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Nebenzia

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2017-08-02
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2023-12-30
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  1. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We welcome Colombia’s Vice-President Francia Márquez Mina and Minister for Foreign Affairs Álvaro Leyva Durán to today’s meeting. We thank the Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, Carlos Ruiz Massieu, for his briefing on the situation in the country and for his assessment. We also thank Mr. Armando Wouriyu Valbuena. At the request of the Colombian authorities, the Security Council today unanimously extended the monitoring functions of the Verification Mission to two additional chapters of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace — agrarian reform and ethnic issues.

    2023-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9240 (2023) · source

  2. In other words, we are in favour of the provision of humanitarian assistance to all Syrians, without double standards or discrimination, and for that to be done in good faith, without politicization and without parallel, unilateral and asphyxiating measures that invalidate any humanitarian assistance. I truly hope that we will be able to reach this seemingly simple and clear objective by July. We urge our colleagues not to waste time and to cast aside the mantra about the alleged lack of alternatives to the cross-border mechanism, which hinges solely on their unwillingness to abandon this mechanism.

    2023-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9237 (2023) · source

  3. Essentially, Western countries are deliberately worsening the situation, trying to delay the process of normalizing the situation in the country as much as possible in order to discredit the efforts of its legitimate Government. In the same vein, they create artificial obstacles to the return of refugees from neighbouring countries to Syria owing to fears that in the event of a mass return of fellow citizens, the Syrian Government will reap political dividends. We believe that such unscrupulous political games concerning Syria must end. That is not only our position, but also the will of the Syrian people.

    2023-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9237 (2023) · source

  4. But not even those efforts helped to conceal the fact that there are grave geographical imbalances in the implementation of early-recovery projects in Syria. The facts speak for themselves — half of the funds go to Idlib, and only 35 per cent of the funds reach the territories in which the majority of the Syrian population resides. This is a stark example of the politicized approach of Western States to the issue of humanitarian assistance. To this day, Western delegations continue to extol their efforts to provide deliver humanitarian assistance to Syria and are carefully sidestepping another extremely uncomfortable issue: their criminal unilateral sanctions that have an adverse impact on ordinary Syrians. It is those sanctions that are the main factor behind the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Syria.

    2023-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9237 (2023) · source

  5. Instead of providing an honest assessment of the current situation and working to improve it, our Western colleagues in the Security Council are focusing efforts on inflating the myth that deliveries through the cross-border mechanism allegedly cannot be supplanted by cross- line deliveries, which do not violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. Tothatend, the Westerndelegations— unfortunately, alongside the United Nations agency representatives who do their bidding — are doing all they can to create a smokescreen around the real statistics related to humanitarian assistance. Council members were able to observe these diversionary manoeuvres during three rounds of informal interactive dialogue.

    2023-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9237 (2023) · source

  6. For the moment, we see that the Western delegations continue to treat this topic opportunistically and have no intention of conscientiously implementing the provisions of resolutions 2585 (2021) and 2642 (2022). They never cared, and continue not to care, about the needs of ordinary Syrians. All that our Western colleagues are interested in is maintaining the cross- border mechanism as a tool to exert political pressure over Damascus, as well as supporting the Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham terrorists, who continue to benefit from deliveries through this mechanism.

    2023-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9237 (2023) · source

  7. The resolution provides six months and useful mechanisms in that regard, including three rounds of the informal interactive dialogue and the issuance of the report of the United Nations country team in Syria on the adverse impact of the illegitimate unilateral sanctions, which must be submitted to the Security Council in full. It is important that everyone clearly understands that there can be no talk of an automatic extension of the cross-border mechanism. Expectations for a new six-month extension in July will be borne out only if the approach of the members of the Security Council towards the provision of humanitarian assistance to Syria changes fundamentally by then.

