YouSaid · the spoken record

Nebenzia

lines on the record: 5,044
first: 2017-08-02
most recent: 2023-12-30
sittings or episodes: 461
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“The trigger for the resurgence of violence may be the ongoing unilateral steps, primarily by Israel, to create irreversible facts on the ground, such as the construction of settlements in the occupied territory, the eviction of Palestinians, the destruction of their homes, the expropriation of property, arbitrary arrests and the de facto carte blanche of the Israeli military to use force. The current situation is the result of many years of stagnation regarding the Middle East settlement. The United States of America and the European Union bear a large share of the responsibility for that tragic state of affairs.”
2022-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9174 (2022) · source
“We believe that the time has indeed come for the Council to take steps to rectify that unacceptable situation. Today’s open debate on the situation in the Middle East is taking place against the backdrop of yet another escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli confrontation in the occupied Palestinian territories — the West Bank of the Jordan River, including East Jerusalem — and around the Gaza Strip, which resulted in bloody clashes and numerous casualties. There are almost daily news reports of civilian deaths in the context of Israel’s so-called anti-terrorist raids. There are also casualties among the Israeli military. That development is of the greatest concern. We call on everyone to show restraint and immediately refrain from violence and provocative actions. This is not the first time that such outbreaks of violence have occurred.”
2022-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9174 (2022) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. Tor Wennesland for his comprehensive briefing on the situation in the Middle East region in the context of a Middle East settlement. We just listened to the emotional statement of the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations, Mr. Riyad Mansour, which could not fail to move anyone who really cares about the fate of the Palestinian people and wants peaceful coexistence between the Palestinian and Israeli States. The Security Council is truly indebted to the Palestinians. The resolutions of the Council and the General Assembly have not been implemented for decades. I wonder why that has not been reported by those that effectively sabotaged them.”
2022-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9174 (2022) · source
“My colleagues’ synchronized attempts to present our arguments as some sort of propaganda are unconvincing and indicative of their bloc discipline, or rather their “frank pledge”. Let me stress again that neither the United States nor Ukraine has responded to our question, either in Geneva or, in the case of the United States, here today. I think that the representative of Ukraine, who will speak shortly, will not do so either. That is why we continue to take steps within the BWC framework. We lodged a complaint with the Council and put forward a draft resolution requesting an investigation. We have the right to do so, whether they like it or not. So let us remain in the legal field and save our political assessments for other meetings.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“That being the case, we were compelled to invoke the provisions of article VI. The fact that some do not like it does not make our request illegitimate. I repeat — we are acting within the legal scope of the Biological Weapons Convention. As I said, even if some do not like our arguments and the facts we cite, they have no right to ignore them and shift the focus to their political assessments. Perhaps that is how they would choose to act within the “rules-based order” that they promote, in which they set the rules and others have to follow them, but here at the United Nations we all are equal before international law and we all proceed on its basis. Like it or not, there will be accountability for violations of the BWC, if proven.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“We have heard no answer even to that simple question, to say nothing of the others that, as can well be imagined, are quite numerous in the 300- page compilation that we shared. In all that was said today, we were particularly touched by the remark of our American colleague concerning the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), saying that there was no United States military biological activity in Ukraine and asserting that this affirmation by UNODA was proof in itself. Does anyone believe that we are that naïve enough to imagine that the Pentagon would have informed UNODA and its High Representative about its secret military biological programmes in Ukraine? We have invoked the mechanism provided for under the Biological Weapons Convention. We invoked article V of the Convention, but received no meaningful response.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“By the United Kingdom? Of course, what the United Kingdom believes to be true is always the ultimate, indisputable truth. If the United Kingdom rejected the allegations, then we can call it a day. There have been attempts to convince us that the cooperation of the United States and Ukraine in the biological area is purely peaceful in nature. But will they please answer one simple question? Why is it that this cooperation on the part of the United States is managed by a military authority — the Pentagon — and its many contractors? If they had really studied the documents that we circulated, which I doubt, they would have seen copies of agreements and work acceptance sheets signed by military representatives on both sides. What sort of humanitarian cooperation can a Ministry of Defence engage in?”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The propaganda arsenal of our Western colleagues has long contained what they believe to be a hard-hitting argument: “Russia is raising a false alarm”, “spreads disinformation”, “misleads the Security Council members”, “distracts the Council from discussing more important matters”. At the same time, we have heard nothing of substance today. Indeed, our Western colleagues have had nothing to say save that, in their high, peremptory opinion, none of this is worth even the tiniest bit of attention. Funnily enough, some of them still cannot tell the difference between biological and chemical weapons, mixing the two together. We were told today, inter alia by the representative of the United Kingdom, that all the issues had been considered and Russian allegations dismissed. By whom?”