YouSaid · the spoken record

Nebenzia

lines on the record
5,044
first
2017-08-02
most recent
2023-12-30
sittings or episodes
461
sources
un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

  1. I will not comment on the second one, but I will with regard to investigate — investigate with the tools that it has, such as the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria. We also would like to investigate. The problem is that we do not accept the methods that the OPCW employs to investigate because they contradict the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Director-General spoke a great deal today. Frankly, we did not hear anything from him that he had not said before. The recent narrative of the Technical Secretariat continues. We again heard claims that those inspectors, in particular Inspector A, was not in any way involved in the Douma investigation. That contradicts the facts that we provided and the documents that we showed. We saw that inspector among us on at least two occasions.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  2. I will switch to English for clarity and straightforwardness. It is good that we engaged in a dialogue with the Director- General. It looks as if the Director-General came to this meeting prepared to speak, or rather he was prepared to speak. Today we heard from some of our colleagues that we should separate the facts from the noise, that there are some allegations or accusations that are not based on facts. To that I may say that, unfortunately, some of our colleagues prefer to turn a blind eye to the facts that we provide, substituting them with convenient conclusions. It seems as if, when we speak, providing scientific facts, they switch off and do not listen to us. The Director-General said that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has no alternative but to investigate and, he added, identify.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  3. Unfortunately, it is becoming increasingly likely that Syria is not the only State at risk and that any State could come under attack and be subject to pressure through the leverage of accusations of the use of chemical weapons. The Security Council has a special responsibility to prevent such an outcome. We must all work to ensure that the OPCW is fully capable of implementing its mandate and remaining an impartial guardian of the chemical non-proliferation regime. Therefore, we hope that today’s conversation with the Director-General of the OPCW will not be the last and will enable us to move at least somewhat closer to that goal. Russia is ready to further work in all forums to restore trust in the OPCW and strengthen its authority and to defend the foundations of the regime for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  4. It is encouraging that, in fact, less than half of the OPCW member States voted for it, including only six Western States members of the current Security Council. The rest either voted against it or abstained in the voting. The same position was taken by a number of former members of the Security Council who participated in meetings on the Syrian issue last year and know the situation inside out. In conclusion, we, like many other responsible participants in the CWC and as a country that stood at the origins of the OPCW, are concerned about the politicization of its work, which is being imposed on it by Western colleagues. The OPCW should be the guardian of the chemical non-proliferation regime and must not be turned into an instrument for implementing political interests or for punishing undesirables.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  5. We expect to hear answers to all these questions in the open part of today’s meeting. I want to emphasize that we have gathered in the Chamber today not, as some colleagues try to describe it, to cross-examine the OPCW Director-General by asking him inconvenient questions. This is a necessary collective effort to rectify the regrettable situation in the OPCW. An open discussion with the leadership of the organization is urgently needed in order to prevent further erosion of its authority and a repeat of the humiliating situation that occurred in April, when a decision was made at the Conference of the States Parties to deny a sovereign State complying with the Convention its rights. That decision was yet again pushed through in violation of Convention norms and the long-standing practice of consensus in the OPCW.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  6. Arias whether he would agree to organize a purely technical discussion within the framework of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board, with the participation of well-known inspectors, to discuss all the inconsistencies concerning the Douma report. I think that our Western colleagues, who so actively advocate transparency and the depoliticization of the work of the OPCW, should welcome that. We are all interested in a frank and, as many delegations have emphasized, technical discussion among professionals. If Mr. Arias does not think it is possible to organize such a discussion in the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board, what other options can he suggest for resolving that situation? Is he ready to meet with former inspectors and discuss their concerns directly with them?

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  7. During the April Arria Formula meeting organized by Russia, one of the briefers — independent reporter Aaron Maté — asked the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom whether they would support an investigation, conducted by the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board, and with the participation of former inspectors of the FFM, into the manipulation of the FFM report. We have not heard an answer from our colleagues. However, let me remind the Council that, according to paragraph 45 of section D of article VIII of the CWC, the responsibility for the activities of the Board lies with the OPCW Director-General. Therefore, we would like to ask Mr.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  8. We would like Mr. Arias to comment on those points today. But there is another element in the new IIT document that goes beyond any reasonable limit. Paragraph 5.18 states that one of the most likely motives for the chlorine air strike was “a ‘punishment’ for the downing of the Russian aircraft”. At the same time, the IIT draws that conclusion, citing an anonymous “military expert”. We call on Mr. Arias to explain to us why the Technical Secretariat, which according to its leadership is engaged in strictly technical analysis, is going beyond its mandate and engaging in politicized conjecture? Who instructed the inspectors to include that deliberately false conclusion in the final document?

