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Nebenzia

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2017-08-02
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2023-12-30
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  1. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. Tor Wennesland, Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, for his briefing on Israel’s settlement activity in the occupied Palestinian territories in the context of the twenty-seventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2334 (2016). We listened carefully to the Special Coordinator’s assessment of the continuing tensions in the West Bank against the backdrop of Israel’s increasing unilateral steps to create irreversible facts on the ground.

    2023-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9425 (2023) · source

  2. We count on the support of all those who realize that to do otherwise would mean that any country could become the victim of such an attack committed by a State drunk on the idea of its own impunity. The Security Council must send a clear message that crimes targeting cross- border pipeline infrastructure are unacceptable and that it is impossible to avoid responsibility for them. That is the only way to prevent their recurrence.

    2023-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9424 (2023) · source

  3. We would advise them not to waste their time and energy on such tactics. All such attempts are doomed to failure beforehand. Our country will continue to seek to objectively and thoroughly establish all the circumstances behind the events, with the due involvement of Russian investigative agencies and all parties concerned, and to bring to justice those who ordered and carried out that act of sabotage. We will use all means at our disposal to that end, including in the Security Council. As part of that work, my country intends to submit a draft presidential statement on this matter — the text of which will be presented in the coming days. We believe that the Security Council should speak out clearly on the terrorist attack and insist on the need for an objective investigation and punishment for those responsible.

    2023-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9424 (2023) · source

  4. At the same time, information is being force-fed to the media in order to shift responsibility to anyone other than the United States in an attempt to counter every objective fact. In such a situation, I would not even bother to use the cliché “you can draw your own conclusions”. If there are still any illusions, a year later, it is probably time to let go of them. I have no doubt that today we will once again hear from our Western colleagues that Russia is allegedly diverting the Council‘s attention from more serious problems by insisting on discussing the terrorist attack on the Nord Stream pipelines. Their tactics are simple and clear, namely, to drag things on for as long as they can, ideally for another one, two or three years and then to state the impossibility of carrying out the investigation, owing to the statute of limitations.

    2023-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9424 (2023) · source

  5. We have threats from the highest level of the United States leadership involving the operations of a cross-border, undersea gas pipeline; its subsequent bombing, which was an act of international terrorism, with dangerous consequences for international peace and security, the economy, the environment and navigation in the Baltic Sea; the transparent delight of high-ranking representatives of the American and pro-American establishment; the resistance of Western countries to the idea of launching impartial and inclusive international investigations under the auspices of the Secretary-General; and the glaring ineffectiveness of the German, Swedish and Danish national investigations.

    2023-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9424 (2023) · source

  6. In particular, we recall the letter dated 7 October 2022 from State Secretary Graichen at the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action to Bundestag Left Party member Nastić, which was made available to the public, making it clear that even before the beginning of the investigation, German authorities had received some intelligence, the disclosure of which allegedly could have harmed the national interests of Germany. I wonder what kind of information could have harmed the party, which, one would think has been the victim alongside Russia? Whatever it may be confirms yet again the fact that Western investigators are not interested in the truth, which on the contrary gets in their way. What are we left with then, one year after the terrorist attack?

    2023-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9424 (2023) · source

  7. Such candid confessions would have enabled even a novice investigator to easily solve the case. However, since Germany, Denmark and Sweden have been tasked with covering up the involvement of their big brother from across the ocean, the investigators have had their hands tied and eyes blindfolded. Therefore, as Seymour Hersh told us, following the meeting between Joe Biden and Olaf Scholz, the American and German intelligence services were instructed to come up with an alternative version of events and gradually leak it to the media. That is exactly what they are doing now, but their fabrications are extremely implausible. And leaks about the actual circumstances of the tragedy do not make it any easier for Western storytellers.

