YouSaid · the spoken record

Nebenzia

lines on the record: 5,044
first: 2017-08-02
most recent: 2023-12-30
sittings or episodes: 461
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Very few people recall that, on 10 April, Damascus officially sent an invitation to the OPCW to send inspectors to Douma. Those inspectors were in Damascus and continued to delay their departure for Douma. That we prevented their visit to Douma, as was just stated by the representative of the United States, is an outrageous lie. On 14 April 2018, the United States, the United Kingdom and France launched a massive missile strike against Syrian civilian and military targets as punishment for the Douma incident. In other words, Paris, London, and Washington, without waiting for any investigation, identified and punished the guilty party themselves. If they had been interested in determining the truth, they would not have struck Syria in violation of the norms and principles of international law, which could have destroyed important evidence.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“We are not going to engage in a detailed discussion of that opus — our attitude towards it was already made clear in the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on 30 January and in a joint statement by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic on 6 February. In my statement I would like to recall the incident in Douma, which has become something of a vial for the Security Council, like the one former Secretary of State Colin Powell waved in this Chamber about 20 years ago (see S/PV.4701). On 7 April 2018, the infamous White Helmets non-governmental organizations reported an alleged incident in Douma, Syria, in which allegedly as a result of dropped chlorine cylinders, several dozen people had died and the wounded had been transported to a nearby hospital.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“For us, that entity does not exist because its establishment was pushed through the Executive Council of the OPCW in violation of the principle of consensus and article XV of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We have repeatedly stated that we reject in advance any products that have already been issued, or will be issued, by the IIT. Its destructive and politicized activities have nothing to do with the principles of impartiality and objectivity. The IIT, by definition, cannot produce anything worthwhile unless the original sin in the methodology of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, including the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), which fabricated and forged its report on the Douma incident for the benefit of Western countries, is corrected. As with the FFM report, the IIT product ignores scientific, logical and causal connections.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“If we have anything to discuss today, it is the decline of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Technical Secretariat, which instead of being a respected and impartial international entity designed to facilitate compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention by the States parties has become an impotent tool in the hands of the collective Western States, covering up outrageous fraud and violations of the Convention. The current Director- General of the OPCW, Fernando Arias, who has finally magnanimously deigned to address the Security Council today, bears considerable responsibility for that. We will use this opportunity and ask him specific questions that he has consistently avoided answering. I will not comment on the activities of the IIT today.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“It may well be that the new report of the illegitimate Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) on the incident on 7 April 2018 in Douma, Syria, the issuance of which was announced in the fall, was intended, in accordance with Western expectations, to make the case that the Council has something to discuss on the Syrian dossier. But today’s meeting and the briefings that we heard were empty. For more than an hour, we heard the same things being repeated over and over.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): First of all, we would like to start by expressing our condolences to the families of the victims affected by the horrific earthquakes yesterday in Türkiye and Syria, whose representatives are at today’s meeting. We have recently had many completely empty meetings on the Syrian chemical dossier, and their uselessness is obvious to everyone. That is why we and many other Council members have called, and are calling, for the streamlining of our scheduled discussions on this topic. Our Western colleagues all along have stubbornly blocked any attempts by sensible Council members to use our common time more productively.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“But we are categorically against turning the Council into a platform for such political games. That has already happened to the OPCW via the determination of certain Western delegations and with the connivance of its leadership. It must not be allowed to happen now to the Security Council. Of course, we will not engage in discussions with Mr. Oñate-Laborde, ask questions or react to his observations, whether at this meeting or during consultations, and we call on other Council members to adopt a similar principled position on the matter.