YouSaid · the spoken record

Nebenzia

lines on the record: 5,044
first: 2017-08-02
most recent: 2023-12-30
sittings or episodes: 461
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“For two months now we have been discussing the developments in Ukraine, and for two months, in addition to the stream of hostility, lies, deceit, fakes, hatred and insults, we have been hearing the same question: How could Russia, unprovoked — as they say — attack a sovereign, democratic, non-aggressive, independent and peaceful Ukraine — for it posed no threat to Russia. Among those who say or think that, I allow that there may be those who are sincere and may not understand what has actually been taking place all those years. Yet there are also deceitful people and countries that have long dreamed of transforming Ukraine into a bridgehead for a battle against Russia and have been doing everything possible — politically and ideologically — to achieve that, since Ukraine gained independence, 30 years ago.”
2022-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9027 (2022) · source
“I would like to remind colleagues and the High Commissioner that, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 48/141, which established the mandate of the High Commissioner, under the guidance and auspices of the Secretary-General, this official is primarily responsible for United Nations human rights activities within the framework of the overall competencies, powers and decisions of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Human Rights Council. No other matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security or the protection of civilians fall under the High Commissioner’s purview.”
2022-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9027 (2022) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): First, we would like to congratulate the United States on its assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of May. We trust that, unlike the previous presidency, yours will be effective and impartial, as is necessary when acting in the capacity of President of the Security Council rather than in a national capacity. We are compelled to make a few remarks about the briefer Ms. Bachelet, the High Commissioner for Human Rights. I will not delve into the substance of what she stated or her one-sided assessments, about which we had many questions.”
2022-05-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9027 (2022) · source
“It remains the only example of a universal multilateral treaty that bans a whole class of weapons of mass destruction. Russia unconditionally and effectively supports the Convention and is committed to its letter and spirit. Our question is, How are its provisions being implemented by the OPCW? We are convinced that, so long as there is political will on the part of the leadership of the organization, it is possible to rectify the current issues. We stand ready to contribute in every possible way and call upon other members of the Council to do the same.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“It will give rise to distrust in other international instruments in the area of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We call upon the leadership of the organization to take decisions, rectify its mistakes and recover the OPCW’s inherent spirit of professional, de-politicized cooperation and apply it to overcome real challenges faced by the international community in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation, primarily with regard to the threat of the use of toxic chemicals and warfare agents by terrorist and extremist entities. Following his re-election as Director-General, Mr. Arias will now have a second chance to do that. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize again that despite the issue of politicization, which aggravates the work of the OPCW, the Convention itself remains relevant.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“That punitive decision was pushed through by Western delegations in violation of CWC norms and the principle of consensus. That has left the OPCW, at its twenty- fifth anniversary, with very serious systemic issues and a considerably tarnished reputation. Damage has also been done to the integrity of the Convention itself, which concerns us greatly. If the situation is not rectified, the OPCW will lose its prestige in the very near future. It will become an instrument for implementing the geopolitical tasks of a very small group of countries. The Convention will then become a punitive instrument, which will strike a blow at the foundation of the chemical weapons prohibition regime and the non-proliferation architecture as a whole.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“One extremely shameful aberration is the activity of the illegitimate Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), whose establishment was railroaded through the Executive Council in violation of the principle of consensus and article XV of the CWC. The flawed methodology of both the IIT and the FFM directly violates the Convention and the principles of conducting investigations in terms of the collection and preservation of evidence and the chain of custody. The reports are prepared on the basis of information collected remotely from biased sources, primarily from the infamous White Helmets. The culmination of those unscrupulous practices was that, for the first time in the history of the organization, a sovereign State complying with the Convention in good faith was stripped of its rights.