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  9. As with the case of Douma, it is not at all clear why Damascus would use chlorine in Saraqib and clearly expose itself to international criticism if it would not have benefited militarily or otherwise anyway? The IIT refers to the alleged use of just one chlorine cylinder in Saraqib, resulting in minor injuries to 12 people, who were discharged from hospital within two hours of arriving there. The group itself says that the Syrian army was not carrying out any offensive operations in the area during that period. The report is full of other glaring inconsistencies, such as the testimony of pseudo-witnesses about helicopters flying at low altitude with their lights on, which, in fact, is unacceptable when carrying out combat missions at night, or a cylinder that somehow was-corroded in less than 12 hours after hitting the ground.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  10. First of all, they concern the new report of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) on the Saraqib incident in February 2018, which was thrown in on the eve of the voting at the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC in April. None of the breaches in the investigation methodology that we have been talking about for years have been corrected in it. The report itself reveals that the IIT never went to the scene of the incident. All the physical evidence was collected by representatives of the again infamous NGO White Helmets. Half of the witnesses interviewed, again for the most part White Helmets, and their testimony were analysed by anonymous so-called authoritative experts and scientific institutions. What kind of impartiality or chain-of-custody requirement can we talk about in such circumstances?

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  11. An appeal by prominent public figures, in particular the well-known non-governmental organization (NGO) the Courage Foundation, calling on the leadership of the Technical Secretariat to finally get to the bottom of the numerous irregularities in its work, including the evidence of fraud in the preparation of the report on Douma. We do not understand that selective approach. The Technical Secretariat actively cooperates with some NGOs, such as the White Helmets, and engages them in highly sensitive matters, while it blatantly turns its back on others that ask inconvenient questions. What kind of freedom of speech, transparency or consideration for the views of civil society are we talking about? However, since last December, new questions have also emerged.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  12. In particular, that was once again confirmed in the FFM report on the November 2018 incident in Aleppo. Time is running out and questions to the Director- General, as head of the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat, are snowballing. Not only is the story of the Douma report not over, but there are more and more twists in it. It is now not even the OPCW inspectors themselves who are being persecuted but the independent experts who are trying to get to the bottom of this story. It is doubly sad that so-called independent and democratic Western media, such as the British Broadcasting Corporation, are joining the campaign to smear them.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  13. It turns out that now the Technical Secretariat is openly violating its own declared principles and is not ashamed to admit it in its reports. We are interested in what measures the leadership of the OPCW Technical Secretariat intends to take to rectify the situation. Another issue is the double standards of the OPCW Technical Secretariat in selecting sources of evidence. The OPCW inspection teams readily grasp any, even the weakest and most inconclusive, material from the infamous White Helmets, while evidence of the involvement of the opposition in the organization of provocations using chemical weapons provided by professionals — the Syrian authorities and the Russian military — is blatantly ignored, as well as the numerous confirmations by local witnesses, that is, living witnesses, of the staged nature of those incidents.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  14. Thirdly, this is Syria’s initial declaration under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). We asked for an explanation of the differences in approach on that issue between Damascus and other countries that have faced similar problems but have not been subjected to the same barrage of criticism for it as Syria. Fourthly, the methodology of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, which in its investigations relies on information from partisan sources opposed to the Syrian Government, collects evidence remotely and draws “highly likely” conclusions based on it. That is in direct contravention of the CWC, which has a chain-of-custody requirement to ensure that evidence is preserved. Moreover, former OPCW spokesman Mr. Lujan said in 2013 that the organization would never examine samples that had not been collected by its inspectors in the field.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  15. Why did the final report exclude the toxicologists’ findings that chlorine was not the cause of the deaths of the victims whom we were shown? The final report makes reference to later meetings with toxicologists in September and October, which are included among the meetings held by the Inquiry Team. However, the final report does not provide no information as to what conclusions the new toxicologists came to. Why and how did it happen that their conclusions became more important and allowed the findings of the first toxicologists to be ignored? Why does the final report not explain exactly what those toxicologists found? Why are their findings and conclusions not compared to those of the original toxicologists? Why were those first findings omitted from the report? I very much hope to have answers to those questions.