    2023-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9424 (2023) · source

  8. I recommend that all Council members familiarize themselves with his findings. We all also remember President Biden’s comment that “there will be no longer a Nord Stream 2; we will bring an end to it”, which was made at a press conference with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on 7 February 2022; the overt joy of Under-Secretary of State Victoria Nuland that the pipeline was, as she said, “a hunk of metal at the bottom of the sea”, at the 26 January Senate meeting; and the gratitude expressed to the United States for bombing the Nord Stream pipelines tweeted by former Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski. And let us not forget how some of the Western members of the Council, unable to contain their emotions, stated openly at Council meetings that the Nord Stream explosions were a response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

    2023-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9424 (2023) · source

  9. It is hard not to notice what all those versions have in common. Each denies Washington’s involvement in the commission of this crime. And they all began to sprout like mushrooms after a spring rain soon after a major investigation by American journalist and Pulitzer Prize-winner Seymour Hersh was published earlier this year, which briefers already mentioned today. That investigation provided many facts indicating that the explosive charges on the Nord Stream pipelines were placed by American divers during the NATO BALTOPS exercise in the summer of 2022. Incidentally, he published today new material supporting that version, which shows that the bombing was carefully planned over several months and demonstrates how thought was given to covering their tracks after the attack.

    2023-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9424 (2023) · source

  10. We heard that it was carried out by tourists on a sailing yacht, who, according to one version, acted practically on their own initiative, without any State support, and, according to another, acted on the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Mr. Zaluzhny, but in total secret from his immediate leader — President Zelenskyy. Even more ridiculous are reports published in some European media about Western intelligence services, including those of the United States, supposedly being aware of the Ukrainians’ plans and even attempting to dissuade the latter from implementing said plans, but with no luck. Yet when we look at the rejection of the peace treaty with Russia in March 2022, it is clear that the Kyiv authorities cannot go against the will of their Western backers on such a serious issue.

    2023-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9424 (2023) · source

  11. The authorities of the three mentioned States continue to ignore those obligations. The words of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz about his intention to see the matter through are strikingly at odds with the matter itself, given the total lack of relevant information. Moreover, there are increasing signs that instead of efforts to identify the circumstances of what occurred, we are actually observing an attempt to conceal those circumstances. A coordinated campaign to promote completely ridiculous versions of events is gaining ground in Western media. What have we not heard over the past year? We heard that Russia itself blew up a gas pipeline that was functioning in its interests.

    2023-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9424 (2023) · source

  12. I would like to remind the Council that we are not talking about some hooligan prank. We are talking about a terrorist attack that targeted international pipeline infrastructure and led to severe economic and environmental consequences for a number of States. No one denies that it was committed using an explosive device. Therefore, there is every reason to believe that it falls under the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, of 15 December 1997, to which Germany, Denmark and Sweden are party. This international legal instrument explicitly states the obligations of its parties to investigate relevant crimes, to extradite or prosecute perpetrators and to provide each other with maximum assistance in connection with investigations, prosecutions or extradition proceedings.

    2023-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9424 (2023) · source

  13. Moreover, in a clear show of disrespect for the Council, Germany, Denmark and Sweden ignored the request to speak at the 11 July Security Council meeting (see S/PV.9373), limiting themselves to circulating yet another letter. Said letter very openly acknowledged that the ongoing investigations may not lead to any results at all. I would like to ask our colleagues who so zealously support those national investigations — what is the point of holding back the collective efforts of Council members if those countries themselves have doubts about the effectiveness of the work they are undertaking? All this looks very much like an imitation of vigorous activity and an attempt to deprive Council members of access to information directly related to the maintenance of international peace and security.

    2023-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9424 (2023) · source

  14. Its text was absolutely depoliticized. It took into account all the specific comments and proposals made by Council members during informal consultations that lasted an entire month. However, the draft resolution was not accepted. Let me note that the main argument made by the colleagues who abstained on the voting was their so-called “full confidence” in the national investigations being carried out by the authorities of Germany, Denmark and Sweden. Well, another six months have elapsed, but there are still no results. And this despite the fact that concern about the lack of any kind of intelligible news for such a long time from Berlin, Copenhagen and Stockholm, has been expressed not only by Russia, China and Brazil, which called for an international investigation in March, but also by a number of other Council members.

