YouSaid · the spoken record

Nebenzia

lines on the record: 5,044
first: 2017-08-02
most recent: 2023-12-30
sittings or episodes: 461
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“We agree that, without the restoration of State control in many parts of the country, it will be difficult to consider the results of the popular vote to be legitimate. That will lead directly to yet another wave of political destabilization, as it did in Mali in 2020. We believe that excessive external interference in those matters, as we have witnessed in recent months, can only further complicate the situation. The security situation remains grave. Extremists continue to terrorize the local population and to attack Malian military units and United Nations peacekeepers. The Malian armed forces and the Blue Helmets of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali continue to suffer casualties and losses.”
2022-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8945 (2022) · source
“In that connection, we welcome the measures undertaken by the transitional Government of Mali aimed at conducting an inclusive nationwide dialogue with all stakeholders in order to identify a way forward to achieve further reform and development in the country. We trust that the results of that dialogue will be implemented as soon as possible. We believe that commitments made with regard to re-establishing constitutional order must be implemented in accordance with the realities on the ground, which have their own logic and require certain necessary adjustments. We acknowledge and understand the difficulties faced by the Malian authorities in preparing for general elections.”
2022-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8945 (2022) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. El-Ghassim Wane, for leading the efforts of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and his briefing on the situation in the country. We also listened attentively to the civil society representative, Ms. Adam Dicko. It is clear that improving the situation in Mali, implementing the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, eradicating terrorism and alleviating socioeconomic difficulties depend above all on internal political stability.”
2022-01-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8945 (2022) · source
“As was shown by the open debate on 9 December (S/PV.8923), the international community is focused on all the real concerns about the Sahel. The Council needs to work in other regions as well. In line with that approach, Russia, together with China and India, proposed a draft resolution on assistance for the Sahel region. Our draft resolution, unlike that of the Niger and Ireland, includes the whole panoply of problems that the region faces and is aimed at mobilizing international efforts, including financing, to provide multilateral assistance to those who need it. We are ready for a substantive and constructive working relationship with all members of the Council.”
2021-12-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8926 (2021) · source
“Furthermore, it became even clearer that the domination of the Security Council by Western countries, in trying to evade responsibility for their own actions by using the climate as a cover, is an anachronism. In our discussions of Security Council reform, we must strengthen the voice of developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and not the collective West, to correct this course, but we are seeking a solution with a comprehensive approach and that does not indulge attempts to shift the blame. We recognize the fact that there are a range of different interconnected problems: climate change, natural disasters, poverty, weak local authorities and terrorism. Those are a very heavy burden for some countries and regions and each situation is unique.”
2021-12-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8926 (2021) · source
“I will provide another interpretation of what happened. The international community is deeply divided on climate issues. We saw that in Glasgow, but at that time the need to achieve a consensus forced our Western colleagues to behave democratically and consider the positions of all countries. Now we see an anti-democratic attempt to ignore the opinion of those 80 Member States that did not support the draft text and to impose on them the position of climate activists. That would be a very divisive action, which would result in a setback in combating climate change. Only our negative vote was able to stop this process, which is insurance against this kind of scenario. This is the best indication of the fact that the veto is a key piece of insurance for our work and similar unacceptable scenarios.”
2021-12-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8926 (2021) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We sincerely regret that your presidency, Sir, has been overshadowed by the division that we warned about. But we need to move forward. I reiterate that, as a responsible member of the United Nations and its Security Council, the Russian Federation, together with India and China, does not share the approach imposed by Western States, which has already led a large number of States that are awaiting assistance to believe in it. The sponsors of draft resolution S/2021/990 speak of 113 countries supporting the draft resolution. What about the 80 countries that did not support the draft resolution? Many colleagues have criticized maintaining the veto in the Security Council, saying that we have seen yet another example of its abuse by Russia, which ignored the opinion of 113 States.”