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“It conducts biased investigations into violations of CWC norms and uses them as a pretext for exerting political pressure. The Technical Secretariat itself persecutes freethinkers who disagree with signing off on political orders from above. At the same time, the leadership of the Technical Secretariat refuses to speak directly about all those dangerous tendencies and has no intention of rectifying them. We have a long list of such egregious examples. It includes the infamous report of the OPCW Fact- Finding Mission (FFM) on the Douma incident in 2018, the final version of which was radically redacted in an illustration of anti-Syrian bias under the pressure exerted by certain delegations and in defiance of the glaring facts.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“But no matter how unique and valuable an instrument the CWC is in itself, the way its implementation is monitored by the OPCW is of fundamental importance. In that regard, the organization has had its ups over the past 25 years and — as we have unfortunately seen in recent years — its downs. A few years ago, we saw the first buds of a dangerous tendency to politicize the work of the OPCW, and today they are in full bloom. As the Syrian chemical dossier has shown, the OPCW is turning from an independent and impartial steward of the Convention into an instrument for the punishment of those who do not please Western countries. Unlawful decisions are being imposed on its governing bodies to give quasi-prosecutorial powers to the Technical Secretariat.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“Today we pay tribute to the Convention as a unique disarmament mechanism to which there is no alternative. The elimination of Syrian chemical-military capabilities is an example of the Convention’s effectiveness. By acceding to the CWC, Damascus has faithfully fulfilled all its obligations in that regard, as the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council in June 2014. The final elimination of Syria’s chemical-military capabilities was confirmed in 2016 by the OPCW Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties. That outcome was made possible by the strong commitment of the Syrian authorities to the political decision to abandon their chemical-military programme and the choice made by the international community to advocate for the establishment of conventional mechanisms.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“We believe that it our moral duty to implement the Convention in good faith and do everything we can to strengthen it. That is why, despite the difficult circumstances, we supported the consensus on the text of the press statement (SC/14876) issued by the President today. We also supported resolution 2629 (2022) on Libya, but for some reason we were criticized for it today. We are proud of the fact that, in 2017, Russia fulfilled its obligations with regard to the destruction of chemical weapons ahead of schedule and under strict international oversight. That fact is confirmed by the report of the OPCW Director-General of October 2017. We urge those who have not yet fulfilled their obligations under the Convention to follow our example.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“In that regard, we would ask Mrs. Nakamitsu: From the perspective of her extensive experience with the United Nations and the practices of the Secretariat, how common is it for the head of an entity never to have visited the country that is the focus of its mandate and to be apprised of the situation on the ground only through its staff’s reports? Are there other such examples in the United Nations system? We believe that the consequences of such a political appointment are having an extremely negative impact on the effectiveness of the OPCW in carrying out its mandate. Today marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Rusia was involved in the very inception of the Convention. For us, therefore, being committed to its implementation is not just a formality.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“It should be recalled in that regard that the Syrians were ready to host the Team as early as last summer, but OPCW Director-General Arias publicly refused to send the Team to Damascus owing to the uncomfortable environment that he said members would face in carrying out their work. As a result, the consultations were significantly delayed. The report does not make a single reference to that but only makes further attempts to shift the blame onto the Syrians. We therefore view the new excuses provided by the Technical Secretariat and the OPCW Director-General to mean that The Hague is simply not interested in constructive discussions with the Syrian side on the subject of the initial declaration. We also find it abnormal that the Director-General, who has held his post for more than four years, has to date avoided visiting Syria.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“With regard to visas, the Russian experts who are supposed to participate in activities at Headquarters in New York have repeatedly encountered the challenge of the non-issuance of visas, even though the host country is obliged to issue visas in a timely manner. We note the double standards in the visa-related accusations against Syrians. We would ask the question: Even if the Syrian side were to agree to issue a visa to the Team’s expert, where is the guarantee that the Technical Secretariat would not fabricate another pretext to postpone consultations and blame Damascus once again?”