    2023-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9424 (2023) · source

  15. In November, the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation sent requests to the competent German, Danish and Swedish authorities to provide legal assistance and form joint investigative teams. In response, we received only boilerplate non-responses. The members of the Council had the opportunity to see that with their own eyes when, in March, we distributed copies of our correspondence with the authorities of those countries (S/2023/193 and S/2023/223). Against the backdrop of that unacceptable situation, the Russian Federation submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council asking the Secretary-General to present proposals for the creation of an independent international commission to investigate the act of sabotage. Tomorrow marks exactly six months since the vote on that draft resolution (see S/PV.9295).

    2023-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9424 (2023) · source

  16. On 29 September, in their letter to the Security Council, Denmark and Sweden indicated that the Nord Streams were destroyed by explosive devices. This seems to have been the only specific conclusion we have heard in all this time. However, the German Prosecutor General’s Office began its official investigation only on 10 October. In October 2022, communiqués were sent from the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Mikhail Mishustin, to Berlin, Copenhagen and Stockholm on the need to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the incident, with the participation of representatives of the Russian authorities and the Gazprom company. There have been no responses to those letters over the past year.

    2023-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9424 (2023) · source

  17. However, to date there have been no results, despite the seven Council meetings — both open and closed — held on this topic. At the same time, more and more evidence is emerging in the expert community showing that the Nord Stream explosion is the work of Washington, which stooped to committing this outrageous crime, guided by a narrow selfish desire to consolidate its dominance in Europe, which is in dire need of Russian energy resources. Today’s sad anniversary is an excellent opportunity to briefly recall the timeline of events. Let me remind the Council of the key points. As early as 28 September, immediately after the sabotage, the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation opened a criminal case under the article relating to acts of international terrorism.

    2023-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9424 (2023) · source

  18. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Dirk Pohlmann and Jimmy Dore for their briefings, which once again demonstrated to the Security Council that the citizens of Western countries also have a great deal of questions for their Governments amid the numerous inconsistencies in the narrative promoted by Washington and its allies in connection with the bombing of the Nord Stream gas pipelines in September 2022. Exactly a year has passed since the sabotage in the Baltic Sea. Nearly the same amount of time has passed since the first Council meeting on this topic (see S/PV.9144). Over the past 12 months, we have heard a great deal about how the national investigations carried out by Germany, Denmark and Sweden are on the verge of finding the perpetrators of this crime.

    2023-09-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9424 (2023) · source

  19. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I addressed you only in your capacity as the President of the Security Council, and never as the Prime Minister of Albania. I stress once again that I am in a procedural dialogue with you, and not a substantive dialogue. Please refrain from making political assessments at the beginning of your statements to the Council.

    2023-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9421 (2023) · source

  20. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I wish to draw your attention, Mr. President, to the fact that you are today acting as President of the Security Council, not speaking in your national capacity as the representative of Albania. Your objective is to conduct a meeting as set out in the Security Council’s rules of procedure, instead of providing political assessments in your capacity as the President of the Council.

    2023-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9421 (2023) · source

  21. Osmani’s participation, which run contrary to the established Security Council and OSCE practices, reflect their fervent desire to advance one-sided rules of the game, which benefit them only, as part of the infamous rules- based order. We urge members of the Security Council to adopt a principled position on this issue and speak out against such an approach. We regret that that Albanian presidency has demonstrated blatant disregard for the procedures and practice of the Security Council, placing the common political and ideological interests of NATO above the obligations of the Council presidency, which is the guardian of the procedures and should adopt an impartial position. Unfortunately, Albania has been unable to manage that today.