2021-12-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8926 (2021) · source
“As has already been said, that region is being held hostage to a complex range of not only climate challenges, but also social, economic and political threats that are exacerbated by terrorism and must be looked at holistically, while considering the specific circumstances of the region. If we really want to ensure that the United Nations and its Security Council will help, then we must be guided by that approach now and in the future.”
2021-12-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8926 (2021) · source
“We call on you not to sow discord within the Security Council on such an important subject. It is the presidency’s responsibility to push towards effective decisions instead of sowing discord. In so saying, we are not just rejecting this; instead of this one-sided approach, we are proposing an alternative, guided by a comprehensive approach that takes different countries and regions into account. We have been impressed by the number of States that have expressed deep concern about the issues facing the Sahel. Let us look at our alternative draft resolution.”
2021-12-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8926 (2021) · source
“It is particularly sad to see the attempt to force the adoption of the draft resolution when there is currently a clear lack of consensus among the members of the Security Council, as countries have a hard time agreeing on how to implement the Paris Agreement, as we saw in Glasgow, and on truly needed measures to fight climate change. The climate agenda should provide a unifying role to ensure success in carrying out individual and joint activities, not to sow discord, particularly for political ends. You know, Sir, that there is no consensus on the draft resolution that has been put to the vote. You have received a number of letters from delegations — both members and non-members of the Security Council. Dissent was also expressed earlier, during the aforementioned open debate on the subject.”
2021-12-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8926 (2021) · source
“The connection between climate and socioeconomic challenges in one form or another, was supported by the absolute majority of countries whose representatives have spoken during specialized open debates that have recently been organized by the Niger presidency of the Security Council, but which more closely resembled meetings of the Second Committee and the Economic and Social Council. For that reason, the substantive work should be carried out within expert forums, the main one of which is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.”
2021-12-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8926 (2021) · source
“Members will agree that giving political workers the task of rapidly drawing conclusions that could lead to intervention in the domestic affairs of States is simpler than strengthen monitoring and early warning systems to respond to natural disasters in developing countries without any political agenda, especially than actually providing the funds that were promised for those purposes. Thirdly, the fight against climate change and adaptation to its negative consequences are a question of sustainable development.”
2021-12-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8926 (2021) · source
“It is also suggested that the results of that dubious analysis — the impact of climate change on peace and security — are presented to the Council in reports of the Secretary-General. The quality of such analyses and especially their conclusions would be questionable, to say the least. Furthermore, such an approach would be a ticking time bomb. Its purpose would be to have a way to include virtually any country on the Security Council’s agenda if it is deemed to be undesirable by someone. It would be easy to find a pretext, as the whole world feels the impact of climate change. Real climate change research should really be the prerogative of climate and weather experts. Such analytical work requires the appropriate training of experts, technical equipment and a great deal of time.”
2021-12-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8926 (2021) · source
“In that regard, it is difficult to offer any advice other than that they turn to history, which, unfortunately, illustrates that donors rarely respond in kind to any favourable good intentions. However, we accuse no one and are even quite understanding. Many countries simply do not have a choice when donors impose a certain viewpoint on them. Besides, it is always easier to blindly follow than it is to work out the subtleties of this or that issue. Returning to attempts to create an entire range of mandates for political experts on climate, I will explain in detail why that is unacceptable. It is implied that peacekeepers are qualified to assess the impact of climate change on specific locations after undergoing some sort of training within a short period of time.”
2021-12-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8926 (2021) · source
“We have drawn the attention of those who wish to shift the blame. It is clear what they are trying to do. I will address myself specifically to those countries that, following the examples of the blame-shifters, have come to believe that such a one-sided approach — assessing everything through the climate lens — might in some way be effective. I should like to cite Pushkin, our famous poet, who wrote better than many on the subject of love. In one of his poems, he writes, “Ah, it is easy to deceive me!/I long to be deceived myself!” It is completely possible that many of the countries in need that are awaiting help from donors entertain fanciful notions concerning their potential saviours.”
