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Nebenzia

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2017-08-02
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2023-12-30
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un-security-council

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  1. Nevertheless, we maintain our faith in the potential of the OSCE and will not give up the attempts to hold a dialogue on the Vienna platform. One only has to spend a little time at the meetings of the OSCE Permanent Council to observe the fundamental difference between the hysterical, offensive statements of Western delegations and the verified, factual reports of our Vienna colleagues. We will continue to calmly convey information on the real state of affairs — as the Bible says, “He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.” The OSCE still has a chance to play a role in bringing together what are sometimes polarized and irreconcilable points of view and developing a platform for dialogue and a framework for peaceful coexistence, just as Soviet, American and European negotiators did in the early to mid-1970s.

    2023-05-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9316 (2023) · source

  2. The short-sighted confrontational policy of the Western alliance of States, led by the United States, is not only provoking an acute crisis in the OSCE area, but is also essentially forcing the organization itself to make a critical choice: either it will take up the crucial task of forming a sustainable European security architecture based on the principle of indivisibility, enshrined in many OSCE documents, including the Charter for European Security of 1999, also known as the Istanbul charter, and the Astana Commemorative Declaration of 2010, or it will continue to do the bidding of the West, which understands security as the limitless expansion of the aggressive NATO alliance and the widespread imposition of how the West conceives of political, economic and human rights principles.

    2023-05-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9316 (2023) · source

  3. The tragedy is repeating itself today, and the pressure by Ukrainian State institutions and its security services on the Church and their interference in the lives of religious communities and freedom of religion are not being scrutinized, despite Ukraine’s blatant violations of its international legal commitments, including those undertaken under the OSCE. We demand that the Chair-in-Office take meaningful steps to protect religious freedom in Ukraine in accordance with OSCE principles and commitments.

    2023-05-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9316 (2023) · source

  4. For example, the Foreign Minister of Northern Macedonia was hardly shy in taking part in a political spectacle commemorating the anniversary of the staging in Bucha, thereby grossly violating the mandate of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office. At the same time, the Chairperson-in-Office and the secretariat of the organization remain shamefully silent about the politically motivated persecution by the Kyiv regime of the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church, in exactly the same way they remained shamefully silent with regard to the atrocities committed by the Maidan authorities and the crimes by Ukrainian nationalists, who burned people alive in the Trade Union House in Odesa, exactly nine years ago.

    2023-05-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9316 (2023) · source

  5. We reaffirm the importance of strict compliance with the entire 2020–2022 set of agreements among the leaders of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan on the normalization of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. The Russian Federation stands ready to provide Azerbaijan and Armenia, which are close to us, with all the necessary assistance both at the political level and on the ground, with the participation of the commanders of the Russian peacekeeping contingent. Unfortunately, the current North Macedonian OSCE chairmanship has yet to successfully create a unifying agenda and cannot afford to adhere to status-neutral approaches.

    2023-05-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9316 (2023) · source

  6. Such dangerous behaviour calls for an immediate response by the co-chairmanship of the United Nations, the OSCE and the EU. For our part, we reaffirm our commitment to the Geneva International Discussions as a unique platform designed to ensure ongoing direct dialogue between Tbilisi, Sokhumi and Tskhinvali. The alternative to a negotiations vacuum is the degradation of the situation on the ground. Owing to the actions of the United States and France, the OSCE Minsk Group has ceased its activities. Meanwhile, the situation involving Nagorno-Karabakh, including in the area of responsibility of the Russian peacekeeping contingent, the Armenian-Azerbaijani line of contact and the dialogue between officials in Baku and Yerevan, continues to raise serious concerns.

    2023-05-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9316 (2023) · source

  7. As is well known, the mission’s mandate in the Republic of Moldova was conferred upon it 30 years ago, but apparently, this is not enough to provide participating States with tangible results. Of particular concern is the subversive role that Ukraine is currently playing in Transnistria, which demonstrates its willingness to intervene, including with the use of force. We regret the politicization of the Geneva International Discussions on security and stability in the Transcaucasus, which led to the unjustified cancellation of two consecutive meetings and a break in the pace of the negotiation process. We believe that such steps reflect attempts by our Western colleagues to cause the confrontation to spread from Ukraine to the South Caucasus and sacrifice the Geneva format to geopolitics.

