregarded.

    2020-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8722 (2020) · source

  12. Instead, what we have today is a document that orders the execution of something that does not yet exist, provides for the possibility of imposing sanctions for the non-implementation of something that does not yet exist and requires the Secretary-General to provide his recommendations in that regard. We doubt that such ultimatums will encourage the Libyans to come to an agreement sooner. It is our sincere wish to see the provisions of Security Council resolutions on Libya implemented. We would like this document to be viable; however, we do not believe that it will be possible on the basis of this text. Therefore, we could not vote in favour of it. If resolution 2510 (2020) is not implemented, we will remind the Council of what we have said today.

    2020-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8722 (2020) · source

  13. Meanwhile, we urged our colleagues not to rush into adopting a resolution. That was also discussed by other members of the Council that were not invited to Berlin but have a direct interest in the Libyan peace process. The Libyans have just begun their dialogue, including within the framework of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, through which the ceasefire parameters should be formulated, as mentioned in the Berlin communiqué. Why could we not wait for the outcome of the Libyan consultations? Then we could have confirmed that the Libyans themselves were in agreement and the Security Council could have enshrined their decision.

    2020-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8722 (2020) · source

  14. The idea itself is not a bad one, but it does have one defect that we are tired of repeating: the absence of clearly expressed consent by the Libyan parties themselves. That is the fundamental principle of the Libyan peace process, which is enshrined in Security Council resolutions on the matter. Allow me to reiterate that only the Libyans themselves should determine the future of their country. I stress that that principle must extend to the recommendations set out in the Berlin outcome document and apply to those aspects that are to be implemented by the Libyan parties, not by external actors. We spoke about that principle with both the organizers of the meeting in Germany and United Nations officials. Was the consent of the Libyan parties obtained? No. Were there any serious attempts to obtain it? No.

    2020-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8722 (2020) · source

  15. If the resolution is an end in itself, then it appears that we have achieved that goal. The Berlin Conference was designed as one of the steps in Special Representative Salamé’s three-point plan, namely, the consolidation of external actors in the interest of creating the necessary conditions to launch a peace process in Libya. We are all in agreement with regard to that goal. All of the participants in Berlin signed the document. If it were a matter of welcoming that result at the Security Council, we could have done so the very next day after the Conference. Instead, we were told that it was necessary to adopt a resolution that would look to the future and have more muscle.

    2020-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8722 (2020) · source

  16. In addition to working on the final communiqué, we tried to support our German colleagues with practical steps to create favourable conditions for the success of the Conference. To that end, together with Turkey, we organized a meeting of the Libyan parties in Moscow on 13 January. Our initiative was aimed at achieving the establishment of a ceasefire in Libya and became a significant contribution to international efforts. Is that not proof that Russia demonstrated as much interest as anyone else in coordinating and implementing the Berlin decisions, if not more? Nevertheless, the way in which subsequent work unfolded at the United Nations suggests that many were more interested in simply adopting a Security Council resolution as quickly as possible, regardless of how it would be implemented.

    2020-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8722 (2020) · source

  17. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation abstained in the voting on resolution 2510 (2020), which was drafted by the United Kingdom and Germany in support of the Berlin Conference on Libya. We still do not have a clear understanding of whether all Libyan parties are ready to implement that decision, although we have repeatedly underscored the importance of that step both during preparations for the Berlin Conference and after its conclusion. It was a requirement due to the specifics of the Libyan crisis, which was the result of gross violations of the various relevant Security Council resolutions in 2011. It must be highlighted that, from the very beginning, Russian representatives played an active part in preparations for the Conference in the German capital.

    2020-02-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8722 (2020) · source

  18. We must not forget about the needs of the Libyans who live in the east of the country and are not getting any oil products delivered to them. In that regard, we would like to underscore that the natural resources of Libya should be used for the good of the people and should not serve the interests of third States. All questions pertaining to the control of oil infrastructure and export operations should be decided by the Libyans themselves.

    2020-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8719 (2020) · source

  19. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Russia abstained in the voting on resolution 2509 (2020), submitted by Germany and the United Kingdom, which extends the sanctions regime on Libya, as the text did not include our important and duly justified comments. The sponsors of the resolution included new language on the illicit importation of oil products into Libya. We would like to underscore that the negative impact of importing oil products is not that obvious for the Libyan economy. Now in Libya, due to the decline in production of its own processing faciliies, three quarters of oil products, by volume, are being imported nd a great part of the imported products is diverted by armed groups to the internal black market or to other countries.