2021-12-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8926 (2021) · source
“The loss of biodiversity, deforestation, the effect of chemical substances and soil pollution as the result of military activity and intervention in the domestic affairs of States require measures to restore the environment over decades and hardly contribute to the fight against climate change. We stand ready to actively draw the Council’s attention to the issue. Secondly, the instability of specific countries and regions is owing to a range of specific reasons that can differ from each other in their makeup and scale. The draft resolution is not aimed at helping countries or work on any specific situation. Instead, it takes a general approach to climate, contrary to the principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”
2021-12-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8926 (2021) · source
“That having been said, the lamentable position of many of the most vulnerable States, from a climate perspective, is a direct consequence of previous colonial policies from Western donors. I would tell them directly how well they have devised this idea of blaming greenhouse-gas emissions, and the Sun and the Moon as well, and of suggesting that the responsibility lies with developing countries themselves. They have not, however, managed to convince us of that today. We also note that our Western partners, who are presenting climate change as a source of political instability, prefer not to draw attention in the Council to the other side of their arguments, namely, the negative consequences of conflict and their impact on the environment.”
2021-12-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8926 (2021) · source
“The provisions of the draft resolution integrating such a connection as “a central component into comprehensive conflict-prevention strategies of the United Nations” (S/2021/990, para. 2) and into the mandates of peacekeeping and political missions could bring with it a whole range of consequences. First, positioning climate change as a threat to international security diverts the attention of the Council from genuine, deep-rooted causes of conflict in the countries on the Council’s agenda. This is convenient for those countries that are actively helping these conflicts to erupt or that have undertaken military activity as a diversion from the Security Council mandate, or simply do not want to provide the countries in need with the necessary practical help in the area of development.”
2021-12-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8926 (2021) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): As we have said earlier and repeatedly, draft resolution S/2021/990, on climate and security, is unacceptable to Russia. I shall once again explain our position in detail. The sponsors did not and do not want to listen to our clarifications. They did not want to talk about this issue in substance. They did not want to hear any arguments, either from us or from other members of the Security Council or States Members of the United Nations. We oppose creating a new area in the Council’s work that would establish a generic, automatic connection between climate change and international security, turning a scientific and socioeconomic issue into a politicized question.”
2021-12-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8926 (2021) · source
“We call for working along those lines in the frameworks that I mentioned, leaving it to the Security Council to address the root causes of conflicts and resolve existing ones.”
2021-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8923 (2021) · source
“On the whole, we think that working on this issue within the UNFCCC, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the High-level Political Forum, and the Peacebuilding Commission and other United Nations forums — and respecting the division of labour within the Organization — has great potential for addressing the socioeconomic recovery of developing countries. In particular, developing countries need to strengthen their capacities to overcome the obstacles to development that are relevant to them, as well as increased and better access to financing and to participation in the global trading system, vaccines against COVID-19, the best available technologies and early-warning systems for extreme natural phenomena, humanitarian assistance, education and vocational guidance for the younger generation, particularly women.”
2021-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8923 (2021) · source
“However, I think that Council members would agree that whether any particular issue is included or not on the Security Council agenda should not serve as a yardstick as to whether or not it is important. Climate change is certainly an issue where this is a concern. As part of its specific nature, it should be looked at with the involvement of all States Members of the United Nations. Nothing can really be helped by including it on the agenda of the Security Council, with its limited membership and very specific toolkit, but it certainly could lead to a muddling and a doubling of efforts.”
2021-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8923 (2021) · source
“Let us be honest: cutting greenhouse-gas emissions in region A is not going to stop floods or droughts in region B over the next 50 or 100 years. Furthermore, in looking for the deep- rooted reasons for terrorism, moving the focus from poverty, sanctions or weak State institutions to climate simply means going away from an open discussion of the reasons for the extreme vulnerability of States, in particular those that have suffered from foreign intervention. Can this really be helped by moving the discussion to the Security Council? For us, the direct connection between terrorism and climate change is not clear. Perhaps our colleagues, by including this subject in the Security Council agenda, simply want to raise the profile of debate on climate.”