    2023-05-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9316 (2023) · source

  8. The situation in the Balkans continues to deteriorate. The worsening situation in Kosovo, owing to the actions of the Pristina authorities with the full complicity of their Western sponsors, is causing increasing concern. Against that background, we see the lack of a balanced response to events by the OSCE, although the organization remains part of the international efforts to settle the situation in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999). We are compelled, unfortunately, to note the lack of progress by the OSCE in reaching a settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, in particular within the framework of the 5+2 negotiation process, which has been put on hold since October 2019.

    2023-05-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9316 (2023) · source

  9. The entire work of the organization was subordinated to promoting Western approaches to the situation in and around Ukraine. The OSCE leadership’s guidelines to act publicly in strict accordance with the consensus position were forgotten. As a result, instead of a platform for dialogue, it quickly become a platform for Russophobic invective and hysterical accusations against our country. The Ukrainization process, which the Polish chairmanship was particularly successful in promoting last year, has led to the lacklustre implementation of the organization’s mandate, and its long-standing experience and competencies are not being used for their intended purpose. The artificial frenzy around the Ukrainian issue comes at the expense of dealing with other crises, of which there are many in the OSCE area.

    2023-05-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9316 (2023) · source

  10. To that end, Kyiv received help from NATO countries, which invested in supplying the Kyiv regime with weapons and equipment and encouraged Ukraine’s crimes against civilians. The OSCE leadership’s response to all that was often highly questionable or absent. As a result, the organization has not only failed in its primary task to achieve peace, based on the good faith implementation of Minsk agreements, but was actually made the West’s accomplice, which not only does the bidding of one side to the conflict, but also provides it with sensitive information. It comes as no surprise that, after the exacerbation of the Ukrainian crisis in February 2022, the organization unequivocally and obediently took Kyiv’s side, while performing the task of serving the interests of individual OSCE States and their alliances.

    2023-05-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9316 (2023) · source

  11. Its activities raised hopes for an improved environment in Europe and a transition to mutually beneficial cooperation and development. Its mediation potential was also sought out. The OSCE was called upon to play an important role in the implementation of the Minsk agreements between Ukraine and the Donbas republics, against whose population the Kyiv regime unleashed a bloody war in 2014. To that end, a robust toolkit was provided under the aegis of the OSCE, which provided a platform for direct dialogue between the parties to the conflict within the Trilateral Contact Group and its working subgroups. But Kyiv systematically avoided participating in substantive dialogue with representatives of the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic, while continuing to shell their peaceful cities.

    2023-05-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9316 (2023) · source

  12. As we know, the United States, which sought to maintain NATO’s dominance, on the basis of the previous version of the CFE, forbade its allies from ratifying the revised version of the Treaty. Washington’s subsequent actions — its withdrawal from the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and its dismissal of the Treaty on Open Skies, with the complicity of European countries — led to an even greater erosion of global and regional security. However, even amid attempts to turn the organization into a kind of supervisory body for the policies of States to the east of Vienna, the OSCE continued to be needed.

    2023-05-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9316 (2023) · source

  13. The system of regional security, built within the framework of the OSCE and based on the principles of indivisible security from Vancouver to Vladivostok was truly unique in its nature. The OSCE succeeded in meeting the challenges of the times, and the efforts of its good faith participants in the process allowed for agreements to be reached on any urgent matter. A striking example was the signing in Istanbul in 1999 of a number of important documents, such as the Charter for European Security and the Agreement on adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) — a fundamental instrument for ensuring European security and military predictability. However, the will to strengthen security in a changing world was not shared by all.

    2023-05-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9316 (2023) · source

  14. In that regard, there have been many expectations of the OSCE, which is the successor of the forum that played a key role in establishing a dialogue between East and West during the Cold War. Today provides us with an excellent opportunity to analyse to what extent such expectations were justified. We are compelled to acknowledge that, faced with the challenges that I just mentioned, the OSCE is undergoing its most severe crisis since it was established almost 50 years ago, which has been exacerbated by attempts by a well-known group of States to use the organization to serve their own political interests and turn it into a tool of a Western crusade, unleashed against Russia. That transformation did not happen overnight.

    2023-05-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9316 (2023) · source

  15. The question of the place and role of international organizations in such an objective process also remains open. Each individual organization deals with that challenge differently. Despite the West’s domination of its structures and desperate attempts by Western countries to impose a Russophobic agenda on every Member State, the United Nations, which is essentially a bastion of multilateralism, continues to be sought out as a platform for dialogue and international cooperation. The Council of Europe, on the other hand, has been unable to withstand such pressure and has steadily slid into political oblivion, while becoming an atrophied appendage of NATO and the European Union (EU) and endorsing their every decision.

