YouSaid · the spoken record

Nebenzia

lines on the record: 5,044
first: 2017-08-02
most recent: 2023-12-30
sittings or episodes: 461
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“As we understand it, the provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement assume that issues of foreign policy are the shared responsibility of all the entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is why such programme statements must be coordinated with all the entities. If that is not the case, then it seems we must draw the conclusion that everything Minister Turković said today should be considered her own personal views. Obviously, she has every right to make her personal views known; however, it appears that they do not reflect the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are convinced that it is very important to adhere to the principle of respect for the interests of the two entities and three constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to maintain a balanced stance.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8810 (2021) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We would like to put a question to Minister Turković. I hope she will not take the question personally, but it is a matter on which we require some clarification. The question is as follows: Does the statement that she made today reflect the position of all of constituent entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina? Has her position been coordinated with the Presidency of the country, and if so how was that done? I ask because we received a letter from the Chair of the Presidency, Mr. Milorad Dodik, stating that she does not have the legal right to make a statement before the Security Council due to the fact that her statement was not agreed with all the entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8810 (2021) · source
“But in this specific case, we are seeing a completely different picture: an attempt to avoid the discussion of the candidature of the High Representative or to assess the activity that of the Office of the High Representative in general. The question then can therefore be asked: why try to deceive and play hide and seek when it is not necessary? It is clear that any candidate for the position who does not have the support of the Security Council and the Bosnian sides will lack not only legitimacy, but also the political support needed to truly contribute to promoting a peaceful settlement. Quite to the contrary, that candidate’s actions will lead only to greater chaos, compound existing differences and ultimately destroy all the positives that have been achieved over the past quarter century.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8810 (2021) · source
“This is precisely why we have put forward the initiative to hold today’s meeting. Our position on the High Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina — the procedure for creating this post — was in fact clearly defined in annex 10 of the Dayton Agreement and is well known. We should not forget that it is the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina who hold the country’s sovereignty. The fate of the country and its development path should be determined by the people rather than a High Representative or any external force. We are always ready to engage in honest discussions on the most important issues with our colleagues in the Security Council. Indeed, an exchange of views and an attempt to find compromise is one of the goals of the Security Council. Only in this way can we find a solution to problems.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8810 (2021) · source
“Such occurrences serve only to strengthen the overall unpleasant sensation on this matter. Russia seeks to support the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina — the Dayton Peace Agreement — because this issue cannot be examined without historical perspective. As is well known, at the beginning of the 1990s, Bosnia and Herzegovina was torn apart by a bloody war that affected all of its society. Many lost loved ones, their homes and their work. In 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement put an end to this terrible tragedy. It was signed by the parties as well as by guarantor States. The Agreement remains the foundation for peace in Bosnia. Our duty as members of the Security Council is to do everything possible to keep this fragile achievement from being destroyed.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8810 (2021) · source
“A logical question has therefore emerged: can we begin work on national reconciliation by provoking an inevitable conflict that threatens to compound the existing differences among the various entities? Fuel to the fire was also added by manoeuvres by some of our colleagues in the Security Council, who, for some reason, decided to bypass the matter in the Council. The letter of 3 June by the current High Representative Valentin Inzko was sent to the Secretary-General and the President of the Council, stating that he would be replaced as of 1 August by Christian Schmidt, but, for some reason, this letter was not circulated. It was circulated only after we raised the matter and insisted on it. For three weeks, it was as if this letter did not exist even though everyone knew about it.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8810 (2021) · source
“It is well known that the procedure for the appointment of High Representatives that has developed over the years is quite logical, transparent and democratic. Candidates are confirmed by the Steering Board with the consent of the Bosnian sides and then approved by the Security Council, usually in the form of an adopted resolution. However, nothing of the sort happened in the case of Mr. Schmidt, not even close. Today we see a completely different picture. The name of the only candidate, who appeared out of nowhere, was confirmed by the Steering Board right away without any kind of discussion. The Board also chose to ignore the views of not only the Russian Federation but of all the Bosnian sides.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8810 (2021) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. Hervé Lecoq for today’s briefing. We welcome the participation in this meeting of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ms. Bisera Turković. We have gathered here at our initiative in order to discuss the letter circulated in the Security Council stating that on 27 May Christian Schmidt, a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany, was supposedly appointed to the post of High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Federation, as a member of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina, would like to categorically disagree with the confirmation of that appointment.”