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“Or is it that, after half a year of ignoring invitations to speak to members of the Security Council, he is now afraid to appear before us alone, even via video link? Certainly, that does not enhance the authority to the OPCW Technical Secretariat. We also have serious questions about the position taken by the presidency on this issue. Unfortunately, in stark contrast with the practice adopted by the Security Council, which presupposes the search for consensus, the presidency actually openly took the side of a group of Western delegations demanding the invitation of Mr. Oñate-Laborde and ignored the concerns and specific compromise proposals of other members of the Council. Of course, we perfectly understand the purpose behind Western delegations forcing through the participation of Mr. Oñate-Laborde at today’s meeting.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“Arias is duty-bound to possess complete information about its work, including technical details, and bears political responsibility for his briefing to the Council. We expect that that is exactly what he will do today and that he will not shift responsibility onto his subordinates. We have never received a convincing explanation, either from the presidency or from any of the Western colleagues who advocated inviting Mr. Oñate-Laborde, as to why the Head of the Investigation and Identification Team, whose status, as far as we understand it, is not part of the OPWC administrative leadership, should be invited as a separate briefer in this Council meeting along with the Head of the OPCW. Does that mean that Mr. Arias himself is not able to answer the questions of Member States and requires cover from an expert?”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We have a point of order. We would like to go on record with our categorical disagreement about the presence at this meeting of the Coordinator of the Investigation and Identification Team of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Mr. Santiago Oñate-Laborde. We see no grounds for his participation at this meeting, given that the legitimacy of that body is not recognized by a number of members of the Security Council. In addition, his presence is clearly redundant; we already have two agreed briefers, that is, OPCW Director-General Fernando Arias and Under-Secretary- General Izumi Nakamitsu. As the Head of a specialized international organization, in our opinion, Mr.”
2023-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9255 (2023) · source
“We support the States of the region in implementing a genuinely independent policy based on the principle of African solutions to African problems.”
2023-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9251 (2023) · source
“Russia intends to continue to provide constructive support for normalization efforts in Mali both through the Security Council and via comprehensive bilateral assistance to Bamako. We believe that effective assistance to the Malian authorities for the purposes of ensuring security and implementing a balanced policy on issues relating to a resolution of the crisis is in our common interest. Without a collective effort it will be very difficult to achieve solid peace and stability throughout the Sahara-Sahel region, which to this day has been unable to overcome the challenges created by the West’s illegal intervention in Libya in 2011. That said, we firmly believe that it is the people of the Sahara-Sahel who must play the main role in advancing peace and security there.”
2023-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9251 (2023) · source
“We have noted the official statement from Paris that France will no longer be funding development assistance programmes in Mali. The Malian Government’s response was understandable when in November of last year the authorities banned non-governmental organizations receiving material or technical support from France from operating there. France’s decision could clearly further exacerbate the dire humanitarian situation in Mali, where according to United Nations data, more than 5.3 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance and the number of internally displaced persons now stands at 440,000. Meanwhile, the humanitarian appeal for Mali remains chronically underfunded.”
2023-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9251 (2023) · source
“As in the case of Afghanistan, the Security Council is going to have to fix everything, and yet somehow Russia is to blame. Unlike some of our Western colleagues, Russia does not try to interfere in Mali’s politics or attach conditions to the assistance it provides that could undermine the country’s sovereignty. Our relations are based on our years of equitable bilateral cooperation and our understanding of our common aim of combating the global evil of terrorism. It should therefore come as no surprise that we have heard no complaints from our African partners regarding the parameters of our interactions. Using the platform of the Security Council to settle scores with Russia is not only irresponsible but disrespectful to millions of Malians.”
2023-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9251 (2023) · source
“The Malian armed forces are carrying out successful counter-terrorist operations in the central regions of the country. They are also taking consistent steps to liberate areas in the north and east of the country from militants. In our view, the negative response of our Western colleagues to the enhanced cooperation between Mali and Russia is yet another manifestation of the neocolonial policies that, combined with a lack of tangible results in the efforts to stabilize Mali after years of a military presence in the country, were the very reason Mali decided to find new partners. The Secretary-General’s internal review report on MINUSMA (S/2023/36) makes it clear that those efforts were ineffective. We saw a similar situation in Afghanistan, where 20 years of a United States presence led to total failure accompanied by numerous crimes.”