    2023-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9237 (2023) · source

  8. The preservation of the cross-border mechanism, which encroaches upon the universally recognized norms of humanitarian assistance, in no way helps to advance that objective. Our vote today is our way to express our appreciation to the previous co-penholders, Norway and Ireland, for the way in which they approached the negotiations on this resolution this time, as well as an advance gesture of trust in the new co-penholders on the Syrian humanitarian dossier in the Council — the delegations of Brazil and Switzerland. We trust that they will live up to this gesture and demonstrate a truly non-politicized and objective approach to addressing the growing problems in Syria.

    2023-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9237 (2023) · source

  9. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Our delegation has made the difficult decision to support the adoption of resolution 2672 (2023), which extends until 10 July this year the United Nations mandate for the use of the Bab Al-Hawa crossing, through which humanitarian aid is delivered from Türkiye to the terrorist-infested Syrian enclave. This, however, should not be interpreted as a change in our principled position on the cross-border mechanism. Needless to say, the resolution in its current form does not reflect the aspirations of the Syrian people, who, in addition to effective humanitarian efforts, expect the Security Council to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty — not in words, but in deeds.

    2023-01-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9237 (2023) · source

  10. On 3 January, Foreign Minister Lavrov had a telephone conversation with Eli Cohen, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, during which we stressed our coherent and consistent position on the Palestinian question, which implies resolving differences between the parties on the basis of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, in accordance with the two-State solution. We urge our colleagues to take a serious approach to reanimating peace negotiations on this well-established international legal basis for the Middle East settlement process.

    2023-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9236 (2023) · source

  11. For our part, we will continue efforts to consolidate international consensus and coordinate efforts among the Palestinians and Israelis and interested international and regional players in the interest of a just solution to the Palestinian problem. We are convinced that direct dialogue between the parties can take place through the mediation of the Middle East Quartet, the only internationally recognized mechanism for mediation in the Middle East approved by the Security Council. At the same time, we would like to note the importance of combining the efforts of the Quartet with those of key regional players. That is precisely what prompted Russia’s initiative to hold a broader ministerial meeting of the Quartet with representatives of Arab countries.

    2023-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9236 (2023) · source

  12. In order to prevent a return to military confrontation, it is necessary to combine international and regional efforts to create conditions for relaunching direct negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis in the framework of the agreed two-State solution — Palestine and Israel, coexisting in peace and security within the 1967 borders. We are disappointed that our American colleagues in the Quartet time and again refuse to cooperate on the resumption of the peace process — even though their attempts to monopolize the peace process and impose peace on the Palestinians, instead of promoting their aspirations to create their own State, as has become obvious to everyone, do not lead to concrete results.

    2023-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9236 (2023) · source

  13. Such steps threaten to totally destabilize the situation and lead to full-scale armed clashes, which we have already witnessed more than once. In that connection, we urge both parties to exercise restraint and refrain from provocative steps or unilateral actions. In particular, we hope that the new Israeli Cabinet will not take the path of escalation, but will instead show political will and renounce radical steps to create irreversible realities on the ground, including the destruction of Palestinian homes and the confiscation of their property, with a view to restarting the peace process. The developments in Jerusalem, which are explosive for the entire Middle Eastern region, demonstrate once again the urgency of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

    2023-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9236 (2023) · source

  14. That incident is difficult to perceive differently in the light of the events of 2000, when the visit of Ariel Sharon — surrounded by hundreds of policemen — to the Temple Mount served as a trigger for the start of the second intifada, which claimed the lives of several thousand people on both sides. We once again recall the unacceptability of violating the historical and legal status quo of Jerusalem, the cradle of the three monotheistic religions, as well as the holy sites located in the city. At the same time, we note the stabilizing role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, historically custodian of the Muslim holy sites of Jerusalem and ensuring free access to them. Disagreements on this city remain one of the main sources of instability — not only regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but also throughout the entire Middle East.