2021-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8810 (2021) · source
“There is a need for the international community to work together to establish a peaceful life through infrastructure projects for the country’s initial reconstruction. In that connection, we call in particular for support for the initiative of the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Peter Maurer, to restore basic infrastructure facilities in the Syrian Arab Republic. We support the ICRC’s assessment that a lack of solutions in that regard threatens to extend the humanitarian disaster not only within Syria itself but also into the neighbouring countries.”
2021-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8805 (2021) · source
“In the hands of our partners, the chemical dossier, where through our common efforts we managed to achieve the elimination of the Syrian chemical arsenal, has degenerated into yet another element of pressure against Syria. We are also trying to ease the politicization of the Syrian humanitarian track and to help establish constructive cooperation between the United Nations and Damascus to provide humanitarian assistance to all Syrians, in compliance with the basic principles set forth in General Assembly resolution 46/182. We commend the efforts of the Government of Syria to rebuild the country after the conflict and establish normal living conditions for the citizens of the country, including refugees. However, the Syrian authorities cannot shoulder the burden of post-war reconstruction by themselves.”
2021-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8805 (2021) · source
“At the same time, it is vital that it remain Syrian-led and Syrian- owned, without external interference or artificial timelines and with neutral United Nations mediation. We are also convinced that the intra-Syrian dialogue must not become hostage to technical modalities. The Russian Federation will continue to encourage negotiations among the Syrians, both in its national capacity and together with Turkey and Iran within the framework of the Astana format. We are planning another meeting in that format in the near future. Russia is doing its utmost to promote a peaceful settlement in Syria. However, literally every aspect of that is encountering opposition.”
2021-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8805 (2021) · source
“That seriously complicates the efforts to stabilize the situation in Syria and the region as a whole. For our part, we are convinced that the Syrian conflict does not have a military solution and can be resolved only by promoting a sustainable political process on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015), with the support of the United Nations. Respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the country remains essential. On the political track, we support the efforts of Geir Pedersen. We believe that it is important to convene a sixth session of the Constitutional Committee in Geneva. We call on all parties to engage constructively in order to enhance the productivity of the intra-Syrian dialogue. The dialogue is not easy, but it is important to support the process in every way possible.”
2021-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8805 (2021) · source
“The areas not under the control of the Syrian Government remain zones of instability. They are controlled by terrorists from Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham — we are speaking here about Idlib and the regions of the north-east. We are concerned about reports of continued clashes in the Euphrates region in the north of Syria. The fact that the issue of restoring the full sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic remains unresolved and that the related security challenges persist is exploited by terrorists from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. No less of a threat to the stability and security both inside Syria and in the region as a whole are the artificially concocted projects to divide the country along ethnic and religious lines. We also condemn the increasing number of air strikes conducted by Israel against Syrian territory.”
2021-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8805 (2021) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to Mr. Geir Pedersen, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, and Ms. Abeer Hussain for their briefings. In spite of the overall stabilization of the military and political situation, the situation remains tense in Syria. Indeed, 60 per cent of the population is facing the real threat of hunger. The socioeconomic and humanitarian situation in the country has deteriorated, first and foremost due to the illegal economic restrictions imposed by the West, in contravention of Security Council resolutions and in spite of the appeals of the Secretary-General to ease the pressure of sanctions at the height of the pandemic. We consider this a continuing attempt to oust the legitimate authorities of the country through economic suffocation.”