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“Russia will articulate its further approach to ensuring national, regional and global biological security depending on the results of the consideration of our complaint and the Security Council draft resolution. The outcomes of this work will also define our position with regard to the strengthening of the BWC and resolving the situation with violations of the Treaty by the United States and Ukraine in the context of the activity of United States biolabs on Ukrainian territory.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“We hope that the Council commission will be able to speedily clarify all circumstances of potential non-compliance by Washington, D.C., and Kyiv with their obligations under the BWC in the context of biolaboratory activities in Ukrainian territory with a view to stimulating the American and Ukrainian sides to remedy the outstanding intolerable situation. We also expect that the commission will present a relevant report on the issue containing recommendations to the Council no later than 30 November and inform the BWC States parties of the results of the investigation at the ninth Review Conference, to be held in Geneva from 28 November to 16 December.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“It is indicated that projects subordinate to the military department of a foreign State are conducive to allowing foreign specialists to penetrate regional biolaboratories and familiarize themselves with strategic developments. We have submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council. In accordance with article VI of the BWC, the draft is aimed at establishing and dispatching a Security Council commission to investigate into the claims against the United States and Ukraine contained in the complaint of the Russian Federation regarding compliance with their obligations under the BWC in the context of the activities of biological laboratories in the territory of Ukraine. The draft is under discussion at the expert level, and we count on its prompt endorsement and adoption.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“Such secrecy and neglect of Russian claims by the United States only confirms their validity. The circumstances described and the nature of military and biological activities carried out in Ukraine testify to the violations of provisions of BWC articles I and IV by the United States and Ukraine. Such assessments are also confirmed by the analytical reports of the Kherson Department of the Security Service of Ukraine, dated 30 June 2016 and 28 February 2017. It is indicated therein that the United States Defense Threat Reduction Agency programmes implemented through the Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp. were intended to establish control over the functioning of microbiological laboratories in Ukraine conducting research on pathogens of infectious diseases that can be used to create or update biological weapons.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“Ukraine fails to mention data on the programmes and projects ongoing since 2016 — including UP-4, Flu- Flyway and P-781 — and funding by a foreign State’s military department in its annual reporting under the BWC confidence-building measures developed by the States parties in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions. This raises the question of a violation of political obligations regarding the submission of data on confidence-building measures adopted by the States parties to the BWC. The United States reports also omit data on the programmes and projects implemented outside United States national territory, or on the financing thereof. Our repeated appeals to the American side to provide exhaustive explanations with respect to such activities remain without due feedback in essence.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“The description clearly states that an infected solider will not be able to fulfil his assigned mission, and that therefore “the sickness can be a more valuable military tool than the most up-to-date military guns and equipment”. It is indicated that “infecting enemy’s personnel in such a way would have significant military effect”. In accordance with United States legislation, a patent cannot be issued in the United States unless a complete description of the actual machine assembly is provided. It therefore follows that a container as a bioagent delivery means has been developed and can be quickly manufactured.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“Unanswered question remain concerning United States patent No. US8967029B1, of 3 March 2015, issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office for an unmanned aerial vehicle equipped for the aerial release of infected mosquitoes, that is, for a device designed to be applied as a technical means of delivery and use of a biological weapon — biological and immunobiological agents, bacteria and viruses — including highly contagious — “that could wipe out 100 per cent of enemy troops”. According to the description, such a drone transports a container housing a huge number of infection-transmitting mosquitoes to be released at a designated area. The attacked people are infected with highly contagious diseases via mosquito bites.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“The geographic scope of both projects includes Russian regions bordering Ukraine and the territory of Russia itself. In addition, on 9 March, on the territory of the Kherson region, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation discovered three unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with 30-litre containers and equipment that could be used to spray bioagents. In late April, 10 more drones of the same type were found in the area of Kakhovka. These facts are of particular importance in light of a confirmed request from the Ukrainian side to the manufacturer of Bayraktar unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)concerning the maximum payload of Bayraktar Akıncı UAVs, with a flight range up to 300 kilometres, and the possibility of equipping them with an aerosol-generating system with a capacity of 20 litres and higher.