2021-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8923 (2021) · source
“We are convinced that each of the negative factors in this context should be analysed and overcome with the consent of the national Governments of recipient countries and the use of the specific expert potential and the toolkit that the United Nations can bring, once again without some one-size-fits-all approach. We defended and will continue to defend the notion that the United Nations works effectively when its labour is properly divided. Forcing climate monitoring detached from fundamental scientific work into the mandate of peacekeeping operations or special political missions would be a disastrous politicization of the climate agenda and lead us away from unified and genuinely global cooperation, which is what the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the UNFCCC are aiming to achieve.”
2021-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8923 (2021) · source
“In order to solve the aforementioned problems, what should the United Nations and the Security Council do? We have to recognize that our approach differs from the opinion of many of our Security Council colleagues. First and foremost, we are convinced that each country or region needs to be looked at individually as well as in connection with other often more significant factors that give rise to socioeconomic or political instability, including foreign intervention in States, or the lack of outside assistance in situations where the local authorities and State institutions cannot cope with the task at hand. A generic one-size-fits-all approach or some kind of automatic attribution of cause and effect will only lead the Security Council down the wrong path in solving these problems.”
2021-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8923 (2021) · source
“The reasons for that are problems of border security, given that the borders are porous, socioeconomic conditions are difficult, the COVID-19 crisis is deepening, and the central authorities on the ground are showing weakness. Terrorists are successfully taking advantage of this, broadening their propaganda and finding new recruits from the dissatisfied population, above all, young people. There is also no disagreement that, in the Sahel, for example, a great many factors, including problems of extreme poverty, a lack of jobs, population growth, desertification, natural disasters, migration, internal conflicts and terrorist activity, have come together into a single knot. The current situation with the coronavirus is also making the situation more difficult. A completely logical question therefore presents itself.”
2021-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8923 (2021) · source
“This mechanism has been able to keep up with its work despite the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. On the basis of CTED’s recommendations, States can be provided with technical assistance through such specialized United Nations structures as the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. We stress that this assistance should be provided upon the request of local authorities and taking into account the specifics of the country and the region, and there are indeed many specifics. Accordingly, despite the active fight going on with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in Syria and Iraq, we are also seeing the terrorist threat spread from the Middle East and North Africa to neighbouring countries and regions, particularly deeper into Africa.”
2021-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8923 (2021) · source
“Nevertheless, there is a range of different sub-issues on the agenda, from sea-level rise, which is an issue for island States, to the desertification in countries in Africa. Those require different approaches to assistance for the States in question. There is no disagreement that cooperation in the fight against international terrorism should also be global in nature. In this context, we think that States Members of the United Nations are able to define threats and issues with the support of the counter-terrorism monitoring activity of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), which helps to prepare reports on States’ implementation of specialized counter- terrorism resolutions, in particular resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005).”
2021-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8923 (2021) · source
“In the spirit of such approaches, the Russian delegation played an active role at the twenty-sixth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in Glasgow in November, and helped achieve a consensus. We think that the success in Glasgow possible was due to the balance struck between climate- and environmental-protection efforts and the socioeconomic interests of countries at different levels of development and therefore at different levels of vulnerability. Help in protecting countries from climate change and natural disasters is an important element in national efforts and international global cooperation, especially in the framework of the United Nations development system.”
2021-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8923 (2021) · source
“First, climate change is an issue that holds a very important place for us both in the national context and in terms of international cooperation. According to our calculations, the climate in Russia is changing 2.5 times faster than the global average. At the same time, we see ever more destructive natural phenomena, and the need to cut greenhouse gases and adapt to the negative consequences of climate change is increasingly obvious to us. On 29 October this year, the Russian Federation a government order that established a strategy for low- carbon socioeconomic development until 2050. This strategy sets the specific goal of achieving a balance between human-made greenhouse-gas emissions and the mitigation thereof through carbon capture by 2060.”
