Conor Murphy
Newry and Armagh · Sinn Féin · Northern Ireland
“More detailed consultations with individual childcare providers and parents are taking place this month and into February. The group agreed that the research would conclude in March 2025. The work is on schedule; there has been no delay. Childcare is an excellent example of various Departments coming together to deliver for our people.”
“The Bill looks at the issue of flexible working, but at every meeting that we have had with employers, we have made a point of talking to them about the need for them to be flexible, particularly in relation to women who are returning to the workforce, and to offer people arrangements that entice them back to the workforce and give them t…”
“I welcome the opportunity to speak to the motion. <BR /> <BR />Although the Department of Education leads on childcare, it is a priority for the Executive as a whole. When setting the Budget for this financial year, the Executive earmarked an additional £25 million for childcare.”
“As a matter of fact, I publicly launched the scheme and the courses in the Met last summer. My officials are also working with our six further education colleges to develop childcare microcourses for future delivery. <BR /> <BR />I also offered to assist Minister Givan's Department as required.”
“The group identified the need to better understand the business models for childcare, what type of support is needed to ensure the sector's financial viability and how support should be targeted. Given my Department's business expertise, we volunteered to take that work forward.”
“No tensions or obstacles have been placed in the way of any of that work, and I hope that that continues to be the case, because the issues are much more important than party political exchanges across the Chamber. We will continue to work in that manner.”
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“To provide expertise in the delivery of infrastructure, I am appointing John Irvine, director of major projects and procurement in the Department for Infrastructure. Sharon Smyth, commercial director in the Department of Finance, will also be appointed, as she has extensive experience in procuring a wide range of supplies and services for Departments. From the Strategic Investment Board (SIB), which is responsible for the Buy Social policy, I am appointing Brett Hannam. The people who design and manage public contracts will, therefore, be at the core of procurement policy. <BR /> <BR />It is also important that procurement policy benefits from the expertise of the sectors that tender for and deliver public contracts on behalf of the public sector. I have therefore appointed five representatives from key sectors of the economy.”
“Previously, almost 20 people attended the Procurement Board. That was too large a group, and I have reduced the membership by half. That will allow the group to meet more regularly and to drive forward reform. <BR /> <BR />Previously, the Procurement Board was staffed by permanent secretaries. As accounting officers, permanent secretaries have a significant interest and role in procurement, but I believe that the board should be made up of the experts who actually design and manage procurement exercises. I am therefore replacing the permanent secretaries with four procurement practitioners. From the health sector, I am appointing Peter Wilson, interim director of operations in the Business Services Organisation (BSO), who is responsible for procurement and logistics.”
“As with many areas of work, the restoration of the Procurement Board has been delayed by the pandemic. The procurement team in my Department has been focused on the response to COVID, and I thank the team for assisting in the procurement of essential PPE for our public services. In particular, working with the Department of Health and the Executive Office, it secured a £60 million order of PPE from China. In a competitive global market, that was a remarkable achievement for a small regional Government. <BR /> <BR />Today, I can announce the restoration of the Procurement Board, which will meet on 16 December. I would also like to update Members on how, with the agreement of the Executive, I decided to restructure the Procurement Board. I have completely changed the make-up of the board.”
“I wish to provide Members with an update on the Procurement Board. Procurement expenditure accounts for some £3 billion annually, representing one quarter of the Executive's Budget. That makes the Executive a hugely significant buyer of goods, services and construction work, and there is tremendous potential to use that spending power for good. <BR /> <BR />Procurement policy is overseen by the Procurement Board, which I chair as Finance Minister.”
“If that is what people have to offer, I am glad that we are not biting on it.”
“Of course, it is not the choice, and we have made that clear. There a requirement for records to be kept, minutes to be kept of meetings, interests to be declared and interests to be published. All of that is there. It is not a straight choice at all. The Member is going back to the premise that nothing has happened since RHI, and that is clearly not the case. <BR /> <BR />I have been struck by the past number of exchanges with his trusty sidekick Mr Wells, who has been riding wingman. The Bill has been through a Second Stage debate and a lengthy Committee Stage, during which all of the issues were talked about, and here we are, at almost 1.00 am during Consideration Stage, and there is a frantic attempt to put a sticking plaster over all of the obvious holes that have become apparent in the Bill over the course of the debate.”