    2020-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8719 (2020) · source

  20. We hope that the specific parameters for the lifting of sanctions on the Sudan will soon be in place, because it is high time for that.

    2020-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8718 (2020) · source

  21. Eritrea’s experience shows that, with the appropriate political will, it is possible to make significant strides towards the lifting of sanctions. We hope that our colleagues in the Council will find the courage to take that important and necessary step forward. We would like to highlight Khartoum’s mediation efforts with respect to the Central African and the South Sudanese negotiation tracks. Such steps to stabilize the entire subregion should certainly be duly noted by the international community, first and foremost by the Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security. In conclusion, we would like to once again underscore that any Security Council sanctions regime should be subject to review and adapted to the realities on the ground.

    2020-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8718 (2020) · source

  22. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian delegation voted in favour of resolution 2508 (2020), on extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), concerning the Sudan. As we see it, the situation in Darfur is steadily normalizing. We note the generally positive dynamics in the military and political situation and the peaceful settlement of the conflict in that Sudanese region. It is clear that the positive trends attest to the fact that the 15-year-old sanctions have now fulfilled their purpose. This document enshrines the understanding that the time has come to develop a clear road map on the review of Security Council restrictions and the eventual lifting of sanctions against the Sudan.

    2020-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8718 (2020) · source

  23. In close contacts with both Palestinians and Israelis, we will continue to steadfastly urge them to adopt a constructive approach in order to agree on negotiated solutions to all pending issues. We note that, despite the differences of views, both President Abbas and the representative of Israel, Danny Danon, today spoke of the need for negotiations. We should like to see here an opportunity for the advancement of the Middle East settlement in order to achieve a just solution. In that context, we reiterate our proposal to provide a platform for direct negotiations between the leaderships of Israel and Palestine in Moscow.

    2020-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8717 (2020) · source

  24. We believe that, given the situation that has unfolded, there is a need to revitalize the efforts of the Quartet of international mediators, which is the sole mechanism recognized by the Security Council to support the Middle East peace process. Russian, as a member of the Quartet, stands ready to engage in close coordination with Arab partners, Israel, the Palestinians and all interested parties in order to help facilitate a compromise. What is all the more relevant under these circumstances is bringing Palestinians together to uphold the shared national interests of the Palestinian people. Russia has been making efforts to restore inter-Palestinian unity, and we welcome the efforts undertaken by our Egyptian colleagues to that end.

    2020-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8717 (2020) · source

  25. And how is it possible to achieve a fair, just settlement unilaterally? Admittedly, given current circumstances, there is one silver lining: the fact that the Palestinian problem, which for many years was relegated to the back track while everybody waited for the United States to finally present its Middle East initiative, amid turbulence in the Middle East, is once again in the international spotlight. The “deal of the century” — regardless of what views there may be in that respect — has drawn attention to the need to resolve the Palestinian issue. However, we are convinced that there is a need to ensure cohesive action on the part of the international community to achieve a just, long-term Middle East settlement.

    2020-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8717 (2020) · source

  26. The present United States Administration has proposed another way to resolve the protracted Palestine-Israeli conflict through a path that fails to reflect the core elements of the universally recognized international legal framework for the Middle East peace process, as set out in Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative. We have stated repeatedly that we will accept a settlement plan that is mutually acceptable to both sides. However, what is to be done when one side, the Palestinian side, regards the plan as unjust and refuses to accept it? This is a plan that proposes to resolve key final-status issues for the Palestinian territory, including borders, settlements, East Jerusalem, refugees and fundamental security issues, at the expense of unilateral concessions.

    2020-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8717 (2020) · source

  27. The Russian Federation has supported and continues to support a just solution to the Palestinian issue on the basis of the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, the Madrid principles and the Arab Peace Initiative, which provide for the creation of an independent, sovereign, territorially contiguous Palestinian State within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, coexisting in peace and security with Israel. Our vision for a Palestinian-Israeli settlement coincides and aligns with the consolidated Arab assessments that have been reflected in the final outcome of the ministerial meeting of the League of Arab States that was held on 1 February in Cairo. The European Union, in a special statement dated 4 February, confirmed its full commitment to the two- State solution.