2021-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8923 (2021) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are pleased to see you, Mr. President, presiding over the Security Council. The Russian Federation wholeheartedly shares the common international concerns about the issues that are at the centre of our debate today. The consequences of climate change, natural disasters and terrorism are catastrophes that are cross-border in nature and require active international cooperation. We are committed to working on these priorities. In addition, our colleagues from the Niger raised another subject for discussion, namely, the possible connection between terrorism and climate change and issues of security, as well as the role of the Security Council in this context.”
2021-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8923 (2021) · source
“Syria has extended an open invitation, and we do not understand what is preventing him from visiting the country, despite the explanation provided today by Mrs. Nakamitsu. Unfortunately, all our attempts to engage in dialogue with the leadership of the Technical Secretariat have been stonewalled, and not only on the Syrian chemical dossier. We have also sought — in vain — answers from the Technical Secretariat on a number of key issues that are important for clarifying the events regarding Mr. Navalny. So far, the Director-General of the OPCW has sidestepped us, just like our Western colleagues. Overall, in view of the above, I believe that the Security Council has sufficient grounds to propose a dialogue with Mr. Arias in the near future, and we hope that he will be better prepared than in previous meetings.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“I think our Syrian colleagues will be able to elaborate on their vision of engagement with the DAT and I urge one and all to listen carefully to what they have to say. We remain very concerned about the Technical Secretariat’s use of flawed methodology based on information collected remotely from biased sources, primarily the notorious White Helmets. That is a direct violation of the CWC, which has a chain-of-custody requirement to ensure that evidence is preserved. There are other questions. For example, why has Mr. Arias never visited the Syrian Arab Republic to see the situation on the ground that he so confidently references in his reports? Such a visit is not only long overdue, but also an obligation of the head of the Technical Secretariat.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“The final elimination of Syria’s military chemical capabilities was confirmed in 2016 by the OPCW Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties. Contrary to Mr. Arias’ claims, under the CWC, the Technical Secretariat has no right to apply complicated and politically motivated verification requirements to Syria. The very nature of the mandate of the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) does not envision any investigative powers; its task is merely to assist Syria in preparing its initial declaration. Nevertheless, in reality, the DAT, with a nod from the Technical Secretariat, has become a full-fledged inspection team, with self-appointed intrusive mandates. And dialogue with the DAT to assess the initial declaration is part of bilateral commitments undertaken voluntarily by Syria.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“Those kinds of glaring inconsistencies and manipulations were characteristic of all previous reports on other episodes of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria — in Khan Shaykhun, Saraqib, Ltamenah and elsewhere. We have also been unable to get clarification on Syria’s initial declaration under the CWC. We have repeatedly asked Mr. Arias to explain why Damascus has been singled out. Other countries with similar issues have not been targets of such a barrage of criticism. I note that despite joining the CWC under extremely difficult conditions of military and political instability and terrorism fuelled from abroad, Syria has nevertheless fulfilled all its obligations in good faith, as reported by the Director-General to the Security Council in June 2014 (see S/1191/2014).”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“It only took those experts one hour to conclude that the nature of the evidence and the symptoms of the victims in Douma did not fit the typical pattern resulting from the use of chlorine as a chemical warfare agent. Why were the conclusions of those German experts not included in the Technical Secretariat’s final report on Douma? The answer is obvious — they did not fit with the version of events fabricated by the Technical Secretariat. The same fate befell many other opinions and evidence. The Douma report and its falsifications alone is a scandalous episode that some of our colleagues in the Security Council and the OPCW Technical Secretariat wish to forget, but it is just the tip of the iceberg.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“We are not convinced by references to the need for a new decision by the governing bodies of the OPCW for that to happen. The ability of CWC member States to ask the Scientific Advisory Board for an adequate explanation on issues related to the implementation of the Convention is stipulated in article VIII. And yet, evidence of blatant manipulation and fraud in the preparation of the FFM report on Douma is only increasing. In particular, a number of media outlets have recently reported on a meeting between four representatives of the OPCW Technical Secretariat and leading German experts on chemical weapons in Germany in June 2018.