    2023-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9236 (2023) · source

  15. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We support the convening by the delegations of China and the United Arab Emirates of today’s Security Council meeting on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question. We are grateful to Assistant Secretary-General Khiari for his briefing on the alarming developments in the Old City of Jerusalem and on the Temple Mount. The escalation of tensions, against the backdrop of the visit to the Al-Aqsa Mosque complex, on 3 January, of Itamar Ben-Gvir, Minister of National Security of Israel, accompanied by Israeli security forces, is of great concern.

    2023-01-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9236 (2023) · source

  16. For our part, as a permanent member of the Security Council, we stand ready to continue to help ensure that the Haitian people enjoy not only order and the rule of law, but are provided with the opportunity for a free and democratic political process and sustainable economic development and prosperity, which is not only important for Haiti, but for the Dominican Republic as Haiti’s immediate neighbour. The extent to which the situation is important for the Dominican Republic is demonstrated by the presence of that country’s Foreign Minister at this meeting. And it is important for the entire region.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  17. We note that the sanctions resolution provides for the examination of the sources and routes of arms smuggling, including through the use of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime channels. Ultimately, we need to not only identify but also to eliminate financial and material resources fuelling gangs, first and foremost, in the areas of weapons and drug trafficking, which are the lifeblood of the criminal groups reigning over Haiti and the main reason for the breakdown of law and order.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  18. The information shared today by Mr. Ives should compel all of us to adopt an even more thorough approach with regard to sanctions. Otherwise, we risk imposing sanctions not against gang members, but rather against the political opposition, who could take part in the nation-wide dialogue, but for whatever reason are undesirable to the United States and its satellites. I once again stress that unilateral measures by the United States and Canada do not represent the will of the international community and should not serve as a cornerstone for the new Sanctions Committee on Haiti. We count on the productive work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022), concerning Haiti, with Gabon as its Chair, es well as the selected experts who we know to be outstanding professionals.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  19. We know what Washington does when it needs to subjugate yet another country. It utilizes unilateral sanctions against the undesirable political figures and aimed at cleaning up the political field in a way that is favourable to the United States. Canada does the same. For example, we know that the Canadian sanctions list includes at least two former Prime Ministers of Haiti who intend to contest this decision. We warn against presenting these measures as a reaction of the entire international community in the framework of the Security Council Sanctions Committee. The Committee was established pursuant to a Security Council resolution precisely to avoid unilateral action and elaborate joint solutions while engaging specialized experts in order to assess the feasibility and appropriateness of possible restrictions.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  20. Haitian political forces, both those in power and opposition parties, need to act constructively in order to independently put their own house in order. We are surprised that this clear political signal to the Haitian elite is not coming from the United States, which is quick to brand the Governments of some Latin American countries as unconstitutional, while at the same time is very protective of other regimes that are loyal to it. Is there not a 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter in force that establishes clear criteria under which a suspension of the constitutional process can take place and the procedure for an international response? Where is the reaction, in accordance with that charter, to the dubious legitimacy — to be generous — of most Haitian authorities?