2023-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9251 (2023) · source
“Since the opinion of the host State is crucial, we believe that consultations should continue. In general, we believe that the effective implementation of Mission’s mandate, including with regard to helping to restore constitutional order and implement the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation, as well as other areas, will not be possible without support for the Malian Defence and Security Forces. Only they are capable of mounting the required offensive against terrorists. Russia provides comprehensive assistance to the Malian army, including by increasing its combat capacity and training military personnel. Such engagement, undertaken at Bamako’s request and in strict compliance with the relevant norms of international law, is yielding results.”
2023-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9251 (2023) · source
“We are satisfied with the progress made in the dialogue with the transitional Government and that there has been progress in ensuring an adequate level of coordination. We regret the fact that some troop- contributing countries decided to withdraw or suspend their participation in MINUSMA. We believe that MINUSMA must strictly adhere to its human rights mandate, namely, to support the Malian authorities in carrying out their investigations. The politicization of that file is unacceptable. In the context of evaluating the modalities of MINUSMA’s work and the Mission’s internal review, we would like to stress that we continue to consider ways to reconfigure the United Nations presence. We hope that that entire process will be geared towards Mali’s needs and support for its efforts.”
2023-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9251 (2023) · source
“However, despite some obvious difficulties, in recent months, the Malian armed forces have demonstrated that they are capable of achieving results in the fight against terrorists. We express our support for the activities of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) aimed at helping the Malian authorities and people to address the problems facing them, particularly in order to stabilize the situation. We are aware of the threats that deployment in Mali, especially in the central and northern regions, poses to the Blue Helmets. We pay tribute to the peacekeepers and Malian soldiers who gave their lives for the sake of peace and security in that country.”
2023-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9251 (2023) · source
“We hope that a mutually acceptable solution regarding the modalities for the meetings will be found. We agree with the current Malian authorities that the issue of security is an overriding priority of the transition period. The country continues its tough and challenging fight against terrorism. Because of the security vacuum due to the hasty withdrawal of French and European military contingents from Malian territory, terrorists from the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims became significantly more active. Those groups, affiliated with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Al-Qaida, continue to carry out regular raids against civilians, Malian army units and United Nations peacekeepers.”
2023-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9251 (2023) · source
“Work is continuing on the drafting of a new constitution that takes into account the key provisions of the 2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali emanating from the Algiers process. It is important that the Malian leadership be committed to upholding that document, which remains the basis for achieving peace and national reconciliation in the country. At the end of last year, after a break of almost a year, the Agreement Monitoring Committee convened and adopted some important decisions, including with regard to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process of former combatants. We call on the signatories, particularly the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad, to renew their participation in the substantive work of the Committee.”
2023-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9251 (2023) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. El-Ghassim Wane, and Ms. Aminata Cheick Dicko for their briefings. We welcome the participation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Mali, Mr. Abdoulaye Diop, at this meeting. We firmly believe that the Malian authorities are determined to do their best to address the challenges facing their country, especially in terms of security and internal political stability. Malians have shown a strong commitment to restoring constitutional order in the country within the agreed time frame. Efforts are being made to fully implement the transitional road map.”
2023-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9251 (2023) · source
“It is clear that Beirut is unable to shoulder that burden, and the issue of Syrian refugees is becoming an existential threat for Lebanon. Against that backdrop, the short-sightedness of donors that are pushing Syrians into tents of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees inside Lebanon, instead of helping people to return to their own countries, is surprising. A sustainable solution to that problem must be found for the benefit of the two countries. We look forward to a United Nations response to all the points that we raised — if not today, then at the next round of the informal interactive dialogue, in February.”
2023-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9248 (2023) · source
“We fully endorse that short, but important, list of issues, which is long overdue for all of us to seriously consider. On a separate note, there is the extremely urgent issue of the return of Syrian refugees, which is crucial not only to the humanitarian reconstruction of Syria, but also to reducing the burden on the host countries, including neighbouring Lebanon. In December 2022, the first review of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification in Lebanon was published. According to the survey, at the end of last year, almost 2 million people in the country, including 37 per cent of Syrian refugees, were in the food crisis phase. Those numbers are estimated to increase to 2.26 million and 42 per cent, respectively, in the next six months.”