2021-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8805 (2021) · source
“I will perhaps forfeit the second question, but I will give a small clarification of the first one. The question was also how CARE’s assistance technically moves into Idlib and who its partners are on the ground there in Idlib where it delivers its assistance.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“While we are waiting, I will perhaps repeat the questions that Mr. Rajasingham missed. The second and third questions were: In his opinion, what is needed to unblock cross-line deliveries to Idlib, and how should that process be done so that such aid is delivered cross-line? Where are the problems? Why could the United Nations monitoring mission not be located in Government territory to monitor the convoys that are going to Idlib?”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“How can one guarantee that humanitarian assistance goes to the end-users? How does that happen specifically? Who are her partners on the ground? Secondly, armed groups in Idlib signed, under the aegis of OCHA, a so-called declaration of commitment of compliance with international humanitarian law and humanitarian assistance. What does she, as a direct beneficiary of that declaration, know about that document, and how has the working situation on the ground changed since it was signed? Thirdly, in her view, how are cross-line deliveries worse than cross-border mechanisms, given that deliveries from Damascus would be better controlled? What exactly is preventing her non-governmental organization, whose primary goal is just to help people in need, from actively advocating for cross-line deliveries?”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“How can the United Nations organize that process, and what problems are being encountered? Thirdly, why cannot the United Nations Monitoring Mission be relocated to Government-controlled territory and why cannot humanitarian convoys access Idlib on inter-Syrian routes? Fourthly, the Al-Qaida Taliban Monitoring Team reported that this area is being used by Hayat Tahrir Al-Shams for money-laundering. Their montly income across the Bab Al-Hawa is about $4 million. In addition, they receive a large amount of money as proceeds from all cross-border activities and trade within the enclave itself, which is completely under their control. Obviously, Hayat Tahrir Al-Shams is also actively engaged in United Nations humanitarian operations. I would like to hear his comments on that as well. I will now pose some questions to Ms. Ibrahim.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“According to the report of the Secretary-General, the situation of food insecurity is getting worse every month. As we understand it, the amount of deliveries through the World Food Programme is at about 80 per cent. There has been no fighting in Idlib for a long time now. We are hearing from different sources that the so-called local administration supposedly enjoys the respect not only of some donor countries, but also of humanitarian agencies on the ground. There is no new influx of internally displaced persons into this enclave. On the contrary, people are still trying in vain to leave. What is happening with food security there? Secondly, as an experienced and high-ranking humanitarian worker, could he inform us what needs to be done to unlock cross-line deliveries in Idlib?”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“With regard to the closing of the Al-Yarubiyah crossing, if the will is there, all of those questions can be overcome. Until our colleagues have demonstrated with their words and actions that they are committed to that task, discussion of extending the transborder mechanism has little meaning. There is still time before the deadline. I hope we will not waste that time. I would like to pose some questions to our briefers. I hope that they will be able to respond to them at this meeting. First, I would like to pose some questions to Mr. Rajasingham. According to United Nations data, every year about $300 million is provided across the cross-border mechanism. Why is that massive sum suddenly barely enough to provide vital goods and services to people. Why is the situation in Idlib in terms of food insecurity?”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“The situation in Al-Hol camp threatens to spiral out of control. According to information we have received, the residents are being actively radicalized. A worrisome picture is also being painted in the Al-Tanf region. I recall once again that the responsibility for what is happening there lies with the occupying Powers. There is a solution to the serious humanitarian situation in Syria, and it does not lie with the extension of the cross- border mechanism. The argument that humanitarian workers find it easier to work within its framework does not convince us. We are convinced that respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria, which we are always defending in words, should be complied with — not only with words but with actions.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“That is simple logic, which at the end of the day will lead to a reduced burden on donors. At the same time, sponsoring projects in Idlib, the majority of which are misappropriated by international terrorists, is something that co-sponsors are ready to do. Only such a distorted reality can lead to the creation of the draft document on the cross-border mechanism that our colleagues will clearly present to us soon. We cannot ignore the man-made environmental catastrophe in the north-east of Syria. The fight against its consequences, much like the efforts on the ground to provide medical assistance to the people, is a long- term priority and requires funding. I would also like to note that we are increasingly concerned about what is happening beyond the Euphrates River and the ongoing attempts aimed at violent demographic engineering.