“<BR /> <BR />The Bill has a series of unintended and, perhaps, from the sponsor's point of view, intended consequences that some Members who support it have not clearly thought through. Opposition to the Bill is not opposition to greater scrutiny, accountability or transparency, but it is saying that that can be done in a much better way. That is the course that the Executive and the parties to the Executive designed over the summer of 2019 and have followed through ever since.”
“<BR /> <BR />As I have said throughout the debate, I am absolutely for proper and improved scrutiny and accountability. I have invested significant work in leading the Executive's response in that regard, and my Department has invested significant work in preparing, drafting and having approved codes for spads and Ministers and on Civil Service conduct. We are about to embark on a significant review of the Civil Service here as well. All of that is intended to lead to much greater effectiveness, responsibility, accountability and transparency. That is its purpose. That is entirely proper for any democratic institution, particularly one such as this, which has gone through financial scandals and has seen scandalous practices exposed.”
“<BR /> <BR />Finally, amendment Nos 6, 17, 18 and 19 all relate to clause 10, which is a good example of unnecessary provision. The Register of Ministers' Interests and the register of special advisers' interests are already required. The latter register of special advisers was published, I think, in July this year. The guidance for Ministers requires publication of a statement of relevant interests twice yearly. The intention of that is to ensure that that is published, but, of course, each Minister is an MLA, and our interests are published in the Register of Members' Interests of all 90 MLAs, so that is clear. If there is some discrepancy between what I declare as an MLA and what I declare as a Minister, that should be a matter for public concern and investigation. Legislating for those things is superfluous and adds no value.”
“Why should any official or Minister have the threat of criminal proceedings hanging over their communication using their own telephone or using a home printer after the office has closed? Why should an official or Minister be threatened with legal action to determine whether their briefing to the press or talking to a constituent was for anyone's improper benefit? Of course, the clauses as amended set out all sorts of protections to defensible breaches, but I cannot see why the courts should have the final say on whether an official is guilty of poor practice. I cannot allow for the possibility that a junior colleague might one day be in the middle of a test case where the margins of this imprecise law are explored.”
“That is so expansive as to include any one of those issues that I mentioned. I would not support that. It is obviously ludicrous, and I have used an example of how ludicrous it could get when trying to define what lobbying is and where it is constituted. Clearly, I would not support that. The whole clause as drafted brings us into all that territory at any stage. <BR /> <BR />Amendment Nos 16 and 20 attempt to narrow down the effects of clauses 9 and 11. Those clauses, as originally drafted, would, as the Bill sponsor clearly now knows, have a devastating impact on government, but the amendments do not detract from the fact that the Bill would criminalise activity in such a way as to do serious damage to the effectiveness of government.”
“That is the point that I am getting to. Even should he remove:”
“Of course, I could expand that slightly. If somebody stopped you on the street and asked you to get six street lights fixed, you might think that that is reasonable, but that might be the thing, as the Member will know, that makes a development an adopted development or not an adopted development. Where does one draw the line? Is it one street light or two street lights? Is it one pothole or two potholes or the resurfacing of an estate that allows a contractor to get his bond back? Where does the definition end?”
“Logically, it would require a civil servant to be present and take a note wherever a Minister might happen to meet a person other than another Minister or official just in case they began to discuss official business. That might be in a constituency office or in the canteen of this Building. For all we know, it could be a chance meeting in a supermarket or after church. That issue should not be in legislation. The good practice guide is where it belongs, so officials can apply their judgement and take the context into account. <BR /> <BR />Mr Wells asked about the suggestion that Mr Allister made when I asked him about it. I was illustrating the absurdity of the idea of what constituted a lobby, and he accepted that it was an absurdity to have to record it if somebody stopped you on the street and asked you to get a street light fixed.”
“The amendment would render unlawful any record of a meeting that failed to include every decision taken, without any reference to and regardless of the relevance of that decision. The amendment would also render unlawful any minute that did not record the name of every person present. Does the secretary have to compile a list of all 500 schoolchildren who attended that meeting with the Education Minister in an assembly hall, listened to him talking about education policy and had the opportunity to question him or lobby him on education policy and how it affected their lives? How does recording that information square with the data protection consequences of the Department storing the details of 500 children for no other reason than the law says that it must? <BR /> <BR />Amendment No 14 looks equally unwieldy.”