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  16. Can he explain what specific analytical work was done by the FFM in the last six months of the investigation? Perhaps it had to do with altering the original findings of the inspectors who investigated the case. Secondly, in June 2018, the FFM approached four toxicologists and pharmacologists from NATO with expertise on chemical weapons. The materials of that meeting were leaked, and WikiLeaks published them. They show that the experts ruled out the use of chlorine as the cause of death of the victims filmed in Douma. That conclusion was acknowledged in the original report but was omitted in the final report. The final report also excluded the June meeting from the list of what the team had been doing.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  17. For example, in his speech of 6 February 2020, he said: (spoke in English) “Both had no involvement in the last six months of the FFM investigation, when most of the analytical work took place”. (spoke in Russian) Furthermore, he said that some of the inspectors, especially one in Douma, played no role in the investigation. That is refuted by the available facts and documents. At the 15 April Security Council meeting, journalist Aaron Maté showed us with documents in hand that much of the work was undertaken in the first few months of the investigation when Inspector B. was still a key member of the FFM and the author of the original report. For example, comparing the original report with the final report, Maté showed that 70 per cent of all samples were analysed in the first month, including 100 per cent of the wood samples.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  18. The attempts by these inspectors to make sure that the leadership of the OPCW investigates the matter resulted in nothing. Moreover, the inspectors were prosecuted for trying to get to the bottom of this issue. Today’s statement by Mr. Arias brings me back to this issue. Mr. Arias claims in his statement that none of the 193 States Members of the United Nations has questioned the findings of the final report on Douma. First, that is factually incorrect. Take our country, for example, and we are not the only ones to have questioned that. On many occasions, including today, the Director-General has said that much of the Douma investigation was carried out when the dissenting inspectors were no longer involved.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  19. In December last year, we put to Mr. Arias a number of questions having to do with the line that OPCW has taken as regards the Syrian chemical file (see S/2020/1202). Members of the Council have the list of questions, so I am not going to repeat them today, but let me just dwell on some salient points. First of all, I would of course refer to the infamous report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM) on the Duma incident in April 2018 (S/1731/2019). As confirmed by various sources, including former OPCW inspectors who participated directly in the investigation, the final version was massively redacted compared to the initial draft, and this was done under pressure from some delegations. In other words, what we are dealing with in this context is fraud.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  20. The Syrian chemical dossier is a specific topic, and first-hand information in this context is irreplaceable. Many delegations have questions — frequently very specific questions — about OPCW activities. So far, Mrs. Nakamitsu has had to answer these questions, and we are very grateful to her for that. But exhaustive answers on this topic cannot be provided by the representative of the United Nations Secretariat, so it would be much more logical to put these questions directly to the Director-General of the OPCW and give him an opportunity to answer them in an open format. We are convinced that is in the interest of the Security Council to have maximum transparency in this regard, and we hope that this is in the interest of the OPCW as well. We expect that this kind of open interactive exchange is exactly what we are going to have today.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  21. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): This is the first time since last October that the Security Council has met in order to discuss resolution 2118 (2013) in person (see S/PV.8764), and we are grateful to the Estonian presidency for that. This is yet one more step towards the return of the Security Council to its traditional methods of work, which is very timely. We are also grateful to Mrs. Izumi Nakamitsu for her briefing. We would like to also welcome the Director- General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Mr. Fernando Arias. It is great that the leadership of the OPCW has finally found an opportunity to participate in the meetings of the Council. We think that this format of our interaction should become a regular one.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source

  22. We regret the fact that the authors decided not to reflect that in the text of the resolution. The meeting rose at 10.15 a.m.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8784 (2021) · source

  23. At the same time, we cannot overlook the fact that, in the course of the negotiations, in spite of the fact that we proposed many compromise solutions, the sponsors of resolution 2579 (2021) declined to take a comprehensive view of the development challenges the Sudan faces, preferring to shift the focus to the climate agenda. We think it is counterproductive to single out the negative effects of climate change and other environmental factors and considering them separately from other issues of socioeconomic development. It is impossible to deny that widespread poverty, the lack of infrastructure, the low technological potential and a low level of donor support are things that are more obvious and more directly impede the country’s stable development, more so than climate change.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8784 (2021) · source

  24. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian delegation voted in favour of extending the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS). Our view is that it is absolutely necessary to help Khartoum as they build their State and implement peacebuilding initiatives. What is also important is that the Sudan, as host country, supported the vision for the future work of the special political mission as proposed by the Council. We hope that there will be fruitful cooperation among Khartoum, UNITAMS and the Security Council.