    2023-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9421 (2023) · source

  22. According to the principles agreed by the OSCE Permanent Council, any statements made by the Chairperson-in-Office, the OSCE Secretary General or official representatives authorized by them must be in line with their mandates and must not depart from the consensus decisions of the OSCE. If the Albanian presidency insists on allowing Mr. Osmani to speak during today’s meeting, we believe he can voice only the consensus position of that organization. Separately, I would note that, due to the destructive approach adopted by Western delegations, the OSCE has long in no way participated in or contributed to the process of resolving the Ukrainian crisis, but has only exacerbated the situation. We believe that the attempts by Western delegations to push through Mr.

    2023-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9421 (2023) · source

  23. But that needs to happen in line with the rules of procedure and existing practice, according to which countries invited under rule 37 speak after the members of the Security Council — especially when there are both members of the Council and other representatives here represented at the level of Head of State or Government. Turning to the participation of the Foreign Minister of North Macedonia as the current Chairperson-in- Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), our bewilderment at that has nothing to do with his nationality, Mr. President. We objected to his presence in his capacity. We informed the Albanian presidency about that just yesterday. As far as we understand it, there has been no discussion in Vienna.

    2023-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9421 (2023) · source

  24. The Council President’s violation of the Council’s working methods is fraught with risks of undermining the authority of the Security Council, which they are trying to transform into a one-man show. For that, the Albanian presidency has convened an open debate in which a large group of supporters from NATO countries is present. It is clear to many, if not most, that today’s meeting will be nothing more than a spectacle. I would like to stress, for the sake of protocol and for those who are trying to distort our position, that we do not object to the participation of the Ukrainian President at this meeting.

    2023-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9421 (2023) · source

  25. In the course of the more than 75 years of the existence of the Organization, speaking at the Security Council has been seen as a privilege. The same applies to statements at the General Assembly rostrum. But during the Assembly’s recently held emergency special session, the representative of Kyiv decided to send a video postcard. At the same time, Western delegations allege that last year Volodymyr Zelenskyy was unable to leave the country due to extraordinary circumstances. Nonetheless, those “circumstances” did not prevent him from travelling to the United States to visit Washington, D.C. Yet at that time he did not deign to travel personally to the United Nations.

    2023-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9421 (2023) · source

  26. I would like to warn you, Mr. President, that if you bang the gavel now to formally implement your decision, the Albanian presidency will be tainted with an egregious precedent of violating established practice in the Security Council for the benefit of one delegation, which time and again continues to demonstrate, with support from the Western members of the Council, that rules do not apply to it and everything is permissible. From the beginning, Western members of the Council three times pushed through the participation of Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Security Council meetings via video-teleconference. That constitutes blatant disregard for the authority of this key organ. Leaders from other States find time in their schedule to personally travel to New York to speak before the members of the Council.

    2023-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9421 (2023) · source

  27. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): With pleasure, Mr. President. We do not believe the arguments that you have advanced are compelling. A number of members of the Security Council will be represented in the Chamber today at the Head of State level. You tried to explain why the Ukrainian President has been prioritized. However, that had nothing to do with the Security Council’s procedures. We could understand the logic when we discussed Somalia — the President of Somalia spoke first here (see S/PV.9356) — but he was the only President from among those present. There are indeed precedents related to other items on the Security Council’s agenda. But in those cases, a specific practice has unfolded. Such a practice is linked to the particularities of certain regions and has nothing to do with the situation in Ukraine.

    2023-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9421 (2023) · source

  28. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): You were hasty, Mr. President, in saying “it is so decided”. We have two questions. First and foremost, we wish to ask you on what basis you propose to give the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the floor before the members of the Security Council speak, many of whom are also represented at the level of Head of State or Government. The second question I wish to pose is, on what basis are you inviting the Minister for Foreign Affairs of North Macedonia to today’s meeting in his capacity as Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe?