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  21. Today the former colonial Powers have changed their methods, but not their colonial approaches. Interference in Haiti’s internal affairs takes place through the imposition of decisions and the installation of political actors outside Haiti’s legal framework. As a result, the country has no authorities legitimately chosen in accordance with the national Constitution. Ongoing international involvement in Haitian affairs has instilled in some local elites the feeling of dependency and permissiveness and has led them to believe that their future depends not on the will of the people, but on the benevolence of external patrons and sponsors. In that connection, the true task of the international community is to help initiate a nationwide political dialogue in order to develop a level playing field for forming a truly legitimate Government.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  22. The chronic crisis of governance, socioeconomic collapse and institutional and legal decay of the island State is, to a large extent, the result of many years of external political engineering. The historical responsibility for that rests not only with Washington, which has repeatedly interfered in Haiti’s internal affairs, including militarily, but also with Paris. It was colonial France that, for more than 100 years after the liberation of Haiti, received from it so- called “payments for independence”, imposed through blackmail and military ultimatums. That was the first and only time in history when those freed from slavery were forced to pay their oppressors. Huge remittances, equivalent to billions of dollars today, were transferred to French bankers and landowners, instead of serving the development of a young country.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  23. It is also clear that there are no ready-made recipes to resolve the crisis and return Haiti to the path of sustainable development. Short-term decisions might ease the pain of the long-suffering Haitian nation, but they will not be able to cure it. If we consider the unblocking of the oil terminal, which was presented as a panacea, it did not facilitate the population’s long-awaited access to basic goods and services. Just like a majority of Haitians, we have doubts that the option of sending an international military force could fundamentally change the situation. If we want to identify truly effective steps, it is important to have a holistic understanding of the causes of the current situation in Haiti.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  24. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed and Special Representative Helen La Lime for their briefings. We also thank American journalist and editor of Haiti Liberté, Mr. Kim Ives, for his fascinating and open-minded insight into the situation in the country. We believe it very useful to invite briefers who can provide the Security Council additional information that enables us to consider issues on the agenda from different perspectives. We also welcome the participation of the Foreign Ministers of Haiti and the Dominican Republic in today’s meeting. Much was said today about the current situation in Haiti. We will not repeat it. The depth of the political, economic and humanitarian crisis that the country that the country finds itself in is obvious to everyone.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9233 (2022) · source

  25. The text drafted by the informal penholders is clear proof of that. At the same time, since the effect of this non-consensual document is going to be rather limited, we decided not to veto it, despite its clearly provocative nature. Russia will continue promoting political dialogue and normalization in Myanmar and to oppose attempts to interfere in its internal affairs. We support the willingness of ASEAN to facilitate a settlement in and around Myanmar, that is, to address humanitarian problems and provide assistance to the people in need. We believe that the collective efforts by ASEAN to implement the five-point consensus must be based on close interaction with Naypyidaw. We remain convinced that the situation in Rakhine state should remain the only aspect of the situation in Myanmar on the Council’s agenda.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9231 (2022) · source

  26. Judging by what our Western colleagues said today, they have no such task with regard to Myanmar, and they will continue fragmenting the situation in the country and try to drag the Security Council into that disgraceful ploy. We proceed from the assumption that all political forces in Myanmar need to act in a reserved manner and abstain from steps that may escalate violence and polarize public sentiment. We see that the military indeed have such a goal. Naypyidaw has reaffirmed its commitment to the constitutional provisions that stipulate the duration of the state of emergency. The intention to hold parliamentary elections in 2023 is a stabilizing factor, which renders Myanmar’s political trajectory more predictable. It is sad that the West would try to not notice either of those things.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9231 (2022) · source

  27. Their true goal is to promote a political anti-Myanmar agenda by pushing through this politicized document and claiming that “progressive mankind” allegedly looks forward to a Security Council resolution on Myanmar. The acts and policies of the military authorities may be given varying assessments; however, the Security Council must not play into the hands of those who would benefit from a destabilization of the situation on the ground, undermining the mediation efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and creating division in the Security Council. It is our firm conviction that any Council product, especially a resolution, must aim at strictly the opposite — promoting international peace and security.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9231 (2022) · source

  28. Moreover, we must say that we are dissatisfied with the work of the authors of the resolution, who apparently never even intended to endorse a well-balanced text accounting for the interests of all Member States in the Council. There were no real negotiations on the text. Our colleagues again and again simply ignored all the concerns regarding the text that other delegations raised. In particular, they ignored the proposal to include the point about the counterproductiveness of unilateral restrictive measures that have a negative effect on the socioeconomic situation in the country. That approach demonstrates that care for the ordinary people of Myanmar and developing solutions for the normalization of the country are not among the goals of those who drafted the resolution.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9231 (2022) · source