    2023-05-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9316 (2023) · source

  16. And while Washington, London, Brussels and a number of other capitals continue their frenzied rhetoric about Russia’s allegedly unprovoked aggression, the true causes of the tectonic shifts that we are witnessing are very clear to any minimally knowledgeable observer. Those causes include the anti-constitutional coup in Kyiv in 2014 and the condoning by the regime, for eight years, of the crimes committed against civilians in southern and eastern Ukraine, in addition to the West’s collective rejection of the principle of the indivisibility of security in favour of NATO expansion. The question of where we are headed and what the renewed system of international relations will look like remains open today. One thing is clear: the world will no longer be unipolar, and Western domination, or American-style peace, is on its way out.

    2023-05-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9316 (2023) · source

  17. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are pleased to see you, Mr. Councillor, in the President’s chair. We also welcome to today’s meeting Mr. Bujar Osmani, Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Minister for Foreign Affairs of North Macedonia. I think it will come as no surprise to anyone if I begin my statement by making the point that, for many years, the United States and its allies have taken systematic and consistent actions to create a Russophobic, nationalist and neo-Nazi entity on our borders, triggering a profound crisis of the international relations system.

    2023-05-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9316 (2023) · source

  18. It is also important to return to the culture of consensus-building, which in recent times has been seriously undermined. We outlined that position in our contribution to the Secretary-General’s New Agenda for Peace and hope that our approaches will be reflected in it.

    2023-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9315 (2023) · source

  19. We are convinced that regional integration bodies, which know at first hand the problems of their member States, can play a constructive role in supporting the efforts of States to ensure the well-being and security of their citizens. In particular, we note the efforts of the African Union and the countries of that continent to build an inclusive and diverse African society that remains united in its common history and culture. In conclusion, we would like to note that the only way to build confidence is through equitable dialogue and a willingness and readiness to listen and to hear, as well as to consider each other’s positions and interests in good faith, understanding that the security of one cannot be strengthened at the expense of the other.

    2023-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9315 (2023) · source

  20. Moreover, the more a given Government’s seeks to chart an independent course, and thereby invokes the resentment of former colonial Powers or the self-proclaimed world’s policeman, the more that approach is seen. In the Security Council we hear from dozens of different representatives from within and outside the United Nations system in order to get as much information as possible. But it is important to understand that no amount of testimonies from representatives of non-governmental organizations can substitute the data provided by Governments; to argue otherwise would be to attack the inter-State nature of the United Nations.

    2023-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9315 (2023) · source

  21. All of that must be done with full respect for the sovereignty of the host State. Interference in the internal affairs of States has never led to sustainable results. Moreover, such interference may not only become an insurmountable obstacle to trust between the main actors but might also lead to the dissolution of States. That brings me to another important manifestation of that crisis of trust, which is the dilution of the role of national Governments in representing the interests of their own populations. Frequently, we have seen that the information provided by the authorities of a number of countries is questioned almost by default. It supposedly needs to be confirmed by the opposition, civil society or other bodies. At the same time, data obtained from certain kinds of non-governmental organizations is accepted without question.

    2023-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9315 (2023) · source

  22. Inclusivity and taking into account the views of all actors are elements of trusting relationships, both at the international and country levels, especially where conflicts rage. The domestic crises of countries cannot be resolved without taking into account the interests of all the groups in their populations. That process is complex, painstaking, often long-term and, most important of all, must be nationally led. There is no one-size-fits-all solution; we need to seek out unique recipes based on the specific social, ethnic, cultural, civilizational and historical characteristics of each given society. Only the Governments of States can ensure such a sustainable social contract. The role of the international community is to provide appropriate political support, share experience and provide humanitarian and economic assistance.

    2023-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9315 (2023) · source

  23. The increasing disinformation and misinformation concerning the United Nations is a problem that deserves special attention and has recently been actively discussed in various forums of our Organization. In our view, that problem requires a comprehensive approach, since negative comments about the United Nations are not always attempts to tarnish its reputation. Some of those criticisms reflect the frustrations of host States and their populations and should not be ignored. On the contrary, United Nations peacekeeping missions need to respond by clarifying their mandates, reaching out more to ordinary people via media outlets and implementing a range of local quick- impact projects. That could help to build constructive engagement and trust with the host country, thereby strengthening the credibility of the United Nations.