    2023-09-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9421 (2023) · source

  29. It is obviously a partnership between Western Governments and Western corporations, which this year have profited on grain exports twice over, on both the export of Ukrainian products owned by their largest corporations and the sale of processed goods by European countries that, as they assure us, perform only a transit role — at even higher costs. The lion’s share of those exports is feed grain and corn fodder at clearly commercial prices. At the same time, concessional deliveries to the poorest countries, including through the World Food Programme, amounted to a mere 1 million tons of grain, which account for 0.2 per cent of global trade. We therefore have a rhetorical question to put forward — what is the humanitarian objective of those deliveries?

    2023-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9418 (2023) · source

  30. They are also fully aware of who it was that deprived them of bread and doomed them to destitution by occupying their lands and plundering Syrian wheat from the fertile lands beyond the Euphrates. We draw attention to the fact that, in the concept note (S/2023/631/Rev.1, annex) that the President’s delegation prepared for today’s open debate, only the Black Sea Grain Initiative was cited as a successful example of public-private partnership. It seems that that fact best proves the thesis we have long voiced about the initiative being purely commercial, and not at all humanitarian, in nature.

    2023-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9418 (2023) · source

  31. The West’s vaunted humanitarian exemptions from its sanctions packages do not work in practice, as the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council have convincingly and factually documented. As the United Nations findings show, even when economic operators deliver assistance to those in need, they must be able to demonstrate post facto that the aid was of a humanitarian nature, and if not may be subject to prosecution, including criminal prosecution. In such circumstances, it is easier for businesses to minimize their risks and refrain from being involved in such operations in the first place. It is the populations of States in need that suffer the most as a result. The people of Syria who went through the devastating earthquake know about that first-hand.

    2023-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9418 (2023) · source

  32. The Secretary- General clarified at the time that he would continue to be guided only by sanctions adopted by the Security Council. It would be interesting to know what that EU demand, which is irrelevant to the United nations as a donor, and the judicious response of the Secretary- General mean in practice. We would be remiss if we failed to once again draw the Council’s attention to the illegitimate unilateral restrictive measures imposed by the countries of the collective West and the so-called over-compliance effect on the corporate sector, which continue to have a negative impact on the work of the entire international humanitarian system, including, as we have said, on promising public-private partnership projects.

    2023-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9418 (2023) · source

  33. In that context, we welcome healthy market competition among the suppliers of humanitarian goods and services within the framework of United Nations procurement and support organizing those efforts on a non-discriminatory basis. The procedure for economic operators’ participation in international tenders should be transparent and clearly understood, and should not be influenced by third parties. That is also the responsibility of the Secretariat. We would like to remind the Council that the agreement between the United Nations and the European Union (EU) on their programme of cooperation on humanitarian aid was predicated on the condition that suppliers cannot be operators that come under EU sanctions. I am referring to the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement.

    2023-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9418 (2023) · source

  34. Joint work with private entities often leads to more effective solutions to humanitarian problems, strengthens the resource base of humanitarian operations and thereby increases the number of lives saved, which is the international community’s key task. At the same time, Governments’ consent to receive assistance must remain an absolute requirement for commercial entities’ participation in international humanitarian operations, along with strict adherence to the principles of neutrality, humanity, impartiality and independence in providing that assistance. Beyond that, with regard to public-private partnerships, we believe that the principle of having no economic or political interests or conditions in relation to recipient countries should be respected.

    2023-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9418 (2023) · source

  35. We have also continued to study the so-called proactive approach to humanitarian assistance advocated by our colleagues, as well as the possibility of coupling it with development efforts. We have seen that donors allow development projects to be part of humanitarian aid efforts in some countries but not in others. We nonetheless believe that it is justified to involve business in the form of public-private partnerships, both bilaterally and in international humanitarian activities. The private sector accounts for only $115.7 million in the provision of humanitarian funding, which is clearly inadequate. However, it is not just about raw numbers.