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“Its premise rests on the idea that the Syrian side is uncooperative with regard to the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team and is based on a single argument — the failure to issue a visa to one of the Team’s members. First, it should be recalled that cooperation with the Team is part of the voluntary bilateral commitments that Syria has made. Beyond that, however, it raises the question: Does all bilateral cooperation between the Technical Secretariat and the Syrians depend on a single expert? What if that expert were unable to come to Syria for another reason? Would the Technical Secretariat use that reason to cancel the twenty-fifth round of consultations and suspend the discussion on the Syrian initial declaration, the importance and urgency of which our Western colleagues have raised repeatedly?”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“In principle, all the reports of the OPCW Technical Secretariat to the Security Council could be duly summarized in advance, without wasting the Council’s time every month on a discussion of identical reports, especially as experience has shown that the debate on the Syrian chemical dossier in the Security Council has not been hampered by a lack of discussion. We have repeatedly voiced our position on the groundlessness of the claims against Syria, especially in the context of its initial declaration. I will not go into detail today. In the report before us, what struck us was yet another inconsistency in the accusatory anti-Syrian narrative.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mrs. Nakamitsu for presenting the latest report (see S/2022/281) of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013). Unfortunately, it is virtually a carbon copy of the previous report (see S/2022/181). Those documents have long been based on a presumption of the guilt of Damascus. Whatever steps the Syrians take towards satisfying the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, they are never enough.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9026 (2022) · source
“If in the near future we anyone deliberately hindering, owing to opportunistic interests, the appointment of a Special Representative, we will draw very serious conclusions about the future of UNSMIL. We also deplore the fact that some members of the Security Council are not prepared to accept a scenario wherein UNSMIL will be headed by someone from the African continent. We think that that is not a constructive approach. It is also a display of neocolonialism. It is important to also remember that in 2011 the African Union spoke out in favour of a peaceful solution to the Libyan crisis, but the Western countries sidelined the Africans and began destroying Libyan statehood, the consequences of which actions we continue to experience to this day.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9025 (2022) · source
“We expect that the Secretary-General will discharge the duties entrusted to him to appoint a Special Representative. In order to speed that process along, we have been consistently speaking out to extend the Mission for three months only, given that for six months now UNSMIL, because of the absence of the Special Representative, has not been able to fully participate in accompanying the political process in Libya. A normal organization of United Nations work on the issue of Libya there is important not just for Russia but, first and foremost, for Libya itself. It is important not to forget that we need to uphold the high standards of the United Nations, primarily impartiality, which, unfortunately, is not something that a number of our colleagues are interested in.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9025 (2022) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation supported resolution 2629 (2022), prepared by the United Kingdom, on extending the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). Nonetheless, we have many questions about the Mission’s work, which we raised very actively during negotiations on the draft. We are convinced that keeping the current configuration of the United Nations mediation efforts in Libya at this very important — literally critical — juncture is unacceptable. In that regard, we stressed the need to ensure that the text sends a very clear and unequivocal signal about the need to without delay make a decision about selecting a new leader for the United Nations team in Libya.”
2022-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9025 (2022) · source
“It is notable that we are seeing this unacceptable situation nine months after the unanimous adoption of resolution 2585 (2021), which is supposed to establish regular domestic access throughout Syria and boost its early recovery. It is particularly significant that during that time only three cross-line convoys have been able to access Idlib, and no supplies at all have reached northern Syria from Damascus. As a justification, we are always hearing about the lack of necessary agreement from the aforementioned Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham terrorists and complaints about unsafe working conditions for humanitarian workers on the ground. We view all that as a basic unwillingness to address the problem of humanitarian deliveries from Damascus, including to Idlib.”
2022-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9022 (2022) · source
“We note that the United Nations 2022 humanitarian plan for Syria provides for a considerable share — 25 per cent — of early-recovery projects to be allocated to the restoration of medical and educational facilities and water-supply systems. However, we have seen in practice that those plans often remain substantially underfunded, and the implementation of development and reconstruction projects is often constricted by donors’ politically aimed preconditions. Largely as a result of those factors, more than half of all Syrians are still living in areas that need to be cleared of mines, and a third of households have no more than two hours of electricity a day.”