    2023-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9315 (2023) · source

  24. Unfortunately, those trends are not limited to individual States but are also reflected in the work of the entire United Nations. Recently, we have seen an erosion of trust in the United Nations — an Organization that is supposed to represent the interests of all Member States and to be a model of impartiality and integrity, whose staff are obliged to act in strict compliance with Article 100 of the Charter. We see that erosion not only on the political track — and even more so on the human rights track — but also on the ground, in the countries in which United Nations missions are deployed, at the very level at which agreed political decisions are implemented.

    2023-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9315 (2023) · source

  25. One clear sign of that situation is the crisis in the implementation of existing agreements and deals and the resolutions of the principal United Nations organs. When those instruments no longer serve the interests of Western States, their non-compliance with them is dissimulated and they are declared irrelevant or simply rejected. The crisis of trust also directly affects mediation efforts. That trend is most glaring in the case of the Minsk agreements on Ukraine and Germany and France’s role in concluding them. Not only have Paris and Berlin failed to get Kyiv to implement the Minsk agreements but they also subsequently admitted that the purpose of signing them was to give the Ukrainian regime time to prepare for war.

    2023-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9315 (2023) · source

  26. It is also clear that the actions of the West have a direct impact on the potential for cooperation among the leading world players in the context of resolving regional crises. For Western countries, which project that on a competition with Russia and China, this is a zero-sum game, and we categorically disagree with such an approach. That state of international affairs undoubtedly affects the work of the Security Council and other international platforms. As such, we see deep-seated disagreements on a large number of issues discussed in the General Assembly. All of that seriously tests the resilience of the United Nations system and affects its capacity to effectively carry out its core mandate of conflict prevention and peacekeeping.

    2023-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9315 (2023) · source

  27. I refer above all to the situation in Ukraine, a country whose role, as a result of the efforts of the United States and its allies, has been relegated to that of a bargaining chip in the geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West. It is for that purpose that over the past eight years they have installed on our borders a Russophobic neo-Nazi dictatorship, declaring war on everything Russian and everything that once objectively connected us. The situation has come to the point that NATO now wages a proxy war against Russia, raising the spectre of the most devastating consequences for all of humankind. How can there be any talk about trust in such circumstances?

    2023-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9315 (2023) · source

  28. Speaking of trust, I feel compelled to mention the treacherous actions of our former Western partners, who over the past 15 to 20 years have managed to consistently destroy the green shoots of mutual understanding and cooperation that emerged after the end of the Cold War. I refer to the broken promises concerning NATO’s eastward non-expansion, the promotion of the so-called colour revolutions and the attempt to impose a so-called rules- based order instead of international law and respect for the Charter of the United Nations. As a result of their efforts, today we live in a world in which truth means nothing and misanthropic and utterly false attitudes are imposed through the collective Western-controlled media, through which white is passed off as black and vice versa.

    2023-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9315 (2023) · source

  29. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We welcome you to today’s meeting, Mr. President, and congratulate Switzerland on its leadership of the Security Council. A country’s maiden presidency of the Council is indeed a historic event, and we wish Switzerland every success. We thank Mr. Volker Türk, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms. Chigwenya and Ms. Olonisakin for their briefings. At a time when there is an obvious deep-seated divide between the positions of Member States and joint efforts are required to overcome the crisis and create a renewed, more sustainable international security architecture, the trust deficit and lack of a unifying agenda become particularly relevant.

    2023-05-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9315 (2023) · source

  30. We could not have done it alone or without the hard work, support and positive contributions of every delegation and the representatives of the Secretariat, including the technical support team and the conference service officers, interpreters, verbatim reporters and security staff. As we end our presidency, I know I speak on behalf of the Council in wishing the delegation of Switzerland good luck in the month of May. The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9314 (2023) · source

  31. We are convinced that pragmatic interaction with the de facto authorities on all key issues — that is, via UNAMA in accordance with its mandate — remains imperative. It is important to prevent the isolation of Afghanistan. A patient and constructive dialogue will be beneficial for all: the people of Afghanistan, the region and the whole world. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. As this is the last scheduled meeting of the Council for the month of April, I would like to express the sincere appreciation of the delegation of the Russian Federation to the members of the Council and the Council’s secretariat for all the support they have given us. It has indeed been a busy month, and one in which we rallied to arrive at consensus on several important issues within our purview.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9314 (2023) · source