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“Our primary concern, but not the only one, is the notorious FFM report on the April 2018 incident in Douma. As confirmed by various sources, including former inspectors of the OPCW who were directly involved in that investigation, the final version of the report was radically different from the original version, due to pressure from certain delegations. In other words, there was fraud. Attempts by those inspectors for the OPCW to investigate what happened came to naught. Instead, they were harassed for their search for the truth. We know that the current leadership of the OPCW is fed up with this issue and is trying to hush up the matter in every possible way. Further evidence of that is the Director-General’s refusal to involve the OPWC’s Scientific Advisory Board to examine the Douma report matter.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“Arias deliberately distorted the essence of the note correspondence between the Permanent Mission of Russia to the OPCW and the Technical Secretariat with regard to the investigation of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) to Douma, omitting the main conclusion reached in our note — that Russia insists on the staged nature of the incident in question because the findings presented in the FFM report (S/1731/2019) did not allow us to conclude that toxic chemicals were used as weapons. That is just one example. There were so many glaring inconsistencies and direct distortions in his responses that we were forced to respond by circulating our arguments as an official Security Council document. It should be no surprise, then, for me to note that it would be impolite to refuse to answer such questions, and we are going to insist on that.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“In particular, we are counting on a reasonable and conscientious response to the concerns we have expressed in the Security Council. Specifically, exactly one year ago, we issued a list of eight questions about irregularities in the work of the Technical Secretariat (see S/2020/1202). At the time, the Director-General refused to answer them in an open session. We also did not receive any responses in closed consultations. Six months later, in June, during another briefing by Fernando Arias (see S/PV.8785), we asked additional questions. Once again, we heard no answers on the substance. Instead, we received blatant disinformation and an outright distortion of the facts. For example, as we all recall, Mr.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“In that respect, it is not much different from all the previous reports of Mr. Arias. Frankly, the situation at the OPCW has deteriorated so much that there is no guarantee that we will ever be able to get back to any kind of starting point in order to rectify the situation. For that to happen, the leadership of that organization would have to show the courage to acknowledge and correct the mistakes it has made. So far, however, it has not shown such willingness, only making matters worse. That is why, in the re-election of Mr. Arias, we distanced ourselves from consensus. However, we are continuing to work with him. We would like to hope that the OPCW leadership will draw the necessary conclusions from what is happening.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“Its culmination and main outcome was the fact that, for the first time in the history of the OPCW, a sovereign State that scrupulously complied with its obligations under the Convention lost its rights in the organization. That is a tremendous blow to the reputation of the OPCW and the entire chemical weapons non-proliferation regime. Its long-term consequences have yet to be understood, but the erosion of international confidence in the OPCW is already apparent. In the light of the many significant and systemic violations, it is pointless to talk about the current report of the Director-General on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) (see S/2021/989). Its main objective is to do whatever it takes, in spite of the facts and common sense, to make Damascus look bad.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“It is no longer possible to hide the fact that the OPCW Technical Secretariat, at the behest of certain States, is rubber-stamping one politically motivated report after another. Based on those reports, the governing bodies of the OPCW are pushing through discriminatory decisions against responsible member States, while the OPCW leadership plays along with those violations, avoiding a serious dialogue with member States that truly care about the fate and the reputation of the organization. The recently concluded twenty-sixth session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention was, unfortunately, a clear confirmation of these unseemly trends.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): As this is the last meeting of the Security Council on the Syrian chemical weapons issue this year, it is time to take stock. Unfortunately, the situation is far from encouraging and the root of the ongoing and newly emerging problems is not actually in Syria. The main source of disappointment is the constant attempts to politicize the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is leading us ever closer to destroying one of the most important pillars of the regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. That is not at all what we are trying to achieve, but the erosion of confidence in the OPCW has taken on alarming proportions, no matter how much our Western counterparts try to convince us otherwise.”