2022-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9022 (2022) · source
“According to various reports there have been approximately 40 such attacks in the past year, resulting in victims among both Syrian servicemen and civilians, including women and children. Western countries’ suffocating unilateral sanctions and politicized approaches to providing humanitarian assistance have continued to worsen the socioeconomic situation in Syria. Food prices have reached new highs, the Syrian pound is collapsing and the numbers of those in urgent need have already reached a record 14.6 million. We can see that the Western States’ illegitimate sanctions policies against a number of countries, including Syria, whose policies are not to the liking of Washington and its satellites, have long ago become a inhumane war against civilians using economic coercion instead of guns and shells.”
2022-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9022 (2022) · source
“The events around the Al-Sinaa prison in Al-Hasakah earlier this year were another clear confirmation of the significant strengthening of the terrorists east of the Euphrates, where the virtual inaction of the United States and its allies has allowed fighters from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant to raise their heads. The security zone at Al-Tanf occupied by Washington is another source of threats. Militants prepared and trained by American instructors are launching raids against Syrian forces and detaining refugees in Rukban, blocking humanitarian assistance’s access to the camp. Another serious destabilizing factor is Israel’s arbitrary rocket attacks, which are violating Syria’s air space and that of Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.”
2022-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9022 (2022) · source
“Despite the fact that there have been no large-scale hostilities in Syria since March 2020, the situation on the ground remains volatile. Tensions persist around the Idlib de-escalation zone, which Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham militants have turned into a terrorist enclave where they are essentially holding Syrian civilians hostage. At the same time, we are seeing attempts to whitewash the terrorists by including them in the pseudo-authorities being created in Idlib. That should fool no one. Categorizing terrorists as good or bad is impermissible. Regular clashes are occurring on the perimeter of three other zones of Turkish operations in northern Syria.”
2022-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9022 (2022) · source
“We believe it is important to ensure that the Special Envoy adheres to his mandate as laid out in resolution 2254 (2015) and especially that he engages more actively with the Syrian parties. I say that because we have a growing number of questions about the Special Envoy’s attempts to advance his step-for-step initiative, whose specific content, participants and added value are still unclear. After all, both Damascus and the opposition reject his ideas. I must confess that we are becoming increasingly concerned that such a scenario could have a very negative impact on the effectiveness of the Special Envoy’s efforts to support the work in the Constitutional Committee, including in the context of the preparations for its next meeting.”
2022-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9022 (2022) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We welcome Geir Pedersen and Joyce Msuya to the meeting and thank them for their briefings. We also listened to Nirvana Shawky’s comments. On the political track, we note the holding in Geneva of the seventh session of the small body of the Constitutional Committee from 21 to 25 March. It is important that Syrians have the opportunity to engage in direct dialogue and discuss the future foundations of their own State. We believe that there is no alternative to continuing the Syrian-led and Syrian- owned political process, with the assistance of the United Nations, in line with resolution 2254 (2015).”
2022-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9022 (2022) · source
“Unfortunately, today we again heard attempts to shift the blame and accuse Russia of a looming food crisis, including in the Middle East. We see that as an attempt to divert attention from the failures of Western States and the sanctions and unilateral coercive measures they have introduced, which are precisely the root cause of the current situation. Our Western colleagues could easily solve this problem if they simply chose to do so. There is therefore no need to engage in demagoguery and mislead the members of the Security Council.”