  32. We note the dedicated work of United Nations personnel in Afghanistan under the leadership of Special Representative of the Secretary-General Otunbayeva, first of all by the humanitarian wing of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), who deliver on their mandated tasks in a very complex environment. We assume that UNAMA will continue implementing its duties in full, including with regard to the coordination of international humanitarian assis- tance to Afghanistan, and supporting the most vulnerable groups — women, children, the elderly and persons with disabilities. Any attempts to politicize the humanitarian issue for various pretexts are immoral and unacceptable.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9314 (2023) · source

  33. If they care so much for the people of Afghanistan, why do they not return the money they stole from them and direct it to remedy the dire humanitarian and socioeconomic situation without preconditions? Why do they not lift the illegal unilateral restrictions and start contributing responsibly to a real settlement of the Afghan problem, which they themselves created? Vulnerable segments of the population, includ- ing women and girls, would benefit most from such steps. Afghanistan needs our shared support, now as never before.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9314 (2023) · source

  34. Of course, those bans must be lifted. However, the real reasons for the unresolved issue of unfreezing Afghan assets that belong to the Afghan people; calls for increasing humanitarian assistance and restoring the country’s economy; and the negative consequences of unilateral sanctions — those matters did not make it to the resolution. However, that approach by our Western colleagues no longer surprises us. This is just another example of the double standards of the United States and its allies when discussing various conflicts in the Council. At the same time, those who are responsible for the terrible crisis in Afghanistan and its consequences, which Afghans are forced to deal with by themselves, are precisely those who today talk loudly about the suffering of women and girls who were left behind.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9314 (2023) · source

  35. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation voted in favour of resolution 2681 (2023), on Afghanistan. We note the efforts of the United Arab Emirates and Japan as co-penholders on the Afghan file in the Council. They worked to find compromise solutions while taking into account a wide range of positions and sought to draft a document that would account for the whole set of challenges that Afghanistan is faced with today. In that regard, it is a matter of sincere regret and disappointment that steps towards a more prominent reflection of all those problems were actually blocked by a number of Western colleagues, led by the United States. Of course, we do not welcome the decision by the Taliban to restrict the rights of women and girls.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9314 (2023) · source

  36. The draft resolution received 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2681 (2023). I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements after the voting.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9314 (2023) · source

  37. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Albania, Brazil, China, Ecuador, France, Gabon, Ghana, Japan, Malta, Mozambique, Russian Federation, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9314 (2023) · source

  38. The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall first give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9314 (2023) · source

  39. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them document S/2023/292, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan, Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, the Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Uruguay and Yemen.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9314 (2023) · source

  40. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, the Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Myanmar, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, Türkiye, Uruguay and Yemen to participate in this meeting.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9314 (2023) · source

  41. There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 5 p.m.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9313 (2023) · source

  42. Considering the trends and facts we have enumerated today, there can be no doubt that we are nearing a moment of truth with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance in Syria. The double-dealing of our Western colleagues and their attempts to use humanitarian leverage as a tool for exerting pressure on Damascus have become too obvious for the United Nations leadership to continue to ignore. It is time to call a spade a spade. Without fair assessments and genuine willingness on the part of the Security Council to help all Syrians in need, there is little point in striving to maintain the Council’s current parameters for providing humanitarian aid to Syria. The choice is up to our Western colleagues. I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9313 (2023) · source

  43. The mechanism long ago exhausted its potential and is certainly not serving humanitarian goals, as was clearly evidenced by the tragic events in February. Furthermore, the problems created by the negative impact of Western sanctions on the international humanitarian response in Syria are worsening before our eyes. We continue to urge the United Nations not to remain silent or to sweep the issue under the rug but to evaluate it properly. At the regular informal interactive dialogue on Syria yesterday, we heard a number of examples of the direct impact that unilateral sanctions have had on the lives of ordinary people in Syria. That is why any claim by the United States and its allies about the targeted nature of sanctions and their allegedly effective exemptions will sound particularly hypocritical today.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9313 (2023) · source