2023-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9248 (2023) · source
“We note that the Secretariat is providing increasing amounts of funds every month without being able to give us a basic breakdown of all the projects, disaggregated by specific regions and thematic areas. How is the total amount of funds raised for those activities calculated? And for whose benefit is it increasing so rapidly on paper? We will not get very far with such an approach; that intolerable situation must be clarified as a matter of urgency. Finally, as we all recall, prior to the Security Council’s adoption in January of resolution 2672 (2023), on the future of the cross-border aid mechanism, the Permanent Representative of that country sent a letter to the then President setting out Damascus’s priorities for shaping the humanitarian situation in its territory.”
2023-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9248 (2023) · source
“First, we need to agree that humanitarian deliveries to that region should be undertaken with the consent of, and not a notification to, Damascus and in close coordination with the legitimate Government. We call on the United Nations not to stop its efforts to increase cross-border deliveries to the area and on Western delegations not to turn a blind eye to terrorist denials of humanitarian aid to that area with regard to sending humanitarian convoys from government territory. We are also dissatisfied by the juggling of figures on early-recovery projects, including by the United Nations. For example, for 374 projects allegedly being implemented in all provinces of Syria, according to the figures made available to us, a record $517 million was received.”
2023-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9248 (2023) · source
“Next year marks the tenth anniversary of the cross- border humanitarian aid mechanism, which currently provides humanitarian assistance to north-western Syria in violation of generally accepted humanitarian norms. We will not repeat our well-known position on that matter. I should just point out that, in its present form, the mechanism has little chance of surviving not only to its anniversary, but even to the next extension in July this year. If our Western colleagues really want to maintain the possibility of providing aid to the people of Idlib not through Damascus, they must immediately start preparing with us for its thorough change. Idlib, where the United Nations continues not to have a presence on the ground, remains a grey area.”
2023-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9248 (2023) · source
“It concerns only the work of humanitarian workers in Idlib, where international terrorists, sponsored by the United States of America, are in control. It is them that Washington cares about. It does not care about the suffering of the Syrian people. Syrians no longer have have any illusions about that. In that context, the decision by the United Nations country team in the Syrian Arab Republic to prepare a report on the impact of the anti-Syrian sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the country deserves support and is timely. We expect it to be available by the end of January, as the Secretariat promised us. We trust that those and other issues that we mentioned will be fully reflected in it and not obscured, as some would wish.”
2023-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9248 (2023) · source
“On 14 January, for example, the United States moved 53 cisterns of stolen oil from Al-Hasakah into Iraq. According to Syrian information, approximately 80 per cent of all Syrian oil was removed from the country by the occupying Powers in the first half of 2022. Comment is unnecessary here. We would also like to draw the Council’s attention to Washington’s recent decision to impose additional restrictions on the sale of medication, equipment and its components, as well as on services and support to a number of State-owned or private medical facilities in Syria. As members can see, that decision is far from being humanitarian in nature. We also note that resolution 2664 (2022), on humanitarian exemptions, which was actively promoted by the United States delegation, has nothing to do with the overall Syrian context.”
2023-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9248 (2023) · source
“However, as is becoming clear, because of the United States Caesar Act it is impossible to bring fertilizer into Syria, given its so-called dual purpose. That is an issue to which we and our Syrian colleagues have already tried to draw the attention of the Secretary-General, including at one of the rounds of the informal interactive dialogue. We expect to receive clear information from the United Nations on what is being done to resolve that situation. If our colleagues in the Security Council continue to try to ignore the obvious ramifications of Western sanctions, then all talk in the Chamber about how important it is to help ordinary Syrians will appear even more deceitful and cynical. Such cynicism can also be clearly seen against the backdrop of Washington’s continued plundering of grain and oil resources in the Trans-Euphrates.”