2022-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9021 (2022) · source
“We would also like to emphasize that advancing the peace process is impossible without restoring inter-Palestinian unity on the basis of the Palestine Liberation Organization. We are ready to work with other interested parties, especially our Egyptian friends, to provide the necessary assistance in that area. Russia will continue its efforts to build international consensus and to coordinate joint actions in favour of a just solution to the Palestinian problem. We are disappointed that our Quartet colleagues again and again refuse to cooperate on resuming the Middle East peace process. As we see it, attempts to monopolize it and to impose economic peace on the Palestinians as a substitute for the just fulfilment of their aspirations to the establishment of an independent State will not yield concrete results.”
2022-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9021 (2022) · source
“On 18 April, Russian President Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, during which he emphasized the importance of relaunching direct dialogue between Palestine and Israel, in particular under the auspices of the Middle East Quartet of international mediators. We reaffirm our readiness to work with our Quartet partners to improve the effectiveness of the work of that format, which has been endorsed by the Security Council. At the same time, we would like to note the importance of coordination between international mediators and regional partners. That is precisely what prompted the Russian initiative to hold an expanded ministerial meeting of the Middle East Quartet with key members of the League of Arab States.”
2022-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9021 (2022) · source
“In order to prevent such recurrences of violent confrontation, international and regional efforts should focus on creating the conditions for relaunching direct negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis within the framework of the agreed two-State solution, with Palestine and Israel coexisting side by side in peace and security on the basis of the 1967 borders. At the same time, we are convinced of the need to intensify multilateral efforts to create an atmosphere conducive to negotiations. For our part, we continue to engage with Palestinians and Israelis, as well as with international and regional stakeholders.”
2022-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9021 (2022) · source
“We call on Israel to abandon radical steps to create irreversible realities on the ground, including the demolition of Palestinian homes, the confiscation of their property and arbitrary arrests, and to resume the peace process within the internationally recognized legal framework. The root cause of the regular outbursts of tension and the cyclical escalation of violence in the Middle East is the unresolved Palestinian question. Recent developments in Jerusalem demonstrate the urgency of resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.”
2022-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9021 (2022) · source
“For instance, procedures to authorize the expansion of 132 settlements are moving ahead at full speed. Last year alone, construction began on 1,270 settler housing units, and tenders were announced for an additional 3,467 housing units in the West Bank and more than 500 in Jerusalem. More than 140 settlement outposts also remain, even though they are illegal, including under the Israeli legal system. Settlement plans for the occupied Syrian Golan also create the risk of general destabilization in the region. There has also been a significant increase in settler aggression, amid the acquiescence of the Israeli authorities.”
2022-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9021 (2022) · source
“In that regard, we note the need to exercise restraint as well as to refrain from provocative steps and unilateral actions in order to prevent a repetition of the scenario of last May, when unrest in Jerusalem escalated into days of violent Palestinian-Israeli military clashes. We recall once again that violating the historical and legal status quo of the holy sites is unacceptable, and we would highlight the stabilizing role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which is historically responsible for protecting the Muslim holy sites of Jerusalem and ensuring free access thereto. The situation, as we heard today from Mr. Wennesland, is aggravated by Israel’s aggressive settlement policy on the West Bank of the Jordan River and in East Jerusalem, which contravenes international law.”
2022-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9021 (2022) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Tor Wennesland, for his informative briefing on the situation in the Middle East region. We continue to closely monitor developments in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in the context of the ongoing clashes at the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, in which more than 152 Palestinians were injured after Israeli security forces used tear gas and rubber bullets against the protesters. We express our deep concern over the escalation of tensions that took place against the backdrop of a general surge of violence in Israeli cities, which resulted in the deaths of more than 40 people, both Palestinians and Israelis, over the past month.”
2022-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9021 (2022) · source
“The responsible work that the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia is doing under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General is critical in that regard, and we hope to be able to count on it in future.”
2022-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9015 (2022) · source
“As for the additional 16 seats, according to the Final Agreement they should have been filled in 2018. In other words, this is actually a four-year delay. In the context of the forthcoming elections to express the will of the Colombian people, I would like to express the hope that the priority for the country’s future leader will be scrupulous compliance with the obligations under the Final Agreement. However, if a policy that consists basically of substituting concepts prevails once again, Colombia may very soon be facing the worst possible effects of such a policy. We all would very much like to see President Duque Márquez’s country avoid that. As a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia will continue to support the Colombian peace process with a view to making it sustainable and irreversible.”