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“At the same time, the list of studied pathogens is not in line with current Ukraine’s health issues, as outlined in World Health Organization documents — including measles, poliomyelitis, tuberculosis and other socially significant infections — but includes pathogens of dangerous infectious diseases that are potential agents of biological weapons. The documents obtained contain descriptions of the UP-4, Flu-Flyway and P-781 projects to study the possibility of spreading dangerous infections through migratory birds, including highly pathogenic influenza and Newcastle disease, and bats — including pathogens of plague, leptospirosis, brucellosis, as well as coronaviruses and filoviruses that are potentially infectious to humans — that can be considered means of delivery.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“Mechnikov Anti-Plague Scientific and Research Institute in Odesa gives vivid insight into the scale and focus of these military and biological activities. According to that document, the Institute had 422 cholera storage units and 32 anthrax storage units. Of note is a large number of test tubes that contained the same strains from different subcultures. In the absence of any recent mass outbreaks of these diseases in Ukraine, the range and accumulated volumes of bioagents challenge their alleged preventive, protective or other peaceful purposes.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“The direct United States Department of Defense involvement in the financing of military and biological activities in Ukraine is reflected in the 2018 plan for the provision of technical assistance to certain recipients of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine under the 2005 Agreement. The real recipients of funds are laboratories of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence located in Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa and Kharkiv. Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp. was designated as the implementation contractor. By 2020, the number of Ukrainian laboratories involved in the work funded by the Pentagon through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp. had reached 30, located in 14 communities, as set out in the relevant registration card. A final report upon review of the microorganism strain collection at the I.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“Article 4 of the Agreement stipulates that all pathogens can be stored only at the laboratories assisted by the United States Department of Defense, and that the samples of all strains collected in Ukraine and data generated by the infectious disease surveillance in that country must be transferred to the United States. The deliverables under the Agreement, as well as the information on its implementation, are by default sensitive or restricted under article 7. At the same time, representatives of the Pentagon or its contractors, in accordance with article 5, shall have the right to participate in all activities related to the implementation of the Agreement.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“Under the 2005 Agreement between the United States Department of Defense and the Ministry of Health of Ukraine Concerning Cooperation in the Area of Prevention of Proliferation of Technology, Pathogens and Expertise that could be Used in the Development of Biological Weapons, the Pentagon may provide the Ministry of Health of Ukraine with assistance in the area of “cooperative biological research, biological threat agent detection and response” with regard to “dangerous pathogens located at the facilities in Ukraine”, as stated in article 3.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“In doing so, each State party undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation that the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. In that connection, Russia has lodged a complaint with the Security Council under article VI of the BWC, in which we state that the United States and Ukraine have committed acts violating their obligations under the BWC and request the Security Council to convene a meeting to consider that complaint. In accordance with article VI of the Convention, the complaint includes all possible evidence confirming its validity.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“As stated in the final report of the consultative meeting, it was not possible to reach consensus on the questions raised; they remain open and must be resolved. The Russian Federation reiterates that we still have questions for the United States and Ukraine regarding compliance with their obligations under the BWC in the context of biological laboratories operating in Ukraine. We circulated a list of those questions together with our formal complaint so that all participants in this meeting would have an opportunity to study it. In accordance with article VI of the BWC, any State party to the Convention which finds that any other State party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“During the meeting, we made every necessary effort to provide detailed materials and arguments to enable the consultative meeting to achieve its objectives and resolve the situation related to military and biological activities on the territory of Ukraine. We expected the representatives of the United States and Ukraine to provide all required clarifications on the substance of our concerns, and hoped to encourage Washington and Kyiv to adopt comprehensive and exhaustive measures to improve the current situation. However, based on the results of the exchange of views among participating States, we must say that the overwhelming majority of the claims put forward by Russia have not been appropriately addressed.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“In late July, informal consultations were held to host a preliminary discussion of organizational issues of the pending meeting. The consultative meeting itself convened on 26 August and from 5 to 9 September. The very fact that the meeting was held and the substantive nature of the discussion confirm the relevance of the problem that we raised, which affects not only Russia but the entire global community. We proceeded on the assumption that the consultative meeting would allow the delegations concerned, with the support of their experts, to gain a thorough understanding of the situation, exchange assessments, ask professional questions and receive detailed answers.