    2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8784 (2021) · source

  25. In that regard, we once again invite our colleagues, including those in the Quartet, to consider our proposals to hold a ministerial meeting of the Quartet, as well as one in an expanded format, with the participation of regional States and the Palestinians and Israelis themselves. We are ready to study proposals and views in that regard, and the sooner we begin our collective work, the sooner the situation in the region will become stable.

    2021-05-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8782 (2021) · source

  26. The status quo of the holy sites of Jerusalem must be respected, and here we know that the Jordanian monarchy plays a special role. Active discussions on the Palestinian question over the past two weeks in the Security Council as well as in the General Assembly have shown that the international community as a whole is unanimous in its understanding of the ultimate goal of a settlement, as well as its legal framework. It is important to preserve this unity, including among the members of the Security Council. The support expressed for these parameters must be translated into concrete actions. We do not believe that the whole set of problems can be solved by any one actor alone. To do so will require working together through collective efforts.

    2021-05-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8782 (2021) · source

  27. It is obvious that there will be no final peace status in the Middle East until all issues are resolved. To prevent a relapse into armed confrontation, it is necessary to focus international and regional efforts on creating conditions for restarting direct talks between Palestinians and Israelis on the basis of United Nations resolutions and the principle of two States, Palestine and Israel, living side-by-side in peace and security within the 1967 borders. One factor that would help create such conditions is the rejection of unilateral steps, including settlement activity and provocations that repeatedly antagonize the parties. Israel’s security concerns must be addressed. It is important to work to restore Palestinian unity on the basis of the Palestine Liberation Organization platform.

    2021-05-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8782 (2021) · source

  28. We actively used the communication channels established within the Quartet. We thank all those who took part in that process, and we note in particular the mediation of the leadership of Egypt and Qatar. The United Nations and Special Coordinator Wennesland also made an important contribution to calming the situation. There is no fighting in Palestine or in Israel today. However, that does not mean that we can put off resolving the Palestinian question to a later date. Unfortunately, history has proven time and time again that this is the key issue for the entire Middle East and the world as a whole. And that is not just a figure of speech or an overstatement. We all saw how sensitive was the reaction of the Muslim Ummah to the events in East Jerusalem around the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound.

    2021-05-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8782 (2021) · source

  29. Today’s discussion of the situation in the Middle East is taking place against the backdrop of the tragic events that claimed the lives of 230 Palestinians, including 66 children, as well as 12 Israelis. We express our condolences to the families of the victims and the injured. The population of the Gaza Strip is in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, including through the reconstruction of infrastructure. UNRWA, whose work we support, can play a key role in that regard. We hope that the Agency’s funding in the current challenging conditions will be stable. We were relieved and glad to learn that a ceasefire was established in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict zone. For our part, we worked vigorously from the outset to bring an end to the hostilities and intensively engaged with key regional partners.

    2021-05-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8782 (2021) · source

  30. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Tor Wennesland, and the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Philippe Lazzarini, for their briefings on the situation in the Palestinian territories. We also listened carefully to Professor Khalidi. I would like to welcome Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Permanent Representative of the United States, to today’s meeting. For her, this is the first in-person meeting in the Security Council Chamber. She is not in the Chamber now, but I think Rodney Hunter will transmit our welcome, which I think we all share.

    2021-05-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8782 (2021) · source

  31. The crisis has convincingly demonstrated that all decisions in that regard must be carefully considered and that forcing through a drawdown of AMISOM is unacceptable. In conclusion, allow me to once again express the hope that Somali political forces will become cognizant of national priorities and specific tasks for restoring stability to the country. That would enable them to expeditiously organize and conduct elections. Russia intends to facilitate that to the best of its ability.

    2021-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8779 (2021) · source

  32. Increasing Al-Shabaab attacks with vehicle-mounted improvised explosive devices, as well as their shelling of the capital’s airport with mortars and their military pressure in Lower Shabelle demonstrate that the group is attempting to use the internal political crisis to strengthen its positions. We call on the Somali authorities and AMISOM to maintain their efforts to fight extremists. We continue to believe that the African peacekeeping mission remains a key element in ensuring the security of Somalia. We expect that the African Union will take the necessary decisions regarding the parameters of transferring security responsibilities in the country from AMISOM to the Somali National Army.