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“We believe that our colleagues from the European Union also should think about the ineffective humanitarian exemptions and take the necessary measures. Our Western colleagues continue to demonstratively ignore the task of rebuilding the country’s infrastructure. Today my French colleague said that more than half of the citizens in Syria are experiencing food insecurity. Did he ask why? Is that because of a lack of humanitarian access, or because of the destroyed infrastructure in the country following its destruction by a war against terrorism and because of the sanctions imposed against a sovereign State? With regard to rebuilding the infrastructure, I understand what he is talking about, my dear friend. Rebuilding infrastructure is a requirement for the return of refugees, and therefore for the relaunching of the economy.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“Separately, I would like to underscore the know- how of our American colleagues — the so-called Caesar Act, without the removal of which any attempts to loosen sanction regimes will be ineffective and will continue to hinder the independent development of Syria. We have taken note of the attempts by Washington to reduce sanctions pressure. I mean the United States Department of the Treasury’s General License 21 of 17 June, which sets forth a broadening of American humanitarian exemptions for Syria in order to simply the delivery of goods and services in the country to fight the pandemic. Only time will tell if that will be effective, because the humanitarian exemptions, which are effective only on paper, already existed.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“We need only think of the unlawful unilateral sanctions imposed in circumvention of the Security Council, which place a heavy burden on every citizen of the country. They talk about humanitarian assistance while pretending that the problem of Syria being overwhelmed by sanctions does not exist. For example, in April and May United Nations agencies were not able to complete a number of planned and approved missions because of a lack of fuel. Why was that the case? That was the result of the sanctions that had been imposed. It took a year for the voices of international non-governmental organizations to be heard and the problem of sanctions to finally be reflected in the reports of the Secretary-General. We call on OCHA to not shy away from that topic and to continue to keep the Security Council informed about this matter.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“We believe that it is the duty of all Security Council members to make efforts to restore the territorial integrity of Syria and strengthen its sovereignty, improve its socioeconomic situation and comply with the principles for the provision of humanitarian assistance, which have been complied with everywhere in all humanitarian operations except the one in Syria. Cross-line assistance is not merely a part of the situation, as our American colleagues said today, it is the only legitimate way of delivering humanitarian assistance in any operation. Over the past year, our opponents have been moving in the opposite direction and are doing everything they can to worsen the problems faced by Syrians in the Government-controlled territories.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“Moreover, we are witnessing consistent attempts by a number of States to paint a picture of Hayat Tahrir Al-Shams as a moderate political force that governs the enclave effectively and impartially, in contrast to the infamous so-called Al-Assad regime. We have not heard a single word from our colleagues in the Security Council. It appears that the status quo suits them, as they do not appear embarrassed by the blatant misappropriation of the United Nations humanitarian assistance, for which their taxpayers are paying tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. It is difficult to see that as anything but criminal hypocrisy. By suggesting that we should not only keep the Bab Al-Hawa crossing point but also open new ones, our Western colleagues have reached new levels of cynicism. We will not accept such methods.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“Those wishing to leave that hotbed of instability are not allowed to enter Government territories, and exceptions are not even being made to allow schoolchildren to take their exams. We can only guess at the morals imposed by the interim rulers of Idlib. Just recently, the so-called University of Idlib showed its true colours by banning male and female students from belonging to the same groups on social networks and messaging services used by students to communicate on academic matters. Moreover, Idlib has seen an increase in child marriages and under-age marriages. Nonetheless, those and other egregious facts are being overlooked by women’s and children’s advocates in the Security Council.