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“Before resorting to the mechanism of article VI, we made every effort to have the situation settled in bilateral and multilateral formats. In mid-June, we sent aide memoires to the United States and Ukraine in which we articulated specific questions regarding their compliance with articles I and IV of the Convention and asked for detailed answers to those. However, neither Washington, D.C., nor Kyiv provided any clarification, and neither took urgent measures to remedy the situation. In light of the outstanding unacceptable situation in the area of biological security, in late June 2022 we sent a request to the two depositaries of the BWC to initiate a procedure for calling a consultative meeting under article V of the BWC, and attached thereto a large volume of documents to justify on our concerns.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“In the course of the special military operation in Ukraine, the Russian Federation has obtained a variety of documents and evidence revealing the true nature of the military biological activities of the United States Department of Defense and its contractors with Ukraine in the military biological area. This has been presented in detail at numerous briefings of the Russian Ministry of Defence and meetings of the Security Council. Analysis of those materials offers evidence of non-compliance by the American and Ukrainian sides with the provisions of the BWC. When making the decision to lodge a complaint and call for a Security Council meeting, Russia acted in full compliance with the understanding of BWC States parties anchored in the final documents of the second and third BTWC Review Conferences.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“The Russian Federation has long repeatedly expressed concern over military biological activities carried out with the direct assistance and participation of the United States Department of Defense in laboratories on the territories of former Soviet republics, far from the North American continent and close to Russia’s borders. Such activities are conducted, inter alia, indirectly through the Pentagon’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency and private companies that are standing contractors of the United States Department of Defense, including the Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp., CH2M Hill and Metabiota. This poses a direct threat to the biological security of the Russian Federation.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We note the briefing of Deputy High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Adedeji Ebo. Russia requested the convening of this meeting of the Security Council on the basis of article VI of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) in order for the Council to consider a complaint lodged on 24 October, which contains evidence of violations of the BWC by Ukraine and the United States in the context of activities of biological laboratories in Ukraine. The complaint is contained in a letter that was circulated on 25 October as an official document of the Security Council (S/2022/796).”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9171 (2022) · source
“They are now trying to get the Secretariat to commit a new violation merely on the grounds that such violations have been committed before. We are very familiar with the pattern. I would like to ask Mr. De Serpa Soares once again if launching an investigation at the request of individual Member States rather than the entire Security Council would violate Article 100 of the Charter and the provisions of resolution 2231 (2015), and if the Secretariat’s consent to carry out such an investigation would be in breach of the Charter.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“How can raising the issue of compliance with the mandate of resolution 2231 (2015) at a meeting of the Council that adopted it be viewed as an attack on the Secretariat and blackmail of the Secretary-General, let alone a violation of Article 100 of the Charter? Blaming others for what they do themselves is a favourite ploy of our Western colleagues. But on the whole, we are grateful to our Western colleagues for the exhaustive list of violations by the Secretariat of Article 100 of the Charter in the form of illegitimate investigations carried out by the resolution 2231 (2015) Facilitator’s team in defiance of their mandate. That will now be on the record of our meeting, as will the fact that we have pointed out those violations in every case.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“The representative of Ireland said that there was no need for a mandate from the Security Council other than a letter of request. That is a surprising statement coming from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). That is utter legal nihilism. We would advise our colleagues from Ireland to better learn the basics, or we will have to question their country’s ability to chair that subsidiary body of the Council. Frankly, a position based on hypocritical distortions by Western countries should no longer surprise anyone, and it does not surprise us. But today various members of the Council have outdone themselves.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“Once again, neither the Secretary-General or the Secretariat has such a mandate, and Russia has always objected to such practices. How can we talk about establishing a practice when it contravenes a mandate and is persistently objected to by the permanent members of the Council? The term “persistent objection” exists and precludes the establishment of a practice, and we have protested that since 2016 and continue to do so today. Today we were urged to consent to an investigation if we have nothing to hide. But the question is not whether anyone is hiding anything, it is about the legitimacy of such an investigation in the absence of a mandate from the Security Council, which is the sole entity that can confer it.