  29. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Russia abstained in the voting on the resolution on Myanmar (resolution 2669 (2022)). It is our principled position that the situation in Myanmar does not pose a threat to international peace and security. This conclusion follows from the contents of the resolution itself, which is mostly focused on human rights aspects. We stand for a division of labour among all United Nations organs in accordance with their respective mandates. In this case, the situation of human rights should be addressed by the Third Committee of the General Assembly, rather than the Security Council. The human rights agenda must not be politicized or turned into an instrument for opposing unwanted Governments.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9231 (2022) · source

  30. If our Western colleagues have this urge to move the negotiating process forward, they would do well to worry about the long-standing stagnation in the Israeli-Palestinian process, which has resulted from Washington’s efforts to block the Middle East Quartet and other international platforms, including the Security Council, from introducing relevant initiatives.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  31. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We asked for the floor yet again because we were surprised by the statement made by our American colleague when he said that Russia suspended the deliberations of the Constitutional Committee on the basis of arbitrary demands on unrelated issues. I want to underscore that we had serious reasons for suspending the meetings of the drafting commission of the Constitutional Committee, given that, at the time, no appropriate guarantees had been extended to the delegation of the host country. Furthermore, the meaning of such a suspension in the deliberations of the Constitutional Committee should not be overstated.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  32. Does it help Damascus that the commitment to Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as stipulated in the resolutions of the Council, is nothing but an empty phrase for the West? We will put all this on one side of the scales and try to imagine what should be on the other side to justify our authorization yet another six- month extension of the cross-border mechanism. Let us be clear: arguments about the lack of an alternative to the cross-border mechanism are unconvincing because the lack of an alternative is artificially supported by the mechanism’s supporters’ inaction. Perhaps new arguments in favour of the cross-border mechanism will appear in the course of today’s meeting, but so far, to be perfectly candid, there have been very few.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  33. However, that approach does not sit well with the United States and its allies, who believe that the Government of Syria may receive vast political dividends after a mass return of its citizens. Once again, as in the case of the sanctions, the West prioritizes its own political goals over the interests and even the lives of ordinary Syrians. How does the Council think the Syrian side should perceive this whole situation? What reasons does Damascus have to believe the new hypocritical and opportunistic Western promises? Moreover, does it help Damascus to see how Western countries are acting like a mother hen nurturing the international terrorism of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham in Idlib — a group that continues to benefit from the deliveries via the cross-border mechanism owing to its lack of basic transparency?