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“The effectiveness of humanitarian operations should be evaluated not by the number of convoys or the volume of deliveries — we are not dealing with one-off actions, as was previously the case — but by the ability of humanitarian personnel to be constantly present where needed. We cannot consider the issue of the extension of the cross-border mechanism in isolation from the situation in Idlib. The enclave has long been a safe haven for terrorists in Syria. In addition to the spread of unvanquished fighters from Hayat Tahrir Al-Shams and Huras Al-Din, the north-west has been receiving new jihadists fleeing from Al-Hol and elsewhere. The terrorists radicalizing Idlib are using ordinary Syrians as human shields, establishing total control over the population.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“However, reports over the same periods confirm that the number of recipients of aid from within Syria remains at the same level — approximately 3.5 million people. Unfortunately, no one at the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has taken the trouble to analyse the situation. Had they done so, the reports would have shown that the effectiveness of United Nations humanitarian operations is actually increasing. There are fewer requests for operations for the same level of assistance. According to United Nations personnel working on the ground, there are no complaints against the Syrian authorities. The issue is now a different one and the realities have long changed.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“As for the accusations against the Syrians regarding their alleged obstruction of the work of the United Nations on Government-controlled territory, including in the context of the alleged non-issuance of permits for humanitarian operations, we are dealing with a trivial manipulation of the facts. The three latest reports of the Secretary-General (S/2021/160, S/2021/390 and S/2021/583) track both the number of permits issued and the coverage of the recipients of humanitarian aid. In particular, they highlight the trend that Syrians have issued fewer and fewer United Nations humanitarian assistance authorizations with each reporting period: 257 from December 2020 to January 2021, 167 from February to March 2021 and 93 from April to May 2021.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“The United Nations is simply not capable of reliably distributing those goods. Why is it that, for seven years now, we have been asked to take the word of unnamed non-governmental organizations, many of which make no secret of their affiliation with Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham fighters? Why is it that, on the basis of their more than questionable reports, we have come to the conclusion that there is no alternative to the cross-border mechanism? I would like to hear just one reason to justify that, given that no effort whatsoever has been made to deploy supplies across the contact lines.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“In other words, United Nations channels are being openly used for dubious schemes for the benefit of terrorists in Idlib. Is that really what the Council considers to be the optimal way to provide humanitarian assistance? All resolutions related to the delivery of cross- border assistance request that the Secretary-General include in his reports detailed information on the humanitarian assistance delivered through United Nations humanitarian cross-border operations, including on the number of beneficiaries, the locations of aid deliveries at the district level and the volume and nature of items delivered. Yet nothing has been done to improve the transparency of cargo flows in the seven years that the cross-border mechanism has been in operation. The reason for that is clear: there is no United Nations presence in Idlib.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“If we are talking about how to make the delivery of supplies to Idlib more efficient, then we have only to look at the map — the logistics from Aleppo are much easier. It is not a matter only of logistics but also of oversight of the aid being sent. The United Nations Monitoring Mechanism has received much praise, given that in its absence the enclave would apparently be flooded with unmonitored deliveries. At the same time, there has been silence about the fact that the levels of smuggling and United Nations humanitarian aid deliveries through the cross-border mechanism have long been equivalent. Mr. Lowcock himself recently admitted that the volume of United Nations supplies through the Bab Al-Hawa crossing did not exceed 50 per cent.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“To compensate for the closure of Al-Yarubiyah, we have had to increase humanitarian assistance in the north-east. As I mentioned, that has been acknowledged by United Nations personnel themselves. In that regard, I have heard on many occasions that assistance in the north-east following the closure of Al-Yarubiyah is in fact in a worse state than when the crossing was still open. It has been reported that the World Food Programme has already reached an agreement with Damascus and is seeking approval from other parties to bring food into Syria through its warehouse in Sarmada, in the de-escalation zone in the north-west. Where is the unwillingness to cooperate on Syria’s part?”