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“It has nothing to do with the issue under discussion today or with resolution 2231 (2015). We are asking another question. What is behind the Secretariat’s willingness to launch an investigation into alleged violations of resolution 2231 (2015) at the request not of the Security Council as a whole but a few Member States? Where does that mandate come from? They refer to practice, not legal norms, and do not mention that we have consistently protested in writing against every mention of an investigation in violation of resolution 2231 (2015). The fact that certain information was already included in the Secretary-General’s reports does not amount to evidence of any legitimate practice, much less the Council’s. Such practices have been at odds with the mandate of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat as a whole from the very beginning.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We have heard nothing legally significant today in the statements of the countries that have asked the Secretariat to carry out an investigation, just the same sneaky arguments about the Secretariat’s obligation to respond to the requests of Member States. It was especially touching to hear accusations of Russia’s violations of resolution 2231 (2015) from the United States, the main violator of the resolution. The Secretariat should respond to requests from Member States, but it should act based on a clear and explicit mandate and the Charter of the United Nations, not the desires of individual countries. In response to our request for an investigation into the Olenivka incident, our Western colleagues are as usual being deceptive.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“All of this poses serious risks to the integrity of the Charter, the effectiveness of the work of the Security Council and to our Organization as a whole. We call on the members of the Council to stand up for the Charter, to condemn the actions of those Western delegations undermining it and to speak out clearly in favour of ensuring that the Secretariat complies with Article 100 of the Charter and its mandate in accordance with the framework established by the Security Council in presidential note S/2016/44. We would like to ask Mr. De Serpa Soares to confirm that the investigation proposed by individual delegations rather than the Security Council as a whole would constitute a violation of Article 100 of the Charter, as it would if the Secretariat consented to conduct such an investigation.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“As for the United States — which itself has already been violating resolution 2231 (2015) for four years by withdrawing unilaterally from the Joint Comprehensive Programme of Action in 2018 — this is a completely new level of disregard for the Charter and the decisions of the Security Council that is unprecedented at the United Nations. Unfortunately, the Secretariat is not demonstrating any particular resistance to such overt political pressure either. We heard the statements by the official representative of the Secretary-General about the readiness to act upon requests of individual Member States. Those statements run counter to the letter and spirit of Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations and of resolution 2231 (2015) itself.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“They present themselves as the chief champions of respect for the Charter of the United Nations, they include calls for upholding the principles of the Charter in various non-core resolutions of the General Assembly and accuse other members of violating them. What are we actually seeing here? It turns out that when they need to, the same Council members who just two weeks ago were foaming at the mouth in this Chamber about the importance of defending the Charter are now themselves openly violating it and pushing the Secretariat to do the same.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“I assume that everyone now understands that, in the context of resolution 2231 (2015), the Secretariat acts solely as a point of contact. We therefore believe that the only thing that it can do after receiving the letters from the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the United States is to transmit them to the Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) for circulation among the Security Council members. The Secretary-General’s report can only reflect the fact that those letters were received. We see in the behaviour of Western delegations yet another manifestation of flagrant hypocrisy and double standards.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“If the Secretariat can unilaterally deal with substantive and policy matters upon receiving orders from certain Member States, then why do we need collective bodies like the Security Council and the General Assembly? I want to stress the fact that the Secretary- General was tasked with preparing reports on the implementation of the resolution does not mean that the Secretariat was, by default, authorized to collect data and respond to reports from Member States about possible violations of the resolution. That is the mandate of the Security Council sanctions committees, with the support of their respective groups of experts, but not of the Secretariat. I hope that we all understand that the resolution 2231 (2015) team cannot, by definition, be considered a sanctions committee, since it is a division of the Secretariat.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“That is how the word “findings” is translated in the note in all the other United Nations official languages — “les conclusions” in French, “выводы” in Russian, “las conclusiones” in Spanish, “ 调查结果” in Chinese and “جياتن” in Arabic. The step by Western delegations demanding that the Secretariat investigate the drone issue sets an extremely dangerous precedent for the work of the United Nations. From the legal perspective, they are seeking to expand the Secretariat’s powers and give it inappropriate functions by infringing on the prerogatives of the Security Council. Such an approach is not in line with the basic principles of the work of the United Nations, including the division of competences among its main organs and their respective designation. It also contradicts plain logic.