2023-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9248 (2023) · source
“Their nefarious effect was highlighted in the December 2022 United Nations humanitarian needs overview for Syria, which clearly states that economic sanctions led to an increase in the number of those in need and that their consequences affected the accessibility and cost of basic goods, including fuel. The record hike in the price of food, especially for agricultural products, was also noted. Overall, approximately 68 per cent of the Syrian population needs food assistance, which means that everyone, including donors, must take immediate steps to rectify the situation and help the agricultural sector in Syria, including by facilitating fertilizer supplies. Our country stands ready to send a shipment of fertilizer to Damascus free of charge. Fertilizer is being blocked by European Union countries because of anti-Russian sanctions.”
2023-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9248 (2023) · source
“We are surprised and disappointed about the fact that the Special Envoy mentioned that five foreign armies and terrorist groups are equally contributing to the violence in the country, without making any distinction among their statuses. He also links that to the crisis in Ukraine as a humanitarian factor. The humanitarian situation in Syria is indeed swiftly deteriorating, which has nothing to do with the action or inaction of the Syrian authorities or the crisis in Ukraine. The Syrian authorities attempt to do all they can for their nationals, but the main obstacles are the unilateral sanctions imposed by Western States on Syria.”
2023-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9248 (2023) · source
“At the same time, we believe that the modalities of international mediation should be based on respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic. Syrians themselves, without external pressure and the imposition of ready-made formulas, should reach an agreement on all outstanding issues on the future organization of their country. In that context, we welcome Mr. Pedersen’s recent contact with the Syrian parties, in accordance with the mandate entrusted to him in resolution 2254 (2015). It is important to ensure that we do not divert our efforts to other initiatives that do not have clear modalities or specific value added.”
2023-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9248 (2023) · source
“Terrorists use the cover of the so-called security zone near Al-Tanf, which was arbitrarily established by Washington. We believe that the goals of ensuring the national security of Syria’s neighbours must not be met at the expense of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. In that regard, in practical terms we are in favour of the full and effective implementation of the Astana format in Idlib and the Trans-Euphrates. Together with our Astana format partners, Iran and Türkiye, we will continue to help to achieve sustainable and long-term normalization in and around Syria. We still see no alternative to advancing a Syrian political settlement process that is Syrian-led, Syrian- owned and facilitated by the United Nations, in strict compliance with resolution 2254 (2015).”
2023-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9248 (2023) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Special Envoy Geir Pedersen and Ms. Ghada Mudawi for their briefings on the political and humanitarian aspects of the situation in Syria. The situation in the country remains tense. The main challenges on the ground continue to be the illegal foreign military presence in the north-east and the south of the Republic, the continuing threat of another military operation in the north, and the increasing number of random attacks carried out by the Israeli Air Force on Damascus and its neighbourhoods. Those tensions have led to a resurgence of terrorist activity by the Security Council-listed Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham. We are also concerned about terrorist activities in the south of the country.”
2023-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9248 (2023) · source
“We believe that the relevance of that initiative is only increasing, especially as the overwhelming majority of Middle Eastern actors are in favour of resuming the work of the Quartet as the sole internationally recognized mechanism for the Middle East peace process endorsed by the Security Council.”
2023-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9246 (2023) · source
“At the same time, given that the actions of a number of Western States specifically caused the outbreak of the majority of conflicts in the Middle East, we believe that regional conflicts should not fall hostage to geopolitical competition. In order to lend renewed momentum to the Middle East settlement, it is now more necessary than ever before to consolidate the positions of external players. There is a need to work diligently to that end by establishing collective cooperation with the States of the region, whose role in the Middle East peace process cannot be overestimated. In that connection, we should like once again to recall the initiative of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sergey Lavrov, to convene a meeting of the Quartet with the representatives of Arab countries.”