“Specifying the contents of the minute of a meeting does not appear to be an appropriate matter for primary legislation and does not take account of the appropriate application of judgement. Amendment No 13 clarifies who is responsible for minuting ministerial meetings and what those minutes must include. To illustrate the mistake of legislating for such a matter, I pointed out that the provisions, as drafted, did not define what a "meeting" was, and a number of contributors referred to that. A meeting might include a conversation in a corridor, as Members have alluded to, or it might include a conversation with a taxi driver when you are travelling to a meeting. It might include, for instance, the Education Minister addressing an assembly hall full of students about education policy matters that affect their life.”
“I absolutely and utterly support that. That is why I have taken the lead, on behalf of the Executive, to improve these matters with the support of other Ministers, but I see no virtue or value in legislating in the way that is proposed in this Bill. Good administrative practices are better set out in guidance and codes that can be updated and adjusted as necessary. <BR /> <BR />The amendments that the Bill sponsor has tabled make significant improvements to some unfortunate drafting. Without those amendments, the Bill could have had a profoundly damaging impact on good government. However, I am still determined to oppose the clauses, even as amended, as they cut across good practice. <BR /> <BR />The Chair of the Finance Committee asked whether it was the Department's view that clause 6 was still too specific: the answer is yes.”
“As Mr O'Toole said, that is the one area of legislation where you have to be ultra careful, because you are depriving people, potentially working-class people, of their liberty. You have to be sure that what you are supporting does exactly what you want it to do. From listening to the debate, particularly that on the third group of amendments, it is clear to me that Members have different outlooks on what the Bill will achieve. <BR /> <BR />It is not that I do not see any value in enhanced scrutiny: I absolutely do. It is valuable at any time in any legislature, but, building on the experiences of RHI and the inquiry and its recommendations, it is not only valuable but essential — absolutely essential — that there is increased scrutiny, accountability and responsibility to ensure that those practices cannot happen again.”
“That law of unintended consequences is probably best summed up by his contribution because, clearly, he thinks that it will hit the people whom, he thinks, should be punished. It is a natural instinct for people to say, post RHI, "We want to see heads hanging on the gate at Stormont. We to see the people who are responsible punished." Then you bring forward a blunt instrument like this, and the people whom, Mr Carroll thinks, he is protecting, namely ordinary civil servants, are suddenly in the frame for all of that. Then, the hand-wringing would happen if someone were caught up in it who was not really the person we wanted to see caught. We have to be sure, if we are going to pass legislation that involves penalties such as imprisonment.”
“it does not specify the grade of civil servant; it could be an administrative officer (AO), the head of the service or anything in between; for them, it will be an offence punishable by jail —”
“<BR /> <BR />The law of unintended consequences was summed up best for me by Mr Carroll, who said that he harsh bits of this — the bite part of this; the bits that are going to punish people — are intended only for the elites. I have been called many things in the Assembly, but "part of the elite" is not one of them. He said that it does not affect the working classes and described the offence as being for any Minister or special adviser. However, he left out the middle bit about civil servants in amendment No 20, which he lauded in his contribution:”
“<BR /> <BR />Since getting to the meat of the debate — the latter end — we have spent a lot of time talking about the law of unintended consequences. The last number of Members, in particular, talked about that. That brings us to Mr Allister's central question: the House has to decide whether the Bill is necessary and can do what is needed to address the deficit that he sees in the approach that the Executive and the five parties that make up the Executive have agreed. The question is whether that approach is correct and appropriate or whether it is deficient and can be enhanced only by the teeth of Mr Allister's legislation.”
“I rise to finish my contribution to a long and detailed debate. Much of the time, the discussion has been framed on the premise that all of this bad behaviour, which we are all very aware of — RHI, Red Sky, NAMA and other scandals and issues that came to public attention — happened because procedures and processes were inadequate. I think that the inquiry found that the observance of some of the procedures was inadequate as well. It has been said that nothing has happened since, that all of this could happen today because nothing has happened in between times to protect against it and that, therefore, the only thing that really gives, as Mr Allister would say, the teeth or the bite — the ability to inflict punishment as a consequence of those things not being met — is legislation such as he has drafted.”
“However, can he see where this exercise on legislation takes us and the ridiculous nature of "any function" of a Minister's Department? If, for example, a Minister were asked to get a street light or pothole fixed, that Minister would now be obliged in law to report it to her Department.”