2021-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8921 (2021) · source
“In conclusion, I should like once again to emphasize that the fight against the illicit diversion of SALW, ensuring the safe storage of stockpiles and the destruction of surpluses constitute the prerogative of States themselves and are an integral part of their sovereignty. That is why the joint work of all States at the General Assembly and the subsequent implementation of measures developed under the United Nations Programme of Action, first and foremost at the national level, are of paramount importance in this regard. Only in this way will we be able to achieve a shared goal and practical success in combating the illicit trafficking of SALW throughout the world.”
2021-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8909 (2021) · source
“We call upon all Member States, through the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action, and taking into account the recommendations of the seventh Meeting of Member States on this process at the General Assembly, to prioritize the implementation at the national level of the following measures: introducing a blanket prohibition on transfers of all types of SALW to entities not authorized by the Governments of recipient States; ensuring stringent regulation and direct control by States of arms-export brokering activities within their jurisdiction and limiting the number of these brokers to the extent possible; prohibiting the re-export or subsequent transfers of imported SALW without the written consent of the initial exporter State; and preventing the production of SALW under expired licences or without licences from the State possessing the technology for their production, including curbing the practice whereby weapons previously produced under licence are slightly modernized without the consent of the original manufacturer and then exported as a new product.”
2021-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8909 (2021) · source
“Clearly, shipments of weapons manufactured in this way are concealed in every possible manner, which means that the end users are in most cases part of criminal networks. The main problem is that in the pursuit of profit or to advance short-sighted political agendas, the suppliers fail to consider whose hands the exported SALW fall into, where they are used and for what purposes. The Russian Federation has highly advanced national legislation to combat the illicit transfer of SALW. We stand ready to share our experience and the array of tried and tested best practices with interested States.”
2021-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8909 (2021) · source
“The main reasons for the uncontrolled spread of SALW around the world are well known. Illicit trafficking in this type of weaponry is a direct consequence of excessively permissive national legislation or persistent loopholes in national export-control regimes, which affects the neighbouring countries in particular. Nor do we see sufficiently responsible conduct by the multitude of arms broker organizations active on the arms market. Further, States with excessive stockpiles of SALW do not always act responsibly; instead of trying to dispose of these weapons, they often try to sell their surpluses, paying too little attention to the problem of illicit cross- border transfers. There is a major threat emanating from the production of SALW under expired licenses or without licenses of the countries that own the relevant technologies.”
2021-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8909 (2021) · source
“The main role of the Security Council is to facilitate conflict resolution in specific countries and regions by tapping into an array of measures applicable to a given situation, each of which is designed to help meet a specific objective. In this regard, it is important to remember that illicit trafficking in SALW is a global problem that has a negative impact, including on the implementation of relevant measures through the Security Council. This problem cannot be solved by imposing restrictions against a specific State or strengthening any given peacekeeping mission. The Security Council duly shoulders its responsibility in these matters. However, at the same time, any efforts to take up issues that are within the purview the General Assembly would be misguided.”
2021-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8909 (2021) · source
“We call on all Member States to and implement the Meeting’s outcome document at the national, regional and global levels. The Security Council is also seized of the issue of illicit transfers of SALW. In 2015, the Council adopted thematic resolution 2220 (2015), which comprehensively outlines the Council’s views on combating this scourge. Further, we note the presidential statements adopted on specific aspects of combating the illicit trafficking in SALW. At the same time, the Security Council should clearly not duplicate the functions of the General Assembly, especially on such a universal issue as countering the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons.”
2021-11-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8909 (2021) · source