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  34. Contrary to obvious facts and the conclusions of authoritative experts, the West tends to explain all of Syria’s problems on the allegedly incompetent acts of the authorities. And when we raise those issues, including within the framework of the interactive dialogues I just mentioned, Western delegations hypocritically try to prove that is an unrelated matter. How can they talk about helping Syria while at the same time trying to hold the country by the throat? Another taboo topic is the issue of creating artificial impediments to the return of Syrian refugees from neighbouring countries. Both Damascus and the refugees themselves, as well as Syria’s neighbours, have an interest in seeing the refugees return.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  35. Nevertheless, even those decoy tactics cannot hide the obvious fact that there is still an inexplicable and unjustified geographical imbalance in the implementation of early-recovery projects in Syria. Half of the donor funds go to Idlib, 15 per cent go to the trans-Euphrates area, and only 35 per cent go to Damascus-controlled areas, where most of the population lives. Those figures clearly demonstrate how politicized the discussion on the Syrian file is and the extent to which Western donors disregard the resolutions of the Security Council. Added to that is the absolutely unacceptable desire of Western States to maintain the wrongful and illegitimate unilateral sanctions against Syria, which have a devastating effect on the lives of ordinary Syrians.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  36. Like careless students on the eve of an exam, they remember the provisions of resolution 2585 (2021) and 2642 (2022) only when they are about to expire and try to present the situation as though they have been diligently implementing those resolutions over the past six months. We can clearly see that that is not quite the case, to say the least. In particular, despite the three rounds of informal interactive dialogue, the overall picture of the cross-border mechanism has not become transparent. Representatives of United Nations agencies and Western donors only go around in circles and juggle numbers, including on early recovery, trying to prove how much they are doing while they carefully dodge questions.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  37. Let me say frankly that the current humanitarian situation in Syria does not provide a favourable context for the discussion on renewing the cross-border mechanism. The point is not that we are against helping ordinary Syrians, as some delegations will try to portray today. The point is that the global community should sincerely try to help all Syrians, without discrimination and politicization. But unfortunately, there is still a long way to go before that can be achieved. We can say that in principle, in the past six months, our former Western partners have not changed their opportunistic approach to this matter.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  38. We are of course reassured to know that half of the world’s supply of the cholera vaccine has been sent to Syrians. However, the special World Health Organization epidemic response plan is only one-third funded. Of the few positive changes, we note the fact that the 2022 humanitarian response plan is 43 per cent funded — which, as Mr. Griffiths just said today, is not enough. We also note the dispatch of the ninth convoy from Aleppo to Sarmada and the plans to dispatch a tenth, as well as the establishment of access to Tel Abyad and Ras Al-Ayn. However, those are the very basic results, and it took the United Nations much too long to achieve them. And it is hard to fight the feeling that more efforts are being spent on trying to prove the indispensability of the cross-border mechanism than arranging cross-line deliveries.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  39. The cost of the basic food basket, which far exceeds the monthly income of most Syrians, combined with the high inflation rate and the devaluation of the Syrian pound, means that, according to United Nations estimates, the number of people in need of assistance in 2023 will reach yet another record high, amounting to 15 million people. Amid the fuel shortages, there have been catastrophic power outages. In a number of governorates, electricity is available only for 20 minutes once every five hours, including in critical infrastructure such as hospitals, schools and municipal facilities. The chronic water crisis and deterioration of key communications triggered an outbreak of cholera in September in Aleppo governorate, which then spread not only throughout the rest of Syria, but also to neighbouring Lebanon.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  40. In November, at least two such cases were reported — an aerial attack on the Al-Shayrat military airbase, located to the east of Homs, as well as strikes from the Mediterranean targeting Syria’s central and coastal areas, which killed six Syrian military personnel and wounded four more. We are convinced that achieving long-term stability and security in Syria can only be possible by fully restoring the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as ending the illegal foreign presence and the practice of turning Syria into an arena for settling geopolitical scores. We are painfully aware of the continuing deterioration of the humanitarian and socioeconomic situation in Syria.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  41. Pedersen’s efforts to depoliticize the Geneva platform, as well as to ensure the resumption of the Committee’s regular sessions, and his engagement with Syrians on that matter, including during his recent visit to Damascus, earlier in December. We believe that key decisions as to the modalities of subsequent rounds of inter-Syrian consultations need to be made by the Syrians themselves, without any external pressure. The situation in Syria’s north continues to raise concern. Military operations in the governorates of Aleppo, Raqqa and Al-Hasakah have already caused deaths, not only among the Syrian military, but also among civilians, including reporters, in addition to destroyingcivilianinfrastructure. Againstthatbackdrop, we condemn the continued illegal aerial attacks by the Israeli air force.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  42. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We would like to thank Geir Pedersen and Martin Griffiths for the overview on the political and humanitarian situation in Syria. The Russian Federation’s unchanging position is that there is no alternative to a Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political process carried out under the United Nations mediation and based on full respect for the principles of the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, without any external interference. In that regard, we consistently support the efforts made by made by Mr. Pedersen, the Special Envoy of the Secretary- General on Syria, within the framework of his direct mandate, as stipulated in resolution 2254 (2015), the key element of which is Syria’s Constitutional Committee. We take note of Mr.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9230 (2022) · source