2023-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9246 (2023) · source
“The direct result of that amateurish approach is the resumption of armed clashes, causing untold suffering to both Israeli and Palestinian civilians alike. We call on the Secretary-General, as one of the parties to the Quartet, to proactively advance multilateral efforts within that body. On the whole, we are highly disappointed and dismayed at the fact that the Palestinian question — like a number of other Middle East issues — has gradually become secondary, if not tertiary, in terms of the importance afforded to it by Western States. That is strikingly clear from the near absence of Western representatives on the list of delegations participating in today’s open debate, whereas those same representatives are more than willing to speak at the Security Council on Ukraine. That speaks volumes.”
2023-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9246 (2023) · source
“We wish to once again emphasize the importance of convening a meeting of the Middle East Quartet of international mediators at the ministerial level and establishing meaningful cooperation between that mechanism, Palestinians and Israelis and key regional stakeholders. Despite receiving the support of many States, the Quartet’s work is currently on hold due to the unwillingness of the United States to pursue multilateral cooperation, seeking instead to completely privatize the Middle East dossier. However, experience and practice has shown that attempts to cut that complex Gordian knot of conflicts singlehandedly by substituting a just solution with economic measures are doomed to failure.”
2023-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9246 (2023) · source
“It is fundamentally important that the majority of States around the world support that policy, as was confirmed in December during the vote on the cluster of General Assembly resolutions on the Middle East (see A/77/PV.52), including on extending the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) until 2026. For our part, we attach great importance to the provision of comprehensive humanitarian assistance to those in need in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as to Palestinian refugees in neighbouring Arab States through international humanitarian agencies with UNRWA at the helm. We believe it vital to continue to provide financial assistance to the Agency so that it can continue uninterrupted in its work to help the millions of Palestinian refugees throughout the Middle East.”
2023-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9246 (2023) · source
“We note the contribution of Algeria to the signing of the Algiers Declaration on Palestinian national unity. Our position on the Palestinian-Israeli settlement remains consistent and unchanged. We advocate the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians to an independent State of their own, within the 1967 borders and with East Jerusalem as its capital, coexisting in peace and security with Israel in accordance with the universally recognized international legal framework. We believe that formula to be the only way to ensure Israel’s security and to achieve the national aspirations of the Palestinian people.”
2023-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9246 (2023) · source
“The controversy surrounding the city remains one of the main sources of instability not only in the Palestinian- Israeli conflict, but also throughout the Middle East. In that context, it is important to ensure equal access for all worshippers to the city’s holy sites and that the status quo is not reversed. In that context, we highlight the role of Jordan and the Hashemite Royal Family as the guardians of Jerusalem’s holy sites. A complicating factor in a Palestinian-Israeli settlement is the continuing rift between Fatah and Hamas, which weakens the Palestinian side’s negotiating position. In that connection, we stand ready alongside other stakeholders, first and foremost our Egyptian friends, to provide the necessary assistance in the swift restoration of intra-Palestinian unity on the basis of the Palestine Liberation Organization.”
2023-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9246 (2023) · source
“Against this backdrop, we are concerned about the intense debate among the recently elected Israeli leadership on a reform of the country’s legal system, that, among other things, would authorize the disproportionate use of force, which has been met with outrage even among Israelis and marked by large-scale demonstrations in Tel Aviv. We are convinced that such unlawful and provocative steps threaten to completely derail prospects for the eventual implementation of a United Nations-endorsed two- State solution, with Israel and Palestine living side by side in peace and security within the 1967 borders. We would like to note separately that the Middle East agenda includes such a sensitive topic as the status of Jerusalem — the cradle of the three monotheistic religions — and the holy sites located there.”
2023-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9246 (2023) · source
“Violence against minors has continued unabated, even during the visit to the West Bank by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Ms. Virginia Gamba de Potgieter. Israelis are also dying, and we reaffirm Israel’s right to security. At the same time, Tel Aviv continues to ramp up unilateral economic sanctions and measures to expand and legalize its settlement policy, including by expropriating Palestinian property, demolishing homes and erecting outposts. According to the Jerusalem Applied Research Institute, to date a total of 243 illegal settlements have been built in the West Bank. There are daily reports of damage to Palestinian property, the destruction of agricultural land and mass arrests, some without charges. More than 815 such detentions were documented over the past year.”