    2023-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9418 (2023) · source

  36. I particularly want to emphasize the situation in African States whose independent economic and agricultural development has for decades been deliberately limited by their former colonial masters and is exacerbated by neocolonial instruments that only worsen their dependence. As we understand it, against the backdrop of a truly dangerous situation in which the humanitarian needs in the world are only growing, Western donors have no alternative but to look for ways to shift the financial responsibility for the consequences of the crises they have unleashed all over the world onto others and maintain the possibility that they can continue to sponsor coups and wars for the benefit of their conglomorates and arms manufacturers, without being distracted by any incidental protests. We have repeatedly drawn the Council’s attention to that issue.

    2023-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9418 (2023) · source

  37. This year alone, the United Nations has already received $1.83 billion to provide humanitarian aid to Ukraine, which is $300 million more than the support given to the long- suffering population of Syria and $1 billion more than the aid to the ordinary people of Afghanistan, who have endured the bitter taste of the NATO and United States experiments in democratization in full. As we know, many of those people are now so desperate that they agree to sell their organs, while some are selling their children in order to find a way to feed the rest of the family. Some of our colleagues prefer not to talk about that, however.

    2023-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9418 (2023) · source

  38. As has already been mentioned, according to the most recent estimates by the Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs, more than 360 million people around the world are currently in need of some form of humanitarian assistance. In order to implement all its country-specific humanitarian appeals for the current year, the United Nations needs $55.2 billion, of which only 29 per cent, or $15.8 billion, has been received. In other words, the shortfall in donations is now almost double the entire annual amount — $20 billion — of funding requested by the humanitarian wing of the United Nations as recently as 2016. It is notable that Ukraine steadily remains the leader in attracting donor attention.

    2023-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9418 (2023) · source

  39. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I thank Ms. Cindy McCain, Executive Director of the World Food Programme, as well as Mr. Cohen and Mr. Miebach, for their briefings. We share the view that the provision of humanitarian assistance to populations in need remains one of the most important areas of the work of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Given the increase year on year in the world’s humanitarian needs, the issue of mobilizing more support, including financial support, to ensure the implementation of the relevant United Nations projects and programmes grows ever more resonant.

    2023-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9418 (2023) · source

  40. “The location of the operation depended on the organ being removed for transplantation and the amount of time necessary to maintain the viability of the harvested organ, taking into account the distance from the site of harvest to the site of transplantation. Depending on the financial status of the client — and, naturally, the clients were mostly wealthy people from Western Europe — the collected organs reached a value of more than $1 million.” I do not believe any further comments on the matter are necessary. Given the course of our discussion today, we intend to post the cited material on our information platform so that the international community may access it.

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

  41. “The main issue with the investigations in Albania and Kosovo was that the NATO leadership concealed all traces of such crimes. There were witnesses, including drivers who transported victims from Kosovo to Albanian territory and camp guards, who saw the crimes with their own eyes and were ready to testify to the investigators. But as soon as information about them became known, those witnesses disappeared. There is also evidence that the hospitals in which organ harvesting operations took place received relevant information. One of those hospitals is located in Tirana and one was even located on board a ship off the coast of Albania.

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

  42. After NATO troops arrived in Kosovo, the number of abductions increased noticeably. Events occurred in the following way. “First, victims were abducted on the territory of Kosovo and sent to places for a medical assessment of their condition. Victims were then transported to Albania to specially created camps, where organ harvesting operations awaited them. There were more than 10 such camps in Albania. “The main perpetrators of those crimes were members of the Kosovo Liberation Army, who received information from the Albanian special services. On the territory of Kosovo, NATO representatives assisted the Kosovo Liberation Army militants. Without the help of NATO representatives, the number of victims would not have been so high.

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

  43. Goran Petronijević, a lawyer and President of the non-governmental organization Center for the Restoration of International Law, said the following: “The victims [of transplantology] were mainly police officers and military personnel of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Later on, even Albanian citizens who collaborated with the Kosovo Liberation Army and civilians fell victim to such practices. Foreign investigators speak of hundreds of victims. Data on missing persons in Kosovo during the specified period confirms that the number of victims exceeded 1,000 people. That criminal activity reached a particularly intensive scale from 1998 to 2000. “During the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia from March 1998 to June 1999, the number of crimes was relatively low.