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“Has anyone asked the country on whose territory humanitarian assistance is being provided what it thinks about the cross-border mechanism? Do the words spoken here today about our commitment to Syria’s sovereignty mean nothing? It is ridiculous to say that deliveries across the contact lines are ineffective or impossible. United Nations representatives in Syria clearly acknowledge that a well-managed mechanism for the cross-line delivery of aid, following the closure of the Al-Yarubiyah crossing point, has allowed them to achieve better results beyond the Euphrates River than through the cross-border mechanism. The coverage of humanitarian needs in the north-east has increased from 35 per cent to 45 per cent, and there is every possibility to further build up operations.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“Rajasingham said that cross-line deliveries were a vital addition to cross- border assistance — and therefore complementary to, but not a replacement for, the cross-border mechanism. It is strange to hear such a statement by a high-ranking representative of the United Nations, namely, the Acting Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, who is clearly familiar with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 46/182, on humanitarian assistance. We were equally surprised to hear the Secretary- General say in his opening remarks that cross-line delivery will never be able to replace the cross- border mechanism in its current capacity. How are we supposed to interpret that? Does that mean that the mechanism will remain the same? I cannot interpret it any other way. There is one more question I would like to ask.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“However, even the United Nations-Syrian Arab Red Crescent- International Committee of the Red Cross convoy that received clearance from Damascus in April last year never got under way. No Council member has acted to make that happen. Over the past year, thanks to the goodwill of the parties, there has been plenty of time and opportunity to achieve a painless and constructive solution and find the optimal formula for supplying Idlib via both the Bab Al-Hawa crossing and intra-Syrian channels. Yet not a single attempt has been made in that regard, and all that we have heard is that the cross-border mechanism would have to be extended. That is not a constructive approach. I was surprised by some of the remarks made by today’s briefers. For example, Mr.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“However, our Western partners are acting as if nothing has changed. They insist on disregarding the fact that it is possible and sometimes even easier to provide assistance to the remaining refugees from within Syria. Last year, when the Council adopted resolution 2533 (2020), we agreed to preserve the cross-border mechanism until 10 July, having clearly indicated the importance of developing sustainable cross-line humanitarian deliveries to Idlib. We stated that the future of the cross-border mechanism would depend on whether or not opportunities would be used to provide deliveries from within Syria. While we acknowledge that it is not easy to agree on such deliveries, we relied on the goodwill of our colleagues.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“Back in 2014, when the Security Council adopted resolution 2165 (2014), which opened four Syrian border crossings to ensure United Nations humanitarian assistance, Russia agreed to that plan — even though it violated Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity — for only one reason. The Syrian Arab Republic was being torn apart by terrorists and Syrian statehood itself was under threat. At the time, refugees and internally displaced persons were in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. Since then, with the support of Russian air forces who arrived in Syria at the request of its legitimate Government, Damascus has pushed back the terrorists, liberated nearly 90 per cent its territory and made great efforts to improve the life of the Syrian people. In such conditions, the cross-border mechanism is an anachronism.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“First, we thank Secretary-General Guterres for his introductory remarks. We also thank Mr. Ramesh Rajasingham and Ms. Sherine Ibrahim for their briefings. The distressing remarks made by colleagues in the Council today paint a black-and-white picture of Syria’s humanitarian landscape. Western countries present themselves as forces for good in the dispute on the future of the cross-border mechanism for humanitarian assistance in Syria, as they continually express their concern about the people, in particular the children, of Idlib. At the same time, Russia and Syria are presented as evil incarnate, indifferent to the suffering of the most deprived and ready to cut off the last supply route for meeting their basic needs. But is that true? Let us be frank.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I would like to make it clear that I will be unable to facilitate the President’s request. In any event, it is more a recommendation than a request, according to note S/2017/507 by the President of the Security Council, to speak for no longer than five minutes when taking the floor in the Security Council. There are at least three reasons for that. First and foremost, it is a mere recommendation. Secondly, we believe that discussion on today’s issue should not be limited with a stopwatch. We also believe that many delegations would like to hear what we have to say today. Thirdly, we also have questions for both briefers and look forward to hearing responses to them. I promise not to disappoint. What we have to say will be interesting.”