2022-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9015 (2022) · source
“However acute the internal differences may be, only dialogue without preconditions can lead to mutual understanding. In that regard, unilateral decisions on a ceasefire, including during electoral processes, play an unquestionably positive role. We are not about to ignore the fact that we also noticed an unfortunate desire to gloss over reality in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/267), with the holding in March of the second parliamentary elections since the signing of the Final Agreement and the election of an additional 16 parliamentarians being presented as a significant milestone and a historic opportunity. In our opinion that is overdoing it, given that parliamentary elections are a natural democratic process that according to the Colombian Constitution should take place every four years.”
2022-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9015 (2022) · source
“One can conclude from the content of those letters that as far as the peace process is concerned the past four years have been treading water or have reduced the security situation in the country to the level of the period when the Final Agreement was signed. The civil society organizations agree that the Peace with Legality initiative is is not a way to ensure compliance with the obligations under the Final Agreement. That depressing assessment confirms the general concern that the prospects are that the country’s crisis may worsen and that the situation is not stabilizing, let alone making any consistent forward progress. It is also important to remember that sustainable peace cannot be achieved without the involvement of all major political players and parties, including the Ejército de Liberación Nacional.”
2022-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9015 (2022) · source
“It appears that someone goes missing without trace every two days. In Colombia today almost 53,000 people are internally displaced, a figure that is an increase of 120 per cent in 2021 compared to 2020. The situation with advancing agrarian reform does not encourage optimism. Of the 3 million hectares promised under the peace programmes, twothirds have been added to the land registry but only 16 per cent has actually been transferred. Against that backdrop, it is regrettable that representatives of Colombian civil society were not given the opportunity this time to present their assessments of the Government’s work to the Council in person. However, it is a positive that non-governmental organizations can at least still inform the members of the Council of their views in writing.”
2022-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9015 (2022) · source
“According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and its data from the first two months of this year, more than 274,000 Colombians, in one way or another, have come up against various manifestations or consequences of armed violence. Local non-governmental organizations have also shared their data from the beginning of the year : there were 31 large- scale reprisals, and 13 signatories of the Final Peace Agreement and 50 civilian activists were killed. Warning signs have been signalled by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which on 23 March published a country report entitled Humanitarian Challenges 2022. The document states that there are currently six armed conflicts in the country in which various rebel groups are countering Government bodies.”
2022-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9015 (2022) · source
“In the country there is still an armed standoff, there is forcible redistribution of the spheres of criminal influence fighting for control over drug trafficking, and the shooting of participants in the peace process. The security situation has deteriorated to such an extent that even the Constitutional Court was forced to announce an unconstitutional state of affairs and require the Government to take urgent measures to improve the situation. There is indeed a great deal to improve, and it needs to be done urgently. After the signing of the Final Peace Agreement, 315 participants in the peace process have been killed. Over the past year alone, the number of cases of armed violence has increased sixfold.”
2022-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9015 (2022) · source
“There are many grounds for such distressing conclusions in the report issued by the Secretary-General for this meeting. The common thread running through it is concern at the pace of Columbian post-conflict settlement. The main problem remains the inability of the Government to ensure the physical safety of the participants in the peace process and of community leaders. The challenge of filling the vacuum in State authority in remote areas of the country is unresolved, as is implementing comprehensive agrarian reform and the coca crop-substitution programme. It is clear that a decrease in the level of violence and ensuring security of the participants of the peace process is a key factor in achieving lasting peace. However, it is precisely in relation to such issues that there are significant failings.”