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

  44. The fact that our Western colleagues have nothing substantive to say is evidenced by the fact that there is no long line forming here from among European and other delegations to sign up for today’s meeting’s list of speakers on Ukraine — quite unlike those convened by our Western colleagues, in which we hear an endless litany of carbon-copy statements about the same things. However, I would like to now respond to the last remarks you made, Madam President, in your capacity as the representative of Albania, when, despite the facts, you tried to protect the Kosovo militants and murderers. In that regard, I wish to cite a video testimony that came to us yesterday from a former judge of the court of the city of Peć, in the Metohija region, and of the Supreme Court of Serbia. Mr.

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

  45. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): First of all, I would like to say that today we have not heard anything new in response to our specific ideas regarding the supply of Western weapons to Ukraine, which does not align at all international obligations, as you just said, Madam President. We have already spoken about the many and repeated violations of a whole range of international treaties on the arms trade that pertain to the supply of those weapons to Ukraine. I will not list them now, as we have already addressed this subject, but if necessary we can certainly address the issue again at a later date.

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

  46. We call on international non-governmental organizations and others to pay particular attention to their protection from those unscrupulous characters.

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

  47. So, indeed, without a body, there is no crime. At the same time, it is known that, even after 2000, those in Kosovo conducting organ transplants continued their criminal business in cooperation with organized criminal groups, in the Medicus clinic in Pristina. The victims of those crimes were people from Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Since the NATO countries that served as cover for that inhuman business are the same countries that have now taken Ukraine under their wing, it is obvious that not only Ukrainian citizens on the territory controlled by the Kyiv regime but also Ukrainian refugees in the European Union face a serious danger. It is first and foremost Ukrainian women and their children who ended up in Europe who are at great risk.

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

  48. A confidential contribution on that topic was also prepared on 30 October 2003 by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). In April 2004, a delegation from the ICTY and UNMIK travelled to the vicinity of Burrel in Albania, where, according to eyewitnesses, organ removal operations had taken place. The delegation visited a so-called “lunatic asylum” in the village of Ripa, where traces of illegal organ removal operations were found in one of the rooms. But in 2005, the ICTY Prosecutor’s Office destroyed all the evidence collected. Characteristically, Albania in 2008 refused Serbia’s proposal for a joint investigation and for many years has been avoiding the admission of Serbian and international experts into its territory. That makes it impossible to locate and identify the alleged burials of the KLA’s victims.

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

  49. Those people were transported to makeshift prisons in Albania, after which the prisoners were filtered out for health reasons and their kidneys and other organs were taken at transit points for further transport to Europe and sale on the black market. The so-called donors were detained near the Albanian town of Fushe-Kruje. Upon receipt of the order, they were shot in the back of the head, and the organs were taken abroad through Tirana International Airport. Those inhumane crimes were described in a book by Carla Del Ponte, former Prosecutor for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), entitled The Hunt: Me and the War Criminals, published in 2008, and in a report on KLA atrocities dated 7 January 2011 by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, authored by Swiss lawyer Dick Marty.

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source

  50. Tellingly, the bail set by the court for the criminal amounted to only 1 million hryvnia. After the bail was paid, that man accused of committing a serious crime was released, and now he is gone without a trace. Apparently, the Ukrainian Government is covering up this gruesome business. Are our former Western partners going to ring the alarm bells? I highly doubt it. In that context, it is worth recalling the crimes that were committed by the Kosovo militants, with the complicity of their Albanian accomplices and with the connivance of the occupying NATO contingents, during the aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In particular, there is documented evidence that from 1998 to 2000, the fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) kidnapped some 300 Serbs, Roma and disloyal Albanians in the province.

    2023-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9415 (2023) · source