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“Subparagraph 6 (g) clearly states that the Secretariat may perform other tasks only when requested by the Security Council. The Council did not give the Secretariat any such mandate, particularly in terms of conducting an investigation. We saw attempts by our Western colleagues and representatives of the Secretariat to justify their authority to conduct such investigations by referring to paragraph 7 of note S/2016/44. In particular, they claim that the biannual report of the Secretary-General should include what in the English version of the note is termed “findings”, from the English word “to find”, which seems to imply that some kind of research should be carried out. But that is another deliberate distortion. The text of the note does not refer to research, but analytical conclusions.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“of informal meetings of the Security Council; ”Manage all incoming and outgoing communications related to implementation of the resolution and assist the facilitator in corresponding with Member States; “Draft correspondence, speaking notes and briefings of the facilitator; “Maintain and archive all information and documents relating to the Security Council’s work related to the implementation of the resolution; ”Maintain and promote publicly available information on the restrictions imposed by the Security Council, including through the Council’s website; “Provide administrative support for the Security Council’s review of recommendations from the Joint Commission.” As participants can see, there is not a single mention of investigations in that list.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“That means that any action in relation to the functions listed in paragraph 2 of the note, be it monitoring of the implementation of the resolution or considering reports about its possible violations, requires a separate decision by the Security Council. The Council took no such decision in relation to the allegations of violations of resolution 2231 (2015) by Russia and Iran. Moreover, it is clear that there are principled differences among Council members in that regard. I would now like to refer to paragraph 6 of note S/2016/44, which provides an extensive list of the Secretariat’s functions in relation to resolution 2231 (2015): “Assist the facilitator in the organization ...”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“Paragraph 4 of note S/2016/44 states that the Security Council shall convene informal meetings at the expert level to carry out such functions, including those related to receiving information from Member States. It is therefore clear that any information coming from Member States should be considered by Council members at those informal meetings. I would like to point out that the note makes no mention of the role of the Secretariat in that process. It is also important that, in accordance with paragraph 5 of note S/2016/44, the Security Council should seek to make decisions related to its functions in the context of resolution 2231 (2015) by consensus through a no-objection procedure of at least five working days.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“Time and again, we hear from Western delegations that the Secretariat is allegedly authorized to monitor the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). That is not true. Paragraph 2 (a) of the note by the President of the Security Council contained in document S/2016/44, which is entitled “Security Council tasks under Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)”, expressly states that the Security Council itself should monitor the implementation of the resolution. Subparagraphs (c) and (d) unambiguously stipulate that it is the Security Council that should answer enquiries from Member States regarding the implementation of the resolution and respond to information regarding alleged actions inconsistent with the resolution.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“Those letters are written proof that the delegations I mentioned are in breach of Article 100, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations, which requires every Member State to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretariat and not to seek to influence its staff in the discharge of their responsibilities. Moreover, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany are in fact pushing the Secretariat towards a dual violation of, first, paragraph 1 of Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations, according to which the Secretariat should not receive instructions from any Government, and, secondly, the Secretariat’s mandate in the context of resolution 2231 (2015) by making it an ultra vires act. I would like to elaborate on the second point.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“says: “We would welcome an investigation by the United Nations Secretariat team responsible for monitoring the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and stand ready to support the work of the Secretariat in conducting its technical and impartial investigation.” Letter S/2022/782, from the Permanent Representative of the United States expressly demands that the Secretariat carry out such an investigation. That is not Russian propaganda, as our Western colleagues like to say. Those are facts. Anyone who wishes to do so can read those letters.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“I am referring to the documented attempts by the United States, the United Kingdom and France, in addition to Germany, to give an explicit, direct instruction to the Secretariat in violation of Article 100 of the Charter. Letter S/2022/781, from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, circulated to the Security Council on 21 October, in relation to the allegations made by those countries of violations of resolution 2231 (2015).”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank United Nations Legal Counsel De Serpa Soares for his briefing. Given the desire of our Western colleagues to spin fake stories about drones that Iran is allegedly supplying to Russia, I would like to begin by setting the record straight. We convened this meeting on another issue. There is the format under resolution 2231 (2015), the corresponding biannual meetings of the Council to discuss the implementation of that resolution. The issue that we are discussing today is much broader. It has to do with the threats posed by the actions of some Council members to the integrity of the Charter of the United Nations and the ability of the Security Council to deliver on its core function of maintaining international peace and security.”
2022-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9167 (2022) · source