  44. Apart from that there have been three restricted missions to Tell Abyad. It seems that in practice the permission that Damascus granted the United Nations to use two additional border crossings, Bab Al-Salam and Al-Rai, for three months in addition to the permit for Bab Al-Hawa, whose mandate will expire on 10 July, has ended enthusiasm at the United Nations for unblocking cross-line deliveries. We want to emphasize that, if our Western colleagues on the Security Council continue to pretend that nothing is happening and ignore the fact that internationally listed terrorists are sabotaging the Council’s decisions, we will draw the necessary conclusions and take them into account when formulating our position in the context of the upcoming renewal of the cross- border mechanism in July.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9313 (2023) · source

  45. However, the United States, which, like its European partners, has robbed Syria of its natural resources, misses no opportunity to reiterate that unless a political transition has been set in motion it will not provide a cent to aid Syria’s post-conflict recovery, lift sanctions or ease the isolation of Damascus. Meanwhile, West- sponsored militants from Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham are openly undermining the cross-line convoys to Idlib and demanding bribes for allowing their passage to those in need. That kind of action is a direct challenge to the international community and the Council. We cannot accept the fact that despite the Security Council’s consensus-based decisions, since August 2021 only 10 convoys have been dispatched to the de-escalation zone, of which the most recent and so far the only one this year was sent on 8 January.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9313 (2023) · source

  46. The consequences of the earthquakes along the Syrian-Turkish border have not yet been overcome. We cannot but note that growing needs and problems endured by ordinary Syrians across the country do not stop Western donors seeking to politicize the delivery of humanitarian assistance, using it as a tool to exert pressure on Damascus, as well as undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. In practice, Western aid and United Nations assistance is currently only reaching areas not controlled by Damascus. Despite all the tricks, Western countries cannot conceal that. The numbers speak for themselves. The OCHA flash appeal for the earthquakes is funded at 97 per cent, while the traditional United Nations humanitarian plan for Syria, designed to deliver assistance to Government- held territory, is only 8 per cent financed.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9313 (2023) · source

  47. Similar military actions in violation of Syria’s sovereignty and that of neighbouring Arab countries, as well as the lack of any response from the leadership of the United Nations, are a cause of deep regret and condemnation. Among the positive news, we note the accelerated pace in the natural process of Syria returning to the Arab family. With our assistance, there is ongoing normalization of relations between Damascus and Ankara by leveraging the benefits of the Astana format. Together with our partners in the Astana process — Iran and Türkiye — we intend to continue to make a contribution to the achievement long-term normalization in the Syrian Arab Republic. Turning to humanitarian aspects of the situation in the country, as we heard today, that remains extremely difficult and continues to deteriorate.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9313 (2023) · source

  48. Against that background, the situation remains fraught with tension. There is the persistent threat of a military operation in the north. There is an ongoing illegal foreign military presence by the United States and its allies in the trans-Euphrates and At-Tanf regions. And we remain alarmed about the smouldering hotbeds of terrorism, primarily in Idlib. We are troubled by the intensification in Israeli air strikes on the territory of Syria. Since the beginning of the year, more than 10 such attacks have been committed, as a result of which Aleppo International Airport was twice disabled. That is an airport through which humanitarian aid is delivered to victims of the devastating earthquakes.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9313 (2023) · source

  49. At the same time, we consider it important that Mr. Pedersen strictly adhere to the mandate enshrined in the relevant Council resolution, at the heart of which is facilitating intra-Syrian dialogue, including within the framework of Constitutional Committee as the optimal format for direct intra-Syrian dialogue. We firmly believe that the difficulties that have arisen in connection with a resumption of its work can, with political will, be surmounted taking into account the interests of all Syrian parties. The fact that there are unresolved technical aspects related to a full resumption of the work of the drafting committee should not become an excuse for any passivity. At the same time, we believe that the principal decisions on the parameters for further rounds inter-Syrian consultations should be taken by the Syrians themselves.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9313 (2023) · source

  50. I thank Ms. Doughten for her briefing. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation. We are grateful to Special Envoy Geir Pedersen and Director Lisa Doughten of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for their briefings on the political and humanitarian situation in Syria. We continue to see no alternative to promoting a political settlement process in Syria, one that is Syrian- led and Syrian-owned, with the assistance of the United Nations and strictly in line with resolution 2254 (2015). In that context, we support Mr. Pedersen’s mediation efforts to advance the Syrian settlement process in a manner that respects the principles of the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic and without any outside interference.

    2023-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9313 (2023) · source