    2020-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8717 (2020) · source

  28. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are pleased to see Minister Goffin preside over the Security Council and to welcome the President of Palestine, Mr. Mahmoud Abbas. We thank the Secretary-General of the United Nations for his statement and are grateful to the Special Coordinator, Mr. Nickolay Mladenov, for his report on the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories. We welcome the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Mr. Ahmed Aboul Gheit. We are firmly convinced and have consistently stated that the lack of a resolution to the Palestinian issue remains among the key factors of instability in the Middle East, which fuels extremist and radical sentiment and incites public resentment among ordinary Palestinians and Arabs.

    2020-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8717 (2020) · source

  29. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Today we are discussing the question of the situation in Syria, as requested by the delegations of three countries. Today’s discussion directly affects the Syrian Arab Republic. This is not an open debate today at which 120 Members of the United Nations take the floor. The five-minute rule is not even a rule; it is a recommendation. The speaker who holds the floor is the representative of the country whose situation is being discussed in the Security Council. It is therefore not right to stop his statement by invoking time limits or any other artificial reason. As President of the Security Council, Sir, I believe that you should show respect to the representative who is making a statement on behalf of the country currently being considered by the Security Council.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8715 (2020) · source

  30. Moreover, this farce is based on nothing but dubious posts on social media, reports of unidentified observers on the ground and — the best in this category — some mysterious radio buffs who intercept encoded radio exchanges between pilots and air bases, apparently by means of kitchen radio receivers. This article has been refuted by the Russian Defence Ministry. We read it and we could not help being surprised by the ignorance of such reports. There is, however, one more thing that grieves us the most. While pursuing the goal of stopping the offensive of the Government forces against the terrorists, the initiators of this cynical campaign forgot the most important thing — international humanitarian law was created by humankind as a means of peace, rather than a tool of war and military propaganda.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8715 (2020) · source

  31. I think they are wrong. We could also take a closer look at the activities of the coalition forces in Afghanistan or in Somalia. In general, there would seem to be an unlimited number of opportunities for the Security Council to hold its meetings and for the humanitarian penholders to direct their energy. However, so long as no action is taken with respect to those numerous instances, and those who allowed them to occur live by the Orwellian precept that all are all equal under the law but some are more equal than others, any criticism directed against Syria and Russia is a mere farce.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8715 (2020) · source

  32. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs answered that question in its reports — there were no such clinics. Medical facilities would have to be rebuilt from scratch. How many civilians died there or were left under the rubble? We were told back then that it had been necessary to combat terrorists. We do not recall any calls for a nationwide ceasefire or cessation of hostilities or truce. On the topic of geography, I should like to teach the Council a geography lesson. Before the beginning of the operation in 2016, the population of Raqqa was 229,000, approximately half the population of Edinburgh. Following the conclusion of the operation, in October 2017, the population was 3,000 people, and, at the end of 2018, it was 165,000. Where did 55,000 inhabitants of Raqqa go? Does anyone believe they all ran away?

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8715 (2020) · source

  33. That is an example of the selectivity that is being preached to us today, or will colleagues try to prove that all of Mosul’s hospitals, clinics and educational facilities were in the remaining 10 per cent — and therefore untouched? How many public Council meetings on this topic or press conferences have been held on that, by the way? Do not bother to check — there were none, and there were no United Nations commissions of inquiry into that either. Perhaps the operation in Raqqa was conducted differently, but the mortars were used only to target the “bad guys”, so the civilian infrastructure was left untouched? No, the city was razed to the ground. Let us ask the humanitarians who entered Raqqa immediately after the coalition forces how many working clinics remained in the city once the operation was over?

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8715 (2020) · source

  34. I would remind those who speak of barbarity about the results of their operations in Raqqa, Mosul, Hajin and Al-Baghuz Fawqani. Thankfully, relevant information has been published by the United Nations. As a reminder, before the operation, there were more than half a million people in Mosul, which was captured by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Between 7,000 and 10,000 of them were killed in air strikes. Dozens of thousands were injured. According to the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements Programme, which assessed the housing conditions immediately after the operation, air strikes and artillery fire destroyed over 90 per cent of all residential buildings in eastern Mosul — 90 per cent.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8715 (2020) · source