2022-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9015 (2022) · source
“Instead, it prefers to talk about the policy of peace with legality, which is a programme that the Security Council did not approve, nor was it agreed to by the other party to the Final Peace Agreement, to which President Duque Márquez referred today as the former combatants. The very use of this term shows that genuine national reconciliation in his country has unfortunately still not been attained. The Final Peace Agreement’s plan for a root and branch transformation of Colombian society has therefore not occurred. With eight years having elapsed since the Final Peace Agreement was signed, this situation risks undermining the very basis of the peace process and destroying what the Colombian people have moved towards so painfully for so long. We are not basing our views on subjective considerations.”
2022-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9015 (2022) · source
“Therefore, today we are not going to gloss over the serious concerns we have as to the fate of the peace process in Colombia. Colombia is not just an ordinary country for the Security Council. At one point, the Council became a sort of guarantor of peace in the country, thus de facto putting its reputation on the line. We therefore are all very carefully following developments in Colombia. I will not hide the fact that our grounds for concern are increasing each year. Of course, Colombia has achieved some progress in implementing the Final Peace Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, but today we would like to focus on the problems with implementing that Agreement. I shall start with the fact that the Duque Administration has consistently avoided mentioning the Final Peace Agreement.”
2022-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9015 (2022) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We would like to thank the Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, Mr. Carlos Ruiz Massieu, for presenting the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the country (S/2022/267) and for his views. We welcome today the President of Colombia, His Excellency Mr. Iván Duque Márquez. His participation in today’s meeting is, of course, significant. It is perceived as wrapping up the work of his Administration on implementing the peace process. We are convinced that those taking the floor after us, members of the Security Council, will say a lot of nice words to try to avoid the thorny issues that abound in the report of the Secretary-General. However, in Russia, we speak the truth to our friends.”
2022-04-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9015 (2022) · source
“I hope that all our colleagues from the United Nations will not allow themselves to be manipulated and play up to Washington, as that is a very dangerous game.”
2022-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9011 (2022) · source
“I say once again that this is an incredibly low blow. Of course, they are not interested in the fact that modern technologies today make it possible to create any video. We watched a video today presented by the Ukrainian side. Already there is plenty of information refuting what was in the video, stating that it was filmed in a different place, at a different time and with different people. Just a few words to my American colleague, who launched a crusade to exclude Russia from the Human Rights Council. That was stated by the representative of a country who three years ago criticized the Council in the strongest, harshest terms because it had the audacity to condemn the actions of American soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq. And, as is well known, the United States left the Council.”
2022-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9011 (2022) · source
“As the Ministry of Defence has claimed based on confirmed information, in the evening of 4 April in the town of Moschun, 23 kilometres north-west of Kyiv, troops from the 72nd Center for Information and Psychological Operations, Ukraine, shot another staged video of civilians allegedly killed by Russian troops for future circulation by Western media. Those kinds of activities were carried out by Ukraine’s special forces in Sumy and other towns. In conclusion, I would like to address my Western colleagues. We understand very well what they are doing by playing the Ukraine card and fuelling anti-Russian hysteria every single day. We are assuming that there will be further horrible provocations similar to the one in Bucha and fresh attempts to discredit Russian soldiers and present them as sadists, murderers and rapists.”
2022-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9011 (2022) · source
“Furthermore, the member of the City Council of Bucha whom I mentioned, Kateryna Ukraintseva, stated on the Meduza website that she had not seen Russian forces execute any civilians. In the same interview. she confirmed that it is the Armed Forces of Ukraine that are guilty of most of the destruction. Of course, those details have not been mentioned in the presentations made by our Western and Ukrainian colleagues. However, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy is already claiming that all the staged events in Bucha give the Ukrainians the right to an uncivilized response. We can only imagine what that is based on how Ukrainian radicals behaved in the east of Ukraine. Many testimonials about their crimes are shocking. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian experts on disinformation and staging do not intend to stop there.”
2022-04-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9011 (2022) · source