“I will let my party political colleague deal with the party political point. With regard to lobbying — as a matter of interest, I speak as a former Regional Development Minister, a post currently held by Mr O'Toole's colleague, the Minister for Infrastructure — does the Member envisage that, if Minister Mallon were walking to the shops in north Belfast and was stopped and asked to get a street light fixed, she is obliged to record that? That is the exercise of "any other function" of her Department. If she were asked to get a pothole fixed, is she obliged to do that and to record it? That is lobbying, as far as I understand it and as the Member explained it to us. The lobbying that he envisages and identifies as a flaw was exposed by RHI.”
“I said that the members of the Committee on Standards and Privileges are hand-picked. The members of the Finance Committee, the Member included — he happened to hand-pick himself — are hand-picked. He makes it seem almost disparaging that the members of the ministerial panel would be hand-picked. Of course, they have a public scrutiny role that is itself open to scrutiny through the reports, and my argument is that they will provide that in a professional way.”
“It is unclear exactly what is being proposed by the amendment. I routinely make a statement to the Assembly that sets out the changes to each Department's budget, which have been agreed by the Executive in each monitoring round. That happens well within the seven-day timescale proposed in this amendment. The amendment has the potential to increase significantly the administrative burden on Department of Finance staff without a corresponding increase in the Assembly's ability to scrutinise Executive decisions.”
“Rather than recognising the responsibility of the Assembly for reading, digesting and acting on the reports of the Civil Service Commissioners, the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Commissioner for Public Appointments, it asks the First Minister and deputy First Minister to provide the summary report: in other words, to give their filtered view to the Assembly of the reports of all those independent organisations, when the reports are readily available for Members and Committees to scrutinise as they so wish. <BR /> <BR />Amendment No 23 has been grouped with the other amendments on accountability when it might just as easily be grouped with the next set of amendments, which is concerned with matters of administration. It places into statute the administrative arrangements for Departments to brief their respective Committees.”
“The place of the Assembly in bringing procedures against a Minister under section 30 of the Northern Ireland Act would remain. In fact, that would be enhanced, because all members will be given a panel members' report on which to act. <BR /> <BR />Amendment No 21 appears to be wholly unnecessary. The Assembly already has the power to call for witnesses and documents under section 44 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. I have yet to hear a convincing reason why this new clause is necessary and what it adds to the existing statute. The Assembly has the capability to achieve its ends under section 44. <BR /> <BR />Amendment No 22 makes minor textual changes to clause 12, but it repeats the error of other provisions in this group by minimising the Assembly's scrutiny role.”
“That arrangement is unlike anything else in our neighbouring jurisdictions — reference has been made to the ongoing difficulties in the London Government — but it will rely on the independence of the panel from the heads of government. <BR /> <BR />Mr Allister, in challenging this, said that it is hand-picked. The reality is that the people on the Finance Committee are hand-picked. Members on the Committee for the Assembly Commissioner for Standards are hand-picked as well. Members on all Committees of the Assembly are hand-picked, and, of course, there is a responsibility on the members who are appointed to report publicly, and that will bring a degree of independence to them and a responsibility to ensure that their work stands up to scrutiny.”
“It is a matter for the Executive Office to establish the ministerial panel and to build on the remit that has already been established, and I look forward to it doing that as a matter of urgency. <BR /> <BR />The investigation function that has been agreed by the Executive provides for the involvement of the Assembly Commissioner for Standards as an ex officio member, if that were required. The ministerial standards panel is intended to be fast, reactive and efficient in dealing with complaints about breaches of the ministerial code of conduct. It is not clear that the Assembly Commissioner for Standards would be able to fulfil the same role, and that concern has been raised by others. The panel for the ministerial code of conduct will be obliged to report publicly.”
“Go raibh maith agat, a LeasCheann Comhairle. The amendments in the second group all seek to ensure that Ministers are more effectively accountable to the Assembly. That is a sentiment and principle that I absolutely adhere to and encourage. However, the question, as one of my colleagues asked, is whether this legislation is the way to do that or whether it makes any substantial improvement to it. The effort here is misplaced. Amendment Nos 10 and 11 make some small tweaks to clause 5, which puts the investigation of ministerial standards within the remit of the Assembly Commissioner for Standards. Stewart Dickson, who has left the Chamber, asked questions relating to that.”
“On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker, perhaps you could advise us, while the Member is teasing stuff out in his head, that Further Consideration Stage will apply only to consequential amendments that come from the Consideration Stage. It is not a point for tabling a new amendment to a Bill.”