2023-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9246 (2023) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Special Coordinator Tor Wennesland for his comprehensive briefing on the situation in the Middle East region in the context of the Middle East settlement process. As we all heard from Mr. Wennesland, the situation surrounding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict remains volatile. In the West Bank of the Jordan River, Israeli security forces continue their brutal military raids, the latest of which resulted in the shooting of two Palestinians in the southern part of Jenin. Against that backdrop, there have been regular outbreaks of violence surrounding the Gaza Strip, resulting in casualties on both sides. Over the past year, at least 224 Palestinian civilians, including 61 children, have been killed by the Israeli military.”
2023-01-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9246 (2023) · source
“We also deplore the fact that no members found anything to say in condemnation of the almost daily uninterrupted strikes launched by Ukrainian armed forces on Donetsk, where civilians are also dying. The Kyiv regime intentionally targets residential districts in which there are no military targets. The residents of Donetsk will tell us what is happening. We will hear more about that at the Arria Formula meeting to be held on Friday.”
2023-01-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9245 (2023) · source
“Since those systems were located in a residential district — in violation of the norms of international law, which Council members so strongly advocate — the remnants of the missile landed on a residential building. The Council knows what occurred thereafter. Had the Ukrainian authorities followed the rules of international humanitarian law, that tragedy would not have occurred. Equally, it would not have been necessary for us to conduct strikes on an infrastructure facility where Ukrainian forces were stationed, had the Ukrainian leadership demonstrated a willingness to negotiate realistically, which would have allowed us to address the causes that led to the beginning of the special military operation.”
2023-01-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9245 (2023) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I shall refrain from commenting on the usual mantra of some members that everything that we bring to the Security Council on the subject of Ukraine is disinformation. Many representatives in the Chamber today mentioned the tragedy in Dnipropetrovsk, where a missile destroyed the entrance to a residential building. Western colleagues even attempted to use that incident to cancel the topic we had proposed for today’s meeting, saying that it was false and did not merit discussion. And yet no member has mentioned the real context of what happened — a concern that was voiced even by Ukrainian officials. A Russian missile that was launched at an infrastructure facility in the city was shot down by Ukrainian air defence systems.”
2023-01-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9245 (2023) · source
“The trends I have mentioned on the rise of authoritarianism and the formation of a dictatorship in Ukraine began long before the special military operation. The Kyiv regime’s actions pose a direct threat, with consequences for peace and security. As we have repeatedly underscored, Russia’s actions are not and never have been aimed at destroying Ukraine as a State. However, we cannot tolerate the fact that a misanthropic, Russophobic and anti-Christian dictatorship is establishing itself near our borders.”
2023-01-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9245 (2023) · source
“I would ask Kyiv’s Western backers, who continue to pay lip service to human rights and freedom of religion: how long do they plan to ignore the actions of the Kyiv regime to incite an interreligious crisis in Ukraine, and how long, in general, do they plan to ignore the inhumane regime that is being formed in the country? Of course, those are rhetorical questions. They have not merely ignored but encouraged such developments over the past decades, in particular in recent years. But how would they deal with such actions in their own countries, which they claim to be democratic? They cannot continue to turn a blind eye to everything the Kyiv regime is doing by writing it off as self-defence against Russia in a situation of war.”
2023-01-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9245 (2023) · source
“In such circumstances, we understand the statement circulated by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church on social media, clarifying that it did not ask us to convene this meeting and did not authorize us to speak on its behalf at the United Nations. That is indeed the case — no one from Ukraine or the Ukrainian Orthodox Church approached us with such a request, and we do not speak on behalf of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. That further confirms the fact that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is not subordinate to Russia, however much the Kyiv regime might try to prove otherwise. We understand that the Church’s statement is motivated by a reluctance to be targeted yet again with delusional accusations of its being a collaborator and to prevent itself falling under the obscurantism and provocations of the Ukrainian authorities.”
2023-01-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9245 (2023) · source