    2021-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8779 (2021) · source

  33. In that regard, we welcome the role played by Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble in de-escalating tensions in the capital and in the withdrawal of opposition-controlled armed security units and militias. We also welcome the announcements regarding the resumption of diplomatic contacts between Somalia and Kenya. Like the Secretary- General, we hope that this will lead to a full restoration of good-neighbourly cooperative relations between the two countries. We call on the United Nations and regional stakeholders to continue assisting Somalia, while strictly respecting its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and without interfering in its internal affairs. We agree with the conclusion contained in the Secretary-General’s report — that the security situation in Somalia remains complex.

    2021-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8779 (2021) · source

  34. The Russian Federation continues to closely follow the evolving situation in Somalia, which is experiencing an acute internal political crisis. We welcome the convening of a nationwide conference in Mogadishu, with the participation of representatives of the Federal Government authorities and the heads of regional administrations in order to resolve outstanding issues. We note that the Federal Government of Somalia, which continues to demonstrate its flexibility and willingness to negotiate, significantly contributed to organizing that conference. We welcome the positive signs that some agreement as to the electoral model has been reached. We would particularly like to emphasize that the violence must not reoccur.

    2021-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8779 (2021) · source

  35. We trust that subsequent Council Presidents will consistently maintain the same position and that the number of meetings in the Chamber will increase until the Council finally moves fully from the virtual format, which we have had for the past year and a half, to an in-person format. We thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. James Swan, and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of the African Union Mission in Somalia, Mr. Francisco Madeira, for their informative briefings. We welcome the participation in this meeting of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Mr. Mohamed Abdirizak Mohamud. We have carefully studied the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/485).

    2021-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8779 (2021) · source

  36. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): At the outset, I wish to say that today is of course a very special day for the Security Council. For the first time since 8 December 2020, the Council is convening an in-person meeting. We thank the Chinese presidency for making that possible. That was our consistent position, and we have long urged that we return to the Security Council Chamber. In our view, we could have done it much earlier, or we should perhaps not have left the Chamber at all. Our meetings were in fact suspended for almost half a year.

    2021-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8779 (2021) · source

  37. We continue to believe that any decisions regarding the configuration of MONUSCO, including the Force Intervention Brigade, should take into account the situation on the ground and thoroughly consider the priorities of Kinshasa and the troop-contributing countries. In that regard, we support a flexible approach to the issue, as reflected in the joint strategy for the phased and responsible withdrawal of peacekeepers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, based on the criteria and targets proposed in that document. In conclusion, let me assure you, Mr. President, of our country’s readiness, including as a member of the Group of Friends of the Great Lakes Region, to continue to actively contribute to the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the stabilization in the Great Lakes region as a whole.

    2020-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8778 (2020) · source

  38. There are also non-military ways to address the problem of illegal armed groups, including a strategy for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former fighters that is currently being developed and rooted in partnerships with local communities. We welcome measures to expand cooperation between MONUSCO and the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo and to improve the effectiveness of the efforts of the Blue Helmets, including the Force Intervention Brigade. This month, the Security Council has the important task of extending the mandate of the peacekeepers for another year. We stand ready to work constructively on the relevant Security Council draft resolution. We trust that its authors will manage to craft a balanced document focused on the specific objectives of the mission.

    2020-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8778 (2020) · source

  39. Despite the generally complicated humanitarian situation, effective measures are being undertaken to prevent the spread of the coronavirus disease pandemic. We express our support for President Tshilombo Tshisekedi’s efforts to involve the neighbouring States in resolving the problems in the east of the country. We believe that regional organizations, in particular the Southern African Development Community and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, play an important mediation role in the peace process. We trust that the new regional strategy prepared by the Office of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa will give additional impetus to those processes. We note the contribution to the stabilization of the eastern provinces made by MONUSCO through nimble responses to myriad security threats.

    2020-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8778 (2020) · source

  40. Against that backdrop, we are deeply concerned about the growing number of civilian casualties, which has led to renewed grievances against peacekeepers in Beni and other cities. Attacks by illegal armed groups and inter-ethnic conflicts persist even in the relatively calm Tanganyika. The situation in the country is compounded by the political crisis, which has already led to the President’s decision to disband a coalition with supporters of former President Kabila Kabange. We count on a reduction in political tensions in Kinshasa through a resolution of problems at the constitutional level. At the same time, there are glimmers of hope. The Congolese authorities have managed to defeat the most recent Ebola outbreak.