“The Member should be aware, given that he is the sponsor of the Bill and was present during its Committee Stage, that that is no longer the case. The bands and levels of payment are set by officials in the Department of Finance; they are not set by me but by officials. To correct something that was the case in the past is not correcting something that is the case in the present.”
“Those improvements have taken place, however, and the codes are there to hold Ministers to account, rather than simply to try to get the Finance Department to get a Minister to do the right thing.”
“The standard of discipline is higher than in the Civil Service, because someone would not be summarily dismissed from the Civil Service but would go through a lengthy disciplinary process during which they would continue to be paid as they sat waiting for the outcome of the process, and the Member knows that full well. <BR /> <BR />The Minister being held to account was not the situation when former Minister Nelson McCausland was asked to account for the behaviour of his spad. Like a lot of other Members, including Mr Wells, you present today as if nothing has happened since that time, by alleging things and, quite rightly, drawing attention to issues that needed significant improvement.”
“I have listened to a lot of what the Member has said, whilst biting my tongue through most of it. First, if I regarded the Assembly as having no role in legislation, I would not be here. I would not have deigned to come to the Assembly to answer and to explain the reasons that I oppose your legislation. I am not treating the Assembly or elected Members with any contempt at all. <BR /> <BR />I will say clearly that I am not proposing to continue with that. That is a misrepresentation of the position that I outlined, because the strengthening of the ministerial codes would mean that, if a Minister were to decide not to discipline a spad, thereby refusing to be accountable and responsible for them, they would be held to account.”
“They emerged from the work of the five parties that make up the Executive and whose approach that was. That was reflected in the recommendations of the inquiry. We have consistently taken that work forward in that manner. That is why I, leading the work stream on this issue in the Executive, oppose the legislation.”
“<BR /> <BR />In conclusion, I do not believe that any of the provisions in respect of special advisers are required. Of course, there have to be rules for ensuring that special advisers are accountable and responsible but these are already set out in their terms and conditions, including in the code of conduct. The force with which some Members have insisted that these measures are necessary does not give credit to all those special advisers who work hard providing invaluable support to Ministers and fulfilling their essential roles in Departments. <BR /> <BR />As I said at the outset, we have been consistent in saying that the way to deal with the RHI inquiry was through the strengthening of codes. We have brought those to the Executive.”
“Ministers have to behave like Ministers, and permanent secretaries have to maintain the correct standards in their Departments. <BR /> <BR />Amendment No 7 and clauses 2 and 3 all attempt to cut the number of special advisers in the Executive Office. I am interested to note that, where the Bill sponsor originally tried to cut the number to four, he has now cut it to three for the First Minister and the deputy First Minister. The work expected of the special advisers in the Executive Office is significant and heavily weighted. Given the volume of work required to manage effective decision-making in a mandatory coalition, the task of special advisers here cannot be compared with the task of special advisers in the offices of the First Ministers of Wales and Scotland.”
“It was observing that, if there were rules, those ought to have been followed. I believe that the current rules are appropriate and proportionate and that they ought to be followed rather than changed, as the Bill would require. <BR /> <BR />Amendment No 5 seeks to address some unfortunate drafting of clauses 1 to 6 in the original Bill, but it still tries to apply a legislative solution in an inappropriate way. The clause aims to ensure that only special advisers are treated as special advisers and that they are not answerable to anyone other than their appointing Minister, with a couple of exceptions. If we want to ensure that special advisers are treated in accordance with their role and that no one else is given special access to Ministers and Departments, it is a matter of leadership.”
“As I said, as far as I am aware, all Ministers in the current Executive have made their appointments in the way that has been outlined and could have chosen to take other steps had they wished to do so. The Bill sponsor makes the mistake of thinking that special advisers ought to be just like other civil servants. Ministers have plenty of civil servants, and we need a special adviser. Such a process would also mean that a Minister was without an adviser for weeks after taking office as that process was conducted. I would like to correct a misapprehension. When the RHI inquiry concluded that Ministers ought to have followed the terms of the code of appointment, which, at the time, did require a selection process of this kind, the inquiry was not reaching a conclusion that the selection process was necessary.”