2021-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8803 (2021) · source
“We thank the Director-General wholeheartedly for being with us today. But I think that my list is incomplete, and we will use the opportunity to provide the Director-General with more comments on what we heard today from him.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“And by the way, I am not the only person who doubts the conclusions of the reports that the Technical Secretariat produces on the incidents. There are other authoritative people in the world and countries that challenge it, but the Director-General prefers not to notice. If he is not prepared to engage through the Scientific Advisory Board, as he said, we propose that we organize an Arria Formula meeting to which we would invite all those who have doubts about the conclusions that the OPCW reached and we would be happy to invite the Director-General there to defend the position of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, if it is challenged, and to provide facts that will make it clear that he was right and they were wrong. Again, as I said, this is just a fraction of what we could have said in response to the Director- General’s comments.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“Apparently, the factual material contained in the report does not allow us to draw a conclusion as to the use of a toxic chemical as a weapon. On that basis, the Russian Federation insists on the version that there was false evidence and on the staged character of the incident in Douma.” I think that quotation gives Mr. Arias a true account of what the Russian Federation meant when it sent that communication. By the way, that corroborates the conclusions that those “pariah inspectors”, who the Director-General claims violated the norms, rules and ethics of the OPCW, set down in their interim report. The Director-General says that he will not engage in a dialogue with some of the Scientific Advisory Board.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“The Director- General choose to quote one phrase of the conclusions that were provided. With the permission of the Council, I will quote the whole part of the conclusions. “The Russian Federation does not challenge the findings contained in the FFM report regarding the possible presence of molecular chlorine on the cylinders. However, the parameters, characteristics and exterior of the cylinders, as well as the data obtained from the locations of those incidents, are not consistent with the argument that they were dropped from an aircraft. The existing facts more likely indicate that there is a high probability that both cylinders were placed at locations 2 and 4 manually, rather than dropped from an aircraft.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“But before they were prevented from going to Douma at the right time, on 10 April, our Western partners rejected our draft Security Council resolution, providing for unimpeded access for chemical expert members of the mission to any location where an alleged accident chemical accident took place. That draft resolution was blocked. On 12 April, these experts were in Damascus waiting to go to Douma, but they were prevented from doing so from Headquarters by the three well-known permanent members of the Security Council, citing security reasons, before the strikes of 14 April took place. The Director-General today quoted the Russian communication to the OPCW Technical Secretariat under the note verbale. This is a seven-page document with a detailed technical analysis by our experts of the incidents in Douma and their findings.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“But I was surprised, personally, when the Director-General referred to the Pinheiro Commission — the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic — as an ultimate authority on gathering evidence and testimony on alleged chemical weapons use in Syria. I wonder where the Commission draws its expertise and authority from to issue judgments on this if we doubt or challenge the outcomes and the conclusions of the body that is designed to deal with this issue, namely, the OPCW Technical Secretariat. Mr. Arias referred to how the inspectors went to Douma. I want to remind everybody, just for the sake of reminding, about a document that we distributed in the Security Council, on 25 May, recalling how, in fact, inspectors went to Douma and how they were prevented from doing so.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“Thirty-one samples were analysed, which is 70 per cent of all the samples that were analysed. Five wood samples were analysed. That is 100 per cent of the wood samples. Eleven biological samples were analysed during that period, which is 100 per cent. So there is a clear gap, an inconsistency and discrepancy in what the Director- General was telling us today. Allow me to finish. I was frankly surprised when the Director-General said that he was surprised to see that Syria was not cooperating with the Investigation and Identification Team. That is not surprising at all. Syria has never recognized the legitimacy of the group. Neither have we. That group was established illegitimately, and Syria cannot be expected to cooperate with it. I think that Syria made that very clear from the very beginning.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source
“He was among us at the Arria Formula meeting that we organized in January, as well as some time later in April. I do not think that any of the Council members who listened to him — and he was very reserved in his comments — doubt his integrity, the facts that he provided or the information that he provided about himself and his role at the OPCW. Many questions remain unanswered. The Director- General spoke a lot today. We reserve the right to deliberately and meticulously answer or comment on all those issues mentioned today. I will refer to only a few things. The Director-General said that the bulk of the investigations came after the inspectors left and that it was done when the final report was prepared. That contradicts the facts, which say that the interim report was produced first, from 3 to 22 May 2018.”
2021-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8785 (2021) · source