  35. All the targets of the Russian military are selected after careful analysis, with airborne surveillance tools and available ground information. Military actions are proportional and discriminate in nature, which is clear given the small number of targets affected out of the total number of ground targets in the area of operation. I would also like to notify the Council that terrorists deliberately turn to civilian objects, including hospitals and schools, using the guise of their protected status, into their combat positions, thereby violating the Geneva Conventions. The latest such example is the terrorist seizure of the Idlib central hospital on 29 January, which was announced by the press release issued by the non-governmental agency serving that hospital.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8715 (2020) · source

  36. That once again speaks to the unacceptable rise of the fighters in the Idlib area, who enjoy complete impunity. Given the escalation of the situation, we are continuing to cooperate with Turkey to achieve de-confliction and an easing of tensions. There are relevant exchanges between the Presidents, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and political and military agencies. We will continue such interaction and we will not allow anyone to sow discord. The same is true of cooperation within the Astana format, in which we are working together with Turkey and Iran to promote the political process. We would like to make it clear that that the Russian Federation is firmly committed to the norms of international humanitarian law.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8715 (2020) · source

  37. In that regard, it is bewildering that some Western countries want to present terrorist groups in Idlib as the moderate opposition. Observations that perhaps Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham is not so bad, or does not really pose a threat, are something that we have been recently hearing with greater frequency, and these observations are made by official representatives of certain countries that called for today’s meeting. We also have questions about calls for a national ceasefire, in line with resolution 2254 (2015), even though paragraph 8 of the resolution directly states that there is a need to combat terrorism, a point to which we will also return. Unfortunately, there has been a tragic recent loss of Russian and Turkish military personnel. Armed drone attacks on the Russian air base at Khmeimim continue.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8715 (2020) · source

  38. Pompeo, in his press statement of 4 February said: (spoke in English) “The United States once again condemns the continued, unjustifiable and ruthless assaults on the people of Idlib by the Assad regime, Russia, Iran and Hizbullah.” (spoke in Russian) He does not say “people in Idlib”, but “people of Idlib”. Idlib is not a country, but rather a Syrian governorate, which does not have citizens of Idlib but rather Syrian citizens who have been taken hostage by the terrorists running rampant. The Secretary of State also referred to barbaric attacks in Idlib, which is something we will return to later. In the course of the counter-terrorist operation by the Syrian army, more than 4,000 fighters were killed, and 17 tanks, mortars and technicals were destroyed.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8715 (2020) · source

  39. No attention is paid to recent instances of terrorist destruction of civilian infrastructure in the vicinity of Homs. Material damage was caused to Syria’s oil and gas complex. Instead of bragging about the politicization of the post-conflict reconstruction of a country, it would be better to lift sanctions and return control of the oilfields to Syrians, not plunder the Syrian national treasure under the pretext of protecting it. That would make a real contribution to improving the humanitarian situation of Syrians. The United States Secretary of State, Mr.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8715 (2020) · source

  40. Some of our colleagues think that those are not the right Syrians. The information provided by the Permanent Mission of Syria to the United Nations, which regularly reports about civilian victims, is also not of interest. However, I would like to take this opportunity to bridge the gaps in my colleagues’ remarks, as well as in the United Nations reports. In December 2019 and early January 2020, 42 civilians were killed, among them were five children, and 92 people were injured, including 30 children. That mainly occurred in the Aleppo governorate. More than 1,000 attacks were reported in the first two weeks of January. The number of civilians and Syrian military personnel killed or injured has already climbed into the hundreds.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8715 (2020) · source

  41. We are talking about the sovereign territory of Syria and about terrorist fighters, and fighting them is the right and duty of the Government of any country to combat terrorists. From December 2019 to January 2020, Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham terrorists seized the Idlib de-escalation zone and intensified their raids. At the end of last year, more than 1,400 attacks were recorded, in which those fighters used tanks, machine guns, mortars and artillery fire. Over the past 24 hours, there have been 31 incidents of open fire in Latakia, Idlib and Hama governorates. All that data is available on the website of the Russian Ministry of Defence. We regularly disseminate relevant bulletins, but some colleagues do not seem to be interested. After all, we are talking about Syrians who are in Damascus-controlled territory.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8715 (2020) · source

  42. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We would like to thank Mr. Mark Lowcock and Mr. Geir Pedersen for their briefings. Today we are once again discussing the situation in Syria in the Security Council. We discussed it twice in one day alone, on 29 January (see S/PV.8707 and S/PV.8708), we discussed it yesterday and there are two more meetings scheduled for 19 and 27 February. There are regular meetings, as well as unplanned meetings such as today. The unplanned meetings now have a common pattern. By some strange coincidence, they are organized when the terrorists in the Syrian Arab Republic are under threat, and the Syrian Government is regaining control over its national territory. Those terrorists, I recall, are recognized as such by the Security Council.