    2020-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8778 (2020) · source

  41. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We would like to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), Ms. Zerrougi, for her comprehensive briefing. We closely read the recent report of the Secretary General (S/2020/1150) on the efforts of peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We concur that the security situation in the eastern provinces remains fraught. We are particularly troubled by the Kivus and Ituri, where inter-ethnic violence and attacks against civilians continue unabated. The Allied Democratic Forces continue to pose a significant threat, as clashes with the Congolese army have significantly increased in recent months.

    2020-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8778 (2020) · source

  42. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council has before it the text of a statement by the President on behalf of the Council on the subject of today’s meeting. I thank the Council members for their valuable contributions to this statement. In accordance with the understanding reached among the members of the Council, I shall take it that the members of the Security Council agree to the statement, which will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/2020/10. The meeting rose at 10.25 a.m.

    2020-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8769 (2020) · source

  43. We stand ready to provide all the necessary assistance to the Haitian people so that the fruit of the Council’s efforts will be a genuine normalization of the situation in Haiti, strengthened sovereignty and self-sufficiency for the country. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. The meeting rose at 10.25 a.m.

    2020-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8768 (2020) · source

  44. It is a great pity that the artificially short timelines prevented an agreement from being reached on what is necessary under present conditions, that is, a substantive document that would go beyond the framework of a mere technical resolution. That is all the more lamentable given that, under such difficult conditions in the country, it is exceedingly important to send a united Council message in support of national dialogue on the basis of the constitutional process. Port-au-Prince needs responsible international assistance. That is why the main goal of the mission, in our view, is to help facilitate nationwide discussions to end the deadlock and to address the situation on the basis of current legislation.

    2020-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8768 (2020) · source

  45. I shall now make a statement in my national capacity. The Russian Federation abstained in the voting on resolution 2547 (2020), on the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti. We value the efforts of the sponsors to include in the document important elements on the role of the Parliament and the need for national dialogue to surmount the problems besetting the country and to conduct elections. At the same time, we regret the fact that not all of the concerns of Security Council members were taken into account. For example, the document fails to mention the most serious problems with violence vis-à-vis civilians, encroachment on human rights and corruption. It also does not mention the need to respect the country’s Constitution when adopting momentous decisions.

    2020-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8768 (2020) · source

  46. The draft resolution received 13 votes in favour, none against and 2 abstentions. The draft resolution has been adopted as resolution 2547 (2020). I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements after the voting.

    2020-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8768 (2020) · source

  47. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them document S/2020/1011, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by the United States of America. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2020/944, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti. The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Belgium, Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, South Africa, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam Against: None Abstaining: China, Russian Federation

    2020-10-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8768 (2020) · source

  48. We welcome the assistance of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force, through MINUSMA, and its help in countering COVID-19. At the same time, we stress that the main responsibility for the protection of civilians, the restoration of control over the northern territories and the resolution of socioeconomic and other problems, is incumbent on the Malians themselves. In conclusion, we express our appreciation to Special Representative Annadif for his effective leadership of the Mission. I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council. I give the floor to the representative of Mali.

    2020-10-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8765 (2020) · source

  49. We welcome the fact that steps aimed at the restoration of constitutional rule have led to the lifting of ECOWAS restrictions for Mali. We must be mindful that the situation in Mali is a key factor for regional security. We expect that the Malian armed forces will continue to fully participate in the operations of Group of Five Sahel (G-5 Sahel) Joint Force and that decisions to galvanize counter-terrorist action, made at the regional summit in Nouakchott, will be put into effect. Bamako and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) must by all means pursue their close cooperation and coordinated activities. Peacekeepers must proceed with the efficient implementation of their mandate in Mali’s northern and central regions.

    2020-10-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8765 (2020) · source

  50. In general, Mali has suffered an increase in assaults and abductions, an upsurge of delinquency, racketeering and robberies, and rising numbers of human rights violations. The humanitarian situation is also of great concern. The coronavirus disease pandemic (COVID-19) has exacerbated the need for food assistance. Schools remain closed and medical facilities are overburdened. This calls for an urgent reaction on the part of humanitarian agencies. We support the efforts of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the area of political mediation for Mali. We highly commend the role of ECOWAS and its Special Envoy for Mali, Mr. Goodluck Jonathan. We call on the Malian authorities to closely engage with colleagues in the region.

    2020-10-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8765 (2020) · source