  43. In conclusion, we would like to note that the Security Council is often criticized for being drawn into discussing issues beyond its mandate, thereby encroaching upon the prerogatives of other United Nations bodies. We wholeheartedly share that concern. Our Security Council colleagues know that we are reluctant to discuss at the Council issues that are of a generic, thematic or narrowly focused nature. But the number of such issues discussed has only grown in recent years. In that connection, we once again call on those who generate such initiatives to ensure that they are in line with the main goals of the Council and take into account what the Security Council can realistically do on such matters.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9229 (2022) · source

  44. Therefore, when discussing the topic of the mental health of peacekeepers and personnel of peacekeeping operations and special political missions at the Security Council, a broad range of people for whom this resolution is meant is excluded from this substantive discussion. The Security Council lacks the necessary competence to consider peacekeeping personnel mental health issues, as well as lacking adequate data and analysis on the subject and mixing the notions of peacekeeping operations and special political missions under the single term “peace operations”. All that introduces uncertainty as to the responsibility for the appropriate selection of personnel, their mental support, funding and the overall scope of the efforts needed. Against that backdrop, adopting this kind of resolution loses added value.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9229 (2022) · source

  45. We have a specialized platform to discuss general peacekeeping issues, that is, the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, and it will continue to be so. That is where all interested parties, including troop contributors and Secretariat experts, come together for a comprehensive review of all aspects concerning peacekeeping operations. The opinions of troop-contributing countries, which have experience in the field and expertise, is of key importance. With regard to special political missions, personnel selection and performance issues fall under the responsibility of the Secretariat. Sometimes special political missions — which include, for example, offices of the Special Envoys of the Secretary-General —are created without direct Security Council request.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9229 (2022) · source

  46. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation supported resolution 2668 (2022), submitted by Mexico, on the mental health of peacekeepers and the personnel of peacekeeping operations and special political missions. However, we would like to make a statement pertaining to this resolution. We cannot agree with what was done by the authors whereby there is a violation of the principle of the division of labour and an introduction of this narrowly specialized topic to the Security Council. It is our view that, when putting forward initiatives, Member States should take into account the prerogatives of the principal organs as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

    2022-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9229 (2022) · source

  47. In July, in responding to the consequences of the earthquake in the south-eastern part of the country, humanitarian aid in the amount of 40 tons of medicines, basic goods and food were delivered to Kabul. In October, another 65 tons of relief supplies were delivered. At the same time, active steps are being taken to develop trade and economic cooperation between our countries. We intend to continue providing assistance to the Afghan people.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9227 (2022) · source

  48. We note the potential of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization mechanism to coordinate efforts to broaden Afghanistan’s economic integration within economic structures in the region, as well as to promote security and stability in the country. A periodic comparison of positions also takes place within the framework of other regional structures, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Through humanitarian and socioeconomic channels, since November 2021, 108 tons of humanitarian shipments, including food — flour, vegetable oil, tea, sugar, rice and canned milk — and basic goods, such as blankets and medicines, were delivered to Kabul. In March, during the visit of a Russian inter-agency delegation to Kabul, 17 tons of medicines were delivered to the Afghan side.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9227 (2022) · source

  49. That is also the purpose of the Moscow format, the most recent meeting of which was attended by the invited representatives of Qatar, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia and held in Moscow on 16 November. At the meeting, participants representing Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan discussed all the relevant issues, including the prospects for economic development in the country and the surrounding region. A united call was made for unfreezing all blocked assets. We also firmly called on the United States and NATO to compensate Afghans for the damage incurred over the years.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9227 (2022) · source

  50. It is necessary to patiently work with the Afghan people to build a State that is politically and ethnically inclusive, free of terrorism and narcotics and economically stable and developed, while it respects and safeguards the rights of all its citizens, including religious and ethnic minorities, women and girls. The country requires international support in all those areas. The effectiveness of the activities of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan also depends on adherence to a comprehensive approach. Russia has consistently advocated developing cooperation with Afghanistan on issues involving a comprehensive settlement. Our Embassy in Kabul continues to operate. Together with our regional partners, we are working to develop a common approach to the situation in Afghanistan.

    2022-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9227 (2022) · source