    2020-02-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8715 (2020) · source

  43. Libya’s neighbours are in a position to play a constructive and valuable role in making progress on a peaceful settlement.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  44. We believe that the Council should support measures that help to facilitate the resumption of the political track and to adopt draft resolutions that will lead to the settlement of disputes among the Libyan parties. In his briefing, Mr. Salamé used the word “credibility”. We believe that any future draft resolution to be adopted by the Security Council needs to be credible. Indeed, a political settlement in Libya should not be or become an arena for international competition. We believe it is important to take into account the views and the interests of Libya’s immediate neighbours, as they are dealing with the immediate consequences of the protracted crisis. The views of regional organizations should also be considered.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  45. It must be a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned dialogue. The Berlin Conference was intended to create the necessary atmosphere and frame with a view to sending a direct message to the Libyan parties. What is now needed is clarity on the positions of the Libyan parties with regard to each of the provisions of the conference’s outcome documents. We have listened attentively to Mr. Salamé and we intend to continue our discussion with him in order to clarify the details of his plan. We fully support the efforts of the Special Representative in this difficult endeavour. We trust that the meetings in the near future of the Joint Military Commission — the 5+5 talks — will help to clarify those issues.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  46. We support and cherish our ties with all stakeholders; we do not favour any of them. We conveyed to them our support for a political settlement. We consistently advise them of the need to renounce seeking power through military means and the importance of unifying the efforts of all conscientious Libyan actors to promptly restore statehood and rebuild national institutions. We view the outcome communiqué of the Berlin conference as a source of support for the efforts undertaken by the Special Representative to set the stage for the Libyan parties to return to the negotiating table with the aim of initiating lasting, inclusive nationwide dialogue. We reiterate what we stated in Berlin, which has also been agreed to by all those present in this Chamber, namely, that dialogue is to be undertaken among the Libyan people themselves.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  47. Let us recall that we had previously participated in the meetings held in Paris and Palermo. We also focused additional efforts aimed not only at overall de-escalation in Libya, but also at setting the stage for the summit in Berlin. Together with Turkey, we organized the meeting of Libyan parties in Moscow on 13 January. Our initiative was aimed at establishing a truce in Libya in order to enable the parties to revive efforts on the political track and was our contribution to the Berlin conference. In working on the documents of the Berlin conference, we proceeded from the key premise of the principles enshrined in the relevant Security Council resolutions, namely, that the Libyan people themselves need to resolve the conflict and determine the fate of their country. Russia had and has no hidden agenda on Libya.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  48. The illicit proliferation of weapons in Libya is destabilizing the security situation both within the country itself and in the Sahel-Saharan region. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that Libya is standing on the brink of disaster. It is indeed standing on the brink of disaster, but that did not begin in April 2019, but in 2011, when Libyan statehood was destroyed. Today’s events are rooted in those of 2011. From the very beginning, we have called for international and regional efforts to focus on unifying Libya. The aim of the Berlin conference was to achieve stabilization by bringing together external stakeholders. From the very beginning, the Russian Federation participated in preparations for the Berlin conference. We were guided by the need to support any initiative to help to facilitate the end of the crisis.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  49. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Ghassan Salamé, for his detailed briefing on developments in the military and political situation in Libya. We are also grateful for the representative of Germany’s briefing on the work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya. From to today’s briefing by the Special Representative, it is clear that the situation in Libya remains fraught with tension. Despite the announced truce, the hostilities have continued and even escalated. We are troubled by the reports of violations of the arms embargo and stress the need to stop the fuelling of the conflict by competing external actors.

    2020-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8710 (2020) · source

  50. However, we cannot fail to note that the maps contained in the plan show the Golan Heights as Israeli territory. In that connection, we would like to remind the geographers who crafted the map that neither we nor resolution 497 (1981) recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. The Golan Heights is illegally occupied Syrian territory.

    2020-01-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8708 (2020) · source