“To expect the Minister to go through the time-consuming path of Civil Service discipline in order to remove a special adviser is ridiculous. A special adviser cannot be moved to another post during an investigation, and the tax-paying public would not thank us if a special adviser was put on paid leave until their disciplinary process was complete. This provision undermines the implementation of the RHI inquiry recommendations. The inquiry wanted Ministers' responsibility for their special advisers to be absolutely clear. Rendering Ministers' responsibilities subject to the NICS handbook compromises that clarity. <BR /> <BR />Amendment No 4 falls into the same trap. It requires a Minister to conduct an appointments process that reflects the appointments process for civil servants.”
“To have one hand-picked political appointment is not going to undermine the effectiveness of the Civil Service, but it provides an invaluable alternative perspective and political support. I heard other Members allude to that when relating their personal experience. Claire Sugden alluded to it, albeit she had a non-political special adviser. <BR /> <BR />If one has a personally appointed special adviser, one has to be able to treat them as such. If the personal relationship breaks down — that experience that has been referenced — that appointment cannot continue. The Minister and special adviser have to part ways and do so immediately. The breakdown of the relationship between a former Enterprise, Trade and Investment Minister and his spad was a contributory factor to the RHI debacle.”
“Clause 1(3), which amendment No 2 would amend, requires a special adviser code of conduct to ensure that special advisers are subject to the discipline chapter of the NICS handbook, and the Minister cannot interfere in that disciplinary process. I am glad that the Bill's sponsor has recognised that that clause, as originally drafted, was eternally inconsistent. It would make no sense to insist that the Minister must be responsible for the conduct and discipline of a special adviser and then say that he or she cannot be involved in that discipline. The clause remains out of step with the purpose and function of a special adviser. Special advisers are our personal appointments. They are supposed to be someone whom the Minister has hand-picked, and that is quite right. A Minister is surrounded by officials whom they have no role in choosing.”
“The codes that have been developed here have been developed since RHI. They have been developed in response to it and agreed by the five parties. We have been criticised for taking away what some people said was a sham process of going through an appointments process on paper and making it clear that the appointment of the special adviser was the responsibility of the Minister alone, that they were accountable to the Minister and that the Minister would be held accountable to the Assembly. That has all changed since the period that he is referring to. The Minister is responsible to the Assembly for that appointment and, under the ministerial code, can be answerable for the activities and behaviour of their special adviser. <BR /> <BR />I lost my train of thought when responding to the Member.”
“Of course, in all other Departments, the special adviser is accountable to their Minister and to no one else. That is inherent in the relationship between the two by virtue of the fact that special advisers are appointed by their Minister. I will add that the appointment process has been the same for all special advisers to the Executive. If other parties felt that there was anything untoward or that a better standard could have been adopted, they could have chosen to go out to public appointment for their special advisers and published the details of who they interviewed. They could have chosen to advertise, but they all chose to appoint their special advisers under the arrangements that were put forward. Mr Wells, do you wish me to give way?”
“They were a significant part of the 'New Decade, New Approach' document and were subject to Executive scrutiny before and after the publication of the RHI inquiry report. The RHI inquiry recommended amendments to the codes rather than legislation. In addition, I am not convinced that the way to bring about the desired change is through this legislation. Putting administrative arrangements into primary legislation makes them difficult to adjust, and it opens up relatively minor matters to legal challenge, which benefits no one, apart from lawyers. <BR /> <BR />Clause 1(2), which would be amended by amendment No 1, would make it unlawful for a special adviser to be responsible for managing any other special advisers, except those in the Executive Office.”
“The revised code of conduct for special advisers, which the Executive published and agreed in January, already captures a significant proportion of those measures and, indeed, goes further in setting out the parameters of good practice. The revisions to the ministerial code of conduct that were agreed in March by the Executive are equally important here as they have to define the relationship between the Minister and the special adviser. <BR /> <BR />The Executive have given serious attention to the codes and guidance that cover the standards of behaviour in government. The codes and guidance were subject to extensive discussion during the talks in 2019, as I said previously.”
“In response to the RHI inquiry report, when it came out some time later, they decided to proceed with that course of action. <BR /> <BR />The Executive have not been asked to take a position on the Bill, but, as I said, they have consistently concluded that the response to the RHI inquiry and its recommendations would be through the work that they had agreed on strengthening the codes and increasing transparency. At no stage did anyone propose that legislation would be required. <BR /> <BR />The group 1 amendments aim to reform the function and behaviour of special advisers. The evidence to the RHI inquiry certainly highlighted the fact that things go wrong with special advisers.”